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Introduction
Today, ISPs1 which host information directed at their subscribers, are commonly 
conducting business in an international market, some of them even successfully make 
their services part of netizens’ daily life, such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter. In 
order to achieve commercial success on the international stage, it is necessary for hosting 
ISPs to know what legal risks they face, in other words their freedom to operate. 
One of the legal risks originates from the dual use of hosting ISPs’ services, and it is that 
their services can be used for both legal and illegal purposes. In particular, copyright 
owners always complain that their copyrighted materials are uploaded on hosting 
platforms without authorization.2 Lawsuits have taken place between copyright owners 
and hosting ISPs worldwide. Th ese lawsuits focus on dealing with whether hosting ISPs 
should be responsible for copyright infringement on their platforms and what kind 
of responsibilities should be imposed on them. Hence, in the context of copyright 
enforcement, the question of how much freedom to operate do hosting ISPs have is 
mainly dependent on the ambit of their responsibilities for copyright infringement. 
Because copyright responsibility rules play a key role in regulating the freedom 
to operate of hosting ISPs, hosting ISPs may face the following two obstacles when 
conducting business on an international stage. First, hosting ISPs are obligated to 
undertake too many responsibilities against copyright infringement on their platforms, 
which unjustifi ably shift the burden of enforcement from copyright owners to them. 
Th e unreasonable burden of enforcement may even stifl e the freedom to operate of 
hosting ISPs. Second, in diﬀ erent jurisdictions hosting ISPs may be subject to diﬀ erent 
rules that regulate their responsibilities for copyright infringement, which exposes them 
to legal uncertainty when expanding their business in the international market. 
Th is is the starting point of this research, which analyzes the importance of copyright 
responsibility rules in regulating the freedom to operate of hosting ISPs, and the legal 
obstacles faced by hosting ISPs when conducting business internationally. In order 
to remove these legal obstacles rooted in copyright responsibility rules, this research 
1  ISP is the abbreviation of Internet service provider. According to the defi nition in the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (thereafter DMCA), an Internet service provider “means a provider of online services or network access, or the 
operator of facilities therefor.” See DMCA Sec. 512 (k)(B). In the light of the defi nition in E-commerce Directive, 
an Internet service provider means “ any natural or legal person providing an information society service”. See 
Council E-commerce Directive of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular 
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market [2000] OJ L 178/1 (thereafter E-commerce Directive), Art. 2. 
Regarding “information society service,” it means any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, 
by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services. See Council Directive 98/48/EC of 20 
July 1998 on amending Directive 98/34/EC laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the fi eld 
of technical standards and regulations, Art. 1(2). Th erefore, ISP is a broad concept which covers a wide range of 
natural and legal persons who provide services on the Internet at the request of the recipients of their services.
2  For example, Viacom claimed that more than 150, 000 clips of its copyrighted materials were available on YouTube 
without authorization, and these clips had been viewed “an astounding 1.5 billion times,” so it demanded 1 billion 
US dollars in damages. See YouTube law  ght ‘threatens net’, BBC(2008), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
technology/7420955.stm. See also Viacom International, INC. v. YouTube, INC., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010), Viacom International, INC. v. YouTube, INC., 676 F.3d 19 (2nd Cir. 2012).
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discusses the copyright responsibilities imposed on hosting ISPs in diﬀ erent jurisdictions 
(US, EU and China), and then examines how the responsibilities rules aﬀ ect the freedom 
to operate of hosting ISP in these jurisdictions. Eventually, based on this examination, 
this research proposes how to regulate hosting ISPs’ copyright responsibilities from 
the perspective of preserving maximum freedom for them to operate. Th e aim of this 
book is therefore to contribute to establishing the freedom to operate of hosting ISPs 
through examining and tailoring the rules of their copyright responsibilities in the US, 
EU and China. By doing so, it is submitted that hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate can 
be maximized in the context of online copyright enforcement so that they can face less 
legal uncertainty when conducting business internationally.
To introduce the specifi c research questions, this chapter fi rst explores the background 
of preserving the freedom to operate of hosting ISPs in the context of copyright 
enforcement (1.1). After this exploration, it presents the defi nition of the problem (1.2), 
and explains the methodologies and the outline of the book (1.3).
1.1 Background 
In the early days of hosting services, because of the limited available bandwidth, only text 
materials could be posted on hosting platforms, such as Usenet newsgroups. However, 
with the development of Internet technologies, larger sized documents, including 
images, music, software and even high-resolution movies, can now be posted on hosting 
ISPs’ platforms, and this has aroused the concern of copyright owners. Regarding these 
uploaded contents, some are posted by Internet users without authorization, which may 
constitute copyright infringement. In such cases, the Internet users who post infringing 
materials should in principle be held liable. However, because of the anonymization on 
the Internet, it is in fact impossible for copyright owners to identify these Internet users 
who commit copyright infringement and then ask them to assume liability. Further, it 
is also much less cost-eﬀ ective to target Internet users, since illegal use occurs in high 
volume while the return from suing Internet users is really low.3 Th erefore, copyright 
owners turn to hosting ISPs, who act as intermediaries and facilitators of distributing 
infringing materials, and claim that hosting ISPs should be responsible for infringement 
committed by their subscribers. 
In the US, EU and China, lawsuits between copyright owners and hosting ISPs have 
been occurring on a large scale. In the US, a large number of hosting ISPs, including 
for example Netcom,4  Veoh,5  Rapidshare,6  YouTube,7 have been sued by copyright 
3  Lemley MA. and Reese RA, ‘Reducing digital copyright infringement without restricting innovation’ (2004) 56 
Stanford Law Review 1345 at 1349. 
4 Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-line Communications Services, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
5 Io Group, Inc v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 Supp.2d 1132 (C.D.Cal. 2008).
6 Perfect 10, Inc. v. RapidShare, No. 09-CV-2596 H (S.D. Cal., 2010).
7 Viacom International, INC. v. YouTube, INC., 676 F.3d 19 (2nd Cir. 2012).
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owners for the infringement on their platforms since the fi rst of such cases occurred in 
1993 where Frena was sued by Playboy as its copyrighted pictures were illegally posted 
on Frena’s BBS8. In the EU, hosting ISPs, such as YouTube, Myspace, Dailymotion, 
Rapidshare, have also faced many lawsuits against them based on copyright infringement 
claims.9 In China, hosting ISPs faced a vast number of lawsuits launched by copyright 
owners, and for example, in January and February of 2009 alone, the Beijing Haidian 
District Court received more than 70 indictments requesting video-sharing websites to 
be liable for videos illegally posted by the subscribers.10 Such a large amount of lawsuits 
against hosting ISPs poses a big threat to their freedom to operate. 
So far, the legislators in the US, EU and China have commonly adopted “safe harbor” 
provisions that exempt hosting ISPs from monetary liability under certain conditions,11 which 
can help to ensure the freedom to operate of hosting ISPs. Th is section gives an overview 
of preserving the freedom to operate of hosting ISPs in the context of online copyright 
enforcement. It fi rst looks back to “safe harbor” provisions, and explores the reasons to grant 
hosting ISPs liability privileges so as to ensure their freedom to operate (Section 1.1.1). Th en, 
it explores the factors that justify the restriction of hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate in the 
light of “safe harbor” provisions (Section 1.1.2). Finally, it presents an overview of the rules 
that regulate hosting ISPs’ responsibilities for copyright infringement, and then addresses the 
challenges they bring to hosting ISPs in operation (Section 1.1.3). 
1.1.1 Liability Privileges to Ensure the Freedom to Operate of Hosting ISPs
On the Internet, as copyright infringement is running rampant, for the sake of protecting 
copyright, ISPs, as gatekeepers on the Internet, may be ideally placed to take charge of 
copyright enforcement.12 However, “safe harbor” provisions still grant ISPs liability privileges, 
which helps to ensuring the freedom to operate. ISPs’ freedom to operate can be justifi ed, 
because it contributes to promoting several social interests, which will be explored below.
8  Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Frena , 839 F.Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993). BBS is the abbreviation for a bulletin board 
system. It is a computer server running custom software that allows users to connect to the system using a terminal 
program. Once logged in, the user can perform functions such as uploading and downloading software and data, 
reading news and bulletins, and exchanging messages with other users through email, public message boards, and 
sometimes via direct chatting. See Bulletin board system, Wikipedia, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Bulletin_board_system (last visited 09-02-2014).
9 Th ese cases will be discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
10  Wang HC (王宏丞) and Cao LP (曹丽萍) and Li DT (李东涛), ‘Study on the Key Points in the Cases of 
Infringement on Video-sharing Websites (论视频分享网站侵权案件中的焦点问题)’ (2009) 4 Electronic 
Intellectual Property (电子知识产权) 11 at 12.
11  See DMCA (n1), Sec. 512; E-commerce Directive (n1), Section 4; Internet Regulation (信息条例) (n1), Art. 14-
17, Art. 20-25.
12  See Ginsburg JC, ‘Putting Cars on the” Information Superhighway”: Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in 
Cyberspace’ (1995) 95 Columbia Law Review 1466; Lichtman D and Landes W, ‘Indirect liability for copyright 
infringement: an economic perspective’ (2003) 16 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 395; Carmichael J, 
‘In Support of the White Paper: Why Online Service Providers Should Not Receive Immunity from Traditional 
Notions of Vicarious and Contributory Liability for Copyright Infringement’ (1995) 16 Loyola of Los Angeles 
Entertainment Law Review 759.
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Th e fi rst justifi cation is for promoting e-commerce. Th e importance of promoting 
e-commerce has been widely recognized in the documents relevant to “safe harbor” 
provisions. For example, the E-commerce Directive clearly states that “the development 
of electronic commerce within the information society oﬀ ers signifi cant employment 
opportunities in the Community, particularly in small and medium-sized enterprises, and 
will stimulate economic growth and investment in innovation by European companies, 
and can also enhance the competitiveness of European industry…”13 Even before the 
E-commerce Directive was enacted, there were already several reports published by 
the EU Commission which announced the importance of developing e-commerce. 
According to these reports, in order to facilitate e-commerce, it is necessary to clarify 
the responsibility of ISPs who transmit and store the information from third parties.14 
In fact, “safe harbor” provisions, which grant ISPs liability privileges, do help to fulfi l 
the policy aim of promoting e-commerce. According to the EU Commission, “safe 
harbor” provisions raise the legal certainty for Internet intermediaries, which reduces 
their business risks and expenses for legal consultants, and encourages the start-up in 
the Internet intermediary industry.15 Further, in the US, a House Report which was 
drafted by the Commerce Committee before enacting DMCA named e-commerce as 
the emerging digital economy.16 At the end of 1997, about 7.4 million Americans were 
employed in the sectors relevant to e-commerce.17 In addition, this report also expected 
that e-commerce would grow very quickly, and that by 2002 the value of e-commerce 
would “range from $200 billion to more than $500 billion, compared to just $2.6 
billion in 1996.”18 Since the growth of e-commerce has had a profound infl uence on a 
nation’s economy and job market, promoting e-commerce should be taken into account 
when drafting the DMCA.19 In China, to promote the development of the Internet 
industry which is an important part of e-commerce, the Internet Regulation grants 
ISPs liability exemptions on certain conditions by referring to the DMCA and the 
E-commerce Directive.20 
Th e second justifi cation is to ensure the eﬃ  ciency of the Internet. In order to maintain 
the eﬃ  ciency of the Internet, Internet intermediaries including hosting ISPs can only 
process such a large amount of information automatically. Th e Internet is characterized 
by eﬃ  ciency in transmitting information, and information can be distributed on vast 
13 E-commerce Directive (n1), Recital 2.
14  See IP/97/313, Electronic Commerce: Commission Presents Framework for Future Action, 16 April 1997. 
IP/98/999, Electronic Commerce: Commission Proposes Legal Framework, 18 November 1998.
15  Nielson  CK, Jervelund C, Pedersen KG, Rytz B, Hansen ES, Ramskov JL, ‘Study on Th e Economic Impact of the 
Electronic Commerce Directive’ (2007), European Commission, DG InternalMarket and Services Unit E2, at 17.
16 Congress, U. S., House Report 105-551 (1998), Part II (thereafter H.R. REP. 105-551(II)), at 21.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid
19 Ibid, at 22.
20  Zhang JH (张建华),  e Interpretation of Regulation on the Protection of the Right to Internet Dissemination of 
Information (信息网络传播权保护条例释义)  (China Legal Publishing House (中国法制出版社) 2006), at 85.
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scales at unprecedented speeds on the Internet. Internet intermediaries substantially 
contribute to the aforesaid eﬃ  ciency, since they process hundreds of millions of data 
transmissions each day, and host or link to tens of billions of items of third party 
content.21 Taking YouTube as an example, in 2015, more than 100 hours of videos were 
uploaded to it every minute.22 In this regard, hosting ISPs are diﬀ erent from traditional 
publishers, because the latter need to choose, edit or even censor the content from third 
parties before distributing it. If hosting ISPs were required to undertake strict liability 
for copyright infringement as publishers do, they then would be forced to monitor the 
content uploaded by Internet users, which would unavoidably reduce the eﬃ  ciency of 
internet transmission. Further, because the Internet today has become an important 
way for the public to access information and knowledge,23 then if Internet transmission 
becomes less eﬃ  cient, it will decrease the public’s ability to access information and 
knowledge. A report conducted by the United Nations Human Rights Council has even 
argued that, if holding ISPs liable for the content transmitted or created by Internet 
users, freedom of speech would be seriously undermined, in the words of UN Human 
Rights Council: “it leads to self-protective and over-broad private censorship, often 
without transparency and due process of law.”24 
Th e third justifi cation is to foster the development of Internet technologies. As noted 
by Jennifer Bretan, if no measure is adopted to protect ISPs from crushing liability, 
ISPs cannot provide the technical backbone to support the Internet anymore.25 
Th erefore, ISPs, as the entities who develop and implement Internet technologies, 
ought to be granted liability privilege so as to guarantee their freedom to operate, 
and otherwise they would lack the motivation to develop and apply new Internet 
technologies.26 Th is argument refl ects the wisdom of liability rules that deal with 
the tension between copyright protection and dual-use technologies in the oﬄ  ine 
21  Lemley MA, ‘Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors’ (2007) 6 Journal of Telecommunications and High Technology 
Law 101, at 101.
22  Statistics, YouTube(2015), available at http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html (last visited 21-09-2015).
23  As noted by the European Court of Human Right, “In the light of its accessibility and its capacity to store and 
communicate vast amounts of information, the Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public’s access to 
news and facilitating the sharing and dissemination of information generally.” See Application nos. 3002/03 and 
23676/03 Times Newspapers Ltd (nos. 1 and 2) v. the United Kingdom [2009] EMLR 14, ECHR. 
24  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, United Nations General Assembly, A/66/290, 10 August 2011, at 12.
25  Bretan J, ‘Harboring Doubts about the Eﬃ  cacy of 512 Immunity under the DMCA’ (2003) 18 Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal 43, at 43. 
26  See generally Lemley and Reese, ‘Reducing digital copyright infringement without restricting innovation’ (n3), at 
1386-1390. In this article, the authors demonstrate that if holding facilitators liable for the copyright infringement 
committed by their users, facilitators would not develop or apply new technologies to improve their services or 
products, which would obviously restrict the technological innovation. 
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world.27 As noted by Ginsburg, in order to keep the copyright incentive meaningful, it is 
necessary to grant copyright owners suﬃ  cient control over new ways of using their works, 
but not so much as to “stifl e the spread of the new technologies of dissemination.”28 
In addition, promoting the development of technologies may generate the so-called 
“spillover” eﬀ ects believed by Mark Lemley.29 He argues that “economic evidence strongly 
suggests that those unanticipated future benefi ts, or ‘spillover’ eﬀ ects, often exceed the 
immediate value of most new technologies.”30 Th e video tape recorder technology 
discussed in the Sony case is a good example. After the Sony case, copyright owners 
later found video tape recorders could bring them a new and enormously profi table 
channel of distributing their works, and in the late 1990s, more than six millions units 
of video cassettes were rented or sold each year.31 Today, the “spillover” eﬀ ects of hosting 
technologies have already started to benefi t copyright owners, because hosting ISPs and 
copyright owners have reached many agreements which allow copyright owners to share 
the revenue of hosting ISPs.32 
27  In the early 1980s, Sony started to sell video tape recorders which could be used to record television programs, and 
fi nally, the US Supreme Court held that since the video tape recorders sold by Sony were capable of substantial 
non-infringing uses, the company was not liable for selling a product that might be used for infringing purposes. 
See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). In the UK, Amstrad Consumer 
Electronics sold blank tapes with twin cassette decks which enabled the high speed copying of a recording from one 
tape to another, and eventually, the House of Lords rejected Amstrad’s copyright liability, because the blank tapes 
enabled the recording and copying of copyrighted materials, but such recording and copying might or might not 
be unlawful. C.B.S. Songs Ltd and ors v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc [1988] 1 A.C. 1013. If the defendants 
in these two cases were held liable for copyright infringement, the technologies concerned would be banned.
28   Jane C Ginsburg, Copyright and control over new technologies of dissemination, Columbia Law Review (2001). 
1613-1614.
29  Lemley and Reese, ‘Reducing digital copyright infringement without restricting innovation’ (n3), at 1387. 
30  Ibid.
31   Liu JR, ‘Why is Betamax an Anachronism in the Digital Age?–Erosion of the Sony Doctrine and Indirect 
Copyright Liability of Internet Technologies’ (2005) 7 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 
243, at 353.
32   For instance, since 2006, YouTube has signed a series of agreements with several copyright giants, including 
Warner Music Group, CBS Corporation, Universal Music Group and Sony BMG. According to these agreements, 
copyright owners can share the advertising revenue collected not only from videos in their brand channels, but also 
from the user-generated videos that incorporate the audio and audiovisual works copyrighted by them on YouTube. 
See Warner Music Group and YouTube Announce Landmark Video Distribution and Revenue Partnership, 
Warner Music Group(2006), available at http://investors.wmg.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=182480&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=906153 (last visited 09-02-2013); CBS and Youtube Strike Strategic Content And Advertising 
Partnership, CBS Corporation (2006), available at http://www.cbscorporation.com/news-article.php?id=23 
(last visited 09-02-2013); Universal Music Group and YouTube Forge Strategic Partnership, Universal Music 
Group(2006), available at http://www.universalmusic.com/corporate/detail/393 (lasted visited 13-09-2013); 
Sony BMG Music Entertainment Sighs Content License Agreement with YouTube, Sony Music(2006), available 
at http://www.sonymusic.com/sonymusic/sony-bmg-music-entertainment-signs-content-license-agreement-
with-youtube/ (lasted visited 13-09-2013). In the EU, Dailymotion have also signed similar agreements with 
wide range of copyright owners, and in the light of these agreements, copyright owners can get as much as 70% 
of all advertising revenue created by their contents. See http://oﬃ  cial.dailymotion.com/en/ (lasted visited 15-09-
2013). In China, Youku has signed corporation agreements with Sony Pictures Entertainment, Warner Brother, 
Dreamworks, Paramount, 21st Century Fox, Disney, and other copyright owners. See YoukuTudou signed a 
5-year copyright licensing contract with Sony Picture (优酷土豆与索尼音像签订五年版权协议), it.sohu.
com(2012), available at http://it.sohu.com/20121106/n356832451.shtml (lasted visited 18-09-2013).
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1.1.2  Justiﬁ cation of Imposing Restriction on the Freedom to 
Operate of Hosting ISPs
Section 1.1.1 demonstrates that ensuring the freedom to operate of hosting ISPs can 
benefi t several social interests. Th erefore, it is reasonable for “safe harbor” provisions 
to grant hosting ISPs liability privilege so as to ensure their freedom to operate. 
Nevertheless, the liability privilege granted to hosting ISPs is not absolute. In fact, “safe 
harbor” provisions also indicate that restrictions may be imposed on the freedom to 
operate of hosting ISPs for the purpose of protecting other’s interests. In the EU, the 
liability rules of intermediaries should strike a delicate balance between the diﬀ erent 
interests concerned and promote cooperation between diﬀ erent parties so as to reduce 
the infringement on the Internet.33 Th e legislative document of DMCA also notes that 
it is necessary to balance the interests of copyright owners, online service providers and 
information users in a proper way so as to foster the development of e-commerce.34 In 
China, Internet Regulation also aims at reconciling the interests of copyright owners, 
ISPs and Internet users.35 Th erefore, copyright protection and Internet users’ interests 
may justify imposing restriction on hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate in the US, EU and 
China.
Without imposing copyright responsibilities on hosting ISPs, hosting platforms would 
be recklessly used for copyright infringement, and hosting ISPs may even promote 
the infringing use of their services for profi t. Th erefore, it is commonly accepted that 
restriction ought to be imposed on hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate for the purpose of 
protecting copyright. In light of “safe harbor” provisions, hosting ISPs can be exempted 
from copyright liability only when they comply with prescribed conditions.36 Further, 
“safe harbor” provisions merely exempt a hosting ISP who complies with prescribed 
conditions from paying monetary damages, but regarding the other kind of reliefs, such 
as injunction, “safe harbor” provisions do not immunize hosting ISPs from them.37 
Th erefore, even though “safe harbor” provisions have been adopted in the US, EU 
and China, hosting ISPs are still subject to several obligations of reinforcing copyright 
protection on their platforms.
33 IP/98/999 ‘Electronic Commerce: Commission Proposes Legal Framework’ (n14).
34 H.R. REP. 105-551(II) (n16),, at 21.
35  Legislative Aﬀ air O  ce Answered Reporters’ Questions on “Regulation on the Protection of the Right to Internet 
Dissemination of Information” (法制办就《信息网络传播权保护条例》答记者问), xinhuanet.com (新华网)
(2006), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-05/29/content_4615669.htm.
36  For instance, hosting ISPs need to comply with several requirement so as to be exempted from monetary liability. 
Further, hosting ISPs also need to fulfi ll certain obligations in notice-and-takedown procedures and identity 
disclosure mechanisms according to “safe harbor” provisions. See generally DMCA § 512, Internet Regulation, 
E-commerce Directive Section 4. Th ese duties will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.
37  See DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, (c)(1); E-commerce Directive (n1), Art. 14; Internet Regulation (网络条例) (n1), Art. 22.
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Internet users’ interests also aﬀ ect how to defi ne hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate. As 
has been demonstrated in Section 1.1.1, ensuring the freedom to operate of hosting 
ISPs contributes to promoting e-commerce, keeping the eﬃ  ciency of the Internet and 
fostering the development of Internet technologies. Th ese three benefi ts cater for Internet 
users’ interests, so in this sense, Internet users’ interests help to justify ensuring the 
freedom to operate of hosting ISPs. In addition, Internet users’ interests are concerned 
in tailoring hosting ISPs’ obligations for copyright protection, because when hosting 
ISPs fulfi ll these obligations, it may raise the concerns on Internet users’ human rights, 
including freedom of speech and privacy.38 
For example, notice-and-takedown procedures have been widely adopted so as to 
eﬃ  ciently remove infringing materials from hosting platforms.39 Nevertheless, this 
procedure not only facilitates the takedown of infringing materials but also results in 
the deletion of lawful materials, which may freeze freedom of expression.40 Further, in 
order to ensure the copyright owners’ right to sue anonymous Internet users, ISPs are 
required to disclose the Internet users’ identities under certain circumstances, which can 
be named as “identity disclosure mechanism”.41 
38  See Seltzer W, ‘Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Eﬀ ects of the DMCA on the First 
Amendment’ (2010) 24 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 171. Rantou MI, Th e growing tension between 
copyright and personal data protection on an online environment: Th e position of Internet Service Providers 
according to the European Court of Justice (2012) 3 European Journal of Law and Technology 2.
39  In the US and China, the notice-and-takedown procedure has been adopted into the “safe harbor” provisions, 
see DMCA (n1) 512 (c), (f ), (g), and Internet Regulation (信息条例) (n1), Art. 14-17. In the EU, although 
E-commerce Directive has not adopted notice-and-takedown procedure, in the member states the statutory or 
self-regulatory notice-and-takedown procedures have been widely adopted. See Commission Staﬀ  Working Paper: 
Online Services, Including E-commerce, in the Single Market, SEC (2011) 1641 fi nal, 11 January 2012, at 39-46.
40  In order to protest against the misuse of takedown notices, a website called “Chilling Eﬀ ects Clearinghouse” has 
been set up to allow the public to report the notices they receive. See https://www.chillingeﬀ ects.org/index.cgi, 
(last visited 22-08-2014). In the light of research done on the 876 notices reported to Chilling Eﬀ ects, Urban and 
Quilter noted that nearly 30% of takedown notices sent to Google were based on fl awed or highly questionable 
copyright claims. See Urban JM and Quilter L, ‘Eﬃ  cient Process or Chilling Eﬀ ects-Takedown Notices under 
Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’ (2005) 22 Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal 621, 
at 667. Another research done by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University revealed that, among 
245 takedown notices reported to Chilling eﬀ ects in 2004, 63% of the notices “either targeted material with a fair 
use/First Amendment defense or stated a weak IP claim.” See Heins M and Beckles T, Will Fair Use Survive? Free 
Expression in the Age of Copyright Control (Brennan Center For Justice 2005), at 35.
41  In the US, DMCA 512 (h) grants copyright owners the rights to apply subpoenas for the purpose of disclosing 
Internet users’ identities. In China, according to Article 13 of Internet Regulations, the administrative department 
of copyrights may, with the purpose of investigating the infringements upon the right to network dissemination 
of information, require the relevant Internet service provider to provide such materials as the names, contact 
information, and the web address of its service objects who are suspected of committing copyright infringement. 
Further, in terms of Internet Interpretation (2006), copyright owners also can request the registration information 
of Internet users from hosting ISPs for the purpose of suing the Internet users for copyright infringement. In the 
EU, there are several directives indicating that Internet users’ data can be disclosed for the purpose of protecting 
copyright, see Article 13 of General Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC), Article 15 of E-privacy 
Directive (Directive 2002/58/EC), Article 15(2) of E-commerce Directive and Article 8 of IP Enforcement 
Directive (Directive 2004/48/EC).
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Yet, the disclosure of Internet users’ identities may confl ict with their privacy.42 In 
addition, anonymity is considered to play an important role in guaranteeing freedom 
of expression, because anonymity not only allows the public to deliver freely their 
opinions about “their interests, beliefs and political ideologies without fear of reprisals 
from the state or any other powerful organization,” but also “permits others to receive 
these views.”43 Th erefore, the obligation of disclosing Internet users’ identities may also 
confl ict with freedom of speech. Besides, fi ltering technologies have been widely adopted 
by hosting ISPs so as to reduce copyright infringement on their platforms,44 which 
raises the concerns about accommodating fair use.45 Th erefore, fi ltering technologies 
may result in over-fi ltering, which negatively aﬀ ects the freedom of speech enjoyed by 
Internet users. 
1.1.3 Operating Challenges for Hosting ISPs in the US, EU and China
For a hosting ISP which is operating or planning to operate in the US, EU and China, 
it may face two challenges resulting from the copyright responsibility rules in these three 
jurisdictions. First, copyright responsibilities imposed on hosting ISPs are diverse in the 
US, EU and China, and this poses legal uncertainty in front of hosting ISPs. Second, 
responsibility rules impose unreasonable burdens on hosting ISPs in some cases.
Hosting ISPs, as facilitators of information transmission on the Internet, may assume 
secondary liability for the infringing materials posted by their subscribers. As will be 
seen in Chapter 2, rules of indirect copyright infringement in the US, EU and China 
are diverse. In the US, contributory infringement and vicarious liability have been 
42  Cohen JE, ‘Overcoming Property: Does Copyright Trump Privacy?’ (2002) 2002 Journal of Law, Technology 
& Policy 375, at 375. Katyal S, ‘Privacy vs. Piracy’ (2004) 7 Yale Journal of Law & Technology 222, at 335-
345. Edwards L, ‘Should ISPs be Compelled to Become Copyright Cops? File-Sharing, the Music Industry and 
Enforcement Online’ (2009) 19 Journal of the Society for Computers and Law 29. In these articles, the authors 
argue that copyright protection endangers privacy.
43  Williams KS, ‘On-Line anonymity, deindividuation and freedom of expression and privacy’ (2005) 110 Penn 
State Law Review 687, at 687.
44  Case law in some jurisdictions requires hosting ISPs to adopt reasonable fi ltering technologies, see BGH 15 August 
2013, No. I ZR 80/12, Han Han v. Baidu (韩寒诉百度), Beijing Haidian District Court, No. 5558 Hai Min Chu 
Zi (2012) (2012海民初字第5558号). Further, in light of self-regulation agreements, hosting ISPs also need to 
adopt fi ltering technologies, see Principles for User Generated Content Services (2007), available at http://www.
ugcprinciples.com/ (last visited 12-06-2015); self-discipline treaty on Internet audio-video program services in 
China (中国互联网视听节目服务自律公约), State Administration of Radio Film and Television (国家广电总
局)(2008), available at http://www.sarft.gov.cn/articles/2008/02/22/20080226114116260491.html (last visited 
16-06-2015). YouTube also establishes its own fi ltering system named “Content ID”, see How Content ID works, 
available at https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en (last visited 18-06-2015).
45  Sawyer MS, ‘Filters, Fair Use & Feedback: User-Generated Content Principles and the DMCA’ (2009) 24 Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal 363, at 366. In this article, Sawyer asserts that given that fair use is such a major challenge 
for the courts to evaluate, it is almost impossible for any technological solution to reach accurate determinations. 
See also Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content, Electronic Frontier Foundation (2007), available 
at https://www.eﬀ .org/pages/fair-use-principles-user-generated-video-content (last visited 28-07-2014). In this 
report, Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) also claims that fi ltering technologies can hardly accommodate fair 
use.
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developed by case law;46 in the EU, diﬀ erent Member States rely on diﬀ erent rules to 
regulate indirect copyright infringement;47 in China, courts refers to joint infringement 
theory when deciding the cases about indirect copyright infringement, and particularly 
assess whether a defendant fulfi lls his duty of care to prevent infringement. 
Liability privileges rules in the US, EU and China have reached a certain degree of 
harmonization, but diﬀ erences still exist in many aspects.48 First, “Safe harbor” provisions 
have been adopted in the US, EU and China, and they share many common points. 
For instance, hosting ISPs have no general obligation to monitor the materials uploaded 
on their platforms.49 Further, in order to benefi t from liability exemption, hosting ISPs 
should not know the infringement in question, or upon knowing the infringement, they 
should expeditiously remove the infringing materials.50 Th ird, hosting ISPs are obligated 
to disclose suspected users’ identities to copyright owners or competent authorities under 
prescribed conditions.51 Nevertheless, “safe harbor” provisions in the US, EU and China 
still include several diﬀ erent provisions. For example, the US and China have codifi ed 
notice-and-takedown procedures in their “safe harbor” provisions, but the E-commerce 
Directive leaves this procedure for the Member state to develop by themselves.52 Further, 
the “safe harbor” provisions in the US include a provision which requires hosting ISPs to 
terminate the accounts of subscribers who commit infringements repeatedly,53 but the 
EU and China have not adopted this provision in their “safe harbor” provisions. Besides, 
as will be seen in Chapter 2, there are still several other diﬀ erences existing between “safe 
harbor” provisions in the US, EU and China. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated 
in Chapter 3, 4, 5 and 6, even regarding those same or similar provisions, courts in 
diﬀ erent jurisdictions tend to interpret them in diﬀ erent ways, which results in diﬀ erent 
impacts on hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate. 
Some responsibility rules developed by case law may impose an unreasonable burden on 
hosting ISPs. As will be seen in Chapter 4, in order to better protect copyright on hosting 
platforms, a certain eﬀ ort has been made to reinforce hosting ISPs’ responsibilities for 
copyright infringement. Regarding secondary liability, the courts in the US, EU and 
46  Regarding what are contributory infringement and vicarious liability, see Sec. 2.1.1.
47  As presented in Chapter 2, the UK has developed authorization infringement and joint tortfeasance, but the civil 
law countries, such as Germany, France and Italy, the courts usually decide the indirect copyright infringement 
cases by referring to the general liability rules, particularly the duty of care notion, in tort law.
48  As noted by Daniel Seng, “safe harbor” provisions have indeed become a global standard to limit ISPs’ liability 
for indirect copyright infringement, but interpretational problems still exist. See Seng D, Comparative Analysis 
of National Approaches of the Liability of the Internet Intermediaries (Preliminary Version), para. 6, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/doc/liability_of_internet_intermediaries.pdf (last visited 04-
03-2016).
49  DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, (m) (1); E-commerce Directive (n1), Art. 15.
50   DMCA (n1), Sec. 512 (c) (1) (A); E-commerce Directive (n1), Art. 14, 1; Internet Regulation (网络条例) (n1), 
Art. 22 (3).
51   DMCA (n1), Sec. 512 (h); E-commerce Directive (n1), Art. 15; Internet Regulation (网络条例) (n1), Art. 15-
17, Art. 24.
52  DMCA (n1), Sec. 512 c (3) and g; E-commerce Directive (n1), Recital 40. 
53  DMCA (n1), Sec. 512 (i).
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China tend to decide hosting ISPs’ liability by taking into account some factors which 
are not prescribed in “safe harbor” provisions, such as the hosting ISPs’ intent and 
business model, specifi c monitoring obligations against repeat infringement, and better 
protection for highly valuable contents.54 Strong arguments can be found to support 
the courts to take into account these factors. However, in the light of case law in these 
jurisdictions, these factors, including imputed intent, illegal business model and specifi c 
monitoring obligation, can easily be too broadly interpreted by courts, which may stifl e 
hosting ISPs’ freedom to conduct legal business.55 Further, as will be seen in Chapter 5, 
if the following questions are not properly dealt with, notice-and-takedown procedures 
would also impose an unreasonable burden on hosting ISPs. Th ese questions are: how to 
defi ne a competent notice, how to deal with defect notices, how to defi ne “expeditiously 
removing”, how to regulate the liability of wrong removing, and whether the validity of 
ex ante notices should be recognized.56
1.2 Deﬁ nition of the Problem
“Safe harbor” provisions have been commonly adopted in the US, EU and China so 
as to ensure the freedom to operate of hosting ISPs. Some strong arguments, including 
promoting e-commerce, keeping the eﬃ  ciency of the Internet and fostering the 
development of information technologies, can be built to justify granting liability 
privileges to hosting ISPs. Nevertheless, the liability privileges granted to hosting ISPs 
are conditional rather than absolute, because as revealed by the legislative documents 
relevant to “safe harbor” provisions, the freedom to operate of hosting ISPs can be 
restricted for the sake of protecting copyright and Internet users’ interests. 
In the US, EU and China, the rules of indirect copyright infringement are diverse. 
Further, although a certain level of harmonization has been reached in respect of liability 
privilege rules, these rules still include some diﬀ erent provisions, and more importantly, 
even regarding these similar or same provisions, the courts in the US, EU and China 
tend to interpret them in diﬀ erent ways. Th erefore, hosting ISPs are exposed to diverse 
copyright responsibilities in the US, EU and China, which poses legal uncertainty for 
them when conducting business in these jurisdictions. In addition, the courts in the 
US, EU and China may interpret copyright responsibility rules in ways that impose too 
much burden on hosting ISPs, which unreasonably restricts their freedom to operate.
Th is book aims at answering a main research question: how to regulate hosting ISPs’ 
responsibilities for copyright infringement while preserving their maximum freedom to 
operate in the US, EU and China?
So far, hosting ISPs’ copyright responsibilities, which aﬀ ect how much freedom to 
54  See Section 4.7.
55  Ibid. 
56  See Section 5.4.
Introduction
25
operate can be preserved to hosting ISPs, have mainly come from three sources, and 
they are copyright liability, facilitating obligations and self-regulatory duties. Regarding 
copyright liability, hosting ISPs do not upload infringing content by themselves, but 
as intermediaries, they may need to undertake secondary liability for the copyright 
infringement committed by their users. Nevertheless, in order to ensure hosting ISPs’ 
freedom to operate, “safe harbor” provisions grant hosting ISPs liability exemptions 
under prescribed conditions. Besides secondary liability, hosting ISPs also need to 
fulfi ll certain obligations, such as taking down infringing materials upon receiving 
competent notices and disclosing Internet users’ identities to copyright owners, so as to 
facilitate copyright enforcement on their platforms. Th ese two levels of responsibilities 
are regulated by the state regulation, including legislation, case law and administrative 
orders. Th e third level of responsibility means the duties that need to be fulfi lled by 
hosting ISPs in terms of self-regulatory norms mainly reached between private entities. 
Self-regulation prevails, since the traditional regulatory norms fail to settle the disputes 
between copyright owners and hosting ISPs.57
Based on the above observation, to answer the main research question, this book focuses 
on addressing the following sub-questions: 
(i)    Should hosting ISPs be required to keep purely passive so as to fall under “safe harbor” 
provisions; 
(ii)   How do the courts interpret the factors that are relevant to decide hosting ISPs’ copyright 
liability under “safe harbor” provisions; and 
(iii)  Whether the liability criteria that are developed by the case law are capable of preserving 
maximum freedom for hosting ISPs to operate; 
(iv)   How notice-and-takedown procedures ought to be interpreted so as to avoid imposing 
unreasonable duties on hosting ISPs; and 
(v)    Whether hosting ISPs should be given more duties to ensure the accuracy of notices; 
(vi)   How hosting ISPs’ duties ought to be tailored in identity disclosure mechanisms; 
(vii) Whether self-regulation can better preserve the freedom to operate of hosting ISPs. 
Th is book discusses how to preserve maximum freedom to operate for hosting ISPs in 
the context of online copyright enforcement, so it will only deal with how copyright 
responsibility rules may restrict hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate in the US, EU and 
China. As for other rules which may impose restrictions on hosting ISPs’ freedom to 
operate, this book will not take them into account. Hence, this book will not assess 
how the censorship regime in China restricts hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate. Further, 
in operation, hosting ISPs collect Internet users’ personal data and exploit these data 
commercially, which may commit privacy violation. Th e restrictions resulting from 
57  Hugenholtz PB, ‘Codes of Conduct and Copyright Enforcement in Cyberspace’ in Stamatoudi IA (eds), Copyright 
Enforcement and the Internet (Kluwer Law International, 2010), at 303.
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privacy laws in this context will not be discussed in this book, and it will only evaluate 
how privacy protection aﬀ ects the copyright responsibilities imposed on hosting ISPs, 
particularly in identity disclosure mechanisms. In addition, for hosting ISPs which acquire 
a position of dominance in the market may also face anti-trust violation complaints, and 
this book will not discuss restrictions based on anti-trust concerns. Moreover, although 
this study covers several jurisdictions, it will not discuss the issue of whether and how the 
copyright responsibility rules in one jurisdiction can be applied in another jurisdiction, 
so private international law is outside of the scope of this study. Finally, the EU and the 
US have been active in negotiating multilateral and bilateral trade agreements which 
may also include some clauses that regulate hosting ISPs’ responsibilities for copyright 
infringement, such as Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). However, lots of 
concerns on protecting fundamental rights has been raised against these trade agreements, 
and ACTA was even rejected by the European Parliament in 2012.58 Th erefore, it is still 
unclear how these trade agreement aﬀ ect hosting ISPs’ copyright responsibilities, and 
this book will not discuss about them. 
1.3 Methodology and Outline of the Book
To answer the research questions stated above, this book mainly takes a comparative 
approach to examine how hosting ISPs’ responsibilities for copyright infringement is 
dealt with in the US, EU and China. Because the Internet is borderless, hosting ISPs 
conceptually conduct business in an international market. In fact, many hosting ISPs 
are conducting business or at least are willing to conduct business internationally. Th e 
US, EU and China are the 3 largest economies in the world, so ambitious hosting 
ISPs would naturally like to conduct business in these three markets. Th e comparison 
of copyright responsibilities imposed on hosting ISPs in these three jurisdictions will 
help hosting ISPs to assess the legal risks they face, and then draw a map of freedom 
to conduct business in these respective areas. Further, when dealing with hosting ISPs’ 
responsibilities for copyright infringement, courts in the US, EU and China apply 
diﬀ erent rules or interpret substantially similar rules in diﬀ erent ways, which results 
in various impacts on hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate. Th e comparison therefore 
also helps to fi nd the best way of regulating hosting ISPs’ copyright responsibilities 
in regard to preserving for them the maximum freedom to operate. Finally, “safe 
harbor” provisions play a vital role in regulating hosting ISPs’ copyright responsibilities, 
since such provisions are not only related to deciding hosting ISPs’ liability, but also 
relevant to the application of notice-and-takedown procedures and identity disclosure 
58  Baraliuc I, Depreeuw S, and Gutwirth S, ‘Copyright enforcement in the digital age: a post-ACTA view on the 
balancing of fundamental rights’ (2013) 21 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 92, at 92-
104.
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mechanisms.59 After the fi rst “safe harbor” provisions were adopted in the US, the 
EU and China also enacted their own “safe harbor” provisions by referring to the US 
version. In this respect, a certain degree of harmonization has already been reached in 
regulating hosting ISPs’ copyright responsibilities, and the author believes that further 
harmonization in interpreting “safe harbor” provisions will enhance hosting ISPs’ 
freedom to operate in these jurisdictions. Th e comparison can help to evaluate whether 
and how the further harmonization can be done in the US, EU and China. To answer 
the last sub-question, the comparative study is still employed, because comparison needs 
to be done between state-regulatory norms and self-regulatory norms.
In the EU, since relevant Directives and ECJ decisions leave much room for member 
states to interpret related rules, in order to look deeper into how hosting ISPs’ copyright 
responsibilities are regulated in the EU, this book also explores the legislations and 
case law in several member states. In fact, several member states have developed their 
own liability rules when applying “safe harbor” provisions, such as notice-and-staydown 
mechanism in France, disturber’s liability in Germany, active hosting theory in Italy, 
authorization infringement and joint tortfeasor in the UK. Th ese specifi c liability rules 
aﬀ ect how much freedom a hosting ISP is allowed to operate, so in order to answer better 
the fi rst three sub-questions, this book evaluates how hosting ISPs’ copyright liability is 
regulated in these four member states under the auspices of the EU jurisdiction. 
Further, regarding case study, since the EU “safe harbor” provisions not only cover 
online copyright disputes but also online trademark infringement, when discussing 
how the “safe harbor” provisions are interpreted by the courts in the EU, the related 
trademark cases are also analyzed, particularly these trademark cases decided by the ECJ 
and supreme courts in member states. In China, the hosting ISPs share the common 
notice-and-takedown procedure with the ISPs who run information location tools, so 
the case law of the latter is also under examination, when discussing how the Chinese 
courts interpret the notice-and-takedown procedure.
Besides the Introduction, this book consists of 7 chapters. Chapter 2 describes the rules of 
hosting ISPs’ responsibilities for copyright infringement, including the liability rules about 
indirect copyright infringement and “safe harbor” provisions in the US, EU and China, 
which establish the basis for the analysis of relevant case law in the next four chapters. 
Although “safe harbor” provisions grant certain liability privileges to hosting ISPs, hosting 
ISPs should keep passive as a pre-condition to falling under “safe harbor” Provisions. 
59  “Safe harbor” provisions not only include the rules on deciding whether hosting ISPs are monetarily liable for 
the infringement committed by their users, but also prescribe notice-and-takedown procedures and the disclosure 
of personal identity. See generally DMCA § 512, Internet Regulation, E-commerce Directive Section 4. Although 
E-commerce Directive does not include the detailed rules about notice-and-takedown procedures, because in light 
of Article 14, hosting ISPs need to immediately remove infringing materials upon knowing them, a de facto 
notice-and-takedown procedure has been widely recognized in the EU. Further, the Recital 14 of E-commerce 
Directive also refers to the Directives on privacy protection, and these Directives allow Internet users’ identities to 
be disclosed for the purpose of copyright protection. Th e detailed discussion will be done in Chapter 2.
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Chapter 3 takes a comparative approach to examine the relevant case law in the US, EU 
and China, and then summarizes on what basis the courts in these three jurisdictions hold 
hosting ISPs as not qualifying for keeping passive. Based on the comparison, this chapter 
suggests, in order to maximize hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate, what factors should be 
taken into account by courts when deciding whether a hosting ISP keeps passive or not. 
After discussing the threshold of “safe harbor” provisions, Chapter 4 takes a comparative 
approach to analyze how the courts in the US, EU and China decide a hosting ISPs’ 
liability under the roof of “safe harbor” provisions. Th is chapter summarizes the factors 
relevant to conclude liability, including general monitoring obligation, knowledge of 
infringement, receiving benefi ts, measures against repeat infringement and inducement, 
and then compare how the courts in each jurisdiction evaluate these factors. Finally, 
based on the comparison, this chapter identifi es the tendencies regarding regulating the 
secondary liability of hosting ISPs from the perspective of case law. Th en, it evaluates 
these liability rules developed from case law so as to check whether they are capable 
of preserving the maximum freedom to operate for hosting ISPs, and if not, how they 
should be adjusted.
Besides undertaking secondary liability under certain circumstances, hosting ISPs are 
also required to fulfi ll certain duties that facilitate copyright protection. In order to 
deal with the overwhelming copyright infringement on the Internet, the “safe harbor” 
provisions in the US and China codify notice-and-takedown procedures, according 
to which a hosting ISP should remove the alleged infringing materials after receiving 
competent notices. In the EU, although the E-commerce Directive does not include 
a detailed notice-and-takedown procedure, the notice-and-takedown procedures have 
been developed in member states, since after a hosting ISP receives the notices which 
can lead to its knowledge of infringing material, it is obligated to expeditiously remove 
the infringing materials. Chapter 5 compares the notice-and-takedown procedures in 
the US, EU and China, and analyzes how the courts in these jurisdictions interpret 
the key issues in notice-and-takedown procedures,60 such as how to defi ne a competent 
notice, how to deal with defective notices, how to defi ne “expeditiously remove”, how 
to regulate the liability of wrong deletion, and the validity of ex ante notices. Based on 
comparison, it concludes how these key issues ought to be interpreted so as to maximize 
hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate. Besides, this chapter rethinks the current notice-and-
takedown procedures in the US, EU and China, and then discusses hosting ISPs’ duties 
in reducing the abuse of the procedures.
60  Th e notice-and-takedown procedures in the EU turn out to be very fragmented. Some member states have adopted 
statutory notice-and-takedown procedures, including Finland, Hungary and Lithuania. Some other member states, 
such as France, Italy and UK, rule on the elements of a competent notice in their national legislations about 
implementing E-commerce Directive. Th ere also exist member states which have not ruled on the elements of a 
competent notice at legislative level, including Holland and Germany. See Sec. 5.2 of this thesis.
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Since the Internet is characterized by anonymization, which causes lots of troubles for 
copyright owners to trace the infringing Internet users, hosting ISPs are obligated to 
disclose the suspect Internet users’ personal identities under the circumstances prescribed 
by laws. Chapter 6 compares the rules of disclosing Internet users’ personal identities in 
the US, EU and China. By comparison, it summarizes the duties imposed on hosting 
ISPs by identity disclosure mechanisms in these jurisdictions, and then analyzes the 
reasonable boundary of these duties. 
Th e disputes between copyright owners and hosting ISPs have not been solved through 
state regulation, so at a private level, hosting ISPs and copyright owners start to cooperate 
with each other and reach self-regulation agreements so as to avoid endless lawsuits.61 
Chapter 7 explores two diﬀ erent types of self-regulation, which are codes of conduct 
and second level agreements reached between hosting ISPs and copyright owners. It fi rst 
looks into the norms set in codes of conduct and second level agreements, respectively. 
Th en, it evaluates these norms by comparing them with state regulation, and examines 
whether self-regulation can better preserve hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate. 
In the conclusion part, chapter 8 summarizes and assesses the research fi ndings in previous 
chapters, and then answers the questions of how to regulate hosting ISPs’ responsibilities 
for copyright infringement while preserving their maximum freedom to operate in the 
US, EU and China. By deducing from Chapter 3 and 4, it summarizes how the courts 
in the US, EU and China decide hosting ISPs’ copyright liability under the roof of “safe 
harbor” provisions, and then suggests how the liability rules ought to be interpreted so 
as to avoid imposing unreasonable burdens on hosting ISPs. By deducing from Chapter 
5 and 6, it summarizes how notice-and-takedown procedures and identity disclosure 
mechanisms are applied in the US, EU and China, and then suggests how to cast hosting 
ISPs’ duties in these two institutions so as to properly ensure their freedom to operate. 
By deducing from Chapter 7, it summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of self-
regulation, and then answers the question of whether self-regulation can better preserve 
hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate. In addition, it also provides some recommendations 
for hosting ISPs who are currently conducting business or planning to operate in the 
US, EU and China. Finally, it addresses the limitations of this research and points out 
what could be done in the future.
61 Hugenholtz, ‘Codes of Conduct and Copyright Enforcement in Cyberspace’ (n55), at 303.
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Th is chapter introduces the rules related to regulating hosting ISPs’ copyright 
responsibilities. First, this chapter explores the secondary liability rules in the copyright 
fi eld in the US, EU and China. In the EU, since there is only limited harmonization in 
respect of secondary liability rules, this chapter looks a little bit further into secondary 
liability rules in several member states, which lays the basis to discuss the case law in 
these member states in the following chapters (2.1). Second, this chapter preliminarily 
explores the liability exemption rules - “safe harbor” provisions in the US, EU and 
China (2.2). Th ird, based on the comparison done on liability rules and “safe harbor” 
provisions, it summarizes the copyright responsibilities that might be imposed on 
hosting ISPs in the US, EU and China, which provides a basis for the analysis of how 
these responsibility rules are applied in the following chapters (2.3).
2.1 Secondary Liability Rules in the US, EU and China
Under secondary liability rules, a facilitator who does not commit infringement by itself 
but merely contributes to the dissemination of infringing materials may be held liable 
as an indirect infringer.62 In this respect, hosting ISPs, as facilitators of information 
transmission on the Internet, may assume secondary liability for the infringing material 
posted by their subscribers. So far, no relevant rules about indirect infringement have 
been widely adopted at international level in the area of copyright law.63 So, each country 
is substantially free to enact its own domestic norms that regulate indirect infringement 
of copyright law. As noted by Lynda J. Oswald, because of the lack of harmonization 
regarding secondary liability rules at international level, businesses face uncertainty 
to evaluate the infringement liability in other jurisdictions, which “makes it diﬃ  cult 
for businesses to eﬀ ectively plan international intellectual property strategies.”64 In the 
following text, the secondary liability rules in the US, EU and China are explored and 
compared. 
62  In the US, there are contributory infringement and vicarious infringement. In the UK, there are authorization 
infringement and joint tortfeasor rules. In France, Germany and China, courts deal with facilitators’ liability for 
copyright infringement by referring to general tort law principles. See the discussion in Section 2.1.1, 2.1.2 and 
2.1.3.
63  Berne Convention, Trips Agreement, WCT and WPPT do not provide any rules about indirect copyright 
infringement. Th e Free Trade Agreements signed between countries may include some rule regulating indirect 
copyright infringement, such as Australia revised its Copyright Act in 2004, and brought in the US “safe 
harbor provision”, according to the Free Trade Agreement signed with the US, see Weatherall K, ‘Of Copyright 
Bureaucracies and Incoherence: Stepping Back from Australia’s Recent Copyright Reforms’ (2007) 31 Melbourne 
University Law Review 967, at 973-975.
64  Oswald LJ, ‘International Issue in Secondary Liability for Intellectual Property Rights infringement’ (2008) 45 
American Business Law Journal 247, at 248.
Responsibility Rules of Copyright Enforcement on Hosting Platforms
33
2.1.1 Secondary Liability Rules in the US
  In the US, where a common law system is adopted, the courts rather than Congress 
have taken the lead in considering the relevant policies and developing theories 
of secondary liability.65 Th e 1909 Copyright Act did not have any provision 
addressing liability for indirect infringement.66 Th e 1976 Copyright Act still 
did not explicitly mention indirect infringement or the liability activities that 
are undertaken by someone other than the direct infringer. However, compared 
with the 1909 Copyright Act, the 1976 Act not only grants copyright owners the 
exclusive rights to explore their works, but also adds that copyright owners can 
authorize others to do so.67 Th e legislative history of 1976 Copyright Act indicates 
that the addition of words “to authorize” as a copyright owner’s right in § 106 was 
intended to confi rm congressional intent that secondary or third-party infringers 
could be liable for copyright infringement in certain circumstances.68 Congress 
realized that it is impractical or futile for a copyright owner to sue a multitude of 
individual infringers, so the law allows a copyright holder to sue a contributor to the 
infringement instead, in eﬀ ect for aiding and abetting.69
  Although the 1976 Copyright Act implies that contributory infringers can be held 
liable, the Act left the details of the secondary liability doctrines to the courts to 
apply in specifi c cases.70 Th e US courts have developed two theories of indirect 
infringement—vicarious liability and contributory infringement based on the 
second liability rules in tort law.71 As for vicarious liability, it can be traced back to 
the “respondeat superior” doctrine developed under the law of agency, which means 
in certain circumstances, the principal can be held liable for the infringements done 
by its agent.72 In the landmark case of M. Witmark & Sons v. Calloway, the court 
held:73
  Neither does the fact, if it is a fact, that young Williams, the operator of the player piano, 
borrowed this music without the direction, knowledge, or consent of the owner or 
manager of the theater aﬀ ect the question. Th e rule of common law applies, to wit, that 
65  Cohen JE, Loren LP, Okediji RL, O’Rourke MA, Copyright in A Global Information Economy, (Aspen Publisher 
2010 (3rd)), at 476. 
66  Heath C and Liu KC, Copyright Law and the Information Society in Asia (Bloomsbury Publishing 2006), at 229.
67  § 106 of 1976 Copyright Act reads that “the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and 
to authorize any of the following (exploration).” 1909 Copyright Act reads that “any person entitled thereto, upon 
complying with the provisions of this Act, shall have exclusive…”
68 Cohen JE, Loren LP, Okediji RL, O’Rourke MA, Copyright in A Global Information Economy (n62), at 476.
69 In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), at 646. 
70  Statement of Marybeth Peters, Th e Register of Copyrights before the Committee on the Judiciary (Intentional 
Inducement of Copyright Infringements Act of 2004), United States Senate, 108th Congress, 2nd Session, July 22, 
2004.
71  Batholomew M and Tehranian J, ‘Secret Life of Legal Doctrine: Th e Divergent Evolution of Secondary Liability in 
Trademark and Copyright Law’ (2006) 21 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1363, at 1366.
72 Nimmer D, Nimmer on Copyright, §12B.04[A][1], ( LexisNexis, 2013) 12.04 [A] [2].
73  M. Witmark & Sons v. Calloway, 22 F.2d 412 (D. Tenn. 1927), at 415, quoting Merges RP, et al., Intellectual 
Property in the New Technological Age: Case and statutory supplement (Aspen Law & Business. 2005), at 570.
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the master is civilly liable in damages for the wrongful act of his servant in the transaction 
of the business which he was employed to do, although the particular act may have been 
done without express authority from the master, or even against his orders.
  Eventually, vicarious liability goes beyond the master-servant context, and extends 
liability to those who profi t from infringing activity where they have the right and 
ability to prevent infringement.74 As noted by Nimmer, the owner of a dance hall 
may need to undertake vicarious liability for infringing performances of the orchestra, 
even if the orchestra is hired as an independent contractor and exclusively determines 
the music to be played.75 Basically, vicarious liability does not require the defendant 
to know the tortious act, but rather, the liability is rendered on the defendant strictly 
because of his or her relationship with the direct tortfeasor.76 In order to fi nd vicarious 
liability, two elements need to be present. First, the defendant must possess the right 
and ability to supervise the infringing conduct. Second, the defendant must have “an 
obvious and direct fi nancial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials.”77 
  Contributory infringement also fi nds its theoretical basis in tort law, particularly 
the principle of joint and several liability.78 As defi ned in case law, a party “who, 
with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes 
to the infringing conduct of another, may be held as a contributory infringer.”79 By 
following this logic, in the case of Elektra Records v. Gem Elec. Distribs, the defendant 
who sold blank tapes and made available both pre-recorded tapes of copyrighted 
works and a high speed, coin-operated “Make-A-Tape” system, was eventually held 
contributorily liable for the infringing copies made by its customers.80 Th erefore, if 
there is knowledge that the work in question constitutes an infringement, then the 
one who causes another to infringe will himself be liable as an infringer.81 Further, 
“in order to be deemed as a contributory infringer, the authorization or assistance 
must bear some direct relationship to the infringing acts, and the person rendering 
such assistance or giving such authorization must be acting in concert with the 
infringer.”82 Just as described by the Supreme Court, a contributory infringer is 
someone who “was in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others 
and had authorized the use without permission from the copyright owner.”83
74 Ibid.
75 Nimmer D, Nimmer on copyright (n85),§12B.04[A][1], 12.04 [A] [2].
76  Batholomew and Tehranian, ‘Secret Life of Legal Doctrine: Th e Divergent Evolution of Secondary Liability in 
Trademark and Copyright Law’ (n68), at 1366.
77 Nimmer D, Nimmer on copyright (n85),§12B.04[A][1], 12.04 [A] [2].
78 See Cohen, Loren, Okediji and O’Rourke, Copyright in A Global Information Economy (n62), at 476.
79 Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
80  Elektra Records v. Gem Elec. Distribs, 360 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y 1973). Quoting Merges, et al., Intellectual Property 
in the New Technological Age: Case and Statutory Supplement (86), at 571.
81 Nimmer D, Nimmer on copyright (n85),§12B.04[A][1], 12.04 [A] [3][a].
82 Ibid.
83 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (n27), at 437.
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  Regarding copyright protection, contributory infringement and vicarious liability, to 
some extent, complement each other. Someone who has no knowledge of a third party’s 
infringement, cannot be held liable for contributory infringement. By contrast, he may 
need to undertake vicarious liability, if he has right and ability to control infringement 
and directly benefi ts from it.84 Conversely, in various circumstances, vicarious liability 
will be absent because of the lack of supervision of the infringing activities or of a direct 
fi nancial interest in the infringing activities, but third party liability may still exist via 
contributory infringement, if the defendant acts with knowledge and his activities aid 
the primary infringer in accomplishing his illegitimate activity.85 
2.1.2 Secondary Liability Rules in the EU
  At the EU level, no explicit provision has been enacted to defi ne under what 
circumstances a defendant should be secondarily liable for copyright infringement, 
and relevant EU directives only indicate that an injunction relief can be issued 
against intermediaries if their services are used by third parties for infringing 
purposes.86 According to the EU Copyright Directive, “Member States shall ensure 
that right holders are in a position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries 
whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copyright or related right.”87 
In this respect, the EU law seems to contain “a minimum nucleus of secondary 
liability” for copyright infringement, and that is the general possibility to request 
injunctions against intermediaries.88 Nevertheless, the Copyright Directive does not 
provide the explicit rules about the injunction relief, but only states that, “without 
prejudice to any other sanctions and remedies available, the right owners should 
have the possibility of applying for an injunction against an intermediary who 
carries a third party’s infringement of a protected work or other subject-matter in 
an internet…. Th e conditions and modalities relating to such injunctions should 
be left to the national law of the Member States.”89 Th erefore, even the “minimum 
nucleus of secondary liability” is mainly left for the Member States to decide its 
conditions and procedures at their discretion. Further, the crucial question of 
secondary liability, which is about whether, or under which conditions, copyright 
84 Nimmer D, Nimmer on copyright (n85),§12B.04[A][1], 12.04 [A] [3][a].
85 Ibid. 
86  Council Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and 
Related Rights in the Information Society [2001] OJ L 167/10, Art. 8(3); Council Directive 2004/48/EC of 29 
April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ L 195/16, Art. 11.
87  Ibid, Directive 2001/29/EC, Art. 8(3). Th e Article 11 of Directive 2004/48/EC directly refers to the Article 8(3), 
and reads that “Member States shall also ensure that rights holders are in a position to apply for an injunction 
against intermediaries whose  services are used by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right, without 
prejudice to Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC.”
88  Leistner M, ‘Structural aspects of secondary (provider) liability in Europe’ (2014) 9 Journal of Intellectual Property 
Law & Practice 75, at 76.
89 Directive 2001/29/EC (n83), Recite 59.
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  owners can claim damages against indirect infringers, is also left for Member States 
to regulate.90 As mentioned in the Introduction, since the courts in Germany, 
France, the UK and Italy have developed some specifi c rules that regulate hosting 
ISPs’ copyright liability, Chapter 3 and 4 choose these four member states to do a 
case law study. Th erefore, the following text only looks into the secondary liability 
rules regarding copyright infringement in these four Member States. 
2.1.2.1 German Laws
  Article 97 of the German Act on Copyright and Related rights provides as follows: 
“1) any person who infringes copyright or any other right protected under this Act 
may be required by the injured party to eliminate the infringement or, where there 
is a risk of repeated infringement, may be required by the injured party to cease 
and desist. Entitlement to prohibit the infringer from future infringement shall 
also exist where the risk of infringement exists for the fi rst time. 2) Any person 
who intentionally or negligently performs such an act shall be obliged to pay the 
injured party damages for the prejudice suﬀ ered as a result of the infringement 
….”  From this provision, there is not any obvious clue about indirect liability 
for copyright infringement. But according to an established formulation in case 
law, anyone who has in any way whatsoever willingly provided cause on the part 
of others can essentially be held responsible.91 From this broad understanding, all 
forms of participation are covered, ranging from complicity to indirect delinquency, 
up to inducement and contributory infringement.92 
  Actually, the abovementioned Article 97 can trace its origin back to Article 823 
and Article 1004 of German Civil Law.  In the light of Article 823 of German 
Civil Law, the imputed fault should be found so as to ask someone to undertake 
liability.93 When deciding imputed fault, “duty of care” is an important notion to 
be referred to. Principally, if anyone through its activity or property creates a source 
which may put others’ rights and interest in potential danger, a duty of care will be 
provoked, which also includes a duty to prevent a third party’s misuse of its property 
to infringe other’s rights.94 Th erefore, a hosting ISP may be liable, if someone takes 
advantage of its service to commit infringements. As to draw a borderline for the 
duty of care, the advantages of maintaining a source of danger is usually weighed 
against potential damages to the other’s rights so as to reach a proper duty scope.95 
90 Leistner, ‘Structural aspects of secondary (provider) liability in Europe’ (n85), at 76.
91  Spindler G and Leistner M, ‘Secondary copyright infringement-New perspectives in Germany and Europe’ (2006) 
37 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 788, at 794.
92 Ibid.
93 German Civil Code, Section 823(1).
94  Angelopoulos C, ‘Beyond the Safe Harbours: Harmonising Substantive Intermediary Liability for Copyright 
Infringement in Europe’ (2013) 3 Intellectual Property Quarterly 253, at 267.
95 Ibid.
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  Moreover, Article 1004 of the German Civil Law prescribes a liability called 
“stoererhaftung” (disturber’s liability), which has been developed into the main tool for 
German courts to deal with the secondary liability of Internet platforms for copyright 
infringement.96 Th is liability rule is only focused on claims for injunction and removal 
rather than claims for damages.97 Generally, the following three requirements need 
to be fulfi lled so as to trigger disturber’s liability: 1) the disturber contributes to 
the infringement of protected rights and this contribution is the causation of the 
infringement from a legal perspective; 2) the disturber should have the capacity to 
prevent the primary infringement; 3) the disturber should have already breached the 
reasonable duty of care he needs to undertake.98 To be mentioned, disturber’s liability 
can be concluded without considering the disturber’s negligence or whether the direct 
infringer or intentional contributor has been sued.99 
  Besides, Article 830 of the German Civil Code also opens a door for regulating 
indirect infringements, which provides that where through a jointly committed 
unlawful action several persons cause damages, each of these people is responsible 
for such damage; and the persons who induce or contribute to the action should 
be seen as joint infringers.100 In the application of this provision, the courts 
assess whether the defendant has induced or contributed to the infringement, 
considering the defendant’s intention, whether there is knowledge of the infringing 
circumstances, the degree of control exercised by the defendant, whether or to what 
extent the defendant has a duty to monitor his activities and whether the defendant 
is guilty of reckless conduct or has created a dangerous situation.101
  Th erefore, with the absence of clear regulations about indirect infringement 
in Copyright Law, the German courts hear relevant cases based on doctrines of 
German general tort law, and a series of case laws have been developed following 
this track. Under these case laws, the event organizers may be held liable, if the 
copyrighted works are performed without legal permission; and the providers 
of products and infrastructure with whose help copyright infringement may be 
undertaken, may be liable as indirect infringers.102 Besides, some new concepts were 
created during the developing process of case law, such as supervision, control and 
inspection duties; however, these duties as preconditions of secondary infringement 
have not yet been related to the classic elements of a general tort action under 
96 Leistner, ‘Structural aspects of secondary (provider) liability in Europe’ (n85), at 78.
97  Jan Bernd Nordemann, ‘Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries: Th e 
Position in Germany’ in Heath C and Sanders AK eds., Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and 
Intermediaries (Kluwer Law International 2012), at 47.
98 Ibid, at 47-48.
99 Ibid.
100 Sterling, JAL, World Copyright Law, (Sweet & Maxwell. 2008), at 629.
101 Ibid.
102  See Spindler and Leistner ‘Secondary copyright infringement-New perspectives in Germany and Europe’ (n88), at 
798-801.
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  German law.103 Hence, the question as to whether the supervision, control and 
inspection duties of the operator correspond to the element of unlawfulness 
(Rechtswidrigkeit), the element of negligence (verschulden) or the question of 
responsibility for another person (zurechnung), has not been answered clearly by 
the courts.104 Nevertheless, according to Gerald Spindler and Matthias Leistner, 
the latest developments in case law gave rise to a doctrine that attempts to relate 
secondary infringement concepts in intellectual property and unfair competition 
law to the corresponding rules on indirect liability in general tort law, so as to 
re-integrate the case law concepts from intellectual property into the traditional 
principles of general tort law.105
2.1.2.2 French laws
  French intellectual property code focuses on stricter IP enforcement, and oﬀ ers 
few clues about indirect copyright infringement.106 Furthermore, in the area of 
copyright, the Court of Cassation concluded that, since copyright was an exclusive 
right, no fault was needed to impose both of injunction relief and damage payment 
on the infringer, which can be called strict liability.107 Th e Court of Cassation’s 
decision may justify setting a strict liability against the primary oﬀ ender, but 
regarding the “multiple actors involved in the digital dissemination of works who 
do not contribute an infringement and whose fault is harder to take as given,” it 
seems unfair to impose a strict liability.108 Th erefore, as what occurs in Germany, 
the French courts hear the cases about indirect copyright infringement on the basis 
of general tort doctrines provided in French Civil Code, under which the fault is 
required for imposition of damage payment.109 Article 1382 of French Civil Code 
provides that “any act whatever of man, which causes damage to another, obliges 
the one by whose fault it occurred, to compensate it;” and Article 1383 provides 
that everyone is liable for the damage he causes not only by his intentional act, but 
also by his negligent conduct or by his imprudence.110 Th erefore, under French 
law, the secondary liability may arise if someone willfully or negligently causes the 
103 Ibid, at 802.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid, at 794.
106  Nérisson S, ‘Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries: Th e Position in France’ 
in Heath C and Sanders AK eds., Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries 
(Kluwer Law International 2012), at 68.
107  Angelopoulos, ‘Beyond the Safe Harbours: Harmonising Substantive Intermediary Liability for Copyright 
Infringement in Europe’ (n91), at 260.
108  A Lucas & H-J Lucas, Traité de la Propriété Littéraire et Artistique, (2nd ed, Litec 2001) 606 et seq. quoting 
Angelopoulos, ibid.
109 Leistner, ‘Structural aspects of secondary (provider) liability in Europe’ (n85), at 86.
110  Edward A Tomlinson, Tort Liability in France for the Act of Th ings: A Study of Judicial Lawmaking, 48 La. L. Rev. 
(1987). 1361.
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copyright infringement conducted by a third party.111 When defi ning the “willful” 
or “negligent” causation, French courts always refer to the important notion - 
reasonable duties of care in general tort law.112 Th erefore, if a defendant is held as 
not fulfi lling reasonable duties of care to prevent a third party from committing 
copyright infringement in question, he probably needs to be liable.113 In fact, 
before the specifi c legislation about hosting ISPs’ liability was adopted, French 
courts usually decided hosting ISPs’ liability by referring to the aforesaid liability 
rules.114 For instance, in the Lacoste case, based on the general duty of care provided 
in Article 1382 and Article 1383 of Civil Code, the High Court of Nanterre set 
three specifi c duties on service providers: to call the users’ attention to respect the 
rights of others, to undertake professional care against infringement, to remove 
the verifi ed unlawful materials and prevent them from being reposted.115 Later, the 
Court of Appeal of Versailles further held that the duty of care should not require 
a hosting ISP to undertake a general and systematic monitoring on all content on 
its platform, but only “due diligence checks (diligences approprieés),” which can be 
provoked “once it acquires knowledge of the unlawful nature of the content on a 
site or once it has reason to suspect unlawfulness.”116 
  In order to promote freedom of speech, French law limits the liability of specifi c 
facilitators of transmitting information, such as editors and publishers, so as to 
encourage them to disseminate works.117 If the editors and publishers can reveal the 
contact information or identities of the authors of works to the claimants, they do 
not need to be liable for the infringing contents they have published.118 Th e French 
law makers tried to extend this legal principle into the digital transmission of 
information on the Internet. In terms of “Freedom of Communication Act,” hosting 
ISPs need to keep the identifi cation information of the users who publish the contents 
on their platforms so as to avoid being liable for the infringement committed by 
their users.119 In this respect, the facilitators of information transmission can avoid 
being secondarily liable, as long as they can help the claimants identify the direct 
infringers. However, unlike in the physical world where publishers usually keep 
suﬃ  cient identity data, the data retained by hosting ISPs is normally not explicit 
111 Leistner, ‘Structural aspects of secondary (provider) liability in Europe’ (n85), at 87.
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid.
114  Angelopoulos, ‘Beyond the Safe Harbours: Harmonising Substantive Intermediary Liability for Copyright 
Infringement in Europe’ (n91), at 264.
115  Madame L. c/ les sociétés Multimania, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Nanterre, 8 December 1999. Quoting 
Angelopoulos, ibid.
116 S.A Multimania Production c/ Madame Lynda L., Cour d’Appel de Versailles, Arrêt du 8 juin 2000. Ibid.
117  Nérisson, ‘Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries: Th e Position in France’ 
(n103), at 68.
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid, at 69.
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enough to identify the direct infringers.120 Th erefore, this sort of liability privilege 
in fact may be not quite applicable to hosting ISPs.
2.1.2.3 Italy laws
  In Italy, Copyright Law does not include any clause about indirect copyright 
infringement, so Italian courts mainly rely on the vicarious liability or the general 
principles of civil liability to decide the case about indirect copyright infringement.121 
In the light of Article 2043 of Italian Civil Code, “any act committed either with 
intent or with fault causing an unjustifi ed injury to another person obliges the 
person who has committed the act to compensate damages,” which provides a legal 
basis for any person to bring actions for damages.122 In the case of PFA Films v. 
Yahoo, the District Court of Roma held that as suggested by previous case law, the 
principles of civil liability which focuses on analyzing the duty of care imposed on 
the third party, could be applied for deciding indirect copyright infringement on 
the Internet.123 Besides, according to Article 2055 of the Italian Civil Code, “if 
more than one person is accountable for the violation of someone’s right, they are 
jointly liable for compensation and damages.” 124 Although there does not seem to 
be any case law or literature on the concept of contributory  infringement  in the 
context of copyright law related to the Internet, it would be unwise to assume that 
contributory infringement in Internet cases would not be covered by the general 
principle set forth in Article 2055 of the Italian Civil Code.125
2.1.2.4 UK laws
  Th e UK Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA) provides a special section 
called “secondary infringement of copyright”, according to which, certain acts, 
including importing infringing copy, possessing or dealing with infringing copy, 
providing means for making infringing copy and so on, will constitute infringement 
if the defendant knows or has reason to believe that an infringing copy is involved. 126 
120    In the case of Dargaud Lombard and Lucky Comics v. Tiscali Media, the court, under the claim of two plaintiﬀ s, 
requested Tiscali – a hosting ISP – to disclose the identity data of its subscriber who uploaded the infringing 
content, but Tiscali could only communicate the registration data, such as last name and fi rst name: “comics”, 
address: “comics street”, and so on, which were totally unreliable for identifying the suspected subscriber. See ibid, 
at 77. 
121  Barazza S, ‘Secondary liability for IP infringement: converging patterns and approaches in comparative case law’ 
(2012) 7 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 879, at 882.
122  Maggiore M and Tardella E, ‘Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC 
competition rules – National Reports (Italy)’ (2012), European Commission, at 3.
123  Barazza, ‘Secondary liability for IP infringement: converging patterns and approaches in comparative case law’ 
(n118),  at 882.
124  Köhler C and Burmeister K, ‘Copyright liability on the Internet today in Europe (Germany, France, Italy and the 
E.U.)’ (1999) 21 European Intellectual Property Review 485, at 491.
125 Ibid. 
126  See UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, Section 22 to Section 26.
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  Th erefore, when deciding the secondary infringement of copyright, it is important 
to examine whether the defendant knows that he is dealing with infringing copy.127 
However, the secondary infringement of copyright only applies to the fi ve acts 
prescribed by CDPA Section 22-26, which do not particularly fi t into establishing 
third party liability in online context.128
  Nevertheless, the authorized copyright infringement provided for in Section 16(2) 
oﬀ ers an important reference for indirect infringement, according to which, since 
copyright owners have exclusive right to authorize others to use their works, copyright 
in a work is infringed by a person who without permission of the copyright owner, 
authorizes another to do any of the acts restricted by the copyright.129 Although the 
unlawful authorization is categorized as primary infringement in the UK Copyright 
Act, but in light of the common understanding, it covers both direct infringement 
and indirect infringement in the copyright area,130 since “over time the concept 
of authorization has evolved to exact liability beyond the directly and vicariously 
liable, from persons associated or aﬃ  liated in a variety of ways with the primary 
infringer.”131 Regarding the authorized infringement, it’s very important to defi ne 
what constitutes “authorize”. In terms of the case law, authorize means, “sanction, 
approve, countenance”.132 To be more detailed, if a defendant is confi rmed to have 
committed authorized infringements, at least, he has some ability to control or prevent 
the infringing act, and also has some degree of knowledge of the infringements or the 
circumstances including the likelihood that infringement will be done.133 In a common 
sense, the term “authorization” can be literally understood as requiring some degree 
of authority, so mere facilitation should be excluded from authorization of copyright 
infringement.134 Similarly, regarding the online technologies which are “by their 
nature almost inevitably to be used for the purpose of an infringement,” since the law 
does not prohibit their invention, manufacture, sale and advertisement, running such 
online technologies cannot be naturally concluded as authorization of infringement.135 
127  Llewelyn D, ‘Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries: Concepts under 
Common Law’ in Heath C and Sanders AK eds., Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and 
Intermediaries (Kluwer Law International 2012), at 21.
128 Bently L and Sherman B, Intellectual property law (Oxford University Press. 2014), at 220. 
129 UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (n123), Section 16 (2).
130  Gendreau Y, ‘Authorization revisited’ (2000) 48 Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A. 341, at 341. 
Llewelyn, ‘Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries: Concepts under 
Common Law’ (n124), at 22. Hocking R ‘Secondary liability in copyright infringement: still no Newz?’ (2012) 23 
Entertainment Law Review 83, at 83.
131  Angelopoulos, ‘Beyond the Safe Harbours: Harmonising Substantive Intermediary Liability for Copyright 
Infringement in Europe’ (n91), at 256.
132 Falcon v. Famous Players Film Company [1962] 2 K.B. 474 at 491.
133  See Jane G Ginsburg and Sam Ricktson, Inducers and Authorisers: A comparion of the US Supreme Court’s Grokster 
decision and the Australian Federal Court’s KaZaa ruling, 11 Media & Art Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2006.
134 See CBS Inc v. Ames Records and Tapes [1981] 2 All ER 812.
135  Angelopoulos, ‘Beyond the Safe Harbours: Harmonising Substantive Intermediary Liability for Copyright 
Infringement in Europe’ (n91), at 258.
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  In order to provide a degree of legal certainty about liability for authorizing 
infringements, in Australia, the Copyright (Digital Agenda) Amendment Act 2000 
provides some factors for courts to decide authorizing infringement,136 and these 
factors were also cited by the UK court in the landmark case “Newzbin”.137 Th ese 
factors are as follows: “a) the extent (if any) of the person’s power to prevent the 
doing of the act concerned; b) the nature of any relationship existing between the 
person and the person who did the act concerned; c) whether the person took any 
reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the doing of the act, including whether the 
person complied with any relevant industry codes of practice.”138 
  Further, according to the common law, an intermediary may attract liability as joint 
tortfeasor.139 In the copyright fi eld, the basic principles of joint tortfeasance were 
laid down in the two Amstrad cases.140 In these two cases, Amstrad produced and 
sold the machines consisting of a radio, a gramophone and a tape recorder with 
“two cassette decks” which allowed users to record from tape to another, and in the 
advertisements Amstrad also propagated the recording capacity of the machines.141 
Th e debating issue is whether Amstrad should be held as a joint tortfeasor, since the 
machines could be used by consumers for making illegal copies. Th e court held that, 
“a defendant who procures a breach of copyright is liable jointly and severally with 
the infringer for the damages suﬀ ered by the plaintiﬀ  as a result of the infringement; 
the defendant is a joint infringer if he intends and procures and shares a common 
design that infringement shall take place; a defendant may procure an infringement 
by inducement, incitement or persuasion.”142 So, joint tortfeasance can be found, if 
a defendant procures the breach of copyright or commits infringement in common 
design with others. Since the machines sold by Amstrad were capable of being used 
for lawful and unlawful purposes, and the consumers independently decided how 
to use the machine, no common design could be found.143 Regarding procurement, 
although Amstrad’s machine could be used for dual purposes and its advertisement 
might persuade consumers to buy the machines because of their capacity for making 
illegal copies, Amstrad did not procure the infringement, since the advertisement 
would not “infl uence the purchaser’s later decision to infringe copyright.”144 
136 Australia Copyright Act 1968, Sec. 36 (1A), and Sec. 101(1).
137  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v. British Telecommunications Plc, Royal Courts of Justice, [2011] EWHC 1981 
(Ch). Para. 91.
138  Australia Copyright Act 1968, Sec. 36 (1A) and Sec. 101(1). 
139  Llewelyn, ‘Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries: Concepts under Common 
Law’ (n114), at 24.
140  Leistner, ‘Structural aspects of secondary (provider) liability in Europe’ (n85), at 82. Th ese two cases are as follows: 
Amstrad Consumer Electronics PLC v.  e British Phonographic Industry Limited [1986] FSR 159; CBS songs ltd and 
others v Amstrad Consumer eElectronics PLC and other [1988] 2 WLR 1191.
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
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  In the view of Lord Templeman, procurement, whether by inducement, incitement 
or persuasion, must be directed to “an individual and must identifi ably procure a 
particular infringement in order to make the defendant liable.”145 
To sum up, since there is only limited harmonization regarding indirect copyright 
infringement in the EU, the member states develop their own approaches to deal with 
indirect copyright infringement. In the EU, the member states such as Germany, France 
and Italy do not provide any specifi c rules about indirect infringement in their copyright 
laws, and the courts mainly rely on the liability principles, particularly the duty of care 
notion, in civil laws to deal with indirect copyright infringement. In the UK, although 
CPDA includes a specifi c section called “secondary infringement of copyright”, whether 
an intermediary is secondarily liable mainly depends on how to apply the rules about 
authorization infringement and joint tortfeasance.
2.1.3 Indirect Infringement Rules in China
  Article 46 of the Chinese Copyright Law provides a list of conducts which constitute 
copyright infringements, but none of the listed conducts can be referred to an 
indirect infringement.146 Th erefore, just as the other countries belonging to a civil 
law system, the courts in China also refer to general tort law doctrines to address 
copyright indirect infringements. According to Article 130 of the General Principles 
of Civil Law, two or more than two persons who cause damage to others by joint 
infringement, will assume liability jointly. As for what constitutes joint infringement, 
the Supreme People’s Court147 declared that, a person who instigates or assists others 
to perform an infringement shall be the co-infringer, and will assume civil liabilities 
jointly.148 In the fi eld of Internet copyright, the Supreme People’s Court follows 
the same track, providing that, if an internet service provider who participates in 
copyright infringements made by others, or instigates or assists others to conduct 
copyright infringements on the internet, the people’s courts should, in term of 
145 Ibid.
146  Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (全国人民代表大会常务委员会), Copyright Law of the 
People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国著作权法), Order No. 26 of the President of the People’s Republic 
of China (中华人民共和国主席令第二十六号), February 26, 2010, Art. 46.
147  In China, Supreme People’s Court is authorized to deliver interpretation on the questions involving the application 
of laws and decrees. See Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (全国人民代表大会常务委员
会), Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Providing an Improved Interpretation 
of the Law (全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于加强法律解释工作的决议) , Adopted at the 19th Meeting 
of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People’s Congress, June 10, 1981, Art. 2. Th e interpretations 
delivered by Supreme People’s Court are named as “Judicial Interpretations” (司法解释) which constitute one 
source of law in China.
148  Supreme People’s Court (最高人民法院), Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Issues Concerning 
the Implementation of the “General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China” (Trial) (最高人
民法院关于贯彻执行《中华人民共和国民法通则》若干问题的意见（试行）), Fa (Ban) Fa [1998] No. 6 
(法(办)发[1998]6号), January 26, 1988, Art. 148. 
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  Article 130 of “General Principles of Civil Law”, confi rm that, the internet service 
provider undertakes joint liability with other conductors or the persons committing
 infringement directly.149 If the Internet Service Provider who serves contents 
to the public150, actually knows that its subscriber is committing copyright 
infringements on the Internet, or after receiving the evidently warning notices 
pointing to infringements, but still does not remove infringing contents or take 
any other measures to eliminate the infringements, the people’s courts should 
hold that, the Internet service provider undertakes joint and several liability 
with its subscriber according to Article 130 of “General Principles of Civil 
Law”.151 So in China, if accusing an ISP of committing indirect infringement, 
the ISP must be found to actually be aware of or at least should know (but 
doesn’t know because of negligence) the direct infringement made by others. 
  In 2009, the China Tort Law was enacted and promulgated by the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress. Because when China Tort Law was 
still in drafting, there were lots of cases in which the ISPs’ services were used for 
defamation, copyright infringement and trademark infringement, the legislators 
in China felt that it was necessary to draft a specifi c provision on ISPs’ liability. 
According to Article 36, if an Internet user commits a tort through the Internet 
services, the victim of the tort should be entitled to notify the Internet service 
provider to take such necessary measures as deletion, blocking or disconnection.152 If, 
after being notifi ed, the Internet service provider fails to take necessary measures in 
a timely manner, it shall be jointly and severally liable with the Internet user for any 
additional damages.153 Where an Internet service provider knows that an Internet 
user is infringing upon a civil right or interest of another person through its Internet 
services, and fails to take necessary measures, it will be jointly and severally liable with 
the Internet user for any additional damages.154 Th erefore, whether an ISP should 
be secondarily liable depends on whether it knows of the infringement committed 
by its users. When deciding whether an ISPs should know of the infringement, the 
courts in China also refer to the duty of care notion based in general tort rules.155 
149  Supreme People’s Court (最高人民法院), Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Issues Related 
to the Application of Law in the Trial of Cases Involving Computer Network Copyright Disputes (最高人民法院
关于审理涉及计算机网络著作权纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的解释) (thereafter “Internet Interpretation 
(2006)”), Fa Shi [2006] No. 11 (法释[2006]11号), November 22, 2006, Art. 3.
150  Th e Internet service provider who serves content to the public points at the websites oﬀ ering storage space for their 
subscribers to upload contents on the Internet, but doesn’t mean it oﬀ ers content to the public directly.
151 Internet Interpretation (2006) (网络解释(2006)) (n145), Art. 4.
152  Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共
和国侵权责任法) (thereafter China Tort Law), Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China No. 21 
(中华人民共和国主席令第二十一号), December 29, 2009, Art. 36.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155  Wu HD(吴汉东), ‘Study on Internet Service Providers’ Liability for Copyright Infringement (论网络服务提供
者的著作权侵权责任)’ (2011) 2 China Legal Science (中国法学) 38, at 38-47.
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  If an ISP has already fulfi lled reasonable duty of care to prevent infringement from 
occurring, it would be held to be unaware of the infringement, and otherwise it 
would be held to be aware of the infringement.156
Based on the discussion above, it can be found that the secondary liability rules in the 
copyright fi eld are quite diverse in the US, EU and China. For instance, in the US, the 
issue of indirect copyright infringement is dealt with under contributory infringement 
and vicarious liability developed from case law. In the EU, since there is only limited 
harmonization with regard to indirect copyright infringement at the EU level, member 
states are allowed to establish their own secondary liability rules in their national laws. 
In the UK, whether an intermediary commits an indirect copyright infringement is 
mainly decided under authorizing infringement and joint tortfeasance theories. In other 
member states, where a civil law system is adopted, such as Germany, France and Italy, 
the courts mainly hear the cases about indirect copyright infringement by referring to 
general tort rules in civil codes, particularly the duty of care notion. In China, since the 
Tort Law was enacted in an era where infringement occurs so frequently on the Internet, 
it includes a specifi c Article that regulates ISPs’ secondary liability. Nevertheless, when 
Chinese courts interpret this specifi c Article, they also refer to the duty of care notion. 
Th erefore, in these civil law countries, duty of care plays an important role in determining 
whether a defendant is an indirect copyright infringer. In Chapters 3 and 4, the case law 
will demonstrate how courts shape hosting ISPs’ secondary liability by referring to the 
liability rules discussed above.
2.2 “Safe Harbor” Provisions
Th e previous section explored the secondary liability rules regarding copyright infringement 
in the US, EU and China. Th is section will discuss the liability exemption rules that are 
particularly granted to ISPs. As referred to in the fi rst chapter, for the purpose of preserving 
the freedom to operate of hosting ISPs, “safe harbor” provisions have been adopted in the 
US, EU and China. In the light of “safe harbor” provisions, hosting ISPs can be exempted 
from undertaking monetary liability under qualifi ed circumstances.157 Besides, liability 
exemption rules, “safe harbor” provisions also include notice-and-takedown procedures and 
identity disclosure mechanisms, which impose certain obligations on hosting ISPs to help 
copyright owners enforce their copyright against infringement. In the following section, 
the “safe harbor” provisions in the US, EU and China will be introduced and compared.158 
156 Ibid. 
157  See DMCA (n1), Sec. 512 (c)(1); E-commerce Directive (n1), Art. 14; Internet Regulation (信息条例) (n1), Art. 22.
158  Th is section aims at providing readers with a general frame of liability exemption rules in the US, EU and China, 
and how these rules are applied will be discussed in Chapter 3, 4, and 5.
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In the EU, because of the existence of the E-commerce Directive, “safe harbor” 
provisions have reached a sort of harmonization in member states.159 Th erefore, this 
section only discusses the “safe harbor” provisions in the E-commerce Directive, 
instead of looking further into “safe harbor” provisions in Member States.
2.2.1 US DMCA §512 
  In 1998, the US congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”), which aims to solve the challenges presented by the rapid expansion of 
the Internet. Section 512 of DMCA exempts four categories of ISPs from monetary 
remedies if their acts follow the requirements listed by this section. DMCA §512 
provides a broad defi nition of “a provider of online service or internet access, or the 
operator of such facilities”, so the services, such as providing internet access, e-mail, 
chat room and web page hosting services, are all included.160 Furthermore, based 
on diﬀ erent characteristics of various services operated by ISPs, the DMCA §512 
provides diﬀ erent requirements for each safe harbor.
  Th e DCMA 512 (a) provides safe harbor for “conduit”, which oﬀ ers Internet access 
service to the public to transmit information on the Internet, such as AOL in the US. 
For this kind of ISP, it can enjoy exemption from monetary damages for its subscribers’ 
copyright infringements, if the following requirements are met: 1) the transmission of 
the material is initiated by a third party; 2) the whole process of transmission is carried 
out automatically and without selection and modifi cation of the material by the ISP; 3) 
the ISP does not select the recipients; 4) no copy is maintained on its system longer than 
necessary and can not be accessed by others than the targeted recipients.161 
  Th e second safe harbor is conferred to the kind of storage called “caching”, which 
is used to increase Internet performance and to reduce Internet congestion. Th e 
exempting conditions to be met by ISPs oﬀ ering a caching service generally refl ect 
those specifi ed in the previous safe harbor, such as the material is made available 
online by a third party and transmitted at the direction of another third party, and 
storage is carried out through an automatic technical process without modifi cation 
to its content.162 Besides, if the person making material available online changes 
the content of the material, the copy stored in caching also needs to be refreshed, 
reloaded or updated through an automatic technical process, and the caching ISPs 
need to follow “notice-and-takedown” procedure.163
159  After the enactment of E-commerce Directive (E-commerce Directive), Germany, France, Italy and UK have 
already implemented the Directive into their domestic laws, see Telemediengesetz (TMG), Loi n° 2004-575 du 
21 juin 2004 pour la confi ance dans l’économie numérique (thereafter LCEN), Th e Electronic Commerce (EC 
Directive) Regulations 2002. Th ere are some diﬀ erences between the “safe harbor” provisions in each member 
states, which will be discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
160 H.R. REP. 105-551 (II) (n16), at 64.
161 See DMCA (n1), Sec. 512 (a).
162 Ibid. Sec. 512 (b).
163 Ibid.
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  Th e third safe harbor is designed for the so-called “host”, which oﬀ ers Internet storage 
space for its users to upload their materials.164 Th e elements listed by this safe harbor 
originate from the indirect infringement theories in common law. First, the ISPs does 
not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the 
system or internet is infringing; in the absence of such actual knowledge, it is not aware 
of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or upon obtaining 
such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the 
material.165 Second, the ISP does not receive a fi nancial benefi t directly attributable to 
the infringing activity, in a case in which the ISP has the right and ability to control 
such activity.166 Th ird, the ISPs need to abide by “notice-and-takedown” procedure, 
which means upon receiving the competent notifi cation claiming infringement, ISP 
must respond expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material claimed to be 
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.167 
  Th e fourth safe harbor relates to information location tools such as online directories 
and hyperlinks, which may refer or link a user to sites that contain infringing 
materials.168 In this case, the operator of information location tools should qualify 
with the same exempting requirements as those listed in the last safe harbor for hosting 
ISPs.169 
  From reading the requirements of the safe harbor provisions, ISPs have to be passive 
in the process of transmitting information. For the “conduit” and “caching”, the ISPs 
should keep extremely passive, and what they can do is transmitting information at 
the direction of their users without choosing what is to be transmitted and to whom 
the material is transmitted by them. For the “host” and “information location 
tool”, the ISPs also need to play a passive role, but upon fi nding the apparent 
infringements or receiving notice claiming infringements, they need to remove or 
disable the access to these materials on suspicion of infringements.170
  Th e “notice-and-takedown” system, as a creative mechanism aiming at fi ghting 
against copyright infringement on the Internet, has been designed in detail under 
DMCA §512. In the case of Netcom, which is one of the most important cases 
between ISP and copyright owner before DMCA §512 was born, the judge required 
that Netcom establish a written procedure for the handling of future complaints 
of copyright violation,171 which was the miniature of the so-called “notice-and-
takedown” system in DMCA 512. As provided in the “notice-and-takedown” 
164 Ibid, Sec. 512 (c)(1).
165 Ibid, Sec. 512 (c)(1)(A).
166 Ibid, Sec. 512 (c)(1)(B).
167 Ibid, Sec. 512 (c)(1)(C).
168  Sullivan ER, ‘Lost in Cyberspace: A Closer Look at ISP Liability’ (2001) 12 Entertainment Law Review 192, at 192.
169 See DMCA (n1), Sec. 512 (d).
170  As being discussed in Chapter 3, how to defi ne “passivity” is an important mission for courts, because it decides 
whether a hosting ISP can enter into “safe harbor”.
171 Cunard J and Wells A, Th e Evolving Standard of Copyright Liability Online (1997) 497 PLI/Pat 365, at 380.
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system, the ISP must designate an agent to receive notice of infringements claims, 
and make the contact information of this agent easily accessible to the public; the 
notice for claiming infringements should meet certain requirements, particularly 
suﬃ  cient for the ISP to locate the claimed infringing materials; after receiving 
valid notice, the ISP should remove or disable the access to the materials which are 
the subject of the infringement claim, and then notify the user who uploads these 
materials that they will be deleted; upon receiving this notifi cation, the user can 
send a counter-notice to the ISP denying the infringement, and then the ISP should 
restore the materials that had been deleted.172 During this process, the ISPs still play 
a passive role, because they only need to follow the instruction of the notice without 
checking the soundness of the notice, and they are also exempt from liability if they 
make a wrong deletion or restoration by following a notice they have received.173
  Th e copyright owners also can apply for a subpoena from the U.S. courts to request 
ISPs to disclose suﬃ  cient information for them to identify the alleged infringers 
before they launch the lawsuits.174 Besides, in order to enjoy the exemption from 
monetary relief, the ISPs should terminate the accounts of subscribers who commit 
infringements repeatedly, and accommodate but not interfere with the standard 
technical measures.175 Last but very important, the ISPs are not obligated to monitor 
their service or deliberately seek acts indicating infringing activities except to the 
extent consistent with a standard technical measure,176 which works as a basis for 
courts to interpret the other elements about liability exemption listed by DMCA 
§512.
2.2.2 The EU E-commerce Directive 
  Before the EU Parliament passed a Directive providing “safe harbor” for ISPs, the 
German Teleservices Act already provided liability limitations for ISPs in certain 
circumstances as following: providers will not be responsible for any third-party 
content which they make available for use unless they have knowledge of such 
content and are technically able and can reasonably be expected to block the use of 
such content; providers will not be responsible for any third-party content to which 
they only provide access, and the automatic and temporary storage of third-party 
content due to user request will be considered as providing access.177 In the later EU 
Directive, we can still fi nd traces of the German Teleservices Act.178
172 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512 c (3) and g.
173  Ibid, how the notice-and-takedown procedure works will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5 “Notice-and-takedown 
procedure in the US, the EU and China”.
174  Ibid, Sec. 512 (h). How the subpoena mechanism is applied in the US will be discussed in Chapter 6 “Disclosure 
of Internet users’ identities in the US, EU and China”.
175 Ibid. Sec. 512 (i).
176 Ibid. Sec. (m) (1).
177 German Teleservices Act (1997), Art. 5 (3), (4).
178 T. Kono, et al., Selected Legal Issues of E-commerce (Kluwer Law International. 2002), at 39.
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  Th e “safe harbor” for ISPs in the EU is provided in the Directive on Electronic 
Commerce, which means that the “safe harbor” provisions in the EU are not just 
limited to the area of copyright, but also include trademark and other areas relevant 
to electronic commerce.179 Furthermore, the “safe harbor” provisions in the EU 
only cover three categories of ISPs, which is “mere conduit”, “caching” and “host”, 
but without dealing with liability in relation to information location tools such 
as hypertext links and search engines.180 As for a notice-and-takedown procedure, 
because of worrying about its potential negative infl uence on the freedom of 
expression, the Directive did not adopt this procedure except making a general 
statement about it in the preface as following: “this Directive should constitute the 
appropriate basis for the development of rapid and reliable procedures for removing 
and disabling access to illegal information; such mechanisms could be developed 
on the basis of voluntary agreements between all parties concerned and should be 
encouraged by Member States.”181 So the “notice-and-takedown” procedure in the 
EU mainly relies on each Member States’ national laws.182
  Th e fi rst category of ISPs who can enjoy liability limitation is the ISP acting as a 
mere conduit. As for the elements of exempting liability, they are also similar to 
those provided in DMCA, as follows: “the ISP does not initiate the transmission 
and select the receiver of the transmission; does not select or modify the information 
contained in the transmission.”183 Besides, the storage of information transmitted 
should be solely for the purpose of carrying out the transmission within an 
automatic, intermediate and transient process, and the information transmitted 
cannot be stored longer than a reasonable period.184
  Th e Directive also contains an exemption for ISPs, who make automatic, intermediate 
and temporary storage of information for the sole purpose of enhancing the eﬃ  ciency 
of information transmission.185 In order to comply with exempting conditions, 
the ISP cannot modify the information, must comply with conditions on access 
to the information and rules regarding the updating of information prevailing 
in that industry, and cannot interfere with the legal use of widely recognized and 
used technology by the industry to obtain data on the use of the information; and 
fi nally, the ISP should remove or disable access to the information expeditiously upon 
knowing the fact that the information at the initial source has been removed from the 
Internet, or by following the order from a court or an administrative authority.186
179  Peguera M, ‘Th e DMCA Safe Harbors and Th eir European Counterparts: A Comparative Analysis of Some 
Common Problems’ (2009) 32 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 481, at 483.
180 E-commerce Directive (n1), Art. 21.
181 Ibid, Recital 40.
182 In Chapter 5, the notice-and-takedown procedures in the EU Member States will be discussed in detail.
183 E-commerce Directive (n1), Art. 12.
184 Ibid, Art. 12.
185 Ibid, Art. 13.
186 Ibid. 
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  Th e ISPs hosting a storage space for their users also enjoy liability exemption under 
the EU Directive, on the condition that: the hosting ISP “does not have actual 
knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is 
not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is 
apparent;” and “upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to 
remove or disable access to the information.”187 Th e previously-mentioned liability 
exemption only applies when the recipient of the service is not acting under the 
authority or the control of the provider.188 By comparing these elements above to 
that provided in US law, we can fi nd that the elements like “control” and “direct 
benefi ts” from vicarious liability are not adopted by the EU Directive.189 Because 
unlike in the US where the vicarious liability has already been developed as a 
common rule in tort law by case law, in the EU, the vicarious liability only applies 
when the direct infringer aﬃ  liates to the defendant, and it’s too hard to prove that 
this kind of aﬃ  liating relationship exists between a hosting ISP and its users.190 
  Th e E-commerce Directive contains several general provisions that cover all three 
types of ISPs. First, Member States must not impose a general obligation on ISPs to 
monitor the information which they transmit or store, or a general obligation actively 
to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.191 Second, the Member 
States may provide that, at the request of competent authorities, the ISPs should 
forward the information enabling the identifi cation of recipients of their service 
who commit alleged infringement to these authorities.192 Th ird, the EU Directive 
indicates that injunctions can be ordered by courts or administrative authorities 
to require ISPs to terminate or prevent any infringement, such as removing illegal 
information and disabling access to it.193
2.2.3 Internet Regulation in China
  When it came to the late of 1990s, with the prevalence of the Internet in China, 
more and more cases about copyright infringement on the Internet were appealed 
to the courts. For instance, in 1999, a hosting ISP was held liable for making two 
literary works publicly available on its platform upon a users’ request but without 
the copyright owner’s authorization.194 Nevertheless, the legislators in China didn’t 
187 Ibid, Art. 14.
188 Ibid. 
189  Peguera, ‘Th e DMCA Safe Harbors and Th eir European Counterparts: A Comparative Analysis of Some Common 
Problems’ (n175), at 491.
190  Wang Q and Guibault L, Study on Online Copyright Regulation in China and Europe, (Law Press 2008), at 83.
191 E-commerce Directive (n1), Art. 15.
192 Ibid.
193  E-commerce Directive (n1), Recital 45. Th e detailed discussion can be found in Section 4.3.2. “repeat infringement 
in the EU”.
194  Th is case was heard by Haidian District Court (fi rst instance) and Beijing 1st Intermediate People’s Court (Second 
Instance), and both courts held the defendant liable. In 2000, this case was selected as a leading case by Supreme 
Peoples’ Court. See Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court No.1/2000 (最高人民法院公报2000年第1期), at 28.
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prepare well for providing a new regulation about this complicated issue at that time, 
so in order to solve the problems which had already emerged, in 2000 the Supreme 
Peoples’ Court in China promulgated a Judicial Interpretation relevant to resolving 
copyright disputes on the internet, particularly about ISPs’ liability, which used the 
DMCA 512 as an important reference.195 According to this Interpretation, the ISP 
which participates in, instigates, or assists in, copyright infringement by a third 
party, must take the infringing liability jointly with the third party;196 the hosting 
ISP which actually knows its subscriber’ infringement through its internet, or after 
receiving an evidential warning notice from copyright owners, but still doesn’t take 
measures to eliminate infringement, will take responsibility for the infringement;197 
the hosting ISPs must oﬀ er the registration information of infringers to copyright 
owners, if the copyright owners ask for this information for launching suits against 
the infringers;198 only the competent notice is valid, which should include the proof 
of the notifi er’s own identity, the proof of his copyright ownership and the proof 
of the infringement;199 an ISP shall be exempted from the liability of breaching the 
contract, if it removes the alleged infringing content by following the competent 
notice; a copyright owner shall be responsible for the damage caused by his wrong 
notice.200 
  In the following years after promulgating the Internet Interpretation (2000), 
the development of the Internet went far beyond the expectation of the People’s 
Supreme Court when providing this Interpretation, which means a lot of cases 
involving new technologies could not be regulated within the framework of this 
Judicial Interpretation. On the other side, the provisions in Internet Interpretation 
(2000) was so general that it left a lot of room for the lower courts to interpret in 
terms of their understanding, which resulted to major problems in judicial practice. 
Th erefore, in order to solve the above-mentioned problems, in 2006, the State 
Council in China enacted the Regulation on the Protection of the Right to Internet 
Dissemination of Information (thereafter “Internet Regulation”).
  According to the Article 20, where any internet service provider provides the service 
of automatic access pursuant to the direction of its service recipients or provides the 
service of automatic transmission of works, performance and audio-visual products 
to its service recipients and if the following requirements are satisfi ed, it is not 
195  Supreme People’s Court (最高人民法院), Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Issues Related 
to the Application of Law in the Trial of Cases Involving Computer Network Copyright Disputes (最高人民法
院关于审理涉及计算机网络著作权纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的解释) (thereafter Internet Interpretation 
(2000)), Fa Shi [2000] No. 48 (法释[2000]48号), November 22, 2000.
196 Ibid, Art. 4.
197 Ibid, Art. 5.
198 Ibid, Art. 6.
199 Ibid, Art. 7.
200 Ibid, Art. 8.
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required to undertake the liabilities of compensation: 201 (1) having not chosen or 
altered the transmitted works, performance and audio-visual recordings; or (2) 
providing the works, performance and audio-visual recordings to the designated 
service recipients and preventing any person other than the designated service 
recipients from obtaining access. Compared to relevant provisions in DMCA and 
the EU directive, the Internet Regulation doesn’t require that the information 
transmitted cannot be stored longer than a reasonable period.
  As provided in Article 21, Where an Internet service provider obtains the relevant 
works, performance and audio-visual products from any other internet service 
provider for the purpose of elevating the eﬃ  ciency of internet transmission to 
store the aforesaid works and provides them to the service recipients automatically 
according to the technical arrangement and in case the following requirements 
are satisfi ed, it is not required to undertake the liabilities of compensation: 202 (1) 
Having not altered any of the works, performance or audio-visual products that are 
automatically stored; (2) Having not aﬀ ected the original internet service provider 
of the works, performance and audio-visual products in controlling the use of the 
relevant works, performance and audio-visual products; or (3) When the original 
internet service provider revises, deletes or shields the works, performance and 
audio-visual products, automatically revising, deleting or shielding according to the 
technical arrangement. By comparing to DMCA 512 and the EU Directive, the 
Internet Regulation does more favor to ISPs who run a caching system, because it 
doesn’t require the ISPs to delete or remove the infringing contents in their system 
even after they know these contents are infringing the law.
  Th e third “safe harbor” in Internet Regulation is provided to hosting ISPs, which 
is described in Article 22. Where an Internet service provider provides information 
memory space to its service recipients, for whom it transmits the works, performance 
and audio-visual products to the general public through the information internet 
and in the case where the following requirements are satisfi ed, he is not required 
to undertake the liabilities of compensation: 203 (1) clearly indicating that the 
information memory space is provided to the service recipients and publicizing the 
name, contact person and web address of the internet service provider; (2) having 
not altered the works, performance and audio-visual products that are provided to 
the service recipients; (3) having no knowledge of and no justifi able reason to be 
aware of the infringement of the works, performance and audio-visual products; 
(4) having not obtained any direct economic benefi t from the works, performance 
and audio-visual products provided by its service recipients; and (5) after receiving 
a warning notice from the copyright owners, deleting those works, performance and 
201 Internet Regulation (网络条例) (n1), Art. 20.
202 Ibid, Art. 21.
203 Ibid, Art. 22.
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audio-visual products alleged as infringing ones by copyright owners according to 
this Internet Regulation. 
  Article 23 confers the last “safe harbor” to ISPs who run an information location 
service. 204 Where an Internet service provider oﬀ ering any searching or linking 
service to its service recipients cuts oﬀ  the link to any infringing work, performance, 
or audio-visual product after receiving a warning notice from the rights owner 
according to the provisions of Internet regulation, it is not required to undertake 
the liabilities of compensation. However, where anyone is actually aware of or 
should have known that any of the works, performance or audio-visual products it 
has linked to constitute any infringement, it shall be subject to the liabilities of joint 
infringement. 
  Th e Internet Regulation provides a detailed “notice-and-takedown” procedure, 
including the contents of the notice, the responsibility of ISPs, the contents of 
counter-notice, the liability of mistaken deletion, which refers a lot to DMCA 512. 
As provided in Article 14, the notice should at least include the following contents: 
(1) Name, contact information and address of the owner; (2) Th e names of the 
infringed works, performance and audio-visual products that are required to be 
deleted or the names of the web addresses whose link is required to be cut oﬀ ; and 
(3) Th e preliminary evidential materials for proving infringement. After receiving 
a notice from the rights owner, the internet service provider should immediately 
delete the relevant works, performance and audio-visual products as suspected of 
infringement or cut oﬀ  the link to the relevant works, performance and audio-
visual products as suspected of infringement and should simultaneously transfer 
the notice to the service recipients that transmit the relevant works, performance 
and audio-visual products. Where the web address of a service recipient is not clear 
and therefore a transfer is impossible, the notice contents should be simultaneously 
announced on the information internet.205 If the service recipient, who receives 
the notice concerning deletion from the ISP, deems that the deleted content does 
not infringe any other’s copyright, it may fi le a written counter-notice to request 
restoring the deleted content, and the counter-notice should contain the following 
elements: (1) Th e name (title), contact method and address of the service object; 
(2) Th e names of the works, performance, audio-visual products as well as web 
addresses as requested for recovery; and (3) Th e preliminary evidential materials 
for proving non-infringement.206 After receiving a written statement from a service 
recipient, the internet service provider should immediately recover the deleted 
works, performance and audio-visual products or recover the link to the works, 
performance and audio-visual products and should transfer the written statement 
204 Ibid, Art. 23.
205 Ibid, Art. 15.
206 Ibid, Art. 16.
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of the service recipient to the relevant copyright owner simultaneously, who cannot 
request the internet service provider to delete the works, performance and audio-
visual products or to cut oﬀ  the relevant link any longer.207 Eventually, if the relevant 
ISP, as a result of the copyright owner’s notice, wrongly deletes or cuts oﬀ  the link 
to any work, performance or audio-visual product and therefore causes any loss 
to its service recipient, the copyright owner shall be subject to the liabilities of 
compensation.208 From this Article, it can be inferred that the ISPs don’t need to be 
responsible for wrong deletion by carrying out the copyright owners’ notices. 
  Th e Chinese Internet Regulation also includes a provision about disclosing the 
identity information of alleged infringers. However, according to Article 13, the 
administrative department of copyrights may, with a view to investigating the 
infringements upon the right to internet dissemination of information, require the 
relevant internet service provider to provide such materials as the names, contact 
information, and the web addresses of its service recipients who are suspected of 
infringement. Furthermore, if any Internet service provider refuses or delays to 
provide such Internet materials as the name, contact information and web address of 
its service recipients as suspected of infringement, the administrative department of 
copyright must give it a warning. In the event of serious circumstances, equipment 
such as computers that are mainly applied to providing the Internet services will be 
confi scated.209
  In addition, the Regulation lacks an important provision which clarifi es that the 
ISPs should not be required to undertake a general obligation to monitor the 
information that they transmit or store, or a general obligation actively to seek 
facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity. Without the clear provision about 
general monitoring liability, the courts bear diﬀ erent opinions about this issue, 
which leads to confusion in judicial practice.210
  Since 2012, the National Copyright Administration (China) has published three 
versions of an amending draft of Copyright Law, and all of them include an 
identical Article regulating the liability of ISPs. To begin with, this article makes 
a declaration about ISPs’ general monitoring liability as following: when internet 
service providers provide storage, search, linking and other purely technological 
internet services to internet users, they do not bear a duty to monitor the information 
concerning copyright or related rights.211 Th e following content of this article is 
similar as what provided in Tort Law. As provided in this article, where users use 
207 Ibid, Art. 17.
208 Ibid, Art. 24.
209 Ibid, Art. 25.
210 It will be discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.1.3. 
211  National Copyright Oﬃ  ce, Amending Draft of Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和
国著作权法修正草案), First Draft (March 2012), Art. 69; Second Draft (July 2012), Art. 69; Th ird Draft (June 
2014), Art. 73. Th e amending draft is currently still pending.
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the Internet to conduct copyright infringing activities or related rights, the injured 
person may notify the ISP in writing, and require it to adopt necessary measures 
such as deletion, shielding, breaking links, etc. Where the Internet service provider 
adopts the necessary measures in a timely manner after receipt of the notifi cation, 
it does not bear liability for compensation; where it does not promptly adopt the 
necessary measures, it bears joint and several liability with the said Internet user. 
Where Internet service providers know or should know that Internet users use their 
Internet services to infringe copyright, and do not adopt necessary measures, they 
bear joint and several liability with the said Internet users.212 Generally speaking, the 
Article in this amending draft makes no concrete change to the current framework 
of regulating ISPs’ liability except for declaring that there is no requirement of 
general monitoring liability undertaken by ISPs.
  Compared with the above-mentioned revision draft of copyright law which just 
provides some general and abstract rules about the ISPs’ liability, the Judicial 
Interpretation issued by the Supreme People’s Court tended to be more detailed 
and easier to enforce. After the promulgation of the Internet Regulation, the courts 
in China heard many relevant cases, but when applying the Internet Regulation, 
diﬀ erent courts had diﬀ erent interpretations of the same regulation, and sometimes 
two courts came to totally opposite decisions based on  very similar case facts, all of 
which lead into a confusion between the ISPs and copyright-owning communities. 
Th erefore, based on the research about both domestic and overseas cases, and 
consulting with relevant industrial benefi ciaries and scholars, the Supreme 
People’s Court issued “Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Issues 
Related to the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Cases Involving Disputes 
over Infringement of the Right of Dissemination through Information Networks 
(thereafter Internet Provisions),”213 which provides responses to the problems in 
judicial practice. Th e contents of Internet Provisions will be discussed in detail 
when Chinese case law is analyzed in the following chapters.
To sum up, after the fi rst “safe harbor” provisions were adopted in the US, the EU and 
China also enacted their own “safe harbor” provision by referring to relevant rules in the 
US DMCA §512. By comparing the “safe harbor” provisions in the US, EU and China, 
one can fi nd that the liability exemption is granted to diﬀ erent types of ISPs so as to ensure 
the ISPs’ freedom to operate and promote the development of the Internet industry. 
With regard to hosting ISPs, many common points can be drawn from the “safe harbor” 
212 Ibid.
213  Supreme People’s Court, Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Issues Related to the Application 
of Law in the Trial of Civil Cases Involving Disputes over Infringement of the Right of Dissemination through 
Information Networks (最高人民法院关于审理侵害信息网络传播权民事纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的
规定), Fa Shi [2012] No. 20 (法释〔2012〕20号) November 26, 2012.
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provisions discussed above. First, hosting ISPs have no general obligation to monitor the 
materials uploaded on their platforms (in China it is still uncertain at legislative level). 
Second, in order to benefi t from liability exemption, hosting ISPs should not know 
the infringement in question, or upon knowing the infringement, hosting ISPs should 
expeditiously remove the infringing materials. Th ird, in the light of the “safe harbor” 
provisions in the US and China, courts need to take into account whether hosting ISPs 
receive direct benefi t from infringement when deciding whether to grant them liability 
exemption. Fourth, the US and EU require hosting ISPs to take certain measures against 
repeated infringement. Fifth, notice-and-takedown procedures have been codifi ed in the 
US and China. Sixth, hosting ISPs need to fulfi ll certain obligations, such as disclosing 
suspected users’ identities to copyright owners or competent authorities. 
Table 1*
No Monitoring 
Obligation
Knowledge Direct Benefi t Repeated 
Infringement 
NT Procedure Identity Disclosure
US √ √ √ √ √ √
EU √ √ × √ × √
China × √ √ × √ √
*   is Table describes a general comparison between “safe harbor” provisions in the US, EU and China. “√” means that the 
“safe harbor” provisions in this jurisdiction include the corresponding elements, and “×” means not. To be mentioned, even 
though two jurisdictions are both featured with “√” under one element, it does not mean these two jurisdictions have the 
same provisions on this element. Because of the limitation of this Table, the di erent provisions on one element in di erent 
jurisdictions cannot be demonstrated by this Table, and these di erences will be exploited in the following chapters. In addition, 
even though a jurisdiction is featured with “×” under one element, as shall be seen in the following chapters, it does not mean 
the courts in this jurisdiction do not take into account this element when deciding upon a hosting ISPs’ liability.
2.3 Conclusion:
Regarding indirect copyright infringement, there is not so much harmonization 
at international level, so the rules about indirect copyright infringement are mainly 
rooted in national law, and the relevant rules in each nation are diﬀ erent from each 
other. In the US, the courts have developed contributory infringement and vicarious 
liability to deal with indirect copyright infringement. In the EU, except the UK where 
authorization infringement and joint tortfeasance have been developed to regulate 
indirect infringement issues in the copyright fi eld, the other Member States, such as 
France, Germany and Italy, deal with indirect copyright infringement by referring to 
general tort law rules. In China, the courts also refer to liability rules in general tort 
law, when hearing cases about indirect copyright infringement. Nevertheless, in order 
to ensure the freedom to operate of hosting ISPs, a liability limitation rule called “safe 
harbor” provisions has been commonly adopted in the US, EU and China. Further, 
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the “safe harbor” provisions are not only related to deciding whether hosting ISPs need 
to be liable for copyright infringement on their platforms, but also bring in several 
mechanisms, in the light of which hosting ISPs need to fulfi ll certain obligations for the 
purpose of copyright enforcement on their platforms, so “safe harbor” provisions play an 
important role in regulating hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate. In addition, although the 
“safe harbor” provisions in the US, EU and China have their own characteristics, they 
are homogenous per se and share many common norms. Th erefore, in this respect, the 
norms on hosting ISPs’ liability have reached a certain level of harmonization in the US, 
EU and China. However, as noted by Mousourakis, “law is more than simply a body of 
rules or institutions; it is also a social practice within a legal community” and “this social 
practice... shapes the actual meaning of the rules and institutions, their relative weight, 
and the way they are implemented and operate in society.”214 When interpreting “safe 
harbor” provisions, the courts in the US, EU and China will be unavoidably aﬀ ected by 
the legal norms rooted in their traditions, especially the rules about indirect copyright 
infringement. Th erefore, in order to preserve maximum freedom for hosting ISPs to 
operate in the US, EU and China, it is necessary to review how their responsibilities 
for copyright infringement are tailored by the courts under the roof of “safe harbor” 
provisions in these jurisdictions, which will be done in the following chapters.
214  Mousourakis G, ‘Transplanting Legal Models across Culturally Diverse Societies: A Comparative Law Perspective’ 
(2010) 57 Osaka University Law Review 87, at 90.
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Introduction:
Traditionally, courts held distributers and publishers strictly liable for any copyright 
infringement that appeared in their publications.215 In others words, publishers are 
responsible for the copyright infringing content supplied by others but appearing in 
their publications. However, the hosting ISPs, who also distribute information supplied 
by others, are not held strictly liable for copyright infringing content that the ISPs 
distribute. Th e signifi cant question is why the law treats similar acts diﬀ erently depending 
on the source of distribution. Th e stated reason is the theoretical ability to control for 
potential copyright infringing acts.216 A publisher, before it distributes any information 
originating from others to the public, needs to screen, select and edit it, which then 
makes the publisher responsible for the content that it distributes.217 In essence, the 
editorial process of selection and organization makes the publisher the “author” of 
the infringing work.218 By contrast, a qualifi ed hosting ISP does not screen, select, or 
edit the information uploaded by Internet users, but only stores the information on 
its system at the direction of its users.219 Many countries have adopted this policy into 
law. For example, the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary adopted this 
concept of liability in its report, stating, “information that resides on the system or 
network operated by or for the service provider through its own act or decisions and not 
at the direction of a user does not fall within the liability limitation of subsection (c).”220 
So, generally, the strict “liability is (only) ruled out for passive, automatic acts engaged 
in through a technological process initiated by another.”221 Similarly, the E-commerce 
Directive also states that the exemption from liability established in the Directive covers 
only cases “where the activity of the information society service provider is limited to the 
technical process of operating … activity is of a mere technical automatic and passive 
nature.”222  Further, in China, the hosting ISPs must not alter the works, performance 
and audio-visual products that are provided by the service recipients.223 Th erefore, in 
order to qualify for the liability limitation or safe harbor, the hosting ISPs should retain 
a passive and technical role during the transmission of content supplied by their users 
so as to avoid moving from being a passive conduit protected by the various safe harbor 
laws to being a publisher strictly liable for the content that it distributes. 
215  Schuerman E, ‘Internet Service Providers and Copyright Liability-Don’t Touch... Or at Least Not Too Much: 
CoStar v. LoopNet’ (2005), 30 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 573, at 575.
216 Spinello RA, Regulating Cyberspace:  e Policies and Technologies of Control (Quorum Books. 2002), at 135-136.
217  Scruers M, ‘ Th e History and Economics of ISP Liability for Th ird Party Content’ (2002) , 88 Virginia Law Review 
205, at 233.
218 Ibid, at 245.
219  Bayer J, Liability of Internet Service Providers for Th ird Party Content (2008) 1 Victoria U. Wellington Working 
Paper Ser. 1, at 6-7.
220 Congress U.S., Senate Report, No. 105-190 (1998), at 43.
221 H.R. Rep. No. 105-551 (II) (n16), pt. 1, at 11.
222 E-commerce Directive (n1), recital 42.
223 Internet Regulation (网络条例) (n1), Art. 22.
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However, the hosting service oﬀ ered by ISPs has been signifi cantly developed in the past 
decade. Before, the contents of hosting websites were almost completely created and 
organized by the Internet users. Nowadays, with the aim of reaching a better position 
in the market, hosting ISPs always take some measures to optimize their service, such 
as facilitating or restraining the creation of certain kinds of content, making Internet 
users access their desired content more easily by designing specifi c web frames, and 
generating profi t by displaying ads with relevant content. 224 Can these developed 
hosting ISPs still conform to the defi nition of “a passive and technical role”? Th e relevant 
legislations drafted 10 years ago cannot give us a clear answer, so the more recent judicial 
decisions on this issue need to be analyzed. However, it seems that the courts in diﬀ erent 
jurisdictions (applying national laws and local canons of statutory construction) make 
diﬀ erent interpretations about “a passive and technical role”, so it is necessary to compare 
the relevant cases in these diﬀ erent jurisdictions and then to analyze the relevant factors 
considered by the courts, and fi nally determine the decisive factors on which there needs 
to be a focus, so as to preserve maximum freedom for hosting ISPs to conduct business 
in the US, EU and China.
Th is chapter fi rst explores how the courts in China interpret the “alteration” of uploads 
so as to disqualify the less passive hosting ISPs for “safe harbor” provisions (3.1). Th en, 
it examines the factors on the basis of which the courts in the EU (France, Germany, 
Italy and the UK) consider hosting ISPs to be content providers like publishers (3.2). In 
the US, hosting ISPs’ competence for “safe harbor” provisions has also been challenged 
before the courts, and this chapter (3.3) discusses the US case law ruling on what is a 
prescribed hosting ISP in the “safe harbor” provisions. Based on the comparison between 
China, the EU and US, it summarizes and evaluates the relevant factors considered 
by courts when deciding on the hosting ISPs’ competence for “safe harbor” provisions 
(3.4). Th e factors evaluated in Section 3.4 can be seen as conducting a certain degree 
of management on the uploaded contents, so the next Section discusses whether a 
hosting ISP should be required to keep purely passive or allowed to conduct certain 
management, and then draw a criterion for deciding what is a qualifi ed hosting ISP 
defi ned in “safe harbor” provisions (3.5). Finally, it summarizes and concludes the 
fi ndings in the previous sections (3.6).
224  de Azevedo Cunha, M. V., Marin, L., & Sartor, G., ‘Peer-to-peer privacy violations and ISP liability: data protection 
in the user-generated web’ (2012) 2 International Data Privacy Law 50, at 50-51.
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3.1 China
Chinese law does not explicitly require hosting ISPs to maintain a passive role when 
transmitting the information, but this requirement can be deduced from Article 22 (2) 
requiring hosting ISPs not to alter the works, performance, or audio-visual products 
that are provided by the service recipients.225 If the hosting ISPs actively alter contents 
uploaded by users, it means that they no longer play a passive role; and under certain 
circumstances, the altered contents will be seen legally as the ISPs’ own content. 
Th erefore, how to defi ne the “alteration” becomes an important question before Chinese 
courts. In the following factual scenarios, Chinese courts have found that the hosting 
ISP had suﬃ  ciently altered the user-supplied-content to be held liable.
3.1.1 Displaying Hosting ISPs’ Logo
  In the case of Hua Xia Shu Ren vs. Youku, the defendant, Youku was a video-
sharing website similar to Youtube, and the plaintiﬀ , Hua Xia Shu Ren owned the 
copyright to the alleged infringed works. In this case, the plaintiﬀ  found some of 
its copyrighted works being illegally uploaded by a network user called “Qilingjiao” 
to the defendant’s website Youku, and then sued Youku for copyright infringement. 
According to the evidence exhibited during the hearing, when a user clicked on the 
alleged infringing videos, before the videos started to play, the screen turned black 
temporarily and showed the defendant’s logo “youku.com”.  Furthermore, during 
the playing of videos, the defendant’s logo always appeared at the upper right corner 
of videos. Based on these facts, the Haidian District Court in Beijing held that these 
logos did not exist in plaintiﬀ ’s videos, and also the logos could not be added by 
the users when uploading the videos, so these logos must have been added either 
by the defendant itself, or automatically added by responding software when the 
users uploaded the videos. In either case the defendant altered the alleged infringing 
videos uploaded by users through the adding of its logos, which functioned as an 
original sign of these videos.226 If one follows the logic of the court’s conclusion, 
it seems that, by adding logos into the videos, the defendant treated the videos as 
its own content, or at least made users believe those videos were coming from the 
defendant.
3.1.2 Inserting the Advertisements 
  In the case of joy.cn v. 6room.com, the plaintiﬀ  joy.cn was a video portal site which 
bought licenses for internet transmission from the copyright owners and then 
made those videos accessible to the public on its website. Th is service was similar 
to that provided by Hulu. Th e defendant 6room.com was a video-sharing website 
225 Ibid.
226  Guang Dian Wei Ye v. youku.com (广电伟业 v. 优酷), Beijing Haidian District Court (北京海淀区法院), (2008) 
Hai Min Chu Zi No. 9200 (2008海民初字 9200).
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for network users to upload videos, which streamed some videos, for which the 
plaintiﬀ  had exclusive licenses for Internet transmission. According to the facts 
recognized by the court, before and after the playing of alleged infringing videos, 
6room.com displayed advertisements, and whenever a viewer clicked on the pause-
button, an advertisement would also appear.  Furthermore, it was impossible for 
Internet users to add these advertisements when uploading, so defendant must have 
pre-integrated the advertisements into fl ash-player. Th erefore, the court concluded 
that 6room actually altered the alleged infringing videos supplied by Internet users 
when it added advertisements.227
3.1.3 Generating a Collection of Uploaded Content
  In the case of Guang Dian Wei Ye v. youku.com, Internet users uploaded episodes 
from a TV series owned by the plaintiﬀ  Guang Dian Wei Ye onto the defendant’s 
website without permission, so the plaintiﬀ  sued the defendant Youku for copyright 
infringement. During the hearing, the court found that the defendant’s website 
contained three collections consisting of episodes from this TV series, which 
facilitated the viewing of the infringing episodes.228 Although the defendant claimed 
that each of the three collections were automatically produced when users clicked 
over from one relevant video to another a suﬃ  cient number of times to draw the 
connection rather than any aﬃ  rmative editing doing so, the court held that this 
argument was not convincing, because the clicking over in the second collection 
amounted to a mere 277 clicks which were far fewer than for a normal technical 
system to automatically create a collection. Th erefore, the court concluded that 
these three collections were edited and integrated by the defendant itself. Above all, 
the court held that the defendant altered the videos uploaded by internet users.229 
To sum up, the interpretation of hosting ISP alteration of user-supplied content by 
Chinese jurisdictions can be divided into three types: fi rst, a loose standard, where 
adding anything into the uploaded contents may constitute alteration, such as pop-
up ads; second, a more moderate standard, focusing on whether the viewers could 
believe the content was oﬀ ered by the hosting ISP, an example of indicia which could 
be displaying logos when the contents are viewed, which may confuse the viewers about 
the origin of content; third, a strict standard, where the hosting ISPs need to edit and 
227  joy.cn v. 6room.com (激动网v.6房间), Beijing Haidian District Court (北京海淀区法院), (2008) Hai Min Chu 
Zi No. 22186 (2008海民初字9200).
228  Generally, the internet users need to upload the episodes one by one, so the uploaded episodes scatter through the 
network system without good order, and it is not convenient for viewers to watch these episodes in sequence, even 
with the help of a built-in searching engine oﬀ ered by website. But the collection solves this problem, because it 
integrates the episodes of a TV series all together in sequence so that the viewers can easily fi nd the episodes they 
would like to watch by visiting the collection.
229  Guang Dian Wei Ye v. youku.com (广电伟业 v. 优酷), Beijing Haidian District Court (北京海淀区法院), (2008) 
Hai Min Chu Zi No. 14023 (2008海民初字 14023).
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integrate the uploaded content, similar to work done by publishers. While the courts have 
in practice applied three diﬀ erent standards; according to Guiding Opinions published 
by the Beijing Higher Court, the fi rst two standards are unreasonable.230 Although this 
Guiding Opinions is not a mandatory legal document, it still has widespread infl uence 
in China.231 As indicated in this Guiding Opinions, the following conduct should not 
be seen as altering the works, performances, or audio-visual products that are provided 
by service accepters: 1) simply altering the storage format of the works, performances, or 
audio-visual products; 2) simply adding digital watermarks, such as websites’ logos, onto 
the works, performances, or audio-visual products; 3) displaying ads before or after the 
playing of the works, performances, or audio-visual products, or pop-up ads during the 
playing of the works, performances, or audio-visual products.232 Furthermore, the Internet 
Provision (draft) published by the People’s Supreme Court also includes a similar article 
which exempts hosting ISPs from liability under the circumstances of altering storage 
formats or adding digital watermarks, but leaves the displaying of ads open.233 However, 
it must be mentioned that this article did not appear in the fi nal version of the Internet 
Provision which came into force from the beginning of 2013.234 It seems that the method 
of defi ning “alteration” provided in the Regulation still needs to be discussed further.
3.2 European Union 
As already mentioned above, the EU E-Commerce Directive specifi cally requires ISPs to 
maintain a passive role when transmitting information if they wish to avoid liability for 
copyright infringement. So in the EU, whether the hosting ISPs have kept to a passive role is 
always debated during hearings about hosting ISPs’ liability. Before the ECJ provided some 
guidance about how to decide whether a hosting ISP oversteps the border of passivity in 
Adwords decision235, the courts in member states have already made several decisions about 
this issue. Th is section fi rst examines the relevant case law in several member states, and then 
explores how the case law in member states interacts with the ECJ Adwords decision.
230  Beijing High People’s Court (北京市高级人民法院), Opinions of Beijing High Court on Several Issues 
Concerning Disputes about Internet Copyright Infringements (trial) (北京市高级人民法院关于网络著作权
纠纷案件若干问题的指导意（试行）) (thereafter “Guiding Opinions (指导意见)”), JingGaoFaFa[2010] No. 
166 (京高法发[2010] 166号), May 19, 2010. 
231  Unlike People’s Supreme Court in China, the Beijing High Court has no statutory rights to promulgate any judicial 
interpretation of general application. However, Beijing, as one of two cities (the other is Shanghai) covering most 
of the disputes about internet copyright infringements in China, always takes a lead in solving these disputes, and 
also has accumulated lots of judicial experience in this aspect. Th erefore, the Guiding Opinions provided by the 
Beijing Higher Court defi nitely has widespread infl uence in China, and will be used as an important reference by 
other courts.
232 Guiding Opinions (指导意见) (n229), Art. 24.
233 Internet Provisions (n208) (draft) (网络条例(草案)), Art. 13.
234 See the Internet Provisions (网络条例) (n208).
235  Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France SARL and Google Inc. v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA and Others, 
[2010] ECR I-02417. Th is case will be discussed in the end of this Section.
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3.2.1 France 
  In the case of Tiscali, copyright owners Dargaud Lomlard and Lucky Comics, 
noticed in January 2002 that, without their permission, their two comic albums 
had been entirely reproduced and were available on defendant Tiscali’s video-
sharing website. So, they sued Tiscali. During the appeal, the judges of the Paris 
Court of Appeal concluded that Tiscali also acted as a publisher, since the services 
provided went beyond the mere technical features defi ned as hosting. Th e appellate 
court stated the following reasons to support its fi ndings: First, “Tiscali Media oﬀ ers 
its users the feature of creating their personal pages from its website, www.tiscali.fr, 
and that goes beyond a merely technical service.” Second, “Tiscali Media has to be 
considered as a publisher as well (i.e. liable for the content), since it commercially 
exploits the website by oﬀ ering advertising space directly on personal web pages, 
such as www.chez.com/bdz.”236 In the fi nal instance, the First Civil Division of the 
French Supreme Court (also) considered these facts as suﬃ  cient to establish that the 
services provided by Tiscali went beyond the simple technical functions,237 although 
the Supreme Court did not hold Tiscali Media’ activities as those of a publisher.238 In 
a similar case involving a video-sharing website called “MySpace,” the French High 
Court of First Instance held that defendant MySpace was a publisher by following 
the same line of analysis, namely, “allowing members to create personal web pages 
within a specifi ed frame structure, including video uploading; and that each time a 
video posted by a member is viewed, advertisements from which MySpace profi ts, 
are broadcast.”239
  However, what is more interesting is that the First Civil Division of the French 
Supreme Court, which dealt with the Tiscali case, reached the totally opposite 
conclusion in the factually similar Dailymotion case, which it decided shortly after 
Tiscali. According to the court in the Dailymotion case, the key point is whether a 
hosting ISP tries to infl uence the uploaded contents or is just optimizing its service, 
and the following conduct by the defendant was proper. First, technical operations 
done by the defendant Dailymotion, such as “re-encoding videos in order to make 
them compatible with the viewing interface, and formatting them in order to make 
optimal use of the server’s storage capacity by limiting the size of uploaded fi les”, 
was necessary for running a hosting platform and irrelevant to selection of uploaded 
content.240 Second, Dailymotion’s optimization of its hosting service, such as
236  See Matulionyte R and Nérisson S, ‘Th e French Route to an ISP Safe Harbor, Compared to German and US Ways’ 
(2011) 42 International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law 56, at 58.
237 Ibid, at 59.
238 Ibid. 
239  Stephen W. Workman, Internet Law - Developments in ISP Liability in Europe, available at http://www.ibls.com/
internet_law_news_portal_view.aspx?id=2126&s=latestnews [last visited July 26, 2013].
240  Amélie Blocman, Liability of Video-sharing Platforms - First Judgement of Court of Cassation, available at http://
merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/2011/3/article18.en.html [last visited July 26, 2013].
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  “setting up of presentation frames and tools for classifying content,” was reasonable, 
because these measures met with the need of users to set up their own individual 
web pages and more easily access their desired content; more importantly, these 
measures imposed no infl uence over the content uploaded by users.241 Finally, using 
defendant’s website for displaying ads was just a way to make profi t, and would not 
infl uence the uploaded content.242
3.2.2 Italy
  In Italy, after the Supreme Court introduced a concept of “active hosting” in a 
criminal case against the Pirate Bay, Civil Courts also started to decide hosting ISPs’ 
liability by referring to the theory of active hosting.243 According to relevant judicial 
interpretation, active hosting means that the hosting ISP which is somewhat active 
(or minimally active) still cannot be treated as a publisher from a legal perspective, 
even though its conduct goes beyond being a merely “passive” ISP within the 
meaning of Recital 42 of the E-Commerce Directive, which provides the hosting 
ISP liability exemption.244 For instance, the District Court of Milan held IOL and 
Yahoo! as active hosting ISPs based on their following activities: 
  
  1) they provided for a system that allowed the publication of advertising links related 
to the videos; 2) the user terms and conditions of the websites included a license 
agreement, according to which users grant IOL and Yahoo! inter alia the right to 
display, edit, adapt, modify and use the uploaded videos; 3) they provided a search 
engine service allowing the indexing of the uploaded videos and their contents, thus 
amplifying their visibility. Th is service also allowed the indexing of so-called related 
videos, ie videos which were related to those searched for by the person surfi ng the 
internet and using the service in question; 4) fi nally, IOL and Yahoo! uploaded 
some videos on their websites themselves.245 
  
  In another case, the District Court of Rome also held that YouTube was running an 
active hosting service, and the reasons were the following: 1) YouTube could properly 
control the uploaded contents, since the terms of service on its website indicated 
that YouTube had the right to remove any uploaded content, terminate users’ 
accounts, and unilaterally change the terms; 2) the YouTube organized the infringing
241 Ibid.
242 Ibid.
243  Bellan A, ‘Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries: Th e Position in Italy’ in 
Heath C and Sanders AK eds., Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries (Kluwer 
Law International 2012), at 108.
244  Bonadio E and Santo M, ‘Court of Milan holds video sharing platforms liable for copyright infringement’ (2012) 
7 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 14, at 15.
245 Ibid. 
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  content so as to make more revenue from ads, because, on its website, an internal 
search box could be used for indexing and fi nding infringing content.246 Based on 
similar criteria, the District Court of Rome concluded several other hosting ISPs to 
be actively hosting or staying neutral.247
3.2.3 Germany
  In Germany, under certain circumstances, hosting ISPs are liable as content-providers for 
their own content (die Haftung als Content-Provider fuer eigene Inhalte), which means, if a 
hosting ISP plays a content-provider-role, it shall be responsible for the content uploaded by 
users as if the content was oﬀ ered by the ISP itself. To determine under what circumstances 
a hosting ISP shall be deemed a content-provider, one must to refer to judicial decisions.
3.2.3.1 Photo Platform Pixum - OLG Hamburg
  In this case, the defendant operated a photo platform, called Pixum, for the public 
to upload photos. Pixum then charged subscribers for each download of one of these 
photos. Th e plaintiﬀ  was a photographer who found that three of his copyrighted 
photos were downloadable from Pixum, so he sued for copyright infringement. Th e 
Oberlandesgericht des (Higher Regional Court of ) Hamburg concluded that the 
defendant was a content provider rather than a hosting ISP, based on the following 
reasons: 1) the photos uploaded by users in the open-access album constituted the only 
substantial contents of the website; 2) each viewer of the website could put the chosen 
photos, which were in open-access albums, into their shopping carts, and then send 
them to their cell phones by clicking on the function-buttons of the website, by which 
it collected money from photos subscribers; 3) the invoices for this kind of service 
were under the signature of the defendant, and the uploading-users did not share 
the profi ts. Th erefore, the court held that, from the view of reasonable users, these 
photos were oﬀ ered by the website operator. Furthermore, unlike the unidentifi ed 
pseudonym used by the actual photo providers, the name and logo of the defendant, 
which moved as a background, was big and clearly visible. According to the terms and 
conditions of service set by the defendant, the uploaders of photos were required to 
grant part of their rights to the defendant so that the defendant could make money by 
oﬀ ering the photo service.248 Th ese two facts also persuaded the court to believe that 
these photos were oﬀ ered by the website operator, from the view of reasonable users. 
If we look into this decision, we can fi nd that the Higher Regional Court of Hamburg 
applied a standard called “from the view of reasonable users” so as to decide whether 
user generated content should be treated as the hosting ISPs’ own content.
246  See Bellan, ‘Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries: Th e Position in Italy’ 
(n238), at 110-111.
247 Ibid.
248 See OLG Hamburg, ZUM 2009, 642, at 645 – Pixum.
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3.2.3.2 Platform for Photos Exchange – KG Berlin
  In this case, the defendant operated a platform for its users to exchange their photos, 
and the Plaintiﬀ  found his photos were publicly accessible on the defendant’s platform 
without his permission, so he sued the defendant for infringement.249 Based on the 
following reasons, the Appeal Court of Berlin concluded the defendant was a content 
provider: 1) the defendant received 40 percent of fees paid by the users who downloaded 
the photos, and the rest of fees were distributed to the users who oﬀ ered these photos 
for sale; 2) the uploaded photos went through a selecting and checking procedure 
before they were publicly accessible; 3) the copyright owners of the photos were pointed 
out, but in an unnoticeable way; 4) in the front part of the website, the corresponding 
philosophy of the operator was displayed under its logo, which was “publish modern 
and time-spiritual photos.” Th e above-mentioned facts would lead objective viewers to 
conclude that the operator of this platform was providing the public-accessible photos 
by itself.250 Th erefore, in the light of the understanding by the Appeal Court of Berlin, 
making profi ts, editing uploaded content, and the overall design of a website may 
attribute content to a hosting ISP. What is meant by an objective viewer? Inferring from 
judicial decisions, it has the same substantial meaning as “reasonable user.”
3.2.3.3 YouTube – LG Hamburg 
  In this case, the plaintiﬀ  found a music work which he owned, publicly accessible 
on YouTube, so he sued YouTube for copyright infringement. Landesgericht des 
(Regional Court of ) Hamburg concluded that YouTube was a content provider 
because: 1) the logo of YouTube appeared on the upper right corner of videos, due 
to a pre-designed website frame, but, in contrast, the pseudonym of the uploading 
users is very small and appears on a separate part of the website from the videos; 
2) the defendant sorts the uploaded videos into diﬀ erent categories,251 and when 
a video is clicked, similar videos will show up on the right side of the webpage 
automatically; 3) YouTube commercially exploits the uploaded videos by selling 
ad space, and requires the uploaders to grant it the right to use these videos.252 
As for commercial exploitation, the court further stated that only the commercial 
exploitation of the third parties’ content cannot transform an internet hosting 
platform to the content provider, but the active integration of third parties’ content 
249  Actually, it’s a case about portrait right rather than copyright, because the plaintiﬀ  is the person who was 
photographed in the picture but not the person who photographed the picture. However, the court in this case 
made a very detailed analysis about under what circumstances a hosting ISP shall be seen as content provider, so it 
deserves to be discussed.
250  See KG: Internetplattform zum Austausch von Fotodateien, 2010 MMR 203, at 204.
251  YouTube argued that it did not sort the uploaded videos into diﬀ erent categories, but it was the uploaders who decided 
which category they would upload the videos to, using the uploading conduit. However, the court rejected this 
argument, because it believed that, as objective viewers, they did not know about the above-said categorizing process. 
252  See LG Hamburg: Haftung eines Plattformbetreibers – YouTube, 2010 MMR 833, at 834.
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into the host platform’s own commercial oﬀ ers can result in liability.253 
3.2.3.4 Chefkoch.de - BGH
  In this case, the defendant operated a website called chefkoch.de, which allowed 
the public to upload cooking recipes and corresponding photos. Th e plaintiﬀ  ran 
a website called marions-kochbuch.de, which introduced cooking recipes with 
depicting pictures. Th e plaintiﬀ  found that some of his copyrighted cooking 
introductions had been uploaded to the defendant’s website, so he launched a suit 
against the defendant for copyright infringement. By comprehensive consideration 
of overall relevant facts, the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) concluded 
that the defendant was a content provider. First, in the light of existing evidence, the 
recipes were activated only after they had been edited, such as carefully selecting, 
checking the accuracy and completeness of the recipes, making sure that the 
characters of the recipes conformed to the standards of professional products, and 
then, through activation, the edited recipes were displayed on the website www.
chefkoch.de. Second, the recipes and corresponding photos were presented under 
the defendant’s logo, which was a cooking hat; furthermore, under the mode of 
print preview, the recipe also displayed under the defendant’s logo, which was much 
bigger than the concealed uploader’s alias.254 Th ird, the uploaders of recipes needed 
to agree that the uploaded contents, including recipes, photos, and text, could be 
copied or transmitted in other ways by the defendant itself and third parties. Fourth, 
the defendant exploited the recipes commercially. To summarize, from the view of 
an objective user, the defendant did not keep a serious and suﬃ  cient distance from 
the uploaded content, so it could not benefi t from the liability limitation enjoyed by 
pure internet-access, caching, and hosting ISPs as provided in the EU E-Commerce 
Directive.255
  To sum up, in Germany, the courts conclude whether the hosting ISP crosses the 
borderline as a passive ISP defi ned in the Directive, by following a standard called 
“from the view of objective users,” which means, if an objective user believes or has 
reason to believe the content on the platform is provided by hosting ISPs, then the 
hosting ISPs shall be treated as content providers and be subject to strict liability. 
Generally speaking, when applying this standard, the court will comprehensively 
consider whether the defendant has taken the following steps: implementing 
preliminary editorial control, integrating the uploaded content as the substantial 
editorial content of the website, inserting the website’s logo or digital water print 
253 Ibid.
254  According to the court’s opinion, normally the users needed to print out the recipes so as to read them in the 
kitchen, so the printing form of recipe was an important factor to consider when judging whether an objective 
viewer would believe the recipe was oﬀ ered by the defendant.
255  BGH: Verwendung fremder Fotografi en für Rezeptsammlung im Internet – marions-kochbuch.de, 2010 NJW-RR 
1276, at 1276-1278.
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  into third party’s content, transferring the using rights of uploaded content through 
“terms and conditions,” and commercially exploiting uploaded content by website 
operators.256
3.2.4 UK
  In the UK, the courts also examined whether hosting ISPs should be held as publisher 
from legal perspective in several cases. In the case of Tamiz v. Google, Google ran a 
platform “Blogger” which allowed Internet users to create their independent blogs, 
and the plaintiﬀ  Tamiz found that one blog hosted on Blogger published several 
articles which were defamatory of him, so he sent notices to Blogger and requested 
the takedown of the articles in question.257 After more than one month, the 
defamatory articles were voluntarily removed by the blogger, so Tamiz claimed that 
after being notifi ed, Google became a publisher who could control the defamatory 
articles and hence was liable.258 After examining the business model of Blogger, the 
Court of Appeal held that Google was not a publisher based on following reason. 
First, since 25000 new words was added to Blogger every minute, it was virtually 
impossible for Google to exercise editorial control over the contents hosted on 
Blogger.259 Second, being notifi ed could not convert Google’s status or role into 
that of a publisher.260 Th ird, being capable of taking down articles on Blogger was 
irrelevant to conclude whether Google had been a publisher.261 Besides, in this case, 
Google displayed advertisements on blogs hosted by it, and shared the advertising 
revenues with bloggers.262 But the court did not take it into account when deciding 
on Google’s legal status. Th erefore, whether making profi ts is not a factor to hold 
hosting ISPs as publishers in the UK.
  Further, whether a defendant is a competent hosting ISP or a publisher relies on 
whether the defendant controls or edits the content in question, and the hosting 
ISP’s controlling or editing of other contents is irrelevant. In the case of Kaschke v 
Gray and Hilton, Mr. Gray posted the blog alleged to be defamatory to Ms. Kaschke 
on the website which was controlled and operated by Mr. Hilton, so Ms. Kaschke 
sued both Mr. Gray and Mr. Hilton for infringement.263 According to the verifi ed
256  Klein, CJ, Haftung von Social-Sharing-Plattformen: Diensteanbieter zwischen Content-und Host-Providing (Beck. 
2012), at 72.
257  Tamiz v Google Inc., [2013] EWCA Civ 68, para. 1. Although this is a case about hosting ISPs’ liability for 
defamation, since the defamation issue is also covered by Article 19 of Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) 
Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/2013), this case is still a good example to inspect how the UK diﬀ erentiates between 
publishers and hosting ISPs.
258 Ibid, para. 2.
259 Ibid, para. 16.
260 Ibid.
261 Ibid. 
262 Ibid, para. 1.
263 Kaschke v Gray and Hilton, Queen’s Bench Division, [2010] EWHC 690 (QB).
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  facts, Mr. Hilton had exercised some editorial control on parts of website, especially 
the homepage, which went beyond the mere storage of information at the direction 
of Internet users.264 However, the court still held Mr. Hilton as a hosting ISP entitled 
to liability exemption, because it is irrelevant that the defendant had done editorial 
control on his website as a whole or its homepages or even the general storage of 
blog posts on his website, and in this case the real point was whether Mr. Hilton 
had done editorial control on the post which was the subject of the complaint from 
the plaintiﬀ .265 
In the EU, apart from the UK courts, the courts in France, Italy and Germany tend to 
hold hosting ISPs as publishers or entities similar to publishers from a legal perspective 
based on the following reasons, such as displaying advertisement, displaying logos, 
requesting the transfer of rights, setting diﬀ erent categories for uploading, editing the 
contents uploaded by users, etc. and then deprive hosting ISPs of “safe harbor” provisions. 
In the Google Adwords case, the ECJ discussed how to decide whether a defendant is 
still a competent hosting ISP protected by “safe harbor” provisions, and stated that, “it 
is necessary to examine whether the role played by that service provider is neutral, in the 
sense that its conduct is merely technical, automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of 
knowledge or control of the data which it stores.”266 Th us, the ECJ clarifi ed that merely 
setting the payment terms or providing general information to its clients cannot have 
the eﬀ ect of depriving Google of the exemptions from liability provided for in Directive 
2000/31.267 Th erefore, by following this line of judicial analysis, in determining whether 
an ISP plays a passive role, it is irrelevant whether it receives profi ts by selling ad space, 
and so is the displaying of logos and allowing users to set up their own individual web 
pages. With regard to requesting the transfer of rights, setting diﬀ erent categories for 
uploading, editing the contents uploaded by users, it needs to examine whether these 
measures leads to a hosting ISP’s knowledge or control of uploaded contents according 
to the facts in individual case.
3.3 United States
As the fi rst country which oﬃ  cially provided a “safe harbor” provision to limit ISPs’ 
liability, the United States courts also seem to interpret US law to broadly protect hosting 
ISPs from liability. So far, no hosting ISP has yet been treated as a content provider, even in 
a case where the defendant set a previewing procedure before allowing the user-uploaded 
photos to be displayed on its platform. In this case, the defendant, called LoopNet,
264 Ibid, Para. 77-80.
265 Ibid, Para. 89.
266 Google France SARL and Google Inc. v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA and Others (n230), para. 114.
267 Ibid, para. 116.
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operated a web hosting service that enabled users to post commercial real estate listings. 
According to “terms and conditions,” if a listing included a photograph, the user had 
to agree not to post copies of the photograph without authorization, and warrant that 
he or she had all necessary rights and authorizations from the copyright owner of the 
photograph. More importantly, a LoopNet employee would preview the photograph 
(1) to determine whether the photograph in fact depicted commercial real estate, and 
(2) to identify any obvious evidence, such as text message or copyright notice, that the 
photograph may have been copyrighted by another. If the photograph failed either one 
of these criteria, the employee deleted the photograph; otherwise, the employee would 
click the “accept” button.268 Th is previewing procedure implemented by employees is 
a typical editing procedure undergone by publishers before publishing any content, 
so as to ensure that the published content conforms to their needs. According to the 
relevant decisions in the EU, LoopNet would certainly be treated as a content provider. 
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that LoopNet 
still qualifi ed as a passive hosting ISP for the following reasons: 1) this previewing 
procedure for each photo took only seconds, which did not amount to “copying”, nor 
did it increase LoopNet’s volition in storing the copy; 2) the employee’s look was so 
cursory as to be insignifi cant, and if it had any signifi cance, it tended only to lessen 
the possibility that LoopNet’s automatic electronic responses would inadvertently 
enable others to trespass on a copyright owner’s rights.269 Th erefore, in the light of the 
Fourth Circuit’s opinion, the preview procedure was too short to make the uploaded 
photographs its own, and this procedure would only reduce the infringements, but not 
increase the infringements, both of which confi rmed that LoopNet still qualifi ed as a 
hosting ISP.
Actually, the LoopNet decision further lowered the threshold for avoiding direct liability 
formulated by the Netcom decision, which has been seen as one of the most important 
judicial references for the US legislators when they drafted DMCA 512.270 According 
to Netcom, Netcom did not take any aﬃ  rmative action that directly resulted in copying 
the plaintiﬀ s’ works other than by installing and maintaining a system whereby software 
automatically forwarded messages received from subscribers onto the Usenet, and 
temporarily stored copies on its system,271 which helped Netcom avoid undertaking 
direct infringement. So, generally, in order to enjoy liability exemption, no human 
intervention should be involved, which was not the case for LoopNet. Th erefore, some 
scholars summarized these two cases as follows: Netcom instructed service providers 
to not touch; Costar (the plaintiﬀ  in LoopNet case) instructs them to touch, but only 
268 See CoStar v. LoopNet, 373 F.3d 544, at 547 (4th Cir. 2004).
269 Ibid, at 556.
270 Patry WF, Patry on Copyright (Th omson/West. 2009), § 21:85.
271 Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-line Communications Services, Inc. (n4), at 1368.
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if it is not too much.272 In addition, the “not too much” standard has been further 
developed by other cases that apply the DMCA 512. For example, in case of Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. CCBill, LLC and CWIE, LLC, the defendant CWIE was a web hosting company, 
and the plaintiﬀ , Perfect 10, was a company who owned copyrights for a lot of porn 
photos. After fi nding some of its photos posted on websites hosted by CWIE, Perfect 
10 sued CWIE for copyright infringement. the United States District Court, C.D. 
California held that, merely because CWIE reviewed its sites to look for blatantly illegal 
and criminal conduct, that was not suﬃ  cient to close the safe harbor to CWIE; such 
a reading of the statute would not be in line with purpose of the DMCA to encourage 
internet service providers to work with copyright owners to locate and stop infringing 
conduct.273 Th erefore, according to this case law, the preview can be done for legal 
purposes, such as getting rid of illegal content.
With the development of Internet technologies, hosting ISPs have adopted multiple 
new functions on their platforms so as to attract more users. However, copyright owners 
may cite these new functions as the evidence to challenge hosting ISPs’ competence 
of being sheltered under the “safe harbor”. Generally, if the new functions run 
automatically, the US courts will conclude that the new functions do not negatively 
aﬀ ect defendants’ competence as hosting ISPs. First, “transcodes” is irrelevant to the 
competence of defendants. In the case of UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital 
Partners LLC, when a video was uploaded to the defendant’s video-sharing websites 
Veoh, it would be automatically broken down into smaller 256-kilobyte “chunks” so 
as to make the video accessible to the public.274 Besides, in order to make the video 
viewable on users’ computers and other portable devices, Veoh’s software automatically 
converted the video into Flash 7, Flash 8 and MPEG-4 formats.275 Th e court held 
that such automatic “transcodes” performed “for the purpose of facilitating access to 
user-stored material,” so Veoh was still a competent hosting ISP. Second, “playback” is 
irrelevant to the competence of defendants. In the case of Viacom International, INC. v. 
YouTube, INC., the defendant YouTube oﬀ ered users a “playback” function which would 
automatically “deliver copies of YouTube videos to a user’s browser cache” in response 
to a user request, and the court held that this function would not cost YouTube’s safe 
harbor.276 Th ird, “related videos” function is irrelevant to the competence of defendants. 
In the case of Viacom International, INC. v. YouTube, INC., the defendant YouTube 
ran a “related videos” function which could “identify and display ‘thumbnails’ of clips 
that are ‘related’ to the video selected by the user” based on the so-called computer 
272  See Schuerman E, ‘Internet Service Providers and Copyright Liability-Don’t Touch... Or at Least Not Too Much: 
CoStar v. LoopNet’, at 593.
273 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F.Supp.2d 1077, at 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
274 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, at 1027 (9th Cir.2011).
275 Ibid.
276 Viacom International, INC. v. YouTube, INC. (n7)
Chapter 3
74
algorithm, and the plaintiﬀ  claimed that this function constituted “content promotion” 
rather than facilitate accessing to stored content, and therefore fell out of the boundary 
of safe harbor.277 However, the court concluded that the “related video” function was still 
protected by safe harbor based on the following two reasons: 1) it “is fully automated 
and operates solely in response to user input without the active involvement of YouTube 
employees;” 2) it “serves to help YouTube users locate and gain access to material stored 
at the direction of other users,” which substantially functions as an access facilitator.278 
In fact, the defi nition of ISP provided in DMCA 512(k)(1) oﬀ ers a base for the US 
court to defi ne a competent hosting ISP in a broader sense. DMCA 512(k)(1) reads as 
follows:
(A) As used in subsection (a), the term “service provider” means an entity oﬀ ering the 
transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications, 
between or among points specifi ed by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, 
without modifi cation to the content of the material as sent or received.
(B) As used in this section, other than subsection (a), the term “service provider” 
means a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities 
therefore, and includes an entity described in subparagraph (A).
Th e defi nition of ISPs in sub-paragraph (A) only applies to Internet access providers 
which are regulated in subsection (a), so the requirements, such as “between or among 
points specifi ed by a user”, “of material of the user’s choosing” and “without modifi cation 
to the content,” are only applicable to Internet access providers.279 Th e hosting ISPs 
are covered by the defi nition in sub-paragraph (B), which does not render any specifi c 
requirement, especially in the absence of any restriction on modifying user-uploaded 
contents, so a competent hosting ISP should not be limited to a mere storage locker.280
3.4 Analysis on the Factors Involved in Deciding Hosting ISPs’ “Passivity”
According to the judicial decisions discussed above, one can fi nd in the US and UK, 
the courts set a low threshold for hosting ISPs to fall under “safe harbor” provisions, but 
the courts in China, France, Italy and Germany tend to deny hosting ISPs’ competency 
for “safe harbor” provisions for their lower level of passivity when providing services. 
After comparing the case law in China, France, Italy and Germany, it can be found that 
the courts in these jurisdictions do share some common reasons when concluding that 
277 Ibid, at 39.
278 Ibid, at 40.
279 Ibid, at 39.
280 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 620 F.Supp.2d 1081, at 1088 (C.D.Cal.2008).
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a defendant is not qualifi ed as a hosting ISP, such as commercially exploiting the user 
generated content, editing or categorizing the uploaded content, displaying its logo with 
uploaded contents, or requiring rights transfers by “terms and conditions.” Actually, just 
as stated at the beginning of this chapter, if one looks into the current business models 
adopted by the hosting ISPs, most of them will conform to at least one or two of these 
factors, which means they may not enjoy “safe harbor” anymore and be exposed to 
higher legal risk. In the following section, these factors will be evaluated to see whether 
they are proper reasons to shut hosting ISPs out of “safe harbor” provisions, and how to 
interpret these factors so as to preserve maximum freedom for hosting ISPs to operate.
3.4.1 Commercial Exploitation of Uploaded Content
  According to the judicial decisions in the EU member states, if a hosting ISP is 
treated as a content provider, the court always refers to its commercial exploitation of 
uploaded content. However, the EU Commercial Directive does not set commercial 
exploitation as a factor to shut hosting ISPs out of the “safe harbor,” and, actually, 
the legality of commercial exploitation has already been implied by the Directive, 
because, as a hosting ISP, it does not oﬀ er the content by itself, but just stores user-
uploaded content without charging fees.281 In order to make profi ts, of course, it needs 
to commercially exploit the uploaded contents.282 As noted by the ECJ in Adwords 
Decision, merely setting the payment terms or providing general information to its 
clients cannot have the eﬀ ect of depriving Google of the exemptions from liability 
provided for in Directive 2000/31.283 However, “it is necessary to examine whether 
the role played by that service provider is neutral, in the sense that its conduct is 
merely technical, automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of knowledge or control 
of the data which it stores.”284 Th erefore, when judging whether a hosting ISP is still 
qualifi ed for the “safe harbor” provisions, the point is not whether it commercially 
exploits the uploaded content, but whether its way of commercial exploitation goes 
against a passive technical ISP. By following this logic, one can divide commercial 
exploitation into two types, which are “active” and “passive” respectively, depending on 
whether the hosting ISPs take the initiative to combine their commercial exploitation 
with concrete and specifi c contents. For example, if a hosting ISP has already known 
a specifi c content existed in its system, and then inserts ads into this content according 
to the character of this content, we can conclude that it is an active exploitation, which 
will place the hosting ISP outside of the “safe harbor”. In contrast, if a hosting ISP 
inserts ads without caring about which content these ads would be displayed with, it 
281  Nérisson, ‘Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries: Th e Position in France’ 
(n103), at 79.
282 Ibid, at. 79.
283 Google France SARL and Google Inc. v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA and Others (n230), at para. 116.
284  Ibid, at para. 114.
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  is a passive exploitation. For example, the hosting ISPs may insert ads according to a 
time schedule, which means in certain time brackets, certain ads will be displayed, no 
matter what content is viewed by subscribers. 
  Th e distinguishing between “active” and “passive” exploitation prohibits hosting 
ISPs from deliberately using infringing materials for profi ts, while preserving 
suﬃ  cient freedom for them to make profi ts through their services. Based on this 
distinguishing factor, targeted advertising, which is a widely-used way for internet 
companies to allocate ad space, can be deemed legitimate. Th e operation of targeted 
advertising is based on tracing internet users’ surfi ng demographics.285 For example, 
if an internet company fi nds out that an internet user always views web pages about 
cell phones, then, when this internet user logs on to the website operated by this 
company, ads about cell phones will appear. Th erefore, it is a good way to make 
the ads reach potential consumers more accurately. According to the distinguishing 
point made above, targeted advertising can be grouped into “passive” exploration, 
because where the adverts are displayed depends on the automatic assessment 
of Internet users’ recent viewing demographics rather than on the hosting ISPs’ 
intentional choices. Th erefore, targeted advertising should be allowed and cannot 
become a reason to shut the hosting ISPs out of the “safe harbor.”  
3.4.2 Editing of Uploaded Content
  Th e publishers, such as newspapers and journals, which traditionally exert editorial 
control over content, are generally responsible for the content they publish, because 
the presence of an editorial relationship indicates that traditional publisher liability 
should apply.286 Th is duty arises from the fact that the publisher has an opportunity 
to know the nature of the content.287 Th e editing is a preparation process before 
publishing, generally including selecting, revising, and arranging the materials to 
be published. So, through editing, the publishers have enough opportunities to 
know the nature of the content, such as whether the content is infringing. More 
importantly, the editing is also a process for a publisher to ensure that the published 
content refl ects its goals and needs. In other words, through editing, the publishers 
treat the content originated from others as their own content. So defi nitely, the 
publishers should undertake responsibility for the content published by them. 
  What is worthy of note is that the aforementioned editing is a human-intervention 
process fi nished by editors, but not an automatic process enforced by technical 
installation, because only human editing can ensure that the published content 
refl ects the publishers’ will and make the publisher know the nature of content. 
Th erefore, when coming to the liability of hosting ISPs, it is necessary for us to 
285 Hoyle, M. D, U.S. Patent No. 6,141,010; Washington, DC (2000), U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃ  ce..
286 Scruers M, ‘Th e History and Economics of ISP Liability for Th ird Party Content’ (n212), at 233.
287 Ibid, at 245.
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distinguish between human editing and automatic editing. If a hosting ISP just 
edits or categorizes the uploaded content through the previously installed technical 
programs, but without enough human intervention, the hosting ISP cannot be 
treated as a publisher. Just like the common sense approach reached in Germany, 
fi ltering (checking the uploaded contents through technical measures) should not 
be seen to fulfi ll the knowledge in the sense of TMG § 10,288 because the machine 
cannot replace the human to check whether the information is infringing or not.289 
Besides, for human editing, the hosting ISPs should prove that the editing prevents 
infringements rather than tolerates them, and even with this kind of editing, the 
hosting ISPs still cannot know the infringing nature of content. Otherwise, they 
are not qualifi ed hosting ISPs. Actually, both copyright owners and hosting ISPs 
recognize that it is necessary to “edit” the users’ uploads to a certain degree so as to 
prevent infringing materials from being uploaded. For example, according to the 
UGC Principles, hosting ISPs need to adopt content identifi cation technologies 
to fi lter out infringing uploads, and hosting ISPs are encouraged to manually 
review all of the user-uploaded content as a complement or replacement to 
content identifi cation technology, so long as the manual review is as eﬀ ective as the 
identifi cation technology in terms of eliminating infringing content.290
  Distinguishing between technical editing and human editing allows hosting ISPs 
to adopt the latest technologies to optimize their services, since the editing that is 
done automatically through pre-installed technical programs will not shut hosting 
ISPs out of “safe harbor”. Further, human editing should be restricted rather than 
absolutely prohibited, and hosting ISPs are allowed to conduct human editing 
which either contributes to reducing infringement on their platforms or does not 
result in their knowledge of the infringement in question.
3.4.3 Displaying Logos with Uploaded Contents
  Th e websites’ logos, at least to some extent, function as trademarks. Actually most 
of them have already been registered as trademarks. In the light of a trademark’s 
functionality of distinguishing the origins of products or services oﬀ ered by diﬀ erent 
entities, it does make sense to conclude that a hosting ISP treats the uploaded 
content as its own if it displays its logo with uploaded content. Furthermore, the 
viewers may deem the uploaded content to be oﬀ ered by the hosting ISP because of 
its logo appearing with uploaded content. However, this argument is not as tenable 
288  It is a provision about exempting hosting ISPs from liability in Germany, which is directly translated from Art. 14 
of E-commerce Directive.
289  See Spindler G, et al., Recht der Elektronischen Medien: Kommentar (C.H. Beck. 2008), at 1530-1532. See also 
Fitzner J, Von Digital-Rights-Management zu Content Identifi cation: Neue Ansätze zum Schutz Urheberrechtlich 
Geschützter Multimediawerke im Internet: Eine Technische, ökonomische und Rechtliche Analyse (Nomos. Baden-
Baden 2011), at 289-290.
290 Principles for User Generated Content Services (n42), Art. 3.
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as it appears. First, it is the hosting ISP’s right to display its logo on its website 
so as to distinguish it from other websites, and as a website mainly consisting of 
content uploaded by users, it is unavoidable for the ISP to display its logo with 
uploaded content. Second, displaying logos works more like a way to diﬀ erentiate 
its service rather than indicate the origin of content, because normally the uploaders’ 
names would be attached with the content, although in an anonymous way. More 
importantly, displaying logos with uploaded content is a pre-installed technical 
process, which is irrelevant to any editing of uploaded content, and has no chance 
of resulting in a hosting ISP’s knowledge of content. Th erefore, displaying logos 
with content cannot work as a reason to treat hosting ISPs as content providers.
3.4.4 Requiring of Right Transfer
  Normally, the “terms and conditions” provided by hosting ISPs will require the 
uploaders to transfer or at least renounce certain rights so as to ensure the further 
dissemination of uploaded content. As publishers, they always ask the authors to 
sign a contract to transfer distributing rights to them. Hence, in this aspect, hosting 
ISPs are similar to publishers, and maybe it is why so many courts took it as a reason 
to treat hosting ISPs as publishers. However, just as mentioned before, a publisher 
needs to accept strict liability mainly because of its editing of content, which gives it 
enough opportunity to know the nature of the content. In the case of hosting ISPs, 
this kind of licensing process happens automatically once the users agree to upload 
any content, without involving any kind of editing or knowledge over the content, 
which means the hosting ISP still maintains a passive and technical role, and still 
can enjoy the shield of the “safe harbor.”
3.4.5 Uploading Contents by Itself
Nowadays, on the one hand, in order to reduce the danger of being sued, and on 
the other hand, in the light of the need of commercial operations, more and more 
hosting ISPs start to cooperate with copyright owners, and try to get the licenses of 
some valuable content. For the licensed content uploaded by hosting ISPs themselves, 
it seems that the hosting ISPs are not passive or purely technical anymore. So the 
Italian court named the defendant IOL and Yahoo! as active hosting ISPs based on 
the facts that they uploaded some content by themselves.291 Technically speaking, in 
these circumstances, the legal status of hosting ISPs is mixed with content providers 
and service providers, which goes far beyond the anticipation of legislators when they 
ratifi ed the “safe harbor” provisions. Actually, it is quite common for legislation to lag 
behind the development of technologies, especially in the fi eld of copyright. When the 
courts face such problems, they cannot simply interpret the legislation literally, but 
291  See Bonadio & Santo, ‘Court of Milan holds video sharing platforms liable for copyright infringement’ (n239), at 15.
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must always refer to the legislative purpose, so as to ensure a reasonable interpretation. 
As illuminated by the House Report of DMCA, “safe harbor” provisions preserve strong 
incentives for service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal 
with copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked environment.292  
If we look into the practical eﬀ ects resulting from this kind of cooperation between 
hosting ISPs and copyright owners, we can fi nd that it is good for reducing the 
infringements, or at least the harm which accompanies infringements. Th e reason is, 
if a user, without permission, uploads copyrighted content which has already been 
licensed to the hosting ISP, from the perspective of the copyright owner, it is not a really 
harmful infringement anymore. Th erefore, hosting ISPs’ uploading of licensed content 
by themselves conforms to the legislative purpose of “safe harbor” provisions, and these 
hosting ISPs can still enjoy the liability exemptions. Besides, from the perspective of 
copyright owners, they are also willing to license their copyrighted works to hosting 
ISPs. For example, since 2006, YouTube has signed a series of agreements which 
involved a large amount of copyright licenses with several copyright giants.293 Further, 
Youku, always referred to as Chinese YouTube, signed a 5-year licensing agreement with 
Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2012, and according to this agreement, Youku can oﬀ er 
more than 300 movies from Sony on its website for the public to view.294 In addition, 
since merging with Toudou, Youku has got copyright licenses from Warner Brother, 
Dreamworks, Paramount, 21st Century Fox, Disney, and other copyright owners.295 
It would be quite absurd to consider these hosting ISPs liable for they get licenses from 
copyright owners. Just as stated by the EU Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen, the same 
exemption should apply if “one or more of the exempted activities are combined with 
an internet content provider’s activities.”296
3.5 How to Deﬁ ne “Passivity” in Post Web 2.0 
Th e previous section evaluates the factors that the courts rely on to deprive hosting ISPs 
of “safe harbor” provisions, and then concludes that most of factors are not rational 
anymore. As referred to in the beginning of this chapter, hosting ISPs should keep 
passive so as to fall into “safe harbor” provisions, and the factors evaluated above can be 
seen as certain management on uploads done by hosting ISPs, so it is understandable 
292 H.R. REP. 105-551(II) (n16), at 49.
293  See Warner Music Group and YouTube Announce Landmark Video Distribution and Revenue Partnership (n30); 
CBS and Youtube Strike Strategic Content And Advertising Partnership (n30); Universal Music Group and 
Youtube Forge Strategic Partnership (n30); Sony BMG Music Entertainment Signs Content License Agreement 
with YouTube (n30). 
294  YoukuTudou signed a 5-year copyright licensing contract with Sony Picture (优酷土豆与索尼音像签订五年版
权协议) (n30).
295 Ibid. 
296  Opinion of Advocate General, L’Oréal SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others, case C-324/09, at para. 
148.
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that the courts deprive them of “safe harbor” provisions based on these factors. However, 
keeping passive does not mean being purely passive, and the following section will 
demonstrate why keeping passive is out of date and hosting ISPs should be allowed to 
conduct certain management of uploads.
First, one should take the development of new internet technologies into account. In 
the post web 2.0 era, the new technologies to some extent make management of hosted 
contents available, by which hosting ISPs can oﬀ er a better service, such as allowing 
Internet users to individualize their web pages, and facilitating access to desired content 
by various indexes; and hosting ISPs can also make better profi ts mainly through selling 
ad space. Th is management not only allows the public to express themselves better 
and promotes the public’s access to information, but also benefi ts the development of 
e-commerce. Th e former conforms to the basic human right of “freedom of expression”; 
the latter meets with the policy objective of the “safe harbor” provisions.297 
Furthermore, the recent case decisions show us a tendency that the courts in the EU, 
US, and China have started to require or at least encourage hosting ISPs to take certain 
monitoring measures for the uploaded content, which actually forces hosting ISPs to 
keep from being purely “passive.” For instance, in China, the new Judicial Interpretation 
issued by People’s Supreme Court provides that, if an ISP can prove that reasonable 
and eﬀ ective technical measures have been taken, but the infringement committed by 
Internet users still cannot be detected, People’s Courts should conclude the ISP bears 
no fault for the infringement.298 In a classic case named as HanHan v. Baidu, before 
the hearing, the defendant Baidu asked its employees to manually check the uploaded 
content to fi lter out infringing content, and the Haidian District Court in Beijing didn’t 
hold it as a reason to treat the defendant as a content provider.299 In the US, Veoh, a 
video-sharing website has adopted some measures which essentially “enabled Veoh to 
terminate access to any other identical fi les and prevent additional identical fi les from ever 
being uploaded by any user,” and the court defi ned these measures as “appropriate steps 
to deal with copyright infringements.”300 In Germany, Rapidshare, a hosting ISP, was 
required by German Federal Court of Justice to take comprehensive and regular control 
297  As stated by the Committee on Commerce in H.R. REP. 105-551(II), “promoting the continued growth and 
development of electronic commerce” is one of two priorities of DMCA 512. In EU E-commerce Directive, the 
Recital (2) emphasizes the signifi cance of e-commerce for the EU, and the Recital (29) stated that “commercial 
communications are essential for the fi nancing of information society services and for developing a wide variety of 
new, charge-free services”.
298 Internet Provisions (网络规定) (n208), Art. 8.
299  Han Han v. Baidu (韩寒v.百度) (n42). In this case, one of Hanhan’s works was illegally uploaded to the literature-
sharing website operated by the defendant, Baidu, so Hanhan sued Baidu for copyright infringement. Th is was 
a high attention case in China. Han Han is one of most distinguished young writers, who has lots of fans in 
China, and in May 2010, he was named one of most infl uential people in the world by Time magazine. Th e other 
party, Baidu, can be seen as the Chinese Google, and is one of the most successful internet companies in China. 
Th erefore, the dispute between these two parties attracted lots of attention, and fi nally this case was selected as one 
of ten annual IP cases (2012) by People’s Supreme Court.
300 Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.(n5), at 1143, 1155.
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over certain content in its service, even including manually checking this content.301 
Th erefore, it is already out of date to restrict hosting ISPs with the requirement of pure 
passivity, and even for the purpose of reinforcing copyright protection, it is reasonable 
to allow hosting ISPs to do certain management on the uploads. 
Th en, what are the appropriate criteria for a qualifi ed hosting ISP in the post-web 2.0 
era? One should refer to the decision made by the ECJ (European Court of Justice) in 
the Google ad-words case, which stated as follows: “it is necessary to examine whether 
the role played by that service provider is neutral, in the sense that its conduct is merely 
technical, automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of knowledge or control of the data 
which it stores.”302 According to this statement, a hosting ISP is still qualifi ed for protection 
under the “safe harbor provision” unless its management of uploaded content results in its 
knowledge or control of them. Th is criterion does allow hosting ISPs to engage in some 
management over uploaded content, but such management should not be too much, so 
as to prevent hosting ISPs from taking advantage of infringing content of which they are 
already aware. Besides, the criterion drawn from US case law303 is also quite reasonable, 
namely, if the management of content benefi ts the prevention of infringements, this kind 
of management should be permissible. If the former criterion warns hosting ISPs how 
much management can be done, the criterion in the US tells hosting ISPs what kind 
of management can be done. Th e US criterion also wins support in the EU, and some 
stakeholders, especially the ISPs, tried to persuade the Commission to adopt the so-called 
“Good Samaritan clause”, which would make sure that an ISP which voluntarily takes 
actions against infringement would in principle not be punished.304 
Table 2*: relevant factors of assessing hosting ISPs’ passivity in the US, EU and China
Inserting Ads Displaying 
logos
Rights 
transfer
Automatically 
editing
Manually editing Self-uploading
US × × × × √ ×
EU √
China × √ ×
*  is Table describes a general comparison on how the courts in the US, EU and China evaluate the factors relevant to decide 
whether a hosting ISP remains passive enough in operation. “√” means that the factor concerned has always been an important 
reason to disqualify a hosting ISP as not passive enough in this jurisdiction, and “×” means the opposite. “ ” means that the 
factor concerned was an important reason to disqualify the passivity of a hosting ISP, but is becoming less important nowadays 
in this jurisdiction. 
301  See BGH – Rapidshare (n42), at para. 58. In this case, the German Federal Court of Justice held that because the 
Rapidshare had induced copyright infringements committed in a substantial scale, it was reasonable for it to take 
comprehensive and regular control over link collections which referred to its service.
302 Ibid, at para. 114.
303 See the discussion about courts’ interpretation about hosting ISPs’ passivity made in Section 3.3. 
304 Commission Staﬀ  Working Paper: Online Services, Including E-commerce in the Single Market (n37), at 36.
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3.6 Conclusion
To sum up, apart from the US and UK where the courts set a quite low threshold 
for a hosting ISP to be a qualifi ed entity falling under the “safe harbor” provisions, 
the courts in some EU Member States (Germany, France and Italy) and China had 
in a long period held a defendant not qualifi ed as a hosting ISP for the reason of its 
lesser degree of passivity under the following circumstances: commercially exploiting 
the user generated content, editing or categorizing the uploaded content, displaying 
its logo with uploaded content, requiring rights transfer by “terms and conditions,” or 
uploading some content by itself, which can be seen as certain management of uploaded 
content made by hosting ISPs. However, in the Web 2.0, it is no longer reasonable to 
require hosting ISPs to keep purely passive, and they should be allowed to conduct 
certain management on the uploaded contents. In order to draw a proper borderline 
for the permissible management, one needs to fi rst check whether this management 
will result in its knowledge or control of uploaded content, and then check whether 
this management is conducive to the prevention of infringements or not. By following 
this criterion, generally the management discussed in Section 3.4 cannot function as 
the reasons to shut hosting ISPs out of the “safe harbor,” except editing, categorizing, or 
actively exploiting the uploaded contents. Th is criterion not only allows hosting ISPs to 
manage uploaded content to optimize their services, but also prevents them from using 
infringing materials for profi ts, and even encourages them to adopt measures against 
infringement on their platforms; this book therefore asserts that it helps to maximize 
hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate in the US, EU and China. 
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Chapter 4
Hosting ISPs’ Secondary Liability under 
the Roof of “Safe Harbor” Provisions 
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Introduction:
Th e previous chapter discusses under what circumstances a hosting ISP meets the 
threshold of “safe harbor” provisions. Th is chapter will discuss how the courts in the 
US, EU and China to decide hosting ISPs’ secondary liability under the roof of the 
“safe harbor” provisions. In the light of “safe harbor” provisions, a hosting ISP who 
complies with certain requirements can be exempted from paying monetary damages.305 
However, regarding the other kind of reliefs, such as injunction, “safe harbor” provisions 
cannot immunize hosting ISPs from them. Th erefore, even though a hosting ISP fully 
complies with liability exemption conditions set in “safe harbor” provisions, it may still 
face liabilities other than paying monetary damages according to the traditional liability 
rules. Besides, as was mentioned in the end of chapter 2, when interpreting “safe harbor” 
provisions, the courts cannot avoid being aﬀ ected by traditional liability rules, so even 
though the US, EU and China have reached certain harmonization in the respect of 
“safe harbor” provisions, in light of case law, the secondary liability rules of hosting ISPs 
are still diverse in the US, EU and China. Th is chapter will take a comparative approach 
to examine the hosting ISPs’ secondary liability for copyright infringement on their 
platforms in the US, EU and China. 
First, this chapter examines how the courts evaluate the relevant factors when deciding liability 
in the US, EU and China, including monitoring responsibility (4.1), specifi c knowledge of 
infringement (4.2), measures against repeat infringement (4.3), benefi t from infringement 
(4.4), and inducement (4.5). Th en, it introduces the Chinese specifi c approaches to conclude 
hosting ISPS’ liability (4.6). Based on the discussion in the previous parts, it summarizes and 
examines the tendencies of case law development in the US, EU and China, and concludes, 
for the purpose of maximizing the freedom to operate of hosting ISPs, how the relevant 
factors should be interpreted when deciding liability (4.7).
4.1 Monitoring Responsibility and General Knowledge of Infringements
With the development of Internet technologies, the public currently can easily upload 
videos, music and text on hosting ISP’s platforms through their computers, pads or 
even cell phones. Facing such immense amounts of uploads every day, whether hosting 
ISPs need to undertake monitoring responsibility becomes a key question. If the answer 
is yes, hosting ISPs need to actively examine every upload so as to remove infringing 
materials, which seems quite burdensome for hosting ISPs. But if hosting ISPs do not need 
to monitor the uploads, lots of copyrighted contents will be uploaded on hosting ISPs’ 
platforms, which seems unfair to copyright owners. In the following section, the relevant 
rules about monitoring responsibility in the US, EU and China will be discussed.
305  See DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, (c)(1); E-commerce Directive (n1), Art. 14; Internet Regulation (网络条例) (n1), Art. 
22.
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4.1.1 “No Monitoring Responsibility” Clause in the US
  Th e “no monitoring responsibility” clause in Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) § 512 can be seen as oﬀ ering a major concession to the ISPs, under which, 
an ISP does not need to “monitor its service or aﬃ  rmatively seek facts indicating 
infringing activity,”306 and it also functions as the backbone of “safe harbor” provisions. 
Furthermore, the “no monitoring responsibility” is closely related to another concept 
“general knowledge of infringements”, which means that an ISP can be deemed 
to know defi nitely that some of its users transmit infringed content through the 
internet service it oﬀ ers, but it does not know exactly which content transmitted by 
which  users are infringing. By deducing from “no monitoring responsibility”, the 
general knowledge of infringements cannot be understood as imputed knowledge in 
the context of DMCA §512. Th is is because if an ISP should be liable for its general 
knowledge of copyright infringement, then it must monitor its internet service to 
seek the infringers and to stop further copyright infringement, since it is highly 
likely the use of its service can cause copyright infringement. William Patry points 
out that, “as a result of this lack of any obligation to be pro-active in seeking out 
possible infringements, service providers cannot be tagged for imputed knowledge 
where there are infringing materials and the service provider does not take steps to 
identify or monitor such material,” so the “no monitoring responsibility” clause thus 
functions as a signifi cant limitation on imputed knowledge.307 In the US, whether 
general knowledge of infringement would lead a third party who had sold neutral 
products to undertake secondary liability was settled in “Sony Betamax” case, which 
established a liability standard called “substantial non-infringing use” by referring to 
the “staple article of commerce” patent law doctrine.308 According to this standard, 
if a product is capable of substantial non-infringing uses, its distribution cannot 
result in contributory liability, unless the distributor fails to take corresponding 
action once knowing about a specifi c instance of infringement.309 Th is implies that a 
general knowledge of infringement alone will not result in secondary liability. From 
a legal perspective, the Internet service oﬀ ered by ISPs is similar to the Betamax 
sold by Sony, both of which are capable of substantial non-infringing use, so the 
rationality embodied in the “Sony Betamax” case has also been merged into DMCA 
§512. 
  In brief, because of the “no monitoring responsibility” clause the courts in the US 
always refuse to enforce secondary liability against ISPs when the claim against 
them is based purely on the grounds of their general knowledge of infringement. In 
the case of Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, the defendant MP3tunes was a 
306 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, (m)(1).
307 Patry, Patry on Copyright (n265), § 21:85.
308 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (n27), at 442.
309 Ibid.
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website allowing users to store music fi les into their personal online “lockers” in which 
the plaintiﬀ  claimed there were lots of fi les infringing its copyright, so the plaintiﬀ  sued 
the MP3tunes for copyright infringement.310 Th e District Court of S.D. New York held 
that although the defendant defi nitely knew some level of infringement was occurring 
on its website, it did not have specifi c “red fl ag” knowledge of any particular infringing 
materials, so the defendant qualifi ed for “safe harbor” in terms of DMCA 512(c)(1)(A).311 
In the case of UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, the defendant Shelter 
Capital Partners owned a video-sharing website called Veoh, and the plaintiﬀ  sued Veoh for 
copyright infringement based on claiming that some of its copyrighted music videos were 
uploaded on Veoh without its permission.312 Th e Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
held that “a broad conception of the knowledge requirement” argued by the plaintiﬀ  was 
inappropriate, and only “specifi c knowledge of particular infringing activity” could shut 
Veoh out of the “safe harbor.”313 In the case of Viacom v. YouTube, the Court of Appeals 
of the Second Circuit reaﬃ  rmed the doctrine of requiring specifi c knowledge again and 
rejected the plaintiﬀ ’s attempt to interpret the “red fl ag” standard as an indication basis to 
hold the ISP liable for its general knowledge of direct infringements.314 
4.1.2 “No General Obligation to Monitor” Clause in the EU
  In the EU, the Directive on Electronic Commerce provides similar rules about ISPs’ 
monitoring responsibility: Member States must not impose a general obligation 
on providers, when providing the service covered by Article 12 (mere conduit), 13 
(caching) and 14 (hosting), to monitor the information they “transmit or store, nor a 
general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.”315 
In several cases about ISPs’ liability heard by the ECJ, the ECJ reaﬃ  rmed that no 
general obligation should be allocated to ISPs.316 Further, regarding the knowledge of 
infringement, as noted by Niilo Jääskinen, since Article 15 of E-Commerce Directive 
forbade the imposition of a general obligation on ISPs, “it is not enough that the 
service provider ought to have known or has good reasons to suspect illegal activity.”317 
  In member states, “no general obligation to monitor” clause has been incorporated 
into their national laws. For instance, in Germany, the “no general obligation to 
monitor” clause is transplanted into § 7 TMG (2), and thus, the German courts, 
by following this clause, conclude that the general knowledge of infringements does 
310 Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F.Supp.2d 627, at 633 (S.D.N.Y., 2011).
311 Ibid, at 644-645.
312 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC (n269), at 1027-1028.
313 Ibid, 1037-1038.
314 See Viacom International, INC. v. YouTube, INC. (n7), at 30-31.
315 E-commerce Directive (n1), Art. 15.
316  C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog NV [2012], ECLI:EU:C:2012:85; Google France SARL and Google Inc. v Louis Vuitton 
Malletier SA and Others (n230); C-324/09, L’Oréal SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others, [2011] ECR 
I-06011.
317 Opinion of Advocate General, case C 324-9 (n291), at para. 163.
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not qualify as imputed knowledge. For example, in Greatest Hits II, the Regional 
Court of Düsseldorf held that “generic knowledge of infringing use is insuﬃ  cient 
to trigger liability.”318 In Rapidshare II, the Higher Regional Court of Hamburg 
held that “infringing use was foreseeable and likely, but noted that unless the 
service provider willfully ignored it, specifi c knowledge was still required to impose 
contributory liability.”319 In France, the “no general obligation to monitor” clause 
is incorporated into LCEN.320 In 2007, Dailymotion, a video-sharing website, was 
held as a publisher by District of Paris and thus liable because it generally knew that 
its platform was used for posting illegal contents.321 But since 2008, Dailymotion 
was held as a competent hosting ISP by the French courts, and then did not need 
to be liable for its general knowledge of infringement anymore.322 
4.1.3 From “Uncertainty” to “No General Monitoring” in China
  In China, the People’s Supreme Court had already used DMCA §512 as an 
important reference when it provided the fi rst Interpretation about Hosting ISPs’ 
liability;323 however, for unknown reasons it did not integrate a “no monitoring 
responsibility” clause which is an essential provision in DMCA 512.324 Six years 
later, unfortunately again, the Internet Regulation, which includes a Chinese version 
of “safe harbor” provisions, still did not address an ISP’s monitoring responsibility, 
and this loophole has resulted in confusion about this issue in judicial practice. For 
example, in the case of “vale.com v. tudou.com”, the Shanghai First Intermediate 
People’s court concluded that the defendant, a video-sharing website operator, 
defi nitely knew that some of the works being  uploaded by its users were infringing 
… so the defendant should have monitored the content uploaded by its users in 
order to fi lter out infringing content.325 By contrast, in another case, “Wangyajun 
v. Lingshida Tech.”, the court aﬃ  rmed that the defendant, as an Internet platform 
oﬀ ering information storing space, faced a huge volume of uploaded content each 
day, so that it was unreasonable to impose monitoring responsibility on it.326 
318  LG Düsseldorf: Störerhaftung des Filesharing-Betreibers, 2008 MMR 759 (quoting S. Barazza, ‘Secondary liability 
for IP infringement: converging patterns and approaches in comparative case law’ (n118), at 885.
319  OLG Hamburg: Haftung eines Sharehosting-Dienstes für rechtsverletzende Inhalte - Rapidshare II, GRUR-RR 
2012, 335, (quoting Ibid). 
320 Loi n° 2004-575 du 21 juin 2004 pour la confi ance dans l’économie numérique (n155), Art. 6-1-7.
321  Waisman A and Hevia M, ‘Th eoretical Foundations of Search Eengine Liability’ (2011) 42 International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law 785, at 798.
322 Ibid.
323  See Internet Interpretation (2000) (网络解释(2000)) (n190), this Judicial Interpretation brought in a “notice-
delete” mechanism and subpoena calling for information to identify infringers from DMCA 512.
324 Ibid, the Judicial Interpretation did not address the issue of an ISP’s monitoring responsibility.
325  vale.com v. tudou.com (网乐互联v.土豆网), Shanghai First Intermediate People’s Court (上海市第一中级人民
法院), No. 19 Hu Yi Zhong Min Wu (Zhi) Zhong Zi (2009) (（2009）沪一中民五（知）终字第19号).
326   See Wangyajun v. Lingshida Tech. (王亚军v.北京零时达科技), Beijing Haidian District Court (北京市海淀区
人民法院), No. 2775 Hai Min Chu Zi (2008) (（2008）海民初字第2775).
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With the studies about ISPs’ secondary liability arising in China, especially after many 
judicial decisions in the EU and US have been introduced into China, a consensus of no 
monitoring responsibility has been gradually reached in China. As stated by an oﬃ  cial 
from the People’s Supreme Court, in the US and EU, it is a common practice that ISPs 
have no obligation to monitor overwhelming amounts of content on the Internet.327 In 
2012, the National Copyright Administration in China published two revised drafts of 
the proposed Copyright Law, both of which include an article which clearly states that 
if an Internet service provider oﬀ ers storage, search, linking or other purely technical 
services to Internet users, then it is not obliged to monitor the information concerning 
copyright or related rights.328 Furthermore, the recently promulgated Interpretation also 
provides that where an internet service provider does not take the initiative to monitor 
the Internet users’ infringement of the right to Network dissemination of information, 
the People’s courts shall not conclude that it is at fault for allowing primary infringement 
to occur.329 Since then, it has been oﬃ  cially rejected that the ISPs’ general knowledge 
of primary copyright infringement can result in secondary liability, and thus Chinese 
jurisdictions began to conform to prevailing practices in the US and EU in this respect.
4.2 Speciﬁ c Knowledge of Infringements
  Specifi c knowledge is a concept which is related to general knowledge but with a 
diﬀ erent meaning from the legal perspective. As its name implies, unlike general 
knowledge, specifi c knowledge requires more than having a general awareness 
that infringements are occurring, but rather a precise knowledge that a particular 
incident of infringement has occurred. Th e US, EU, and China, all recognize that if 
an ISP possesses specifi c knowledge of infringement but does not expeditiously stop 
it, then it should be secondarily liable for these acts of infringements. As provided 
in DMCA §512(c)(1)(A), in order to avoid monetary damages, the hosting ISP 
must not “have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material 
on the system or internet is infringing; in the absence of such actual knowledge, 
is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; 
or upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or 
disable access to the material.”330 Th e relevant provision in the EU Directive on 
electronic commerce is quite similar to the DMCA provision. Th e EU Directive 
327  Th is statement was presented at a press conference on introducing “Th e Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court 
on Several Issues Concerning Application of Law in the Trial of Cases Involving Disputes about Infringing Right 
to Internet Dissemination of Information (2013)” when the oﬃ  cial was questioned about “ISPs’ monitoring 
liability”,  http://www.sipo.gov.cn/mtjj/2013/201301/t20130121_783586.html (last visited 18-09-2014). 
328  People’s Republic of China Copyright Law (fi rst revising draft), Art. 69, published by National Copyright Oﬃ  ce 
in March, 2012. In second revising draft, the same rule is also provided in Article 69. 
329 Internet Provisions (网络规定) (n208), Art. 8.
330 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512 (c) (1) (A).
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  provides that if the hosting ISP does not “have actual knowledge of illegal activity or 
information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances 
from which the illegal activity or information is apparent; and upon obtaining 
such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or disable access to the 
information.”331 In member states, this provision has been incorporated into their 
national laws. In China, the knowledge requirement for ISP liability immunity is 
articulated slightly diﬀ erently from the provisions in the US and EU, and it reads as 
follows: “the (hosting) ISP has no knowledge of and no justifi able reason to know 
the infringement of the works, performance, sound or video recordings.”332 From 
the above provisions, it is clear that “specifi c knowledge” can be categorized into 
two types of knowledge, actual knowledge and constructive knowledge. 
4.2.1 “Red ﬂ ag” Standard in US
  “Th at actual knowledge standard is high, and by itself does not reach an entity 
that willfully ignores blatant indications of infringement,”333 which means actual 
knowledge is diﬃ  cult to prove. Th erefore, the parties involved always argue about 
what constitutes constructive knowledge of an infringing activity. According to the 
House Report (commerce committee), the provisions about constructive knowledge 
in DMCA can best be described as a “red fl ag” test, which means if the service 
provider becomes aware of a “red fl ag” from which infringing activity is apparent, it 
will lose the limitation of liability if it takes no action. 
   
   Th e “red fl ag” test has both a subjective and an objective element. In determining whether the 
service provider was aware of a “red fl ag”, the subjective awareness of the service provider of the 
facts or circumstances in question must be determined. However, in deciding whether those 
facts or circumstances constitute a “red fl ag”, in other words, whether infringing activity would 
have been apparent to a reasonable person operating under the same or similar circumstances, an 
objective standard should be used.334 
  
  In the view of David Nimmer, the knowledge requirement required by the “red fl ag” 
test is more favorable to ISPs than the previous contributory infringement, which 
is not “what a reasonable person would have deduced given all the circumstances, 
but rather whether the service provider deliberately proceeded in the face of blatant 
factors of which it was aware,”335 so as to “avoid rewarding those (ISPs) who adopt 
the posture of an ostrich.”336 In other words, the infringing fl ag must be “brightly 
331 E-commerce Directive (n1), Art. 14, 1.
332 Internet Regulation (网络条例) (n1), Art. 22 (3).
333 Nimmer D, Copyright: Sacred Text, Technology, and the DMCA, (Kluwer Law International, 2003), at 358.
334 H.R. REP. 105-551(II) (n16), at 53.
335 See Nimmer, Copyright: Sacred Text, Technology, and the DMCA (n328), at 358.
336 Ibid.
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red indeed--and be waving blatantly in the provider’s face--to serve the statutory 
goal of making ‘infringing activity ... apparent.’”337 Nimmer’s interpretation of the 
“red fl ag” test has been widely quoted by the US courts.338 As for what constitutes 
“red fl ag”, the legislative history suggests a high standard: 
   Th e infringing nature of such sites shall be apparent from even a brief and casual viewing, 
e.g., sites typically use words such as ‘pirate’, ‘bootleg’, or slang terms in their URL and header 
information to make their illegal purpose obvious … to internet users; but just one or more well 
known photographs of a celebrity at a site cannot be treated as red fl ag.339 
  
  By following this high standard, the US courts held that the following circumstances 
did not qualify as a “red fl ag”: 1) if investigation of “facts and circumstances” is 
required to identify material as infringing, then those facts and circumstances are 
not “red fl ags”;340 2) hosting of password-hacking websites is not a per se “red fl ag” of 
infringement;341 3) the disclaimer, which states that “copyrights of these fi les remain 
the creator’s. I do not claim any rights to these fi les, other than the right to post 
them” was not a “red fl ag” of infringement;342 4) describing photographs as “illegal” 
or “stolen” is not “red fl ag”;343 the professionally created nature of uploaded content 
does not constitute per se a “red fl ag” of infringement.344 However, a notifi cation 
about specifi c infringement from a third party, such as an Internet user, rather than 
from a copyright owner, might meet the “red fl ag” test.345 Th e case law in the US 
337 Ibid.
338  See Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Internets, Inc. (n5), at 1148; Corbis Corporation v. Amazon.com, 351 F.Supp.2d 1090, at 
1108 (W.D. Washington 2004).
339 See H.R. REP. 105-551(II) (n16), supra note 21, at 57-58.
340 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Internets, Inc. (n275), at 1108.
341  Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, at 1114 (9th Cir. 2007). As stated by the court, the burden of 
determining whether passwords on a website enabled infringement is not up to the service provider. Th e website 
could be a hoax, or out of date. Th e owner of the protected content may have supplied the passwords as a short-
term promotion, or as an attempt to collect information from unsuspecting users. Th e passwords might be provided 
to help users maintain anonymity without infringing copyright. Th ere is simply no way for a service provider to 
conclude that the passwords enabled infringement without trying the passwords, and verifying that they enabled 
illegal access to copyrighted material. We impose no such investigative duties on service providers.
342  Ibid. As stated by the court, contrary to Perfect 10’s assertion, this disclaimer is not a “red fl ag” of infringement. 
Th e disclaimer specifi cally states that the webmaster has the right to post the fi les.
343  Ibid. As stated by the court, describing photographs as “illegal” or “stolen” may be an attempt to increase their 
salacious appeal, rather than an admission that the photographs are actually illegal or stolen, and shouldn’t place 
the burden of determining whether photographs are actually illegal on a service provider.
344  Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Internets, Inc. (n5), at 1149. As stated by the court, with the video equipment available to the 
general public today, there may be little, if any, distinction between “professional” and amateur productions.
345  UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC (n269), at 1040. In this case, the Court made a very interesting 
diﬀ erentiation between the notifi cations from a copyright owner and the third party. Th e CEO of Disney sent an 
email to a Veoh investor, which stated that the movie Cinderella III and various episodes were available on Veoh 
without Disney’s authorization. Th e court decided that this email did not qualify as a red fl ag for the following 
reason: as a copyright holder, Disney was subject to the notifi cation requirements in § 512(c)(3), which this 
informal email failed to meet. However, if this notifi cation had come from a third party, such as an Internet user, 
it might meet the “red fl ag” test, since it specifi ed particular infringing material.
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examining facts, such as hosting of password-hacking websites, statement of right 
disclaimer, describing content as “illegal” or “stolen”, which always indicates the 
illegal nature of content, fi nding that these circumstances do not establish a red fl ag 
suggests that establishing a red fl ag is a very high burden for any copyright owner 
alleging infringement.
  Even though the US courts recognize the existence of “red fl ag”, an ISP will not 
defi nitely possess “red fl ag” knowledge, because another subjective requirement still 
needs to be met, namely, the ISP shall subjectively know the existence of “red fl ag”, 
which is also hard to prove. As Judge Howard stated in the case of “Io v. Veoh”, 
“although one of the works did contain plaintiﬀ ’s trademark several minutes into 
the clip (which might qualify for red fl ag), there is no evidence from which it can 
be inferred that Veoh was aware of, but chose to ignore, it.”346 First, the percentage 
of infringing content on hosting platform is irrelevant to the specifi c knowledge. In 
the case of Viacom v. YouTube, the evidence cited by the plaintiﬀ  Viacom indicated 
that YouTube knew about 75-80% of its streams containing copyrighted materials, 
and “more than 60% of YouTube’s content was “premium” copyrighted content” 
but only 10% of it was authorized.347However, the court held that these statements 
were not suﬃ  cient, standing alone, to result in YouTube’s specifi c knowledge of 
any instance of infringement from the legal perspective.348 Second, hosting ISPs 
should bear specifi c knowledge of infringing materials in the litigation rather than 
other infringing materials. In the case of UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital 
Partners LLC, the court held that even if the defendant’s knowledge of materials 
that infringed Disney’s movies and TV shows qualifi ed for the “red fl ag” test, this 
fact would not favor the plaintiﬀ ’s claims that the defendant knowingly hosted 
unauthorized music videos from UMG.349 In the case of Viacom v. YouTube, 
although the plaintiﬀ  successfully demonstrated that YouTube knew some particular 
infringing video clips, the court held that “only the current clips-in-suit are at issue 
in this litigation.”350 Further, hosting ISPs’ confession, such indicating the knowledge 
of particular infringement in internal reports and email exchanges, can provide strong 
evidence for a “red fl ag.” In the case of Viacom v. YouTube, an internal report from 
YouTube stated that there were episodes and clips of some well-known shows which 
were blatantly illegal on YouTube, and some internal e-mail exchanges also indicated 
that YouTube knew of the particular infringing video on its platform, so the Court 
concluded that YouTube bore specifi c knowledge of infringing videos indicated in the 
report and e-mail exchanges.351 However, normally this kind of internal document is 
346 See Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Internets, Inc. (n5), at 1149. 
347 See Viacom International, INC. v. YouTube, INC. (n7), at 33. 
348 Ibid. 
349 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC (n269), at 1040.
350 See Viacom International, INC. v. YouTube, INC. (n7), at 34.
351 Ibid.
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out of the reach of copyright owners. Th erefore, constructive knowledge of 
a hosting ISP is not easy to establish through applying the “red fl ag” test.
 Besides the “red fl ag” test provided in DMCA §512, according to the common 
law, willful blindness is tantamount to knowledge.352 Th erefore, willful blindness 
can also lead to ISPs being liable for the primary infringement committed by its 
users. By referring to case law, one can fi nd that a person is “willfully blind” if 
the person is “aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute and consciously 
avoided confi rming that fact.”353 From this defi nition, it appears that the liability 
resulting from “willful blindness” can be based on a defendant’s general knowledge 
of infringement (aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute). However, as 
mentioned before, the “no monitoring responsibility” clause in DMCA §512 
prohibits a court from concluding secondary liability based on an ISP’s general 
knowledge of infringement.354 Th erefore, when applied to a hosting ISP’s liability, 
the doctrine of “willful blindness” should be strictly interpreted. As for how strictly 
it should be, in a case, the  US District Court for Southern District of New York held 
that what disqualifi es the service provider from DMCA§512 protection is blindness 
to “specifi c and identifi able instances of infringement.”355 Th e court’s interpretation 
turns the “willful blindness” test back to an analysis of the “red fl ag” test; because, 
the red fl ag should be a specifi c and identifi able instance of copyright infringement. 
If so, then the “willful blindness” doctrine seems no more than to reaﬃ  rm the “red 
fl ag” test. However, in the long term, more relevant case law is needed to determine 
how precisely “willful blindness” should be applied.
4.2.2 Hosting ISPs’ Speciﬁ c Knowledge in the EU
  According to Article 14 of E-Commerce Directive, in order to benefi t from 
liability exemption, hosting ISPs should “not have actual knowledge of illegal 
activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or 
circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent;” or “upon 
obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable 
access to the information.”356 With regard to actual knowledge, the E-Commerce 
Directive is silent on what constitutes actual knowledge, and “leaves it for courts 
352 Ti any (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, at 110 (2d Cir. 2010).
353  United States v. Aina-Marshall, 336 F.3d 167, at 170 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 983 F.2d 
455, at 458 (2d Cir.1993)).
354  See Viacom International, INC. v. YouTube, INC. (n7), at 35. As stated by the Federal Court of Second Circuit, 
Section 512(m) is explicit: DMCA safe harbor protection cannot be conditioned on aﬃ  rmative monitoring by a 
service provider. For that reason, § 512(m) is incompatible with a broad common law duty to monitor or otherwise 
seek out infringing activity based on general awareness that an infringement may be occurring. 
355 Viacom Int’l Inc. et al. v. YouTube et al., 07 civ. 2103 (LLS), 32 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2013)
356 E-commerce Directive (n1), Art. 14.
Hosting ISPs’ Secondary Liability under the Roof of “Safe Harbor” Provisions
95
to decide the levels and types of knowledge that actual knowledge requires.”357 As for 
awareness of apparent infringement, it should be understood to be as same as “should 
have known” and “have reason to know” which are applied in tort law for the purpose 
of evaluating constructive knowledge.358 In the case of L’Oréal v. eBay, the ECJ provided 
some clues to decide whether a hosting ISP had knowledge of infringement prescribed 
in Article 14.359 According to the ECJ’s decision in this case:360
   
   it is suﬃ  cient, in order for the provider of an information society service to be denied entitlement 
to the exemption from liability provided for in Article 14 of Directive 2000/31, for it to have 
been aware of facts or circumstances on the basis of which a diligent economic operator should 
have identifi ed the illegality in question and acted in accordance with Article 14(1)(b) of Directive 
2000/31.
 
  So, when deciding whether a fact or circumstance can lead to a hosting ISP’s 
knowledge of illegal information or activity, the court should treat the hosting ISP 
as a diligent economic operator. If from the perspective of a diligent economic 
operator, the illegality of information or activity is apparent from the fact or 
circumstance, the court should hold that the hosting ISP concerned knows about 
the infringement. Regarding how a hosting ISP can know the aforesaid facts or 
circumstances, the ECJ further stated that:361
   Th e situations thus covered include, in particular, that in which the operator of an online 
marketplace uncovers, as the result of an investigation undertaken on its own initiative, an illegal 
activity or illegal information, as well as a situation in which the operator is notifi ed of the 
existence of such an activity or such information. In the second case, although such a notifi cation 
admittedly cannot automatically preclude the exemption from liability provided for in Article 14 
of Directive 2000/31, given that notifi cations of allegedly illegal activities or information may 
turn out to be insuﬃ  ciently precise or inadequately substantiated, the fact remains that such 
notifi cation represents, as a general rule, a factor of which the national court must take account 
when determining, in the light of the information so transmitted to the operator, whether the 
latter was actually aware of facts or circumstances on the basis of which a diligent economic 
operator should have identifi ed the illegality.
357  Sadeghi M,  e Knowledge Standard for ISP Copyright and Trademark Secondary Liability: A Comparative Study on 
the Analysis of US and EU Laws (Brunel University London, 2013), at 103.
358  Larusdottir JS, ‘Liability of Intermediaries for Copyright Infringement in the Case of Hosting on the Internet’ 
(2004) 47 Scandinavian Studies in Law 471, at 484.
359 L’Oréal SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others (n327).
360 Ibid, para. 120.
361 Ibid, para. 122.
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  Th erefore, a hosting ISP can acquire such facts or circumstances in various ways, 
including through its own investigation and being notifi ed by copyright owners. In 
this case, the ECJ created a new notion “a diligent economic operator” for deciding 
whether a hosting ISP knows the illegal nature of infringing materials, but did not 
provide a defi nition for this notion, which leaves much space for Member States 
to interpret. Further, before evaluating the illegal nature of infringing materials, 
hosting ISPs have to know the infringing materials concerned at the fi rst place, and 
the ECJ held that the knowledge as such can be acquired through either their own 
investigation or notifi cations from rights holders. In the following text, it explores 
how this knowledge standard in Article 14 is implemented in several member states.
4.2.2.1 Positive Knowledge in Germany
  In Germany, “actual knowledge” is called “positive knowledge” (positive 
Kenntnis).362 According to the dominant legal opinion, positive knowledge of 
concrete and specifi ed information should be understood in terms of direct intent 
(dolus directus);363 this means that “should know” in the sense of rough negligence 
is not enough to constitute positive knowledge.364 Th erefore, it is common for the 
German courts to conclude that negligent ignorance is not equal to the positive 
knowledge required by law.365 However, a hosting ISP cannot be completely 
immunized from monetary claims if it does not know of the infringements by reason 
of its rough negligence, because under Article 10 of German TMG, in order to 
enjoy the immunity, a hosting ISP should not know any fact or circumstance from 
which the illegality of the conduct or information is apparent.366 Nevertheless, the 
rough negligence provided in TMG § 10 limits its application only to deliberately 
rough negligence, and can only be found in clear and obvious cases,367 such as where 
the concrete evidence of committing defi nitely illegal conduct or absolutely illegal 
content is displayed in front of the hosting ISP.368
  Th e TMG § 10 includes the language “keine Kenntnis von der rechtswidrigen 
Handlung oder der information”, which was inherited from § 5 of the 1997 TDG 
and can be translated in English as “no knowledge of the illegal conduct or the 
information”. However, in the German language context, it can be interpreted in 
two ways, one of which is “no knowledge of the illegal conduct and no knowledge 
of illegal information” and the other being “no knowledge of the illegal conduct 
362  Fitzner, Von Digital-Rights-Management zu Content Identi cation: neue Ansätze zum Schutz urheberrechtlich 
geschützter Multimediawerke im Internet: eine technische, ökonomische und rechtliche Analyse (n268), at 283.
363 Ibid.
364 OLG München: Gewerbeschädigende Äußerungen in einem Meinungsforum im Internet, 2002 MMR 612.
365 Spindler, et al., Recht der elektronischen Medien: Kommentar (n268), at 1530.
366 Telemediengesetz (TMG), Sec. 10(1).
367  See Fitzner, Von Digital-Rights-Management zu Content Identi cation: neue Ansätze zum Schutz urheberrechtlich 
geschützter Multimediawerke im Internet: eine technische, ökonomische und rechtliche Analyse (n268), at 287.
368 LG Düsseldorf: Markenrechtsverletzung durch Onlineauktion, 2003 MMR 120-127.
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and no knowledge of information.” Th ere has been considerable disagreement as to 
how TDG §5 should be interpreted. According to the German legislators, the term 
“illegal” in Article 14 of ECRL only points to conduct but is irrelevant to  interpreting 
the term “information,” so for the “information,” the knowledge requirement can 
be fulfi lled if the hosting ISP knows the existence of the information regardless 
of whether it also knows the illegality of this information or not.369 However, 
Prof. Spindler believes that the German legislators unintentionally misunderstood 
Article 14 of the ECRL when transplanting it into German law; on the contrary, 
the ECRL does not diﬀ erentiate between conduct and information with regard 
to illegality.370 Th e circumstances are, however, diﬀ erent. For example, in the case 
of illegal conduct, the information itself is legal, and only the conduct such as the 
unauthorized copying or publishing of this information is illegal; in the case of 
illegal information, the information itself is illegal, such as pornography, violent or 
Nazi content.371 After the “Google AdWords” case concluded by the ECJ, the debate 
about this question seemed to end, because the ECJ had specifi cally declared that a 
service provider cannot be held liable for data which it has stored at the request of 
an advertiser, unless, it had knowledge of the unlawful nature of the data or of the 
advertiser’s activities, but failed to act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to 
the data concerned.372 A month later, the German Federal Court of Justice followed 
the ECJ’s opinion in the case of “Google AdWords”,373 and since then in Germany a 
hosting ISP must have knowledge of the illegality of information in order to trigger 
its responsibility to delete or block this information.
  With development of fi ltering technologies, many hosting ISPs have installed fi ltering 
programs in order to reduce copyright infringement. Before any content can be 
uploaded, it will be scanned by the fi ltering program, so technically this content is 
known by the fi ltering program. Th is raises the question of whether the information 
that is “known to” a fi ltering program is legally equated to the knowledge possessed by 
the hosting ISP. Th e “knowledge” of the fi ltering program if attributed to the ISP may 
remove the hosting ISP from of its “safe harbor”. It is generally accepted that, because 
a hosting ISP not only needs to know the information but also the illegality of the 
information, and the machine cannot displace the human in checking whether the 
information is infringing or not, then the knowledge of the fi ltering program should 
not be seen as fulfi lling the knowledge in the sense of TMG § 10.374
369 BT-Drs. 14/6098, S. 25, (quoting Spindler, et al., Recht der elektronischen Medien: Kommentar (n268), at 1531.)
370 See Spindler, et al., Recht der elektronischen Medien: Kommentar (n268), at 1531.
371 Ibid. 
372 Google France SARL and Google Inc. v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA and Others (n230), at Para. 120.
373 BGH, April 29, 2010, Case No. I ZR 69/08 – Vorschaubilder.
374  See Spindler, et al., Recht der elektronischen Medien: Kommentar (n268), at 1531-1532. Also see Fitzner, Von Digital-
Rights-Management zu Content Identi cation: neue Ansätze zum Schutz urheberrechtlich geschützter Multimediawerke 
im Internet: eine technische, ökonomische und rechtliche Analyse (n268), at 289-290.
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  Generally speaking, it is not easy to prove that a hosting ISP has knowledge of 
copyright infringement as understood in TMG § 10. As noted by Prof. Hoeren, if 
there is no notifi cation of an alleged infringement, then it is legally presumed that 
the provider has no suﬃ  cient knowledge of any infringing action and, consequently, 
the ISP is not responsible.375
4.2.2.2 Actual Knowledge in France
  For the purpose of implementing the E-commerce Directive, in 2004, the law makers 
enacted the Act on Confi dence in Digital Economy (LCEN). With regard to Hosting 
ISPs’ liability, the LCEN reads almost the same as that in the E-commerce Directive, 
according to which, a hosting ISP is liable for the infringing contents uploaded by their 
users in the following circumstances: “it has actual knowledge of the illegal nature of 
stored content or of facts and circumstances showing its illegal character,” and “upon 
obtaining such knowledge, it does not act expeditiously to remove or disable access 
to the data.”376 Th erefore, hosting ISPs can only be held liable when they have actual 
knowledge of infringement on their platform and refuse to get rid of the infringement. 
As referred to before in the US part, actual knowledge is really hard to be proved, 
and normally only a competent notice can lead to the hosting ISP’s knowledge of 
infringement. In order to increase the legal certainty, Article 6-5 of LCEN introduces 
a notice procedure which rules on what kind of elements should be included in a 
notice.377 Regarding how the case law in France interprets Article 6-5 and what kind 
of notice can lead to hosting ISPs’ having actual knowledge, will be discussed in the 
next chapter. Anyhow in France, without receiving competent notices, hosting ISPs 
should not be considered to have actual knowledge of infringement.378
4.2.2.3 Knowledge in the UK
  In the UK, for the purpose of implementing the E-Commerce Directive, the 
Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002/2013 were enacted in 
2002, and Article 19(a) literarily copied the knowledge criteria set in E-Commerce 
Directive.379 Generally, in order to result in a hosting ISP’s actual knowledge of 
infringement, a competent notice under Article 22 should be sent to the hosting 
ISP.380 In the case of McGrath v. Dawkins and Amazon, Amazon was an online 
375  Hoeren T and Yankova S, ‘Th e Liability of Internet Intermediaries-Th e German Perspective’ (2012) 43 International 
Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 501, at 510.
376  Nérisson, ‘Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries: Th e Position in France’ 
(n103), at 70.
377 LCEN, Art. 6-5, quoting ibid, at 71.
378 Ibid, at 71.
379 Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 (n155), Art. 19.
380  Lucy Nunn, Internet service providers: copyright infringement, Th omson Reuters(2014), available at http://login.
westlaw.co.uk/maf/wluk/app/document?src=doc&linktype=ref&context=23&crumb-action=replace&docguid=I4
B88A580587211E4B6DA87DCBE8E5CD8 (last visited 14-05-2014).
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bookseller, and on its website the public could write a review of each book.381 
McGrath wrote a book concerning debate on religion versus science, and in order 
to publicize his book, he posted the details of it in a review of another writer’s book 
on the Amazon’ website, which aroused lots of critics of McGrath, and some of 
them were even hostile.382 After receiving notice from McGrath, Amazon deleted 
some of the inappropriate items but not all of them, so McGrath sued Amazon 
for infringement.383 When deciding whether Amazon could rely on defenses under 
Article 19 of the Electronic Commerce (EU Directive) Regulations 2002, the court 
held that Amazon, as a corporation, could only have actual knowledge of defamation 
through human representatives, and given the large scale of Amazon’s website, it was 
impossible to know the posting in question before receiving the complaints from 
McGrath.384 However, in this case, the complaining notice sent by McGrath was 
incompetent, so Amazon should not be held as knowing the postings in question.385 
Regarding constructive knowledge, it can be concluded that, if a hosting ISP is 
“aware of facts or circumstances from which it would have been apparent”, then the 
activity was unlawful, but so far, no case laws oﬀ er further guidance on this point.386
4.2.2.4 Actual Knowledge in Italy
  Th e E-commerce Directive was implemented in Italy through enacting the 
Legislative Decree 70/03 (thereafter “L.D 70/03”). In line with Article 16 of L.D. 
70/03, in order to enjoy the liability exemption, a hosting ISP should not “have 
actual knowledge of unlawful activity or information and, as regards claims for 
damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the unlawful activity 
or information is apparent.”387 Besides, “upon obtaining such knowledge or 
awareness and upon communication of a court or of a competent authority, the 
provider acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.”388 
As noted by Alberto Bellan, unlike what is provided in the E-commerce Directive, 
in Italy, it seems that besides having knowledge of infringement, an order from 
the court or a competent authority is still necessary to trigger the hosting ISPs’ 
obligation to expeditiously remove the infringing materials in question.389 With 
regard to the knowledge of infringement, according to Italian case law, whether 
a hosting ISP actually knows the infringement mainly relies on the notices sent 
381 McGrath v Dawkins and Amazon, [2012] EWHC B3 (QB), para. 3.
382 Ibid, para. 4 and 5.
383 Ibid, para. 13 and 14.
384 Ibid, para. 42.
385 Ibid, para. 47.
386 Nunn, Internet service providers: copyright infringement (n375).
387  Art. 16(1) L.D. 70/03, quoting Bellan, ‘Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and 
Intermediaries: Th e Position in Italy’ (n238), at 90.
388 Ibid.
389 Ibid. More details will be discussed in the chapter “notice-and-takedown procedure in the US, EU and China.”
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by copyright owners.390 As for what kind of information should be included 
in a notice so as to lead to the hosting ISP’s actual knowledge, diﬀ erent courts 
made diﬀ erent opinions on this issue, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
  To sum up, at EU level, the ECJ held that when deciding whether a hosting ISP 
knew the illegality of information or activity, the court should treat the hosting ISP 
as a diligent economic operator.391 Further, in order to conclude that the hosting 
ISPs had knowledge under Article 14 of E-Commerce Directive, the hosting ISPs 
should know the information or activities concerned in the fi rst place and such 
knowledge can be acquired through either self-investigation or notifi cation from 
rights holders.392 Since hosting ISPs do not need to actively seek the infringing 
information or activities,393 the notifi cations from copyright owners become the 
main source of the hosting ISPs’ knowledge of infringement. As demonstrated by 
case law in the four Member States discussed above, before a competent notice 
has been sent, it usually cannot be concluded that the hosting ISP is aware of the 
infringement. Th erefore, complaining notices play an important role in leading to 
the hosting ISP’s knowledge of infringement in the EU.394 
4.2.3 “Should Know” in China
  In China, a hosting ISP’s actual knowledge of infringement can rarely be proved, 
except where it receives oﬃ  cial notice from the copyright owner by post, fax or email to 
complain about the infringement.395 As for what constitutes “should know”, namely 
“justifi able reason to know” as provided in Internet Regulation, some Chinese courts 
have concluded the existence of “red fl ags” as being equivalent to “should know”. In 
the case of Hua Xia Shu Ren v. Youku.com, the Handian District Court concluded 
that the defendant, “Youku.com”, should have known of the infringements involved 
based on the following facts: 1) a large number of infringing videos, most of which 
were marked “copyright is reserved by Hua Xia Shu Ren”, were claimed to be oﬀ ered 
by an internet user, the so-called “Qilingjiao”; 2) the defendant also publicized 
its service as “Youku is a good learning club”.396 In this case, the videos marked 
“copyright is reserved by Hua Xia Shu Ren” can be treated as a qualifi ed “red fl ag” 
in the context of the US “red fl ag” test, because the claim of “copyright reservation” 
390  Bellan, ‘Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries: Th e Position in Italy’ (n238), 
at 112.
391 L’Oréal SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others (n327), at para. 120.
392 Ibid, at para. 121 and 122.
393 E-commerce Directive (n1), Art. 15.
394  In other member states, notices also play a vital role in resulting in hosting ISPs’ knowledge of infringing materials. 
See Verbiest T et al., Study on the Liability of Internet Intermediaries (2007), at 36-46, available at http://
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/study/liability/fi nal_report_en.pdf (last visited 28-08-2015).
395 See Internet Provisions (网络条例) (n208), Art. 13.
396  Hua Xia Shu Ren v. Youku.com (华夏树人v.优酷), Beijing Haidian District Court (北京市海淀区法院), No. 
9200 Hai Min Chu Zi (2008) (（2008）海民初字第9200号).
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  has already made the infringing nature of relevant videos obvious, just like the clip 
containing the plaintiﬀ ’s trademark for several minutes in the case of Io v. Veoh397. 
However, rather than applying both aspects of the US “red  ag” test, the Handian District 
Court decided the question of liability without considering whether the defendant knew 
of the “red  ag”.  us, the Handian District Court made hosting ISPs more easily subject 
to secondary liability than they would be under the two pronged “red  ag” test in the US. 
  
   ereafter, scholars in China increasingly proposed the US “red  ag” test, especially, 
Prof. Wang Qian, systematically started to advocate the implementation of the US “safe 
harbor” provisions in China, and wrote several in uential articles about the US “red 
 ag” test.398 Eventually, the Chinese courts determined that the application of the “red 
 ag” test consists of two steps, one of which is the existence of “red  ag”, and the other 
is that a hosting ISP also knows of the “red  ag”. According to the Internet Provision 
issued by the People’s Supreme Court, some factual circumstances under which a hosting 
ISP would be found to meet the “should know” standard are: 1) hot-play audio-video 
located on the homepage, other main pages, or other places of a website which can be 
easily identi ed by ISPs; 2) taking the initiative to choose, edit, sort or recommend the 
hot-play audio-video works, or setting a special top list for them; 3) other circumstances 
under which it can be easily determined that the relevant works, performances, audio 
recordings and sound or video recordings  are o ered without authorization, but the ISPs 
then failed to take reasonable measures to prevent the copyright infringement.399 
  After examining the specifi c circumstances enumerated above in the Internet 
Provision, the shadow of the American “red fl ag” test can clearly be seen. Th e fi rst 
circumstance demonstrates a concrete example fulfi lling the “red fl ag” test. To be 
more precise, in terms of hot-play400 audio-video works available on the Internet 
for free, hosting ISPs should know that these works are infringing copies without 
need of further investigation, since the copyright owners would not make their 
popular audio-video works available on the Internet without charge when these 
works are still considered hot-play. Th erefore, these infringements are suﬃ  cient to 
qualify them as “red” fl ags. Furthermore, during their daily operations, the ISPs 
certainly check their own homepage and other main pages, so if these infringed 
397  See Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Internets, Inc. (n5), at 1149. In the decision, the court did not directly conclude that the 
clip qualifi ed for “red fl ag”, but it can be implied from the phrasing: “Although one of the works did contain the 
plaintiﬀ ’s trademark several minutes into the clip, there is no evidence from which it can be inferred that Veoh was 
aware of, but chose to ignore, it.”
398  Wang Q (王迁), ‘Infringement Research on Copyright of Video-sharing Website (视频分享网站著作权侵权问
题研究)’ (2008) 4 Studies on Law and Business 42 (《法商研究》2008年第4期), at 42-53.
399  See Internet Provisions (网络规定) (n208), Art. 12.
400  “hot-play” is a term that can always be found in the decisions made by Chinese courts, and fi nally was incorporated 
into the Provisions by the People’s Supreme Court. In terms of relevant decisions, “hot-play” has always been used 
to describe the audio-video works which are newly distributed, popular and still on screen. 
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hot-play audio-videos are being shown on these sites, the hosting ISPs cannot deny 
knowing these are fl ashing “red fl ags”. For the second one, the facts depicted by it 
look more like direct infringements rather than indirect infringement subject to 
the “red fl ag” test, because if the hosting ISPs take the initiative to choose, edit, 
sort or recommend the hot-play audio-video works, they are actively involved in 
these infringements and should be defi ned as direct infringers rather than secondary 
or contributory infringers. Nevertheless, if they are actively participating in the 
copyright infringement, they clearly should know the infringement is taking place. 
Th e third circumstance can be seen as a substantial copy of the “red fl ag” test but 
expressed from another perspective.
  Besides setting specifi c “should know” circumstances for hosting ISPs, concerning 
all types of ISPs, the Internet Provisions also list some others factors which need 
to be comprehensively assessed when concluding “should know”. Th ese are: 1) the 
character of service oﬀ ered by ISPs, the ways of oﬀ ering service, the possibility 
of leading to infringements through its service, and ISPs’ capability of managing 
information; 2) the types and fame of transmitted works, performances, sound 
recordings and video recordings, and whether the infringement is obvious or not; 
3) whether the ISPs take initiative to choose, edit, modify and recommend the 
works, performances, audio recordings and audio-video recordings; 4) whether the 
ISPs adopt reasonable measures to prevent infringements actively; 5) whether the 
ISPs set convenient processes to receive the infringing notices, and whether the 
ISPs respond to them reasonably; 6) whether the ISPs take reasonable responding 
measures against repeat infringements committed by the same internet user; 7) the 
other elements which need to be considered.401 
  By analyzing  the factors enumerated above, one can fi nd that, compared to the “red 
fl ag” test, they seem more likely to regulate the commercial model of ISPs rather 
than focus on whether the ISPs know about the existence of concrete infringement. 
Except for the second and third factors, which are directly relevant to the knowledge 
of ISPs, the other factors require the ISPs to fulfi ll a certain duty of care so as to 
reduce infringement. In addition, the People’s Supreme Court also enumerates a 
particular instance, under which the People’s courts can legally presume that the ISPs 
have knowledge that their Internet users are infringing a copyright owner’s right to 
network dissemination of information, as follows: where the ISPs recommend the 
hot-play audio-video works by means of setting list, content, indexes, describing 
paragraph, content introduction, etc., when oﬀ ering Internet service, and the public 
can access these works through directly downloading, browsing or other ways.402 
401 See Internet Provisions (网络规定) (n208), Art. 9.
402 Ibid, Art. 10.
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  Based on the similar reasons referred to before, this particular instance is more like 
a direct copyright infringement rather than an indirect infringement, because if 
an ISP recommends any audio-video works, these audio-video works can be seen 
as being its own oﬀ ering from a legal perspective, and thus it should be subject to 
direct liability, if there is any copyright infringement.
Based on the above discussion of imputed knowledge, one can fi nd that, compared 
with judicial practice in the US, the Chinese courts seem to be interpreting imputed 
knowledge more broadly and extending it to cover not only the “red fl ag” test, but 
also to cover direct infringement. More importantly, the “should know” criterion in 
China compels hosting ISPs to undertake certain duties so as to regulate their business 
model. In contrast to what occurs in China, it seems that in the EU member states 
discussed above, the imputed knowledge can be found by the courts in quite limited 
circumstances, such as where competent notices have been sent by copyright owners.
4.3 Repeating Infringements
  Since hosting ISPs do not need to undertake general monitoring responsibility 
for checking the content uploaded by their users, copyright owners rely heavily 
on certain ex post facto measures to protect their rights, such as measures against 
repeating infringements. In each country there are diﬀ erent measures required against 
repeating infringements. In the US, the “safe harbor” provisions require hosting 
ISPs to take necessary measures against repeat infringers. In the EU, although the 
E-Commerce Directive does not include a specifi c provision that requires hosting 
ISPs to prevent repeating infringements, it does indicate that the injunctions can 
be ordered by courts or authorities to require the termination or prevention of any 
infringement.403 In China, the Internet Provision issued by the People’s Supreme 
Court seems to adopt a mixed solution, which means hosting ISPs are required to 
take necessary measures against both repeat infringers and repeated infringement of 
the same copyrighted content. In this section, it discusses and compares the hosting 
ISPs’ obligations against repeating infringement in the US, EU and China.
4.3.1 Repeat Infringer Policy in US
  In the US, in order to enjoy liability limitation, an ISP should “have adopted and 
reasonably implemented, and informed subscribers and account holders of the 
service provider’s system or internet of, a policy that provides for the termination 
in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service 
provider’s system or internet who are repeat infringers.”404 After examining this 
403 E-commerce Directive (n1), Recital 45.
404 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512 (i) (1) (A).
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provision, its focus is on infringing users rather than on infringing content, which 
can be properly called a repeat infringer policy, and ISPs’ clients must also be 
informed about this policy. 
  Th e repeat infringer policy is closely related to the DMCA “notice-take down” 
mechanism. First, only after a qualifi ed notifi cation has been sent, which is suﬃ  cient 
for the hosting ISP to locate the infringing content, will the court investigate whether 
the hosting ISP has implemented a policy against repeat infringing properly. For 
example, in the case of Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, the notice sent by Perfect 10 
only identifi ed the website that contained the alleged infringing materials, but did 
not identify the URLs of the images nor identify which of its images were being 
infringed, so the notice failed to provide IBill with enough information to locate 
the infringing materials.405 Th erefore, the court found that this notice could not 
support the claim that IBill had failed to reasonably implement its repeat infringer 
policy.406 Second, a hosting ISP must name a proper agent to receive notifi cations of 
complaint. In  Ellison v. Robertson, the defendant had changed the e-mail address to 
which “the infringement notifi cations were supposed to have been sent”, and “failed 
to provide for the forwarding of messages sent to the old address or notifi cation that 
the e-mail address was inactive”, so the court found that the defendant did not have an 
eﬀ ective notifi cation agent in place at the time when the alleged infringing activities 
had occurred, and thus had not reasonably implemented its policy against repeat 
infringers.407 Th ird, unlike the notice-take down procedure, notices of copyright 
infringement from a non-party are relevant in deciding whether the repeat infringer 
policy is properly implemented. In the case of Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC , the 
appeals court held that § 512(i)(1)(A) required it to assess the service provider’s 
“policy” rather than how the service provider actually treated a particular copyright 
owner, so defendants’ actions towards non-parties were relevant in determining 
whether defendants had reasonably implemented their repeat infringer policy.408 
  Since there is a public policy against repeat infringers, it is important to defi ne and 
discuss what “repeat” should mean in the context of infringement. However, it 
seems that the US courts did not exert much eﬀ ort in interpreting the concept of 
repeat infringer. In the case of Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, the court found that 
both of the following circumstances conform to repeat infringer policy: 1) upon 
receiving notice from the plaintiﬀ  that complied with the DMCA’s notifi cation 
requirements, defendant - IBill had suspended the oﬀ ending web site’s account;409 
2) the defendant’s Internet Key would ban a webmaster from its age-verifi cation 
405  See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC (n268), at 1090. Th is opinion has been upheld by 9th Circuit Court in the 
appealing instance; see Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC (n336), at 1113.
406 Ibid.
407 See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F3d 1072, at 1080 (9th Cir, 2004).
408 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC (n336), at 1113.
409 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC (n268), at 1090.
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service after it had received three notifi cations regarding the web sites of any 
particular webmaster.410 Th erefore, at least in the U.S. District Court for the 
Central District of California, it is tolerable if an ISP does not enforce its repeat 
infringer policy against an internet user after its second infringement. Additionally, 
it is worth noting that Congress requires reasonable implementation rather than 
perfect implementation.411 Hence, although an ISP’s policy can be easily sidestepped 
by infringing internet users, such as opening a new account after their original 
accounts have been terminated, the eﬀ orts to sidestep the defendant’s policy do not 
amount to a failure of implementation on the part of the defendant.412 Moreover, to 
identify and terminate the accounts of repeat infringers, the ISPs also do not need to 
track users in a particular way to or aﬃ  rmatively police users for evidence of repeat 
infringement.413 However, impeding the proper implementation of this policy is 
prohibited. In the case of Aimster, an encryption system was built into the defendant’s 
system which prevented it from knowing which users were transmitting which 
particular fi le, so actually the repeat infringer policy could never be implemented, 
and based on this the court concluded that the defendant failed to satisfy the 
threshold requirement of DMCA 512 (i)(A).414 Nevertheless, if a hosting ISP does 
not allow the copyright owner to take advantage of the content-identifi cation tool 
that is only open to its partners, the hosting ISP may not violate the repeat infringer 
policy. In the case of Viacom v. YouTube, the defendant YouTube adopted the content 
identifi cation tools which allowed the copyright owners who had partnership with 
it to identify their copyrighted materials on YouTube, but Viacom was not a partner 
of YouTube and thus could not utilize the content identifi cation tools.415 Th erefore, 
Viacom claimed that YouTube “deliberately set up its identifi cation tools to try to 
avoid identifying infringements of class plaintiﬀ s’ works,” and thus violated the 
repeat infringer policy.416 Th e court fi rst defi ned the deployment of the content 
identifi cation tools as a sort of monitoring measure taken by YouTube, and then 
referred to DMCA 512(m)(1) which reads that “a service provider monitoring its 
service or aﬃ  rmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity, except to the 
extent consistent with a standard technical measure complying with the provisions 
of subsection (i).”417 Th en, the court held that only “refusing to accommodate or 
implement a ‘standard technical measure’ exposes a service provider to liability,” but 
“refusing to provide access to mechanisms by which a service provider aﬃ  rmatively 
410 Ibid, at 1093.
411 Ibid, at 1089.
412 Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc. (n333), at 1103. See also Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Internets, Inc. (n5), at 1143-1145.
413 Ibid.
414 In re Aimster Copyright Litigation (n66), at 655.
415 Viacom International, INC. v. YouTube, INC. (n7), at 41.
416 Ibid.
417 Ibid.
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monitors its own network has no such result.”418 Since the content identifi cation 
tools in question were not the standard technical measure prescribed in DMCA 
512 (i), YouTube should not be excluded from safe harbor for restricting access to 
the content identifi cation tools.419 In fact, content identifi cation tools deployed by 
YouTube function as a convenient way for its partners to identify their copyrighted 
materials, but the non-partner copyright owners still can use normal measures 
to identify their contents on YouTube, so the content identifi cation tools in this 
case are substantially diﬀ erent from the encryption system deployed by Aimster.
4.3.2 Repeat Infringement in the EU
  At the EU level, the relevant Directives confer upon copyright owners the right to apply 
for an injunction against ISPs whose services are used for copyright infringement. For 
instance, the Article 8(3) of Information Society Directive provides that “Member 
States shall ensure that rights holders are in a position to apply for an injunction 
against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copyright 
or related right.”420 But the Directive does not include any condition and modality 
relating to such injunctions, and leaves the details of injunction rules to the national 
law of the member states.421 Meanwhile, the IP Enforcement Directive reconfi rms 
these injunction rules provided in the Information Society Directive.422 Further, in the 
light of this Directive, all remedies including injunctions “shall be fair and equitable 
and shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits 
or unwarranted delays,” and “shall also be eﬀ ective, proportionate and dissuasive and 
shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade 
and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.”423 
  In the case of L’oreal v. eBay, the ECJ also held that Member States had the right to 
order the hosting ISP concerned to take measures that not only bring  to  an  end  the 
infringement  of  a  copyright  or  trademark holder’s  rights,  but also  prevent  further 
infringement.424 Regarding the measures that can be ordered in an injunction, the 
ECJ further stated that, the measures should not confl ict with “no general monitoring 
obligation” clause,425 and “must be eﬀ ective, proportionate, dissuasive,” and “must not 
create barriers to legitimate trade.”426 However, except providing these three general 
criteria, the ECJ did not indicate any explicit measure that can be ordered in an 
injunction, and left it for national courts to decide at their discretion.
418 Ibid.
419 Ibid.
420 Directive 2001/29/EC (n83), Art. 8(3).
421 Ibid, Recital 59.
422 Directive 2004/48/EC (n83), Art. 11.
423 Ibid, Art. 3.
424 L’Oréal SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others (n327), at para. 125-134.
425 Ibid, para. 139.
426 Ibid, para. 144.
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  Th erefore, in the EU, copyright owners can apply for injunctions from courts so 
as to require hosting ISPs to prevent infringement from occurring in the future. 
Nevertheless, whether hosting ISPs are obligated to, or to what extent hosting ISPs 
should take measures to prevent repeat infringement in the future, mainly depends 
on the national law in the member states. In fact, because the same infringing 
materials can easily be uploaded again after being taken down, in order to eﬀ ectively 
prevent such endless notice-and-takedown process, the courts in member states do 
request hosting ISPs to take necessary measures against repeated infringement. Th e 
following section explores how national courts defi ne hosting ISPs’ obligations 
against repeating infringement under the roof of the EU Directives.
4.3.2.1 Störerhaftung - Disturber’s Liability in Germany
  As discussed in the section about “hosting ISPs’ knowledge in Germany”, a hosting 
ISPs’ knowledge of infringement is diﬃ  cult to prove without proper notifi cation 
from the copyright owners, so liability based on knowledge can rarely be found 
by a court. However, German law oﬀ ers an alternative basis on which to impose 
hosting ISPs’ liability, störerhaftung, which can be translated as “disturber’s liability” 
in English. According to Article 97 of German Copyright law (UrhG § 97), 
 
   Any person who infringes copyright or any other right protected under this Act may be required by 
the injured party to eliminate the infringement or, where there is a risk of repeated infringement, 
may be required by the injured party to cease and desist. Entitlement to prohibit the infringer from 
future infringement shall also exist where the risk of infringement exists for the fi rst time.427 
  “Disturber’s liability” is a kind of liability which requires the responsible party to 
prevent certain infringements from occurring again in the future. Th e TMG § 
10 only limits the monetary damages liability of qualifi ed hosting ISPs, but the 
other remedies such as “disturber’s liability”, can remain unaﬀ ected by TMG § 10. 
Currently, whether the hosting ISPs should face “disturber’s liability” has become 
a main point of contention by parties before the German Courts. Prof. Leistner 
notes that if someone runs an automatic processing system (such as a platform 
automatically processing the contents uploaded by its users), it is not practical for 
him to acquire the knowledge or control over the information transmitted in the 
system; however, in order to ensure it is free of liability in this way, it must adapt 
itself in the future to qualify for the following requirement, namely, based on the 
intensifi ed duties established in the context of “disturber’s liability”, it should at 
least take minimal control over the transmitted information after receiving clear 
notices about concrete infringements.428 
427 German Copyright Act, Sec. 97 (1).
428  Leistner M, ‘Grundlagen und Perspektiven der Haftung für Urheberrechtsverletzungen im Internet’, 2012 ZUM 
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  Th e German Federal Court of Justice made a fundamental and proper development 
of the breadth of “disturber’s liability” for the hosting ISPs. Upon receiving evidence 
about a concrete and obvious infringement, the relevant ISP should not only block 
this concrete infringement; but it is also responsible for taking all possible and 
reasonable measures to prevent substantially similar infringements from occurring in 
the future.429 As for what constitutes possible and reasonable measures, the German 
courts have diﬀ erent opinions. In Sharehoster II, the Higher Regional Court of 
Hamburg followed a strict approach to an ISP’s monitoring duty, and required 
the defendant, after being notifi ed by the plaintiﬀ  of a particular infringement, to 
undertake a preventive search (both automatic and manual) of all hosted content in 
order to identify the material infringing the plaintiﬀ ’s rights, and check all the fi les 
uploaded by users who have previously uploaded infringing content.430 Th e Higher 
Regional Court of Düsseldorf, by contrast, seems to have favored the hosting 
provider, and found that the measures applied by the ISP (essentially the same as 
those in the case before the Hamburg Court) were suﬃ  cient, but the monitoring 
duties required by the plaintiﬀ , such as word fi ltering of titles, manual searching 
and blocking IP addresses, were unreasonable.431 
  Moreover, academics in Germany are also enthusiastic about setting a proper 
criterion for “disturber’s liability”. In Prof. Leistner’s opinion, because of 
E-Commerce Directive Article 15 (§ 7 Abs. 2 TMG), no general active monitoring 
responsibility should be taken into account. In any case, if legal business-models are 
worthy of protection, they are usually only obliged to take economically reasonable 
fi ltering conduct (usually only automatic measures are feasible).432 However, when 
analyzing the ISP’s legal business-model it is still necessary to distinguish between 
dangerous and neutral business-models. Th e former means a business-model which 
could easily result in infringements based on its previous advertising, design, and 
the funding structure of its platform, while the latter means a business-model 
which is not particularly friendly to infringements due to its marketing, structure 
of platform, and benefi ting model.433 For the active disturber (the one who runs 
the  dangerous model), if it still operates a legal business-model, then the further 
control and duties are not unreasonable  so as to make the particular dangerously 
structured business-model neutral again.434 From the above-statement, the hosting 
731.
429 Ibid, at 724.
430  Sharehoster II, 2010 MMR 51, at 53 (quoting Matulionyte and Nérisson, ‘Th e French Route to an ISP Safe 
Harbor, Compared to German and US Ways’ (n231), at 66)
431  Rapidshare,  2010 MMR 483, at 484 (quoting Matulionyte and Nérisson, ‘Th e French Route to an ISP Safe 
Harbor, Compared to German and US Ways’ (n231), at 66-67)
432 Leistner, ‘Grundlagen und Perspektiven der Haftung für Urheberrechtsverletzungen im Internet’ (n423), at 725.
433 Ibid.
434 Ibid.
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  ISPs’ intent, which can be deduced from its business-model, is an important factor 
when deciding how broad the “disturber’s liability” should be, which means that 
if a hosting ISP has the intent to promote the infringing use of its platform, it is 
reasonable to ask it to take more responsibility in the frame of “disturber’s liability”.
  In the case of “Rapidshare”, the German Federal Court of Justice also delivered a 
similar opinion. It concluded that when deciding the scope of responsibilities as a 
disturber, the following two factors should be considered: (1) whether the business-
model of a hosting ISP is designed for infringements from the beginning or not, 
and (2) whether it promotes the infringing use of its service by its own measures.435 
If a hosting ISP induces copyright infringements committed on a substantial scale, 
it is reasonable for it to take comprehensive and regular control over the “links 
collections”436 which refer to its service.437 
  To conclude, unlike the repeat infringer policy in the US, in Germany substantial 
measures are required to be taken against repeat infringement of the same content 
rather than repeat infringers. However, similarly to the US, these measures taken by 
hosting ISPs should be possible and reasonable, but they do not need to be perfect. 
As for what the possible and reasonable measures are, that depends on the hosting 
ISPs’ intent as mirrored in their business-model. Th is means that the more likely a 
hosting ISP’s business-model is to result in infringements, then more sophisticated 
measures against repeat infringement of content are possible and reasonable. In 
addition, the enforcement of disturber’s liability in Germany is also relevant to the 
notice-and-takedown procedure, because generally a proper notifi cation from the 
copyright owner needs to be sent so as to trigger disturber’s liability. 
4.3.2.2 Stay-down in France
  In the EU, in order to prevent the same infringing materials from being repeatedly 
uploaded, the courts in Member States developed a “notice and stay-down” 
mechanism by case law.438 In the light of “notice and stay-down” mechanism, a 
hosting ISP is obligated to take necessary and permanent measures to prevent the 
infringing materials, which had been the subject of complaint in notices, from 
being uploaded on its platform again.439 Since 2007, some French courts have 
already introduced the “notice and stay-down” mechanism, required the hosting 
ISPs to take all necessary measures to monitor the materials which had been notifi ed 
435 BGH – Rapidshare (n42), Para. (b).
436  “link collections” means the collections of search results after searching for specifi c content through search tools. 
For instance, if a person searches keywords of “alone in dark, Rapidshare” in Google, the results are links from 
which a person can download “alone in dark” residing on Rapidshare.
437 BGH – Rapidshare (n42), Para (c).
438  Parti K and Marin L, ‘Ensuring freedoms and protecting rights in the governance of the Internet: a comparative 
analysis of blocking measures of illegal Internet content and the liability of ISPs’ (2013) 9 Journal of Contemporary 
European Research 138, at 149.
439 Ibid.
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as illegal.440 For instance, in Tranquility Bay the TGI de Paris (High Court of 
Paris) concluded that, once the defendant had been notifi ed about the infringing 
materials, it was obligated to implement any possible means to prevent the same 
infringing materials from being uploaded again; otherwise, it could not be sheltered 
under safe harbor protection. 441 In 2011, the Paris Court of Appeal held Google 
Video liable because it failed to take every possible means to prevent the complaint 
videos in copyright owner’s notifi cations from being accessed again.442 However, 
after the ECJ reaﬃ  rmed the doctrine of “no general monitoring obligation” in the 
case of Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, the “notice and stay-down” mechanism was 
dismissed by French courts.443 In 2012, the Cour de Cassation (Supreme Court) 
put an end to this “notice and stay-down” mechanism based on the reason that 
this mechanism cannot be achieved without undertaking a general monitoring 
obligation.444 According to the reasoning made by the court, although it seems 
only to impose a specifi c monitoring liability on Google by requiring it to prevent 
the same infringing content from being accessed again, it is impossible to fi nd this 
repeat infringing content without screening all posted content (including non-
infringing ones), which amounts to subjecting Google to a general obligation to 
monitor.445 As noted by Angelopoulos Christina, since the materials specifi ed by 
the notifi cations can accumulate at a really fast speed, the only way to monitor such 
a large amount of “specifi ed” materials is to use fi ngerprinting or similar automatic 
fi ltering technologies to check every upload.446 
4.3.2.3 Stay-down in Italy
  In Italy, in order to prevent the endless take-down and reposting process, copyright 
owners tend to request the courts to order hosting ISPs to prevent the same infringing 
materials from being uploaded again. However, such a kind of claim cannot always 
be confi rmed by courts. For instance, in the case of RTI v. Google, some football 
match videos copyrighted by RTI were embedded and linked on a blog hosted by 
Google’s Blogger.com, so it requested Google to remove the infringing materials and 
440  Angelopoulos, ‘Beyond the Safe Harbours: Harmonising Substantive Intermediary Liability for Copyright 
Infringement in Europe’ (n91), at 264.
441 Ibid. 
442 Ibid. 
443  Parti and Marin, ‘Ensuring freedoms and protecting rights in the governance of the Internet: a comparative analysis of 
blocking measures of illegal Internet content and the liability of ISPs’ (n433), at 149. In the case of Scarlet Extended SA 
v SABAM, the European Court of Justice stated, that Member States must not put ISPs under any obligation to endorse 
illegal police activities and thus providing surveillance of users. Th e ECJ also ruled that national court’s order to force ISPs 
to implement fi lter systems, installed at ISPs’ own expense and used for an unlimited period of time, would breach the 
ISP’s rights to conduct business freely, and would infringe individuals’ rights to privacy and personal data protection.
444  Angelopoulos, ‘Beyond the Safe Harbours: Harmonising Substantive Intermediary Liability for Copyright 
Infringement in Europe’ (n91), at 265.
445 Ibid. 
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prevent them from being posted again.447 Th e District Court of Rome held that the 
plaintiﬀ ’s claim confl icted with no general monitoring Clause in the E-commerce 
Directive, and Google had no obligation to fi lter out the infringement in the 
future.448 It is commonly believed that the District of Rome was aﬀ ected by the 
ECJ case “Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM”, when making this decision.449 However, 
in the case of Delta TV v. YouTube, the District Court of Turin to some extent took 
a diﬀ erent decision. In this case, some of videos copyrighted by Delta TV were 
uploaded on YouTube without permission, so the Delta TV sent some complaint 
notices to YouTube, and requested YouTube to take the necessary measures to 
prevent the infringing materials indicated in the notices from being uploaded 
again.450 In the decision, besides deciding the necessary elements of a competent 
notice which can provoke the hosting ISPs’ responsibility to remove the materials 
in question, the District Court of Turin also held that YouTube should allow the 
Delta TV to use the Content ID system451 to prevent the same infringement from 
being committed again.452 According to the Content ID policy made by YouTube, 
copyright owners should submit the reference fi les used for fi ltering by themselves 
at their own cost.453 But the District Court of Turin held that after receiving a 
competent notice, YouTube is obligated to incorporate the infringing materials 
into the Content ID system as reference fi les at its own cost so that the Content 
ID system can fi lter out the further infringement.454 In the decision, the District 
Court of Turin also referred to the ECJ case “Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM”, and 
reconfi rmed that ISPs should not be requested to actively monitor the materials 
uploaded by users, and then held that it was not active monitoring to keep the 
infringing materials stay-down by relying on Content ID.455 Th erefore, with the 
development of fi ltering technologies, the Italian courts seem to also update their 
views on stay-down obligation.
447  Decision of the Court of Rome of July 11, 2011, quoting Coraggio G, ‘Google’s victory might be a short success’ 
(2012) 23 Entertainment Law Review 139, at 140.
448 Ibid. 
449  Ibid. In the case of Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM, the ECJ held that “must be interpreted as precluding an injunction 
made against an internet service provider which requires it to install a system for fi ltering … which is capable of 
identifying on that provider’s network the movement of electronic fi les containing a musical, cinematographic 
or audio-visual work in respect of which the applicant claims to hold intellectual-property rights, with a view to 
blocking the transfer of fi les the sharing of which infringes copyright.” See Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM (n70).
450  Coraggio G, YouTube case changes rules on Internet liability, Lexology(2014), available at http://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=bf912a7f-b3d2-47b2-9fed-c50534122b00 (last visited 26-04-2014).
451  Content ID is an anti-piracy system run by YouTube and it can be used to fi lter out the copyrighted materials by 
reference fi les, see How Content ID works (n42).
452  Spedicato G, Italy: the take-down notice must contain the speci c YouTube URLs, Wolters Kluwer(2014), available at 
http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2014/05/28/italy-the-take-down-notice-must-contain-the-specifi c-youtube-urls/ 
(last visited 27-08-2014).
453 How Content ID works (n42).
454 Coraggio, YouTube case changes rules on Internet liability (n445).
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4.3.2.4 Injunction in the UK
  In the UK, the injunction provision in Information Society Directive was 
implemented by Sec. 97A of the Copyright, Design and Patent Act, which reads 
that “the High Court (in Scotland, the Court of Session) shall have power to grant 
an injunction against a service provider, where that service provider has actual 
knowledge of another person using their service to infringe copyright.”456 When 
determining whether an ISP has the actual knowledge in this section, “a court shall 
take into account all matters which appear to it in the particular circumstance to 
be relevant,” and particularly, whether the ISP has received a competent notice.457 
Th erefore, after notifying a hosting ISP about copyright infringement, the copyright 
owner can apply for an injunction order against the hosting ISP, and prevent it from 
oﬀ ering its service to the infringing party. Nevertheless, such a notice should not 
be held a pre-condition to conclude that a hosting ISP acquires actual knowledge 
of other parties infringing copyright through its service.458 Regarding the breadth 
of injunction, the UK courts refer to the injunction rules at the EU level, and hold 
that an ISP may not only be required to prevent the continuation and repetition 
of the infringement that it has actual knowledge of, but also prevent the “further 
infringement of that kind”.459 Nevertheless, when deciding the scope of injunction 
in a concrete case, the court should ensure that the injunction entitled to copyright 
owner must be dissuasive, eﬀ ective and proportionate, and must not hamper the 
legal business.460 Further, a copyright owner is only authorized to seek an injunction 
to restrain the illegal transmission of its own copyrighted works. In the case of 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v. Newzbin Ltd, the plaintiﬀ s tried to seek an 
injunction that covers all binary and all text materials including those they did 
not have rights to, but eventually, the court held that this injunction request 
was unreasonable, and only granted the plaintiﬀ s an injunction to “restrain the 
defendant from infringing claimants’ copyright in relation to their repertoire of 
fi lms.”461 
  To sum up, compared with the repeat infringer policy in the US, the hosting ISPs 
in the EU are required to take measures against repeat infringement of the same 
materials rather than against repeat infringers. However, it is still questionable 
whether such obligation of preventing the same infringing materials from being 
456 UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (n128), Sec. 97A(1).
457 Ibid, Sec. 97A(2).
458  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Newzbin Ltd, [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch), Para. 134, 135. In this case, although 
the defendant denied that it had actual knowledge of any person using its service to infringe, because it did 
not receive any notice from the plaintiﬀ , the court still held that the defendant acquired the actual knowledge 
prescribed in Section 97A.
459  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v. British Telecommunications Plc, Royal Courts of Justice, [2011] EWHC 1981 
(Ch). Para. 153-156.
460 Ibid. 
461 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v. Newzbin Ltd (n453), Para. 135. 
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uploaded complies with the “no general monitoring obligation” clause in the 
E-Commerce Directive. For example, the French courts have adopted the “notice 
and stay-down” mechanism, but in 2012, the French Supreme Court dismissed this 
mechanism, since it was inconsistent with the “no general monitoring obligation” 
clause.462 In Italy, the courts seem to adopt a compromising approach. Although 
they recognize that stay-down obligation may confl ict with “no general monitoring 
obligation” clause, they hold that copyright owners should be allowed to use the 
anti-piracy tools that have been deployed by hosting ISPs to keep the infringing 
materials stay down.463 In Germany, based on the disturber’s liability in Tort Law, 
German courts require a hosting ISP not only to remove the infringing materials 
in question after receiving complaining notices, but also to take all necessary and 
reasonable to prevent the same infringing materials from being uploaded again.464 
In order to avoid confl icting with “no general monitoring obligation” clause, the 
obligations under disturber’s liability is named as specifi c monitoring.465 In the UK, 
an injunction can be ordered against the hosting ISP which has actual knowledge 
of infringement, and it can require the hosting ISP to prevent the continuation and 
repetition of that infringement, or even stop the further infringement of that kind.
4.3.3 Repeat Infringement from the Same Internet User in China
  Although the Internet Regulation adopts the “notice-and-takedown” mechanism, it 
does not include a provision requiring ISPs to take action against repeat infringers 
or the repeat infringement of the same content. However, the General Principles of 
the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, as a fundamental legal document 
protecting private rights, provides a general liability rule which is quite similar to the 
“disturber’s liability” in German civil law as follows: 1) cessation of infringements; 
2) removal of obstacles; 3) elimination of dangers.466 Based on the rationale 
embodied in the Chinese “disturber’s liability”, some courts require hosting ISPs 
to take essential measures against repeat infringements. For instance, in the case of 
Yinian v. Taobao, although the defendant Taobao had already deleted the infringing 
462  Angelopoulos, ‘Beyond the Safe Harbours: Harmonising Substantive Intermediary Liability for Copyright 
Infringement in Europe’ (n91), at 265.
463 Coraggio, YouTube case changes rules on Internet liability (n445).
464  M. Leistner, ‘Grundlagen und Perspektiven der Haftung für Urheberrechtsverletzungen im Internet’, (n423), at 
725. 
465  Matulionyte and Nérisson, ‘Th e French Route to an ISP Safe Harbor, Compared to German and US Ways’ (n231), 
at 66.
466  National People’s Congress (全国人民代表大会), General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (中华人民共和国民法通则), Order No. 37 of the president of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民
共和国第37号主席令), Art. 134. Th e legislators in China used Art. 1004 of German Civil Law as an important 
reference, which provides that “If the ownership is interfered with by means other than removal or retention of 
possession, the owner may require the disturber to remove the interference. If further interferences are to be feared, 
the owner may seek a prohibitory injunction”, when drafting Art. 134. Th is kind of “störerhaftung” has also been 
reaﬃ  rmed by the newly-adopted China Tort Law in Art. 15.
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content after receiving complaints which all pointed to one account (the owner of 
this account was another defendant in this case), this account still existed even after 
seven complaints. Based on this fact, the Court then concluded that the defendant 
had not fulfi lled its duty of care, so it faced contributory liability.467 In the case of 
Han Han v. Baidu,468 the plaintiﬀ  sent notifi cation complaining that one of his 
books “Xiang” had been uploaded onto the defendant’s literature-sharing platform 
without permission.469  After receiving notice, the defendant deleted the infringing 
content; however, the same infringing content under a diﬀ erent title could still be 
accessed on the defendant’s platform.470 Based on these facts, the Court concluded 
that the defendant had not taken suﬃ  cient measures to prevent the infringing 
content from being transmitted through its platform, despite the fact that the 
defendant claimed it had run an anti-piracy system.471 
  By comparing the two cases cited above, it appears that that, according to the 
fi rst case, courts that require the hosting ISPs to terminate accounts repeatedly 
used for infringing activities, are likely to adopt the US approach. In contrast, by 
deducing from the second case, courts requiring the hosting ISPs to prevent the 
same infringing content from being accessed again are more likely to follow the 
stay-down (EU) approach. Th is diﬀ erence shown in these two cases, demonstrates 
that the Chinese courts know of the necessity of requiring hosting ISPs to prevent 
repeat infringements, but they are not entirely sure which approach to adopt. Th is 
struggle is also refl ected in the newly issued Internet Provision. In the draft of the 
Internet Provision, it stated that the ISP should take reasonable measures to prevent 
the infringement of the same content from occurring again, which is typical of the 
stay-down approach.472 However, the fi nal version of Internet Provision includes a 
more nuanced expression: whether the ISPs take reasonable measures against repeat 
infringements made by the same internet user.473 Th is can be understood in two 
ways: fi rst, if  “repeat” is interpreted as “same”, namely, the same infringements 
made by the same internet user, it is a “double requirement of identity” standard 
such as that advocated by the EU Advocate General in the case of “L’Oréal SA 
467  Yinian v. Taobao (衣念v.淘宝), Shanghai First Intermediate People’s Court (上海市第一中级人民法院), No. 
40 Hu Yi Zhong Min Wu (Zhi) Zhong Zi (2011) (（2011）沪一中民五（知）终字第40号). Th is case was 
published in the Bulletin of People’s Supreme Court (Vol. 1, 2012) as a guiding case.
468  Han Han is one of most distinguished young writers who has many fans in China, and in May 2010, he was named 
one of most infl uential people in the world by Time magazine. Th e other party, Baidu, can be seen as the Chinese 
Google, and is one of the most successful internet companies in China. Th erefore, the dispute between these two 
parties attracted considerable attention and, fi nally, this case was selected as one of ten annual IP cases (2012) by 
the People’s Supreme Court.
469 Han Han v. Baidu (韩寒v.百度) (n42).
470 Ibid.
471 Ibid.
472  Internet Provisions (n208) (Draft) (网络规定(草案)), Art. 8 (6).
473 See Internet Provisions (网络规定) (n208), Art. 9 (6).
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  v. eBay”;474 second, if “repeat infringement” is understood more broadly, meaning 
all infringements after the fi rst one made by the same internet user count as repeat 
infringements, then it looks more like a rule against repeat infringers, because 
terminating the repeat infringer’s account seems the only eﬃ  cient way of getting 
rid of these repeat infringements. As for what constitute reasonable measures, in 
the case of “Han Han v. Baidu”, the court held that manual monitoring measures 
should not be imposed, because they are too burdensome to be continuous; 
regarding technical measures, whether they are reasonable depends on the current 
technical level and will change with the development of new technologies.475 
Furthermore, the court held that the measures need not be perfect and that the 
following measure is inappropriate, namely, using the author’s name plus the title 
of the work as keywords to fi lter out infringing content, because that in turn might 
block considerable legal content.476 
  By comparing the rules against repeat infringement in the US, EU and China, it 
appears that the US rules focus on punishing repeat infringers, the EU rules focus 
more on preventing the repeat infringement of content, and the rules in China can 
be understood as a mixed solution, which not only ask hosting ISPs to prevent the 
repeated infringing of content based on the “double requirement of identity” (a 
limited EU approach), but also require hosting ISPs to terminate the accounts of 
repeat infringers (a US approach). Of these three approaches, the EU one imposes 
the heaviest burden on hosting ISPs, because hosting ISPs need to monitor these 
infringing materials so as to prevent them from being uploaded on the platforms 
again. By contrast, the Chinese approach only requires hosting ISPs to prevent the 
same user from uploading the same infringing materials. Regarding terminating the 
accounts of repeat infringers, it can be fulfi lled without complicated monitoring 
eﬀ orts, and although the policy of terminating accounts can easily be sidestepped by 
creating new accounts, hosting ISPs do not need to be responsible for the sidestepping 
done by Internet users. To be mentioned, although in the US hosting ISPs are not 
obligated to prevent the same infringing materials from being uploaded again, the 
US courts hold such eﬀ orts as evidence to prove the hosting ISPs’ due diligence in 
preventing infringement. For instance, Veoh, a video-sharing website in the US, has 
adopted means for generating a “hash”, or digital “fi ngerprint”, for each video, which 
essentially enables Veoh to terminate access to any other identical fi les and prevent 
474  Opinion of Advocate General, C-324/09 (n291), Para. 182. In this case, the AG fi rst admitted that nothing 
in Directive 2004/48 would prohibit injunctions against the intermediary requiring not only the prevention of 
the continuation of a specifi c act of infringement but also the prevention of repetition of the same or a similar 
infringement in the future if such injunctions are available under national law. However, he also emphasized legal 
certainty and that an injunction should not impose impossible, disproportionate or illegal duties such as a general 
obligation to monitor. He concluded that an appropriate limit for the scope of injunctions may be that of a double 
requirement of identity. 
475 See Han Han v. Baidu (韩寒v.百度) (n42). 
476 Ibid.
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additional identical fi les from ever being uploaded by any user.477 Th e court took 
Veoh’s eﬀ orts against repeat infringement as one reason to conclude Veoh fulfi lled 
its duty of care and thus should be exempted from liability.478 Further, in order to 
prove their diligence against copyright infringement in front of courts, some Chinese 
hosting ISPs also implement technologies to fi lter out the infringing materials 
which are repeatedly uploaded.  For example, Tudou, a video-sharing website, has 
established a database called “collection of black content”, and any video which has 
been complained about will be marked with a fi ngerprint and put into the database 
for comparison with videos uploaded thereafter, so as to fi lter out repeat infringing 
content.479 Finally, in all three jurisdictions a common restriction has been set on 
required measures, and that is that the measures only need to be “reasonable” rather 
than “perfect”.
4.4 Beneﬁ t from Infringements
  In the US common law, directly benefi ting from infringements is one of two prongs 
for concluding vicarious liability, and the other is having the right and ability to 
control the infringements.480 Th e US “safe harbor” provision also adopts a similar 
rule to regulate hosting ISPs’ secondary liability.481 By contrast, in the EU and China 
where vicarious liability does not apply, benefi ting or profi ting from infringements 
is not an independent culpable element when concluding liability in the copyright 
fi eld. However, when hearing cases about hosting ISPs’ secondary liability, the 
courts in the EU and China still take into account the hosting ISP’s benefi t or intent 
to benefi t.
4.4.1 Direct Beneﬁ t in US
  According to DMCA §512(c)(1)(B), in the US, if a hosting ISP wants to be 
exempted from secondary liability, “it should not receive a fi nancial benefi t directly 
attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the 
right and ability to control such activity”. In a literal sense, the substantial contents 
of this provision are quite similar to the vicarious liability rule in US common law. 
477 See Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Internets, Inc. (n5), at 1143.
478 Ibid.
479  During a workshop about “video-sharing website’s secondary liability” held in the Center for Studies of Intellectual 
Property Rights of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, the former legal director, Mr. Guangliang Cai 
delivered an introduction about the anti-piracy measures adopted by Tudou, which covered the database of black 
content. Th e relevant statement can also be found in Tudou’s copyright policy from its website, see http://www.
tudou.com/about/cn/copyright.html. 
480 See Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc. (n76), at 1162.
481  See DMCA (n1), Sec. 512 (c)(1)(B). According to this Article, if a hosting ISP wants to be exempted from 
secondary liability, it should not receive a fi nancial benefi t directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case 
in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity.
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However, the Congressional report specifi cally states that: the liability limitation 
provided in DMCA 512 “protects qualifying service providers from liability for all 
monetary relief for direct, vicarious and contributory infringement.”482 Th erefore, 
it seems that the “fi nancial benefi t” and “right and ability to control” in DMCA 
512 (c)(1)(B) may be  interpreted diﬀ erently from the same terms in the context of 
an allegation of vicarious liability. However, not all US courts follow the indication 
in the Congressional report. For example, in Costar Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 
Judge Chasanow concluded that: “the DMCA provides no safe harbor for vicarious 
infringement because it codifi ed both elements of vicarious liability”.483 In Perfect 
10, Inc v. CCBill LLC, the Ninth Circuit held that ‘direct fi nancial benefi t’ should 
be interpreted consistently with the similarly-worded common law standard for 
vicarious copyright liability.”484 However, for most US courts, the statement in 
the legislative history seems a more reasonable interpretation and persuasive. For 
instance, in the appeal of Costar Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., the Fourth Circuit held 
that even though an ISP should undertake vicarious liability under common law, 
it “may still look to DMCA for safe harbor if it fulfi lled conditions therein.”485 In 
a case closed in 2012, the Ninth Circuit also concluded that in some cases ISPs 
subject to vicarious liability can be exempted from monetary remedies if they fulfi ll 
the requirements of the “safe harbor” provision, and specifi ed that the “right and 
ability to control such activity” in DMCA 512 (c)(1)(B) should be interpreted more 
narrowly than analogous terms under vicarious liability.486 
  As for what is the direct benefi t in DMCA §512(c)(1)(B), according to the House 
Report, if an ISP principally runs a legal business and charges infringers the same 
fees as it charges non-infringing users, then the profi t received by the ISP is not 
directly attributable to infringements.487 Th erefore, “receiving a one-time set-up fee 
and fl at, periodic payments for service” from an infringer would not constitute 
direct benefi ts, nor would receiving fees “based on the length of the message or by 
connect time”. However, “where the value of the service lies in providing access to 
infringing materials”, the foresaid fees should be accounted as direct benefi t.488 In 
case law, besides referring to the Report above,489 the US courts also rely heavily on 
the standard about benefi ting directly as developed under the vicarious liability in 
482 Congress, U.S., House Report 105-796 (1997-1998) (thereafter H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-796), at 73.
483 Costar Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, at 704 (D. Md. 2001).
484 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC (n336), at 1117.
485 Costar Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc. (n263), at 555.
486  See UMG Recording, Inc. V. Veoh Internet, Inc. (n291), at 1042-1045. In this case, the plaintiﬀ  UMG is a recording 
company which has copyright over considerable amounts of music, some of which was uploaded onto the 
defendant’s running video-website Veoh, so the plaintiﬀ  sued Veoh for copyright infringement.
487 See H.R. REP. 105-551(II) (n16), at 54.
488 Ibid.
489  See Costar Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc. (n478), at 720. In this case, the court held that it would not be considered as a direct 
fi nancial benefi t “where the infringer makes the same kind of payment as non-infringing users of the provider’s service”.
Chapter 4
118
  common law, and thus base their conclusion on “whether the infringing activity 
constitutes a draw for subscribers, not just adding benefi t”.490 Regardless of whether 
they follow the criteria stated in the House Report or the “constituting a draw” 
standard in common law, it is held that the defendant’s hosting of websites for a fee 
was not suﬃ  cient to prove its receiving direct fi nancial benefi t from infringements.491 
However, charging fees based on oﬀ ering a host service is only one way of making 
profi ts, and nowadays it is quite typical for a hosting ISP to oﬀ er a free hosting 
service, but sell advertising space to generate profi ts, as Veoh, YouTube, and other 
content-sharing websites do. Th is raises the question, therefore, of whether the 
sale of advertising space can be identifi ed as making a direct fi nancial benefi t from 
infringements. Th e US courts seem to avoid answering this question, but instead 
try to resolve the problem of hosting ISPs’ qualifying for DMCA 512 (c)(1)(B) 
by analyzing whether the hosting ISPs have the right and ability to control the 
infringements. Th is is because if a hosting ISP has no right and ability to control 
the infringements, then the court does not need to consider whether the hosting 
ISP receives direct benefi t from infringements, and thus it certainly qualifi es for 
DMCA 512 (c)(1)(B). For instance, in the case of Io v. Veoh, the Court held that 
“even assuming (without deciding) that Veoh received a direct fi nancial benefi t 
from the alleged infringing activity,” since the “defendant does not have the right 
and ability to control such activity,” the defendant still did not lose its qualifi cation 
for DMCA 512 (c)(1)(B).492 In the fi rst instance of Viacom v. Youtube, the Court 
admitted that “there may be arguments whether revenues from advertising, applied 
equally to space regardless of whether its contents are or are not infringing, are 
‘directly attributable to’ infringements,” but then based on YouTube’s lack of right 
and ability to control the infringements, it then held that YouTube still qualifi ed for 
the DMCA 512 (c)(1)(B) safe harbor.493 
490  See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC (n336), at 1117; see Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Internets, Inc. (n5), at 1150.  Th is 
standard can be traced to the classic case of  Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction (76 F.3d 259, at 264 (9th cir. 1996)). In 
this case, the Ninth Circuit held that the sale of pirate recordings in a Cherry Auction swap meet is a “draw” for 
customers, so the defendant who ran this swap meet directly benefi ted from infringements.
491  Ibid, Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC (n336), at 1118. In this case, the defendant, CWIE, hosted websites for a 
fee, and some of these websites included content which infringed the plaintiﬀ ’s copyright. First, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the defendant’s hosting of websites for a fee was not suﬃ  cient to prove the infringements functioning 
as a “draw” in the context of vicarious liability. Further, by noting that “ receiving a one-time set-up fee and 
fl at, periodic payments for service from a person engaging in infringing activities would not constitute receiving 
a ‘fi nancial benefi t directly attributable to the infringing activity’”, the Ninth Circuit held that the hosting fee 
received by the defendant was not directly attributable to infringements.
492 Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Internets, Inc. (n5), at 1150.
493  See Viacom International, INC. v. YouTube, INC. (n2), at 517. In this case, the court held that in any event the 
provider must know of the particular case before he could control it. Th is interpretation of “control” has been 
overruled by the appeal court, which specifi ed that “control” has nothing to do with hosting ISPs’ “item-specifi c” 
knowledge of infringements. See Viacom International, INC. v. YouTube, INC. (n7), at 36-38.
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  When it comes to having the “right and ability to control infringement”, nearly 
all US courts494 have held that the control provision in the DMCA 512 (c)(1)(B) 
should be interpreted diﬀ erently from the common law vicarious liability criteria, 
and that it “required something more than the ability to remove or block access to 
materials posted on a service provider’s website”.495 Th e “something more” standard 
was derived from the “notice-and-takedown” procedure in the DMCA, because in 
order to conform to the “notice-and-takedown” procedure, a hosting ISP must have 
the right and ability to remove or block the infringement complained of by the 
copyright owner.496 Regarding what constitutes “something more”, only a few US 
courts have made relevant statements. In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 
which is the only case to conclude that an ISP has the right and ability to control 
infringement under the DMCA §512(c)(1)(B),497 the court based its conclusion 
on the following facts: the defendant ran a monitoring program to notify service 
receivers with “detailed instructions regarding issues of layout, appearance, and 
content”, and if a service receiver failed to comply with the instruction, its access to 
service would be blocked.498 Two other courts suggested that the following conducts 
may fulfi ll the “control” requirement: 1) being “actively involved in the listing, 
bidding, sale and delivery” of items oﬀ ered for sale;499 2) controlling vendor sales 
by previewing products prior to their posting, editing product descriptions, or 
suggesting prices.500 A court even connected the “right and ability to control” with 
the specifi c knowledge of infringement, and held that “the right and ability to control 
494  A decision made by the District Court of S.D. New York was an exception, and in this case the court held that “the 
ability to block infringers’ access to a particular environment for any reason whatsoever is evidence of the right and 
ability to supervise.” See Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F.Supp.2d 124, at 157 (S.D.N.Y.2009).
495  See Viacom International, INC. v. YouTube, INC. (n7), at 36-38. In this case, the court summarized all decisions 
about the control provision in the DMCA 512 (c)(1)(B), and concluded that the prior case law completely agreed 
with the opinion that the control provision required something more than the “ability to remove or block” the 
hosted content.
496  According to the “notice-and-takedown” mechanism, once a hosting ISP receives a competent notice about 
infringing content, it should expeditiously remove or disable access to material alleged to be infringing. Th erefore, 
the DMCA 512 has already implied that a qualifi ed hosting ISP should have the right and ability to remove or 
disable access to materials posted on its website. A similar analysis can also be found in the relevant US case law. 
For example, in the case of Hendrickson v. Ebay Inc., the Court stated that: “Congress could not have intended 
for courts to hold that a service provider loses immunity under the safe harbor provision of the DMCA because it 
engages in acts that are specifi cally required by the DMCA.” See Hendrickson v. Ebay Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 
at 1093-1094. (C.D. Cal. 2001).
497 See Viacom International, INC. v. YouTube, INC. (n7), at 38.
498  See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, at 1173 (C.D. Cal. 2002). In this case, the 
Cybernet ran a web-service called “Adult Check”, and the plaintiﬀ , Perfect 10, was a corporation owning copyright 
over considerable pornographic content. During the hearing, the court was unsure about whether Cybernet was a 
qualifi ed ISP. However, the court held that even with the assumption of Cybernet’s qualifi cation as an ISP, Cybernet 
could still not enjoy the shield of the “safe harbor” provision, because it failed to conform to the DMCA 512(c)(1)
(B).
499  See L’Oréal SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others (n327), at 1094.
500 See Corbis Corporation v. Amazon.com, Inc. (n333), at 1110.
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  the activity requires knowledge of it, which must be item-specifi c.”501 By examining 
the factors listed above, it can be concluded that the US courts set a very high 
standard for control provision in the DMCA §512(c)(1)(B), and consequently the 
normal hosting ISPs without actively being involved in choosing posted contents can 
hardly meet the threshold of “control”. Furthermore, a hosting ISP which commits 
an inducing infringement is highly likely to fulfi ll both elements of “control” and 
“direct benefi ts”.502
  To sum up, although the provision in the DMCA §512(c)(1)(B) can be seen as 
originating in vicarious liability in common law, it should be interpreted as being 
less strict when applied to hosting ISPs, because it is set to limit the hosting ISPs’ 
liability. Along with this track, the US courts mainly focus on defi ning which benefi t 
is not directly attributable to infringement and which conduct is not a “control” 
rather than defi ning what constitutes direct benefi ts and “control”. Th erefore, 
hosting ISPs running a normal commercial model, such as Veoh, YouTube and 
Amazon, are still qualifi ed for the DMCA §512(c)(1)(B).
4.4.2 Beneﬁ t in the EU
  Unlike the DMCA 512, the E-Commerce Directive does not prescribe whether 
hosting ISPs benefi t from infringement is a factor to be considered when deciding 
whether hosting ISPs can enjoy the liability exemption.503 Nevertheless, the courts in 
member states do take into account whether hosting ISPs benefi t from infringement 
when deciding on their liability for copyright infringement, which will be discussed 
in the following section.
4.4.2.1 Germany
  Whether a hosting ISP receives benefi t from copyright infringement is not an 
independent culpable element in Germany, because neither TMG § 10 nor general 
tort law rules clearly forbid receiving benefi ts, but  German courts do take it into 
account when deciding whether a hosting ISP should be liable for direct user 
infringement.
  In Germany the courts can deem a hosting ISP as a content provider and, thus, 
directly liable for infringement (“die Haftung als Content-Provider fuer eigene 
501  Viacom International, INC. v. YouTube, INC. (n2), at 527. Th is conclusion has been overturned by the Appeal 
Court, since if setting the knowledge of specifi c items as a precondition of having right and ability to control, the 
DMCA 512(c)(1)(B) would be superfl uous. “Any service provider that has item-specifi c knowledge of infringing 
activity and thereby obtains fi nancial benefi t would already be excluded from the safe harbor under § 512(c)(1)
(A) for having specifi c knowledge of infringing material and failing to eﬀ ect expeditious removal. No additional 
service provider would be excluded by § 512(c)(1)(B) that was not already excluded by § 512(c)(1)(A).” see Viacom 
International, INC. v. YouTube, INC. (n7), at 36.
502 Th e detailed discussion can be found in the following Section 4.5.1. “inducement liability in US”.
503  Peguera, ‘Th e DMCA Safe Harbors and Th eir European Counterparts: A Comparative Analysis of Some Common 
Problems’ (n175), at 491.
Hosting ISPs’ Secondary Liability under the Roof of “Safe Harbor” Provisions
121
Inhalte”). When deciding whether a hosting ISP should be treated as a content 
provider from a legal perspective, the German courts always refer to the factor 
of receiving a benefi t. For instance, in a case about a platform for photograph 
exchange, the KG Berlin (Berlin Court of Appeal) concluded that the defendant ran 
the platform as a content provider, and one of the reasons was that: the defendant 
received 40 percent of the fees paid by the users who downloaded the photographs, 
and the rest of the fees were passed on to the users who oﬀ ered those photographs for 
sale.504 In another case about the video-sharing website YouTube, the LG Hamburg 
(Higher Regional Court of Hamburg) found that “YouTube commercially exploits 
the uploaded videos by selling ads space” was one of the reasons to hold YouTube 
as a content provider.505 However, only receiving benefi ts from infringing content 
cannot lead a hosting ISP to be liable, because the German Federal Court of Justice 
set a quite strict pre-condition to make benefi t be imputed in the case of Marions 
v. Kochbuch.506 In this case, the German Federal Court of Justice emphasized that 
whether the defendant selected, checked, edited and integrated the up-loaded 
contents into its website should be deemed as the core factor to conclude the 
defendant’s liability as a content provider, and the other facts, such as the requiring 
of rights transfer and receiving benefi t, are only supportive evidence to conclude 
the liability.507 By examining the decision of the German Federal Court of Justice, 
one fi nds that “die Haftung als Content-Provider fuer eigene Inhalte” is to some 
extent comparable to the DMCA §512(c)(1)(B) in the US, because integration of 
up-loaded content into its website can be seen as having the right and ability to 
control infringement, and the benefi t received by a hosting ISP through integrating 
infringing content into its website can defi nitely be seen as directly attributable to 
infringement.
504  KG: Internetplattform zum Austausch von Fotodateien (n245), at 204. Th e other three reasons are as follows: 1) in 
particular, the uploaded photographs went through a selecting and checking procedure before they were publicly 
accessible; 2) the copyright owners of the photographs were pointed out but in an unnoticeable and indiscreet 
way; 3) in the front part of the website, the corresponding philosophy of the operator was displayed under its logo, 
which was “publish modern and time-spiritual photos”.
505  LG Hamburg: Haftung eines Plattformbetreibers – YouTube (n247), at 834. Th e other reasons are as follows: 1) 
the logo of YouTube appeared on the upper right corner of videos because of a pre-designed website frame, when 
the downloadable videos were on play, but by contrast the signs or pseudonym of the uploading-users were very 
small and appeared on a separate part of the website apart from the videos; 2) the defendant sorts the uploaded 
videos into diﬀ erent categories, and when a video is clicked, the similar videos will show up on the right side of the 
webpage automatically; 3) YouTube requires the up-loaders to grant it the right to use these videos.
506  BGH: Verwendung fremder Fotografi en für Rezeptsammlung im Internet – marions-kochbuch.de (n250), at 
1276-1278. Case reference: BGH, Urteil vom 12. 11. 2009 - I ZR 166/07. In this case, the defendant operated 
a website called chefkoch.de for the public to upload cooking recipes and corresponding photographs and the 
plaintiﬀ  ran a website called marions-kochbuch.de which introduced cooking recipes with relevant pictures. Th e 
plaintiﬀ  found that some of his copyrighted cooking instructions had been uploaded to the defendant’s website, so 
he launched a suit against the defendant for copyright infringement. 
507 Ibid, at 1276. 
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4.4.2.2 France
  As being referred above, according to Article 6 of LCEN, whether a hosting ISP 
should be held liable depends whether it has actual knowledge of the infringement 
at issue, and whether a hosting ISPs receives profi ts is irrelevant when deciding 
liability. However, maybe because French judges consider the facts from the victim’s 
common sense508 and were infl uenced by US law,509 receiving profi ts had been held as 
a culpable element by French courts. In this respect, French courts adopted a similar 
approach to German courts which took receiving profi ts as a reason to categorize 
hosting ISPs as publishers or entities similar to publisher from the legal perspective. 
In the case of Tiscali, the defendant Tiscali was held as either a publisher or providing 
a service that went beyond mere technical functions, since Tiscali benefi ted from 
renting advertising space.510 In another case, Myspace was held as a publisher for the 
same reason.511 Th ese decisions were criticized as inconsistent with French law, since 
the two French Acts (Freedom of Communication Act and LCEN) clearly state that 
the safe harbor defense covers the hosting service, either free of charge or for a fee.512 
Besides, since lots of hosting services are provided for free, hosting providers have to 
be fi nanced by cross-subsidizing, such as selling ad space.513 Eventually, the French 
court changed their judicial thought on this issue. In the case of Dailymotion, the 
French Supreme Court held that Dailymotion’s use of a website for displaying ads 
was just a way to make profi t, and would not infl uence the uploaded content, so 
displaying ads would not transform Dailymotion into a publisher.514 
4.4.2.3 Italy 
  In Italy, as what occurred in Germany and France, benefi ting from copyright 
infringement had been held a reason to refuse hosting ISPs a “safe harbor”. For 
instance, in the case of Reti Television Italiane (RTI) v. IOL and Yahoo!, the plaintiﬀ  
RTI found that some of its television programs were unlawfully uploaded on the 
video-sharing 
508  Copyright owners, as the victims, commonly believe that it is unfair for hosting ISPs to benefi t from large number 
of visits attracted by the contents copyrighted by them.
509  Nérisson, ‘Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries: Th e Position in France’ 
(n103), at 79. 
510  Matulionyte and Nérisson, ‘Th e French Route to an ISP Safe Harbor, Compared to German and US Ways’ (n231), 
at 58. Case reference: First Civil Division of the Supreme Court, 14 January 2010, Case No. 06-18855, 2010 Bull. 
civ. I, No. 8. In this case, profi ting from selling ad space was just one reason to hold Tiscali as a publisher, and the 
other reason is allowing users to establish their personal pages. See discussion in the previous chapter.
511  Workman SW, Internet Law - Developments in ISP Liability in Europe, IBLS, available at http://www.ibls.com/
internet_law_news_portal_view.aspx?id=2126&s=latestnews (last visited 01-03-2014).
512  Nérisson, ‘Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries: Th e Position in France’ 
(n103), at 79.
513 Ibid.
514  Blocman A, Liability of Video-sharing Platforms - First Judgement of Court of Cassation, IRIS Merlin(2011), available 
at http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/2011/3/article18.en.html (last visited 03-08-2014).
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  website run by IOL and Yahoo!, so the RTI sued IOL and Yahoo! for copyright 
infringement.515 Since the defendants “provided for a system that allowed the 
publication of advertising links related to the videos,” the District of Milan held it 
as one reason to conclude the defendant was acting as an active hosting provider, 
so the defendant could not enjoy the liability privilege set forth by the Article 14 
and 15 of the E-commerce Directive.516 In another case, YouTube was also held 
as an active hosting provider by the District of Rome, and one of the reasons was 
that YouTube organized the infringing content so as to make more revenue from 
ads.517 In 2011, the Court of Milan even held that the E-commerce Directive was 
already out of date, since it did not take into account that the hosting providers 
who were “not merely passive and neutral with respect to the organization of the 
management of the contents published by the users but active in the management 
of such contents from whose advertising exploitation it gained profi ts.”518 
  As an active hosting ISP, since a high number of videos were uploaded every day, it 
was not obligated to undertake ex ante monitoring on all uploads, but it still needed 
to undertake a higher level of duty care than a passive one.519 For example, an 
unspecifi c notice “from a party alleging to be a right holder and merely mentioning 
the types of programs infringing its rights would have been suﬃ  cient to trigger an 
obligation to control and likely remove the infringing videos.”520 Recently, Italian 
courts seem to have loosed their standard on “active hosting”. In the case of Delta 
TV v. YouTube, the District Court of Turin held that no suﬃ  cient evidence had been 
given to demonstrate YouTube as an active hosting ISP.521 But obviously, YouTube 
are still making profi ts by selling advertising spaces. Th erefore, in the view of District 
Court of Turin, making profi ts is not an important factor to hold a hosting ISP as 
“active” anymore.
To sum up, at the beginning, making profi ts, such as selling ad spaces, had been 
viewed as an imputed factor to hold hosting ISPs liable in France, Germany and Italy. 
Nevertheless, the courts in these three Member States have already lowered their criteria 
on imputed benefi ting, and getting revenues through a normal business model, such 
as selling ad spaces, is not an imputed factor anymore. In fact, this change in these 
515  Bellan, ‘Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries: Th e Position in Italy’ (n238), 
at 108.
516 Bonadio & Santo, ‘Court of Milan holds video sharing platforms liable for copyright infringement’ (n239), at 15.
517  Bellan, ‘Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries: Th e Position in Italy’ (n238), 
at 110.
518  Decision of the Court of Milan of January 20, 2011 No.27079/09, quoting Coraggio, ‘Google’s victory might be 
a short success’ (n442), at 139-140. 
519  Bellan, ‘Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries: Th e Position in Italy’ (n238), 
at 111-112.
520 Coraggio, ‘Google’s victory might be a short success’ (n442), at 140.
521 Spedicato, ‘Italy: the take-down notice must contain the specifi c YouTube URLs’ (n437).
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three jurisdictions conforms to Adwords Decision made by the ECJ, because in this 
decision, the ECJ clarifi ed that merely setting the payment terms or providing general 
information to its clients cannot have the eﬀ ect of depriving Google of the exemptions 
from liability provided for in Directive 2000/31.522 Th e Advocate General in this case 
even argued that, “information society  services  will  rarely  consist  of  activities  which 
are exclusively  technical,  and  will  normally  be  associated  with  other activities which 
provide their fi nancial support.”523 Th erefore, generally, benefi ting has become a less 
important factor when deciding on hosting ISPs’ liability in the EU.
4.4.3 Direct Beneﬁ t in China
  Article 22 of the Regulation provides that a hosting ISP can be exempted from 
monetary remedy if it fulfi lls certain requirements, one of which is “not receiving 
benefi t directly attributable to infringements”. Since neither Chinese tort law rules 
nor Chinese Copyright Law had categorized benefi ts into direct and indirect, the 
concept of “direct benefi t” in Article 22 has obviously been introduced from the 
DMCA 512(c)(1)(B). However, for some unknown reason, the other element of 
“right and ability to control” has not been integrated into Article 22. Faced with this 
new concept of “direct benefi t”, the Chinese courts seem to be unsure about how 
to interpret it, and some courts have even reached completely diﬀ erent conclusions 
when interpreting similar facts.
  In China, the public is generally free to use most hosting services, so a hosting ISP 
will mainly make a profi t by selling advertising space on its website. Th is raises the 
question of whether this kind of benefi t should be aﬃ  rmed as directly attributable 
to infringements. In the case of “BuSheng v. YoBo”, the Haidian District Court in 
Beijing concluded the existence of direct benefi ts based on the following analysis: 
the infringing music on the defendant’s website attracted more people to visit its 
website, so the defendant could make more profi t by selling advertising space.524 
In contrast, in another case, “CiWen v. 56.com”, the Beijing Second Intermediate 
People’s Court concluded that all of the videos on the defendant’s website could 
be viewed for free, and although an advertisement was being displayed with a 
copyrighted work owned by the plaintiﬀ , there was insuﬃ  cient evidence to prove 
that the benefi t received by the defendant in this case was directly attributable to this 
522 Google France SARL and Google Inc. v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA and Others (n230), at para. 116.
523  Opinion of Advocate General, Google France SARL and Google Inc. v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA and Others, joined 
cases C-236/08-C-238/08, at para. 339.
524  BuSheng v. YoBo (步升v.友播), Beijing Haidian District Court (北京市海淀区法院), No. 6939 Hai Min Chu 
Zi(2008) (（2008）海民初字第6939号). In this case, the plaintiﬀ  BuSheng owned copyright of certain musical 
works, some of which had been uploaded to the defendant’s websites by Internet users, so the plaintiﬀ  sued YoBo 
for copyright infringement.
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  copyrighted work.525 In limited cases, the court has concluded a hosting ISP’s liability 
based on selling advertising space even without considering whether it constitutes 
direct benefi t or not. For example, in the case of “joy.cn v. 56.com”, the Haidian 
District Court held that, since the defendant “56.com” had profi ted by displaying 
advertisements with the uploaded content, it needed to undertake a higher level of 
duty of care to check for potential copyright problems among the uploaded content; 
however, the defendant had not fulfi lled this kind of duty of care, so it should be 
liable.526 Furthermore, Article 22 of the Regulation also requires hosting ISPs not 
to alter the works, performance, sound or video recordings that are provided by the 
service recipients. Some Chinese courts have held that displaying advertisements 
with uploaded contents forms a sort of alteration in the context of Article 22, and 
have thus expelled hosting ISPs out of “safe harbor”. For example, in the case of 
“joy.cn v. 6room.com”, the HaiDian District Court concluded that, since before and 
after the playing of alleged infringing videos, 6room.com displayed advertisements, 
and whenever a viewer clicked on the pause-button, an advertisement would also 
appear, so the defendant had actually altered the alleged infringing videos supplied 
by Internet users when it added advertisements.527
  Today, however, the Chinese courts no longer seem to be treating “display 
advertisements” as an “alteration”. According to a Guiding Opinions published 
by the Beijing Higher Court,528  “displaying the advertisement before or after the 
playing of the works, performance, sound or video recordings, or popping up ads 
during the playing of the works, performance, sound or video recordings” should 
not be found as alteration of uploaded contents.529 Moreover, the Internet Provisions 
promulgated by the People’s Supreme Court include a detailed provision about 
what constitutes direct benefi t, which states the following: 
525  CiWen v. 56.com (慈文v.56网), Beijing Second Intermediate People’s Court (北京市第二中级人民法院), No. 9 
Er Zhong Min Zhong Zi (2008) (（2008）二中民终字第9号). In this case, a television series call “Jia” (Family) 
owned by the plaintiﬀ  CiWen had been uploaded to the defendant’s website “56.com” without permission, so the 
plaintiﬀ  sued “56.com” for copyright infringement.
526  joy.cn v. 56.com (激动网v.56网), Beijing Haidian District Court (北京市海淀区法院), No. 24750 Hai Min Chu 
Zi (2008) (（2008）海民初字第6939号). In this case, some copyrighted videos owned by the plaintiﬀ  “Joy.cn” 
had been uploaded to the defendant’s website “56.com” without permission, so the plaintiﬀ  sued “56.com” for 
copyright infringement.
527 joy.cn v. 6room.com (激动网v.六房间) (n222).
528  Th is Guiding Opinions (n229) is not a mandatory legal document, because unlike the People’s Supreme Court 
in China, the Beijing Higher People’s Court has no statutory rights to promulgate any judicial interpretation of 
general application. However, Beijing, as one of the two cities (the other is Shanghai) hearing most of the disputes 
about Internet copyright infringement in China, the courts there always take a lead in solving these disputes and 
have accumulated considerable judicial experience in this respect. Th erefore, the Guiding Opinions provided by 
the Beijing Higher People’s Court defi nitely has widespread infl uence in China and will be used as an important 
reference by other courts.
529 Ibid, Art. 24 (3).
Chapter 4
126
   where service providers make profi ts by displaying advertisements along with specifi c works, 
performances or sound or video recordings, or receive other fi nancial benefi ts which are 
specifi cally related to the works, performances or sound or video recordings transmitted by them, 
it should be concluded that the service providers receive direct fi nancial benefi ts; however, the 
normal advertising fee or service fee collected by service providers on the basis of oﬀ ering an 
Internet service cannot be identifi ed as direct benefi t.530 
  Th erefore, where selling advertising space is regarded as receiving direct benefi ts, 
a specifi c relationship should exist between advertisements and the content with 
which they are displayed. Th is kind of specifi c relationship indicates that service 
providers have a certain ability to control the uploaded content, since the service 
providers should specify the content before displaying any advertisement with it. 
Consequently, although the Internet Regulation does not restrict “receiving direct 
benefi ts” with the element of “control”, the Chinese courts have already realized 
that “receiving direct benefi ts” should be interpreted strictly and that service 
providers should at least have some sort of control over the uploaded content when 
concluding that they directly benefi t from selling advertising space.
To sum up, the US “safe harbor” provision requires a hosting ISP not to receive direct 
benefi t from infringement when it can control the infringing activities. It seems that the 
US courts interpret the “receiving direct benefi t” prong by referring to vicarious liability 
in common law, but since the “control” prong has been quite strictly interpreted, in just 
a few cases the hosting ISPs were blocked outside of “safe harbor” because of making 
profi ts through their services. In Germany, France and Italy, “receiving benefi t” is one 
factor used to hold a hosting ISP liable as a content provider. However, in the case 
of Adwords, the ECJ held Google not liable for making profi ts by selling Adwords 
service.531 Th en, in Germany, “receiving benefi t” became merely supportive evidence 
to render hosting ISPs liable as content providers. In France and Italy, making a profi t 
through a common business model also cannot result in hosting ISPs’ liability anymore. 
In China, although the Chinese “safe harbor” provision does not prescribe a “hosting 
ISPs’ ability to control infringements” as a restriction to the element of “receiving direct 
benefi t”, the “control” requirement has already been indicated in the Internet Provisions 
issued by the People’s Supreme Court. Ultimately, in the US, EU and China, a hosting 
ISP cannot be held liable because it simply operates a normal advertising business 
without choosing with which content the advertisements are displayed.   
530 See Internet Provisions (网络规定) (n208), Art. 11.
531 Google France SARL and Google Inc. v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA and Others (n230), at para. 116.
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4.5 Inducement Liability
Since a service provider’s liability cannot be concluded from its oﬀ ering a service 
which is capable of substantial non-infringing use, the service provider’s intent could 
be an important reference for courts in deciding its liability. Th is is because the “safe 
harbor” provision does not aim at fostering copyright infringements. Th erefore, if a 
service provider encourages or induces its users to commit infringements with illegal 
intent, then it is probably barred from the “safe harbor” provision and, thus, liable for 
primary infringements. Th is section examines the role of inducement and illegal intent 
in deciding a hosting ISPs’ copyright liability. 
4.5.1 Inducement Liability in the US
  In Grokster, the US Supreme Court adopted inducement liability into the fi eld of 
Internet copyright against a p2p software called Grokster. Inducement liability can 
be concluded under either of these two circumstances: 1) “actively encouraging 
(or inducing) infringement through specifi c acts”; 2) “distributing a product 
distributees use to infringe copyrights, if the product is not capable of ‘substantial’ or 
‘commercially signifi cant’ non-infringing uses.”532 As for the former circumstance, 
it can be further described as distributing “a device with the object of promoting its 
use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other aﬃ  rmative steps to 
foster infringement.”533 After Grokster, several cases about p2p software have been 
decided by taking advantage of inducement liability as established in Grokster,534 
but the relationship between inducement liability and “safe harbor” provision was 
substantially discussed until the “Fung” case.
  In the case of Columbia v. Fung, the defendant Fung ran several websites including 
www.isohunt.com, www.torrentbox.com, www.podtropolis.com, and www.ed2k-
it.com, which allowed users to download fi les to their computers.535 Th e plaintiﬀ  
claimed that with the facilitation of Fung’s websites, users could easily download 
“infringing copies of popular movies, television shows, sound recordings, software 
programs, video games, and other copyrighted content free of charge,” and some 
of these contents were copyrighted by the plaintiﬀ , so the plaintiﬀ  sued Fung for 
copyright infringement.536 In the fi rst instance, the Court held the defendant Fung 
contributorily liable for its inducement of copyright infringement on the following 
grounds: 1) the defendant’s message to users demonstrated its consistent intent to 
promote the infringing use of its service, such as setting special pages for users to 
532 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, at 942 (2005).
533 Ibid, at 913.
534  Arista Records LLC. v. Lime Group LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 398, at 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Th is is a case against p2p 
software, and since running  p2p software is not a typical internet service covered by “safe harbor” provision, the 
court need not discuss the relationship between inducement liability and the “safe harbor” provision.
535 Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Gary FUNG, 2009 WL 6355911 (C.D. Cal.), at 1.
536 Ibid.
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  upload dot-torrent fi les about top popular movies; 2) the defendant assisted its users 
to engage in infringement; 3) the defendant implemented the technical measures to 
promote copyright infringement; 4) the defendant’s business model depended on 
massive infringing use.537 When facing the defendant’s assertion of its qualifi cation 
for the “safe harbor” provision, the court stated that “inducement liability and the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act safe harbor are inherently contradictory.” Th is 
is because inducement liability results from bad faith conduct with a purpose of 
promoting infringement, but the “safe harbor” provision aims at protecting the 
legal e-business run in good faith.538 Th erefore, the district court in the “Fung” 
case appeared categorically to bar inducement liability from the “safe harbor” 
provision.539 
  In “Columbia v. Fung”, on appeal, the 9th Circuit Court also started by comparing 
this case with Grokster, and then concluded that the defendant, Fung, had fulfi lled 
every element of inducing infringement, including the distribution of a device or 
product, acts of infringement by Internet users, with the object of promoting its 
use for infringing copyright and causation between infringements and inducing. 
Hence, Fung needed to undertake inducement liability.540 However, when coming 
to the relationship between inducement liability and the “safe harbor” provisions, 
instead of holding that inducement liability could be categorically excluded from 
the “safe harbor” provision, the 9th Circuit mentioned the possibility that a hosting 
ISP who committed inducement could still be shielded from liability.541 However, 
the 9th Circuit still found the defendant Fung liable, because he failed to meet “safe 
harbor” provision for host or information tools ISPs.542 To be precise, Fung was 
“aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity was apparent,” and 
received a benefi t directly attributable to the infringing activity where he had the 
“right and ability to control such activity.”543
  Th e 9th Circuit held that the defendant had the “red fl ag” knowledge of infringement 
on the basis of his particular inducing activities: the record was “replete with 
instances of Fung actively encouraging infringement, by urging his users to both 
537  Ibid, at 9-15. In this case, the defendant, Fung, ran several websites which would “collect, receive, index, and make 
available descriptions of content, including so-called ‘dot-torrent fi les,’ and would also provide access to ‘open-
access’ BitTorrent Trackers.” Consequently, the district court denied treating the defendant’s service as a transitory 
digital Internet communication or host rather than an information location tool. However, the court made a clear 
statement about the relationship between inducement liability and the “safe harbor” provision, so it is still relevant 
to the discussion here. Moreover, in the appeal instance, the 9th Circuit held that the defendant could be seen as a 
hosting ISP.
538 Ibid, at 18.
539  See Reese RA, ‘Th e Relationship Between the ISP Safe Harbors and Liability for Inducement’ (2011) 8 Stanford 
Technology Law Review 1, at 3.
540 See Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Gary FUNG, 710 F.3d 1020, at 1032-1037. (9th Cir. 2013).
541 Ibid, at 1040.
542 Ibid.
543 Ibid, at 1047. 
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upload and download particular copyrighted works, providing assistance to those 
seeking to watch copyrighted fi lms, and helping his users burn copyrighted material 
onto DVDs.”544 Th ese materials were obviously copyrighted to a reasonable person 
and could not be “licensed to random members of the public” without any charge, 
because they were “suﬃ  ciently current and well-known”.545 Moreover, Fung also 
admitted that he had personally used the isoHunt website (one of the websites 
involved in this dispute) to download infringing materials.546 Th erefore, the 9th 
Circuit held that he had the broad “red fl ag” knowledge of copyright infringement.547 
As for the “receiving direct benefi t from infringement” prong of § 512(c)(1)(B), the 
9th Circuit based its opinion on the following facts: 1) Fung attracted advertisers by 
pointing advertisements to the infringing materials; 2) Fung induced and assisted 
these persons who committed infringement on his websites so as to attract more 
visitors to his websites; 3) Fung’s revenue relied on the number of visitors to his 
websites.548 Furthermore, the 9th Circuit also held that Fung had the right and 
ability to control the infringement, because 1) Fung organized and described the 
torrent fi les on his websites so as to make these high-likely infringing materials 
much easier to access; 2) Fung assisted users to locate the likely infringing materials 
that they could fi nd themselves; 3) Fung personally removed disqualifi ed torrents 
from his websites, such as fake or infected ones.549 To sum up, even though the 9th 
Circuit refused to exclude inducement liability from the “safe harbor” provision 
categorically, a hosting ISP who commits an inducing infringement still seems to be 
highly likely to be barred from the “safe harbor”.
4.5.2 Inducing Infringement in China
  Hosting services are likely to be used for copyright infringement, so in order to 
prevent hosting ISPs from making more profi t by promoting the infringing use of 
their services, Chinese Courts tend to hold hosting ISPs liable if they commit certain 
inducements. Th e Internet Provision issued by the People’s Supreme Court reads 
that where service providers induce or encourage Internet users to infringe others’ 
copyright by delivering words, oﬀ ering technical support, or rewarding credits, the 
service providers shall be concluded to have committed inducing infringements.550 
In addition, the Guide for Hearing Copyright Disputes Involving Video-sharing 
544 Ibid, at 1043.
545 Ibid.
546 Ibid.
547  Ibid. In this case, the 9th Circuit Court was still not entirely confi dent about “red fl ag” knowledge already being 
fulfi lled, for the reason that it was uncertain whether exclusion from the § 512(c) safe harbor because of actual or 
“red fl ag” knowledge of a specifi c infringing activity applied only with regard to liability for that infringing activity, 
or more broadly.
548 Ibid, at 1045.
549 Ibid. 
550 See Internet Provisions (网络规定) (n208), Art. 7.
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(hereinafter “Guide”) published by the Beijing People’s Higher Court also provides 
that, where hosting ISPs, by taking advantage of their service models, induce or 
encourage internet users to infringe the rights of others’ works, performances, 
sound or video recordings on the Internet, the hosting ISPs shall be held to have 
committed inducing infringements.551 
  Only a few months after the Internet Provision entered into force, a company 
which ran a BBS for Internet users to share content was held to have committed 
an inducing infringement in the case “chineseall.com v. 178.com”. In this case, the 
BBS operated by the defendant “178.com” had a sub-platform for subscribers to 
upload ePub-formatted e-books, and a copyrighted book owned by the plaintiﬀ  
had been uploaded without permission, so the plaintiﬀ  sued 178.com for copyright 
infringement. According to the court investigation, the defendant had a policy of 
rewarding these subscribers who uploaded content or replied to such content with 
virtual “silver coins”, so ChaoYang District Court in Beijing held that the defendant 
had induced its subscribers to commit infringements.552 
  By examining the Internet Provision, Guide, and 178.com case, one can see that the 
Chinese Courts have a stricter rule against hosting ISPs which commit inducements 
than the US courts. First, unlike the 9th Circuit, which rejected setting inducement 
liability as a categorical exclusion from “safe harbor”, the Chinese courts have 
already made it quite clear that an inducing infringement cannot enjoy the liability 
exemption provided in the “safe harbor” provision.553 Second, even compared with 
the inducement liability criteria founded in “Grokster”, the Chinese inducing 
infringement is easier to reach, because “Grokster” required the defendant to induce 
infringements by clear expression or other aﬃ  rmative steps,554 whereas in China a 
general or even indirect inducement can lead a hosting ISP to undertake liability, 
such as awarding virtual “silver coins” to those subscribers who upload content or 
make comments.555 
4.5.3 Intent to Facilitate Infringement in the EU
  In the EU, there is no specifi c category of copyright infringement called inducing 
infringement. However, it is commonly held by the tort law rules that if a person 
induces others to commit infringement, he/she must be liable for the infringement. 
For example, as provided in Article 830 of German Civil Code, the persons who 
551  Beijing High People’s Court (北京市高级人民法院), Guide for Hearing Copyright Disputes involving Video-
sharing (视频分享著作权纠纷案件的审理指南), JingGaoFaFa[2012] No. 419 (京高法发[2012]419号), Art. 
3.
552  chineseall.com v. 178.com (北京中文在线v.北京智珠网络技术), Beijing Chaoyang District Court (北京市朝阳
区人民法院), No. 8854 Chao Min Chu Zi (2013) (（2013）朝民初字第8854号).
553  In terms of the Provisions promulgated by People’s Supreme Court, once the inducing infringement has been 
concluded, “safe harbor” provisions are not applicable anymore.
554 See MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster (n527), at 913.
555 See chineseall.com v. 178.com (北京中文在线v.北京智珠网络技术) (n547).
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induce or contribute to the infringement should be seen as joint infringers.556 In 
the UK, the person who “conspires with the primary party or procured or induced 
his commission of the tort” will be held liable as a joint tortfeasor.557 Further, the 
UK case law has developed a concept named “Nelsonian knowledge” that is similar 
to the “willful blindness” in the US.558 If a man deliberately “shut his eyes to the 
facts he prefer not to see”, he should be held to have Nelsonian knowledge of these 
facts and therefore be liable.559 Besides, the ECJ also indicates that hosting ISPs’ 
intent can be taken into account when deciding their liability. In the case of L’oreal 
v. eBay, the ECJ stated that if eBay “provides assistance which entails, in particular, 
optimizing the presentation of the oﬀ ers for sale in question or promoting them,” 
it should be held liable.560 But the ECJ did not make any further statement about 
what constitutes imputed intent. At national level, the courts in member states also 
take hosting ISPs’ intent into account when deciding liability, and provide more 
detailed interpretation about imputed intent. Th e following section explores how 
national courts interpret imputed intent when dealing with hosting ISP’s liability.
4.5.3.1 Germany
  In Germany, in the fi nal instance of Rapidshare, the Federal Court of Justice referred 
to hosting ISPs’ intent and their commercial models when deciding how broad 
the hosting ISP’s “Disturber’s liability” should be.561 It is worth noting that the 
same defendant, Rapidshare, faced diﬀ erent fates in two lawsuits which occurred in 
the US and Germany, respectively. In these two cases, Rapidshare had operated an 
online hosting service for users to upload and share their content. While Rapidshare 
itself did not oﬀ er a search tool or index contents for users who wanted to search for 
specifi c materials, its users could still easily fi nd the infringing materials in Rapidshare 
through search tools run by others.562 In the US, the S. D. Cal. Court held that 
Rapidshare’s commercial model was tolerable, and it neither committed contributory 
infringement nor needed to undertake inducement liability.563 However, the same 
commercial model seems problematic in the view of the German Federal Court of 
Justice. It fi rst held that Rapidshare needed to assume “Disturber’s liability” because 
its commercial model substantially induced large scale infringements.564 Second, 
as for the scope of “Disturber’s liability”, Rapidshare should exert comprehensive 
and regular control over its “link collections”, such as seeking out any infringing 
556 Sterling, JAL, World Copyright Law (n97), at 629.
557 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v. Export Credits Guarantee Dept [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 19, at 46.
558 Twinsectra Limited v. Yardley and Others [2002] UKHL 12, para. 112.
559 Ibid. In light of Lord Millet’s understanding, Nelsonian knowledge amounts to actual knowledge.
560 L’Oréal SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others (n327), para. 123.
561 See what has been discussed in Section “Störerhaftung - disturber’s liability in Germany”. 
562 Perfect 10, Inc. v. RapidShare (n6); see BGH – Rapidshare (n42), at 1.
563 Ibid, at 6-11.
564 BGH – Rapidshare (n42), para. (b).
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“link collection” by taking advantage of general search machines such as Google, 
Facebook, and Twitter, and if necessary, proper web crawlers should also be used.565 
4.5.3.2 France 
  In France, the Supreme Court held that if a defendant provided a product or service 
which manifestly intended to allow Internet users to communicate copyrighted 
materials without permission, the defendant should be liable.566 In the case of 
SCPP and SPPF567 v. Mubility (Societe), the defendant ran the music streaming site 
“Radioblogclub.fr” which oﬀ ered “an index system via hypertext links and a search 
engine” allowing its users to fi nd the phonograms through the name of the artist or 
the work from a database available on the website radioblog.fr, and then to listen 
to them.568 Further, as has been shown in the certifi ed reports, the large majority 
of music available on the website “radioblog.fr” was defi nitely under copyright 
protection, since they were famous French or international light music works.569 
Besides, the defendant also promoted the software named “Radioblog” which 
could be downloaded from its website. With the help of “Radioblog”, the users 
were allowed to search and index the music on website radioblog.fr, make up their 
own playlists, listen to them and transfer them onto the personal sites or blogs.570 
Based on the facts above, French Supreme Court held that the defendant provided 
the internet service, especially the software, which “manifestly aimed at making 
protected works available to the public without authorization,” and therefore, 
should undertake criminal liability.571 
  In this case, the defendant claimed that it could benefi t from liability exemption 
as a hosting ISP, since the playlists of music on radioblog.fr were made up by 
Internet users, and it also implemented the policy that once a request was made 
for a phonogram to be taken down by the rights holder, the removal could be done 
immediately.572 However, this claim was dismissed and French Supreme Court held 
that a host might not benefi t from the liability exemption provided in the Article 
565 Ibid, para. (c), para. 21.
566  Spitz B and Avocats YS, France: Radioblog condemned to damages for over €1 million, Wolter Kluwer(2012), available 
at http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2012/11/13/france-radioblog-condemned-to-damages-for-over-e1-million/ 
(last visited 27-08-2014). 
567  SPPF is the short name for Société des Producteurs de Phonogrammes de France, and SCPP is the short name for 
Société Civile des Producteurs Phonographiques. Both of them are copyright collective management organization 
in France, and in this case, a large amount of music managed by them was made accessible to the public without 
authorization through the defendant’s service.
568  M. Louvel , P. ; Mme Radenne , J. ( Rapporteur ), M. Arnould J., Mubility (Societe) v. Societe 
Des Producteurs De Phonogrammes En France (Sppf ) (As Civil Parties), [2013] E.C.C. 22, 
229. 235.
569 Ibid, at 232.
570 Ibid, at 236.
571 Ibid, at 232-236.
572 Ibid, at 235.
Hosting ISPs’ Secondary Liability under the Roof of “Safe Harbor” Provisions
133
  6.I.3 of LCEN, if it had actual knowledge of the unlawful materials but failed 
to expeditiously remove or block access to them.573 Th erefore, in the light of the 
French Supreme Court’s ruling, if a hosting ISP intentionally provides a service 
or product which aims at facilitating copyright infringement, the hosting ISP is 
presumed to have actual knowledge of the copyright infringement and thus is liable.
4.5.3.3 UK
  In the UK, the Court of Appeal held a hosting ISP who took active measures to help 
and induce Internet users to commit copyright infringement as an authorizer of the 
infringement or as a joint tortfeasor.574 In the case of Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp 
v. Newzbin Ltd, the defendant Newzbin ran a website which enabled the registered 
members to search for a wide range of content hosted on Usenet, and with lots 
of measures done by Newzbin to facilitate the search, many TV programmes and 
movies copyrighted by the plaintiﬀ s could be easily found and downloaded from 
the Usenet, so the plaintiﬀ  sued Newzbin for copyright infringement.575 Before 
discussing the court’s decision, it is necessary to look into how Newzbin operated. 
Usenet allows its users to upload and view messages on an electronic equivalent of 
public bulletin boards which was mainly designed to deal with text materials of 
relatively small size.576 Th erefore, for the binary materials, such as fi lms, which are 
substantially larger than text materials in size, they need to be encoded in a text 
form and then split into multiple parts so that they can be posted on newsgroup.577 
But each of these multiple parts is posted on the newsgroup separately, so a fi lm may 
be distributed across hundreds or thousands of parts, which makes it quite time-
consuming for Internet users to download a whole movie from Usenet.578 Newzbin 
retrieved the messages that were scattered on a range of Usenet newsgroups by the 
title information, and provided three forms of indices which helped users fi nd 
out all relevant messages of a fi lm.579 Especially, in order to provide the Newzbin 
index, 250 “editors” were required to make the reports about fi lms, and ensure 
that each report includes all of the individual messages that comprise a copy of a 
fi lm or other binary work and relevant descriptive information.580 Further, Newzbin 
developed a facility for its premium members to create NZB fi les, and each NZB 
fi le contained all the information a news client required to fetch all the Usenet 
messages and reassemble the original binary work from its component parts.581 
573 Ibid, at 236.
574 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v. Newzbin Ltd (n453).
575 Ibid, para. 1 to para. 4.
576 Ibid, para. 6, para. 10.
577 Ibid, para. 10.
578 Ibid, para. 13.
579 Ibid, para. 23-27.
580 Ibid, para. 27.
581 Ibid, para. 29.
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  Th erefore, Newzbin immensely facilitated users to search and download fi lms and 
other binary works from Usenet. Besides, the evidence showed that it would be 
straightforward for the Newzbin to restrict access to the movie and TV categories of 
binary content, but rather than to do so, the Newzbin in fact focused on facilitating 
the access to binary content.582 
  Based on Newzbin’s operation activities, the Court of Appeal held the Newzbin as an 
authorizer of copyright infringement. By referring to Section 101(1) of the Australia 
Copyright Act, the court held that when deciding on authorization infringement, 
the following factors should be considered: the nature of the relationship between 
the alleged authorizer and the primary infringer, whether the equipment or other 
material supplied constitutes the means used to infringe, whether it is inevitable to 
be used to infringe, the degree of control which the supplier retains and whether 
he has taken any steps to prevent infringement.583 First, regarding the relationship 
between Newzbin and it members, premium members paid Newzbin weekly, 
and then were allowed to use the searching and indexing facility provided by 
Newzbin to fi nd the binary works on Usenet.584 Second, with regard to binary 
works, Newzbin identifi ed all of the, perhaps several thousand, messages which 
made up a particular binary work and, in so doing, saved premium members the 
very substantial task of manually locating and identifying each of them separately, 
so Newzbin provided its premium members the facility that went considerably 
beyond indexing and categorization.585 Th ird, Newzbin provided a facility for its 
premium members to create NZB fi les, and upon pressing a button, the NZB fi les 
would be delivered to and stored at members’ personal computers. If these NZB 
fi les consisted of copyrighted works, the infringement would inevitably occur.586 
Forth, Newzbin organized its indexing database into diﬀ erent categories in terms of 
the subject matter, and a very large proportion of the content in movie category was 
commercial and so very likely to be protected by copyright. However, Newzbin did 
not take any fi ltering measures to prevent infringement, but rather encouraged its 
“editors” to make reports about movies.587
  Further, the Court of Appeal also held Newzbin as a joint tortfeasor. To conclude 
whether a person is a joint tortfeasor, it needs to examine whether he/she participated 
with others in a common design to infringe.588 Normally, mere (or even knowing) 
assistance or facilitation of the primary infringement is not enough, and the joint 
tortfeasor must have so involved himself in the tort as to make it his own. 
582 Ibid, para. 79, 37, 49 and 50.
583 Ibid, para. 90.
584 Ibid, para. 98.
585 Ibid, para. 99.
586 Ibid, para. 100.
587 Ibid, para. 101.
588 Ibid, para. 103.
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  Th erefore, a joint tortfeasor should have induced, incited or persuaded the primary 
infringer to engage in the infringing act or have a common design or concerted 
action or agreement with the primary infringer on a common action to secure the 
doing of the infringing act.589 According to the decision delivered by the Court 
of Appeal, Newzbin operated a site which was designed and intended to make 
infringing copies of movies readily available to its premium members; the site was 
structured in such a way as to promote such infringement by guiding the premium 
members to infringing copies of their choice, and then provided them with the 
means to download those infringing copies by using the NZB facility; the activation 
of the NZB facility in relation to one of the claimant’s copyright fi lms would 
inevitably result in the production of an infringing copy; Newzbin had encouraged 
and induced its “editors” to make reports of fi lms protected by copyright, including 
those of the claimants; Newzbin further assisted its premium members to engage 
in infringement by give advice through the sharing forums; Newzbin profi ted from 
the infringement; and fi nally, the claimants were not able to identify particular 
infringements made by particular members only because the defendants kept no 
records of NZB fi les they had downloaded.590
  In the decision, the Court of Appeal did not mention the E-Commerce Directive, 
which provides ISPs with defense again civil and criminal liability for infringement 
committed by their users in certain circumstances.591 Th erefore, it seems that an 
ISP which actively induces and facilitates the Internet users to commit copyright 
infringement, not only should be held as the authorizer of infringement and joint 
tortfeasor, but also cannot benefi t from the liability exemption.
  To sum up, in the EU, the E-Commerce Directive does not include a provision 
dealing with hosting ISPs’ intent and liability exemption. Nevertheless, at the judicial 
level, the ECJ indicates that an illegal intent to promote infringement can render 
hosting ISPs liable. In Member States, the courts also pay attention to hosting ISP’s 
intent, when deciding hosting ISPs’ secondary liability for copyright infringement. 
Generally, if a hosting ISP intentionally promotes the infringing use of its service or 
even actively induces Internet users to commit copyright infringement, it needs to 
assume secondary liability and cannot benefi t from liability privilege. 
Based on the discussion above, it can be found that although the courts in each 
jurisdiction have set diﬀ erent criteria about imputed inducement, there is a common 
tendency in the US, EU and China that the courts take hosting ISPs’ intent and business 
models as important factors when deciding liability. In the US, inducing infringements 
589 Ibid, para. 108.
590 Ibid, para. 111.
591  Shillito M and Meale D, ‘Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Newzbin Ltd - copyright - online service provider 
held liable for copyright infringements of its users’ (2010), 32 European Intellectual Property Review 67, at 68.
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must be done by clear expression or other aﬃ  rmative steps,592 whereas in China a general 
or even indirect inducement can lead a hosting ISP to be liable, such as awarding virtual 
“silver coins” to those subscribers who upload content or make comments.593 In the EU, 
an intention to induce or facilitate infringement will be highly likely to result in hosting 
ISPs’ liability.
4.6 Chinese Approaches to Decide Hosting ISPs’ Liability
  In China, the People’s Courts always decide hosting ISPs’ liability by referring to 
whether they have fulfi lled reasonable duty of care in preventing Internet users from 
uploading infringing content. As for what kind of duty of care is reasonable for a 
hosting ISP, that remains unclear in Chinese judicial practice. However, it is at least 
certain that in the following three circumstances hosting ISPs should undertake a 
higher level of duty of care: when creating a channel for users to upload movies and 
television series, when having famous works or hot-playing movies uploaded onto 
their websites, and when the works have been viewed over certain times. 
4.6.1 Setting a Channel for Users to Upload Movies and Television Series
  In order to make the uploaded content look well-organized, the operators of 
video-sharing websites always divide their uploading channels into diﬀ erent 
categories which are usually labeled with “original”,594 “movies and TV series”, 
“entertainment”, “education” “music” and others.595 According to the Chinese 
Courts, the operators of video-sharing websites have the right to design the layout 
of their websites, but creating a channel specifi cally for movies and TV series is 
problematic. For example, In the case of “nubb.com v. Tudou.com”, the Shanghai 
Higher People’s Court concluded that since the defendant, Tudou.com, had set 
an uploading channel for “movies and TV series” parallel with a channel entitled 
“original”, it must have known that the channel “movies and TV series” would 
produce a high possibility of infringement. Th erefore, it should have undertaken 
more duty of care over the contents in the channel “movies and TV series” and was 
thus liable.596 Th is raises questions as to how far this kind of higher duty of care can 
reach. Some courts have even interpreted it as monitoring liability. For instance, in 
the case of “GuanShi Culture v. 6room.com”, the HaiDian District Court in Beijing 
concluded that the defendant, 6room, had created a channel especially for movies 
592 See MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster (n527), at 913.
593 See See chineseall.com v. 178.com (北京中文在线v.北京智珠网络技术) (n547).
594 Th e “original” here means the videos made by amateur Internet users rather than professional producers.
595  Th is kind of division can be found on nearly all main video-sharing websites in China, such as “youku.com”, 
“tudou.com”, and “video.sina”.
596  nubb.com v. Tudou.com (新传在线v.土豆网), Shanghai High People’s Court (上海市高级人民法院), No. 62 Hu 
Gao Min San (Zhi) Zhong Zi (2008) (（2008）沪高民三（知）终字第62号).
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and TV series, which meant it obviously knew many professionally produced movies 
and TV series were being uploaded onto its website. Consequently, the defendant 
should have monitored the content being uploaded to the “movies and TV series” 
channel and thus was liable.597 Interestingly, it is also a common practice for video-
sharing websites, such as YouTube and Veoh, to create diﬀ erent channels (including 
a channel for fi lms) for Internet users to categorize their uploaded content, but the 
US courts did not take this as a reason to require YouTube or Veoh to undertake 
a higher level of duty of care. Perhaps aﬀ ected by the relevant US case law, the 
Internet Provision does not specify that setting a channel for “movies and TV 
series” will result in a higher level of duty of care.598 However, the Provision leaves 
considerable room for the lower courts to interpret in their own way.599 According 
to the Guide issued by the Beijing Higher People’s Court, with regard to the works 
involved, performance or audio-videos found in the channel of “movies and TV 
series”, it is assumed that the defendants (video-sharing website operators) should 
know that these contents are infringing,600 which means the operators of video-
sharing websites still need to undertake a kind of duty of care similar to monitoring 
the channels of “movies and TV series”.
4.6.2 Famous Works and Hot-playing Audio-video Works
  For hot-playing audio-video works, the Chinese courts have not given a clear 
defi nition, but by deducing from case decisions, hot-playing audio-video works 
generally mean those movies and television series which are popular and still playing 
at movie theaters or on regular television. Since in China the box oﬃ  ce is still the 
main revenue source for most movie producers and given that audiences who can 
watch the movies on the internet might not pay to enter theaters, the Chinese courts 
require video-sharing websites to fulfi ll more duty of care so as to prevent hot-play 
movies from being uploaded. In the case of “vale.com v. Tudou.com”, the Shanghai 
First Intermediate People’s Court held that because the production of movies was 
costly, it was almost impossible for copyright owners to make them available on the 
Internet for free; therefore, video-sharing websites should bear a higher level of duty 
of care on movies, especially for those hot-play ones.601 
597  GuanShi Culture v. 6room.com (观视文化v.六房间), Beijing Haidian District Court (北京市海淀区法院), No. 
31332 Hai Min Chu Zi (2008) (（2008）海民初字第31332号). Th e HaiDian District Court also drew a similar 
conclusion in another case “GuanDianWeiYe v. Youku.com”, see No. 14023 Hai Min Chu Zi( 2008).
598 See Internet Provisions (网络规定) (n208). 
599  Art. 9 and 12 of the Provision list some instances where service providers should be presumed to “should know the 
infringements”, and these two articles end with “other factors” to be considered, which leaves lower courts enough 
room to make their own judgments.
600 See Guide (指南) (n546), Art. 7(1).
601  vale.com v. Tudou.com (网络互联v.土豆网) (n320). In another case - nubb.com v. Tudou.com, the Shanghai Higher 
People’s Court made a similar statement on protecting “hot-play movies”, see nubb.com v. Tudou.com (新传在线
v.土豆网) (n591).
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  As for what constitutes famous work, there is also no clear defi nition, which means 
courts must decide on a case-by-case basis. Once a work has been identifi ed as being 
a famous work, a higher level of duty of care will be imposed on hosting ISPs. For 
instance, in the case of “Hanhan v. Baidu”, the HaiDian District Court in Beijing 
fi rst admitted that the defendant, Baidu, did not need to monitor the “Baidu Wen 
Ku” (a platform for Internet users to upload and share literature) operated by it. 
Moreover, when deciding whether the defendant should have known that an illegal 
copy of “Xiang” (a work copyrighted by the plaintiﬀ ) was being uploaded to “Baidu 
Wen Ku”, the following factors were comprehensively considered: objectively 
accessing the current situation of “Baidu Wen Ku”, the fame of Hanhan and his 
work “Xiang”, and Baidu’s actual capacity to anticipate and control infringing 
activities. Finally, the Court concluded that the defendant should have undertaken 
a higher level of duty of care on illegal copies of Hanhan’s works, such as “Xiang”, 
because of Hanhan’s reputation and the wide infl uence of his works.602 By contrast, 
in the case of “JiaHua Culture v. 56.com”, even though the defendant “56.com” had 
created an upload channel called “movies and TV series”, on the grounds that the 
movies concerned were neither hot-play ones or famous in China, the ChaoYang 
District Court in Beijing held that the defendant was not liable.603
  Th e Internet Provision issued by the People’s Supreme Court sets “the fame of works” 
as one of the factors to consider when concluding whether service providers should 
know about an infringement. Additionally, the Internet Provision also includes 
rules about “hot-play audio-video works”, which state that hosting ISPs will be 
presumed to know of the existence of infringements in the following circumstances: 
where hot-play audio-video works are located on the homepages, other main pages, 
or other pages which can be easily accessed by hosting ISPs, or where hosting 
ISPs take the initiative to choose, edit, sort or recommend hot-play audio-video 
works, or set a special top list for them.604 When examining these rules, they do 
not require hosting ISPs to undertake a higher level of duty of care than complying 
with the normal “red fl ag” test and not actively being involved in infringement. Th e 
Guiding Opinions published by the Beijing Higher People’s Court also include a 
similar provision, but cover not only hot-play audio-video works, but also popular 
music, other types of well-known works, and the performances, sound or video 
recordings related to these famous works.605 Further, in terms of the Guide issued 
602 See Han Han v. Baidu (韩寒v.百度) (n42). 
603  JiaHua Culture v. 56.com (佳华文化v.56网), Beijing Chaoyang District Court (北京朝阳地区法院), No.20595 
Chao Min Chu Zi (2013) (（2013）朝民初字第20595号).
604 See Internet Provisions (网络规定) (n208), Art. 12.
605  See Guiding Opinions (指导意见) (n229), Art. 19(1). According to Article 19(1), where the alleged infringing content 
includes hot-play audio-video works, popular music works or other types of well-known works, or the performances 
and audio-video products, and this content is located on the homepages, other main pages or other pages which can be 
obviously accessed by service providers, then the hosting ISPs should be presumed to know about this infringing content. 
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  by the Beijing Higher People’s Court, once hot-play audio-video works, 
performances, or sound or video recordings can be found on their websites, hosting 
ISPs can be presumed to know of the hot-play content (so should be liable).606 
Th erefore, by deducing from the Guide, hosting ISPs should monitor the hot-play 
content so as to avoid being held liable. To sum up, it is commonly held that hosting 
ISPs should thus exert a higher level of duty of care on preventing the hot-play or 
famous content from being uploaded. However, when it comes to how high this 
specifi c duty of care should be, the People’s Supreme Court does not require hosting 
ISPs to do more than simply comply with the “red fl ag” test, whereas the Beijing 
Higher People’s Court asks hosting ISPs to at least monitor hot-play audio-video 
works, performances, sound or video recordings.607
4.6.3  Higher Duty of Care on the Works Being Viewed over a Certain Number 
of Times
  In the case of ZhongQinWen v. Baidu, the plaintiﬀ  ZhongQinWen found some 
of its copyrighted works were available on the platform BaiduWenku run by the 
defendant, so the plaintiﬀ  sued Baidu for copyright infringement.608 But Baidu 
claimed that the BaiduWenku was just a platform for Internet users to upload and 
share materials, and it had fulfi lled a reasonable duty of care to prevent infringement 
on its platform, so it should not be held liable.609 In the fi rst instance, Beijing First 
Intermediate People’s Court held that Baidu was incapable of monitoring all of 
the uploads and did not directly benefi t from infringement, but should know the 
infringing uploads in question.610 According to the decision, the defendant Baidu 
kept the viewing and downloading data of each uploaded text, and by using current 
technologies, it was reasonable for Baidu to execute a monitoring mechanism in the 
light of which, once an uploaded text has been viewed or downloaded more than a 
certain number of times, Baidu needs to inspect the potential copyright problems of 
the text, including contacting the uploader, checking whether the text is originally 
created by the uploader or legally authorized by the copyright owners.611 In this 
case, the plaintiﬀ ’s works had been viewed by a high volume of users, but Baidu 
failed to exercise its duty to examine the legal status of the plaintiﬀ ’s works, so Baidu 
should know the plaintiﬀ ’s works were illegally uploaded.612 In the appeal instance, 
606 See Guide (指南) (n546), Art. 8(1).
607  Th e courts in Beijing have jurisdiction over most copyright disputes on the Internet, so the Guiding Opinion 
issued by Beijing Higher People’s Court strongly aﬀ ects cases about hosting ISPs’ liability.
608  ZhongQinWen v. Baidu (中青文v.百度), Beijing First Intermediate People’s Court (北京市第一中级人民法院), 
(2013)YiZhongMinChuZi, No. 11912 (（2013）一中民初字第11912号).
609 Ibid. 
610 Ibid.
611 Ibid.
612 Ibid.
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Beijing Higher People’s Court upheld the decision in the fi rst instance.613 Th is case 
law in fact sets another duty for hosting ISPs to protect popular works. Because 
once a copy of a popular work is uploaded on a platform, it tends to attract more 
views and downloads. Th erefore, it is quite useful in respect of protecting these 
popular works, if setting an obligation for hosting ISPs to examine the copyright 
status of uploads which have been viewed or downloaded more than certain times. 
Meanwhile, this case law also tries to avoid rendering too much duty of care on 
hosting ISPs, since hosting ISPs are merely obligated to examine a certain amount 
of popular uploads but not all of them. However, both Beijing First Immediate 
People’s Court and Beijing Higher People’s Court did not set a clear indication on 
deciding how many times of views or downloads is enough to trigger the examining 
duty, which makes hosting ISPs’ liability uncertain. 
4.7 Analysis on the Imputed Factors Evaluated in Case Law:
Th e previous sections compare how the courts in the US, EU and China interpret 
relevant factors, including no general monitoring obligation, knowledge of 
infringement, receiving benefi ts from infringements, taking necessary measures against 
repeat infringements and inducement of infringement, when deciding hosting ISPs’ 
liability. Based on the comparison, some tendencies can be found regarding regulating 
the copyright liability of hosting ISPs in the US, EU and China. First, because hosting 
ISPs are not subject to a general obligation to monitor their services or actively seek 
infringing materials, it is not easy to prove their knowledge of infringement in the US and 
EU except when they receive competent complaints.614 In China, based on the “should 
know” criterion developed by case law, hosting ISPs’ knowledge of infringement is easier 
to prove, because this criterion not only covers the US “red fl ag” test, but also aims at 
regulating the hosting ISPs’ business-model by requiring them to fulfi ll a certain level of 
duty of care. Second, “receiving benefi ts” as an imputed factor seems to have become less 
important than before. For example, in the US, with the restriction of having the right 
and ability to control infringing activities, hosting ISPs can barely be held liable even if 
they receive direct benefi t from the infringements; in the EU, “receiving benefi ts” has 
already become a side-factor to be considered; in China, “receiving direct benefi ts” as an 
imputed factor can only be concluded in quite limited circumstances. 
Th ird, hosting ISPs’ intent has become a more prevalent factor when the respective courts 
conclude liability. For instance, in the US, “willful blindness” and inducing infringement 
have been frequently discussed when the courts hear the cases about hosting 
613  ZhongQinWen v. Baidu (中青文v.百度), Beijing High People’s Court (北京市高级人民法院), 2014 
GaoMinZhongZi, No. 2045,  (（2014）高民终字第2045号).
614  In some jurisdictions including the US, France and the UK, a hosting ISP is held to know infringement, if it 
induces or intentionally facilitates the infringement. See Section 4.5.1 and 4.5.3.
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ISPs’ liability; in the EU, if a hosting ISP intentionally promotes the infringing use of 
its service or even actively induces Internet users to commit copyright infringement in 
a substantial scale, it may need to be liable; in China, a general inducement or even an 
indirect inducement can lead a hosting ISPs to be held liable. Further, the courts also 
tend to evaluate hosting ISPs’ business models rather than simply checking whether their 
services are capable of non-infringing use or not. In Germany, if a hosting ISP’s business 
model is more likely to result in infringements, it needs to take more eﬀ ective measures 
to prevent these infringements. Fourth, although a general monitoring responsibility 
is strictly forbidden for hosting ISPs, a specifi c monitoring responsibility has been 
established in the EU, which basically works thus: once infringing content has been 
identifi ed, the hosting ISP needs to monitor this specifi c content so as to prevent it from 
being uploaded again. In China, a similar kind of specifi c monitoring responsibility can 
also be found in the Internet Provisions and relevant case decisions. In addition, compared 
with the US and EU, China requires hosting ISPs to undertake a higher level of duty 
of care to prevent hot-play audio-video works, famous and popular works from being 
uploaded, which aims at oﬀ ering better protection for such highly valuable content.
Based on the above observation, these factors, including intent, business model, specifi c 
monitoring obligation and better protection for highly valuable content, have become 
the main reasons to hold hosting ISPs liable in the US, EU and China. In the following 
section, analysis will be done on these imputed factors drawn from the case law regarding 
hosting ISPs’ secondary liability, and examines how these factors ought to be interpreted 
so as to preserve maximum freedom for hosting ISPs to operate in the US, EU and China.
4.7.1 Intent and Business Model
  Base on the case law discussed above, courts have started to examine hosting ISPs’ intent, 
namely whether they intend to induce Internet users to commit infringement through 
their services, when deciding hosting ISPs’ secondary liability. If one looks deeper into 
case law, the intent to induce can be divided into two categories which are specifi c 
intent to induce (US)615 and general intent to induce (Germany, China)616. Regarding 
the specifi c intent to induce, it requires “actively encouraging (inducing) infringement 
through specifi c acts,” such as “shown by clear expression or other aﬃ  rmative steps taken 
to foster infringement.”617 In contrast, general intent to induce only requires indirect or 
even passive inducement, which can be deduced from hosting ISPs’ business model.618 
615 See Section 4.5.1 “inducement liability in the US”.
616  See Section 4.5.2 “inducing infringement in China” and the Germany part in Section 4.5.3 “intent to facilitate 
infringement in the EU.”
617 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster (n527), at 942.
618  As being discussed in Section 4.5.2, a Chinese court held BBS operator as inducer because it had a policy of 
rewarding these subscribers who uploaded content or replied to such content with virtual “silver coins.” Further, 
as has been discussed in Section 4.5.3, in Germany, the Federal Court of Justice held that Rapidshare needed to 
undertake “Disturber’s liability” because its commercial model substantially induced large scale infringements.
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  Generally, since hosting ISPs’ services can be used for both lawful and unlawful 
purposes, it is reasonable to check whether hosting ISPs intend to induce 
infringement when deciding their secondary liability. Nevertheless, what level of 
intent to induce can lead to hosting ISPs’ liability should be properly defi ned, or 
otherwise, the inquiry into hosting ISPs’ intent may render unreasonable burden 
on them, which would negatively aﬀ ect the development of new distribution and 
copying technologies.619 In other words, hosting ISPs’ freedom to conduct business 
may be inappropriately impeded.
  From the perspective of ensuring hosting ISPs’ freedom to invent and adopt new 
Internet technologies, specifi c intent to induce is a more suitable standard. First, this 
standard does not challenge the technologies that are capable of unlawful use, but 
focuses on examining ISPs’ acts, namely, whether they actively encourage copyright 
infringement by using their services.620 Further, this standard does not question the ISPs’ 
business model, which allows ISPs to adopt the latest technologies to optimize their 
services.621 For instance, in the “Fung” case, the court held that the nature of Fung’s 
business model alone could not justify inferring bad intent to conclude inducement 
infringement.622 By contrast, if a hosting ISP needs to be liable for their general intent to 
induce infringement, it may negatively aﬀ ect the hosting ISP’s freedom to employ new 
Internet technologies. Th is is because, for a hosting ISP running a service capable of 
both infringing and non-infringing use, any promotion of its service can be, in a broad 
sense, understood as inducing infringement. For instance, in China, a BBS operator 
was held as an inducer merely by awarding virtual “silver coins” to those subscribers 
who upload content or make comments.623 By awarding virtual “silver coins,” the 
defendant does intend to encourage subscribers to upload content which is highly 
likely to include infringing materials, so in this sense, the defendant induces copyright 
infringement.624 However, such a broad interpretation of inducement will deter hosting 
ISPs from adopting new technologies or optimizing measures that can attract more 
users. In Germany, the court decided the scope of a disturber’s liability by examining 
hosting ISPs’ business models, and if the measures adopted by a hosting ISP increase 
the risk of the infringing use of its service, it needs to accept wider disturber’s liability.625 
619  Högberg SK, ‘Th e Search for Intent-Based Doctrines of Secondary Liability in Copyright Law’ (2006) 106 
Columbia Law Review 909, at 913.
620  According to the Grokster decision, “suspect” product design alone does not give rise to inducement liability under 
Grokster. See MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster (n527), at 938. 
621 Reese RA, ‘Th e Relationship Between the ISP Safe Harbors and Liability for Inducement’ (n549), at 6.
622  Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Gary FUNG (n550), at 1032-1037. In this case, the court held Fung’s business 
model as supportive evidence to conclude inducement infringement. Further, some technical features of Fung’s 
service can promote copyright infringement, such as implement “spider” program that allows users to locate and 
obtain copies of dot.torrent fi les, but the 9th Circuit did not take it as a reason to hold Fund as an inducer. 
623 See See chineseall.com v. 178.com (北京中文在线v.北京智珠网络技术) (n547).
624 Ibid.
625  Germany: “Rapidshare III” - Telemedia Act secs.7(2), 10 (2014), 45 International Review of Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law 716, at 716.
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  Th is decision may persuade hosting ISPs not to adopt new technologies to optimize 
their services, such as search tools or contents index, since these measures will help 
to fi nd infringing materials, which increases the risk of the infringing use of their 
services.
  “Specifi c intent to induce” standard refl ects the wisdom of “substantial non-
infringing use” doctrine626 which provides signifi cant protection for innovation in 
technologies that are related to the use of copyrighted material627. In the light of 
“substantial non-infringing use” doctrine, if a technology developer invents a dual-
use product or service that is capable of both infringing and non-infringing use, the 
technology developer will not be held liable for the infringement committed by users 
through the new technology.628 Further, under the “substantial non-infringing use” 
doctrine, the quantity or proportion of non-infringing use is irrelevant, because the 
product or service in question merely needs to be capable of non-infringing use.629 
By contrast, as demonstrated above, a general intent to induce can be easily inferred 
by the fact that the product or service is widely used for infringing purpose. Although 
“substantial non-infringing use” seems to favor technology developers, it aims to 
“reconcile the need to give copyright owners eﬀ ective protection for their works and 
the rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.”630 
If liability rules lead technology developers to be easily liable for the technologies 
they invent for exploring copyrighted materials, copyright owners would control 
the development of new technologies involving copyright exploration.631
To sum up, although it is rational to examine hosting ISPs’ intent when deciding 
liability, the imputed intent should be narrowly interpreted for the sake of allowing 
hosting ISPs to adopt new technologies. Th us, the general intent to induce infringement 
cannot result in hosting ISPs’ secondary liability. Th is suggestion seems unfavorable to 
copyright protection, but as noted by Ginsburg, copyright owners “should maintain 
suﬃ  cient control over new markets to keep the copyright incentive meaningful, but not 
so much as to stifl e the spread of the new technologies of dissemination.”632 Further, 
allowing the application of new technologies can also benefi t copyright owners, because 
“economic evidence strongly suggests that those unanticipated future benefi ts, or 
‘spillover’ eﬀ ects, often exceed the immediate value of most new technologies.”633 For 
instance, the Video Cassette Recorder (VCR), as a technology that copyright owners 
626  Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (n51), at 442.
627 Lemley and Reese, ‘Reducing digital copyright infringement without restricting innovation’ (n3), at 1356.
628 Ibid, at 1356.
629 MGM Studio, Inc v. Grokster Ltd, 380 F.3d 1154, at 1162 (9th Cir. 2004).
630 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (n51), at 442.
631 Lemley and Reese, ‘Reducing digital copyright infringement without restricting innovation’ (n3), at 1356.
632 Ginsburg, ‘Copyright and control over new technologies of dissemination’ (n34), at 1613-1614.
633 Lemley and Reese, ‘Reducing digital copyright infringement without restricting innovation’ (n3), at 1387.
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tried to outlaw,634 later created a new market for copyright owners to make tremendous 
profi ts.635 Currently, hosting ISPs and copyright owners have reached many cooperation 
agreements, in light of which copyright owners can share the revenues of hosting ISPs.636 
Th erefore, a narrow interpretation of imputed intent is not only capable of maximizing 
hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate, but also may benefi t copyright owners in a long run.  
4.7.2 Repeat Infringement and Speciﬁ c Monitoring
  Although an infringing material can be removed through notice-and-takedown 
procedure, this procedure cannot prevent the infringing material in question 
from being uploaded again. Th erefore, in order to avoid the endless notice-and-
takedown circle, hosting ISPs have been required to take necessary measures against 
repeat infringement.637 For the purpose of preventing repeat infringement, certain 
monitoring needs to be done on the contents uploaded by users so as to locate the 
possible repeat infringement. Nevertheless, the “safe harbor” provisions prohibit 
requiring hosting ISPs to undertake general monitoring obligations.638 In order to 
reconcile this potential confl ict, the US court held that, to identify and terminate 
repeat infringers, the ISPs did not need to track users in a particular way to or 
aﬃ  rmatively police users for evidence of repeat infringement.639 However, in the 
EU, the courts justify such monitoring on repeat infringement by naming it as 
“specifi c monitoring” so as to avoid the suspicion of violating the “non-general 
monitoring obligation” clause.640 In Germany, once notifi ed of infringing materials, 
a specifi c monitoring obligation will be imposed on hosting ISPs to take necessary 
and reasonable measures to prevent the identical infringement from occurring 
again.641 Th erefore, in the case of Rapidshare discussed above, the Germany 
Supreme Court held that it was proportionate to monitor “a single digit number of 
external websites” regarding one specifi c work.642 Similarly, “notice and stay-down” 
mechanism in France required the hosting ISPs to take all necessary measures 
634  Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (n51). In this case, copyright industry tried to persuade the US Supreme 
Court to ban the sale of VCRs produced by Sony, but fi nally the US Supreme Court created the “substantial non-
infringing use” doctrine, which confi rmed the legality of selling VCRs.
635 Lemley and Reese, ‘Reducing digital copyright infringement without restricting innovation’ (n3), at 1387.
636  According to a series of self-regulation documents signed between hosting ISP and copyright owners, hosting ISPs 
share their profi ts with copyright owners. See section 8.2 in Chapter 8.
637 See repeat infringer policy, disturber’s liability and notice-and-staydown discussed above in Section 4.3. 
638 See DMCA (n1), Sec. 512 (m) (1), E-commerce Directive (n1), Art. 15.
639 Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Internets, Inc. (n5), at 1143-1145.
640  Matulionyte and Nérisson, ‘Th e French Route to an ISP Safe Harbor, Compared to German and US Ways’ (n231), 
at 66. 
641  ‘Germany: Teleservices Act, secs.8(2),11; EU E-commerce Directive, Arts.14(1) and (2); Trade Mark Act, 
sec.14(2),(3) and (4) - “internet auction” (Internet-Versteigerung)’ (2005) 36 International Review of Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law 573, at 573.
642 BGH – Rapidshare (n42), Para. 53.
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  to monitor the materials which had been notifi ed as illegal.643 In China, when 
deciding whether a hosting ISP should know the infringement concerned, courts 
need to evaluate whether the hosting ISP take reasonable measures against repeat 
infringements made by the same internet user.
  Th e specifi c monitoring obligation is also acknowledged by the E-commerce 
Directive and ECJ. In the light of Recital 47, a “non-general monitoring obligation” 
clause does not concern monitoring obligations in a specifi c case.644 Further, 
according to the ECJ, any business, even legitimate ones, may be required to 
conduct specifi c monitoring as long as it does not put the business itself at risk.645 
However, the borderline between specifi c monitoring and general monitoring 
can be blurred in the light of case law in Germany and France, since any notice 
from copyright owners can trigger the specifi c monitoring obligations in these two 
jurisdictions. Further, the notices as such in fact can accumulate at a very fast rate, so 
eventually, in order to monitor these infringements specifi ed by notices, it is highly 
likely that hosting ISPs need to conduct a wide-spread monitoring obligation on 
materials uploaded by users.646 For this reason, the French Supreme Court dismissed 
the “notice-and-staydown” mechanism in 2012.647 In addition, imposing a specifi c 
monitoring obligation on hosting ISPs can result in a well-known phenomenon 
“slippery slope” in the context of Internet intermediary liability, because once 
hosting ISPs are subject to the fi rst monitoring obligation, then their monitoring 
obligations would grow like a snowball.648 As noted by Schellekens, if a hosting 
ISP is already obligated to monitor a specifi c infringing material, it would be 
diﬃ  cult for a court to uphold that the monitoring of another specifi c infringing 
material is not possible.649 Th erefore, the boundary between specifi c monitoring 
and general monitoring is not clear-cut, and a specifi c monitoring obligation is 
highly likely to force hosting ISPs to conduct the general monitoring in the end.
  Besides the overlapping concern of specifi c monitoring and general monitoring, 
specifi c monitoring may also cause cost concern. In order to fulfi ll the so-called 
specifi c monitoring obligation, a hosting ISP may need to adopt a sophisticated 
and costly monitoring system, which would stifl e its freedom to operate. As noted 
by the ECJ in the case of SABAM v. Netlog, the plaintiﬀ  required Netlog to adopt 
a fi ltering system at its expense for the information stored on its servers so as to 
643  Angelopoulos, ‘Beyond the Safe Harbours: Harmonising Substantive Intermediary Liability for Copyright 
Infringement in Europe’ (n91), at 264.
644 E-commerce Directive (n1), Recital 47.
645 L’Oréal SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others (n327), para. 144.
646  Angelopoulos, ‘Beyond the Safe Harbours: Harmonising Substantive Intermediary Liability for Copyright 
Infringement in Europe’ (n91), at 265.
647  Jasserand C, ‘Hosting providers’ liability: Cour de Cassation Puts an End to the Notice and Stay Down Rule’ 
(2013) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 192, at 192-193.
648 Schellekens M ‘Liability of internet intermediaries: A slippery slope?’ (2011) SCRIPTed 8(2) 154, at 154-155.
649 Ibid, at 163.
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block the exchange of fi les copyrighted by the plaintiﬀ , but the fi ltering system as 
such was unnecessarily complicated or costly, and thus failed to strike a fair balance 
between the protection of copyright enjoyed by right holders and the freedom of 
conducting business by hosting ISPs.650 
  When dealing with a specifi c monitoring obligation, it is useful to explore why 
“safe harbor” provisions set restriction on ISP’s monitoring obligations. First, ISPs 
need to process a vast amount of information every day, so in order to ensure the 
eﬃ  ciency of the Internet, it is impossible for them to monitor all of the information 
transmitted.651 Second, if forcing ISPs to implement very burdensome monitoring 
obligations, it would inappropriately impede ISPs’ freedom of conducting legitimate 
business,652 and eventually stifl e the e-commerce that is promoted by “safe harbor” 
provisions. Th erefore, when dealing with specifi c monitoring obligation, courts 
should take into account the following two factors: whether hosting ISPs are capable 
of conducting the required monitoring and whether imposing such monitoring 
obligations will inappropriately impede their freedom to operate. In this sense, how 
far a specifi c monitoring obligation can extend mainly depends on the hosting ISP’s 
monitoring ability in each case. For example, YouTube has adopted a sophisticated 
monitoring system - Content ID which can suﬃ  ciently prevent the infringing 
uploadings.653 But for the start-up hosting ISPs, adopting a monitoring system as 
such would be too costly for them, so if requiring start-up ISPs to adopt complicated 
monitoring systems, it “would eﬀ ectively raise the barrier to market entry, stifl ing 
innovation.”654 Nevertheless, it may raise legal uncertainty, if defi ning hosting ISPs’ 
specifi c monitoring obligations based on their monitoring ability. First, judges are 
not experts in Internet technologies, so they may be incapable of accurately assessing 
the monitoring ability of hosting ISPs. More importantly, Internet technologies are 
updated on an extremely fast track, so a specifi c monitoring obligation defi ned in 
one case may soon become outdated. 
  In addition, considering so much information needs to be processed by hosting ISPs 
every day, even specifi c monitoring has to be done by technical fi ltering. However, 
the accuracy of technical fi ltering has been widely criticized, particularly for its 
inability to accommodate fair use. Michael S. Sawyer asserts that given that fair use 
is even such a major challenge for the courts to evaluate, it is almost impossible for 
any technological solution to reach accurate determinations.655 Electronic Frontier 
650 SABAM v. Netlog (n311), para. 44-46.
651 Lemley, ‘Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors’ (n21), at 101.
652 L’Oréal SA and Others v. eBay International AG and Others (n327), para. 140.
653 How Content ID works (n42).
654  Holland CBA, Hermes J, Sellars A, Budish R, Lambert M, and Decoster N, NoC Online Intermediaries Case Studies 
Series: Intermediary Liability in the United States  at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/is2015/sites/is2015/images/
NOC_United_States_case_study.pdf (last visited 28-09-2014).
655  Sawyer MS, ‘Filters, Fair Use & Feedback: User-Generated Content Principles and the DMCA’ (n43), at 366. In 
part III of this article, Sawyer made a detailed analysis on why fi ltering technologies cannot accommodate fair use.
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Foundation (EFF) also claims that fi ltering technologies can hardly accommodate 
fair use.656 Th erefore, technical fi ltering may result in over-fi ltering, and negatively 
aﬀ ect the freedom of speech enjoyed by Internet users. In this regard, there seems a 
natural confl ict between imposing a specifi c monitoring obligation and protecting 
Internet users’ freedom of speech. Moreover, monitoring may also give rise to privacy 
concern. In the case of SABAM v. Scarlet, since the fi ltering system required by the 
SABAM would involve a systematic analysis of all content and the collection and 
identifi cation of users’ IP addresses from which unlawful content on the network 
was sent, the ECJ held such a fi ltering system was inappropriate and confl icted with 
privacy protection under the Charter of Fundamental Rights.657
  Above all, in order to avoid an endless notice-and-takedown circle, obligations have 
been imposed on hosting ISPs to prevent repeated infringement. Th ese obligations 
are justifi ed under the terminology of “specifi c monitoring”. Nevertheless, specifi c 
monitoring obligations can easily overstep the border with general monitoring 
obligations, and may impose unreasonable costs on hosting ISPs’ operation. 
Further, based on the rationale embodied in “safe harbor” provisions, hosting 
ISPs’ specifi c obligations should be defi ned by assessing their monitoring ability 
so as to avoid imposing unreasonable burden on them. However, this approach 
tends to result in legal uncertainty. Finally, specifi c monitoring may also confl ict 
with Internet users’ interests. Because of the drawbacks of imposing a specifi c 
monitoring obligation, this book proposes an alternative solution, and that 
is to treat specifi c monitoring as a reason to exempt hosting ISPs from liability 
rather than an obligation to make them liable. To be specifi c, if a hosting ISP 
does not implement specifi c monitoring, the court should not take it as a 
reason to hold the hosting ISPs liable. On the contrary, if a hosting ISP adopts 
specifi c monitoring, the court should treat it as a positive factor when deciding 
to grant the hosting ISP liability exemption.658 Th is alternative solution avoids 
imposing unreasonable monitoring burdens on hosting ISPs, but still encourages 
hosting ISPs to implement specifi c monitoring against infringing materials.
4.7.3 Better Protection for the Highly Valuable Content
  In China, hosting ISPs are obligated to undertake a higher duty of care on the 
specifi c content, including the content uploaded to the channel “movies and TV 
series,” famous works and hot-playing audio-video works, and content being viewed 
656 Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content, Electronic Frontier Foundation (n43).
657 Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM (n70), para. 26.
658  In the case of Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Internets, Inc., the court held the similar opinion. In this case, the defendant 
Veoh adopted fi ltering technologies to prevent the same infringing materials from being uploaded again, so the 
court took this eﬀ ort as a reason to exempt Veoh from liability. See Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Internets, Inc. (n5), at 
1143.
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  over a certain number of times.659 In fact, the higher duty of care as such is almost 
equal to monitoring duty, since if any of this content is successfully uploaded, the 
hosting ISP in question needs to be secondarily liable.660 Some reasons can be drawn 
to support such a higher duty of care. First, these contents tend to be professionally 
created, and normally will not be made available to public without charge.661 
Second, since these contents are usually highly valuable, better protection of them 
can substantially reduce the damage caused to copyright owners. Th ird, although 
hosting ISPs cannot monitor all of the content uploaded by users, it is reasonable to 
limit the monitoring extent to these famous and high valuable ones.662 Nevertheless, 
even though these reasons can to certain degree justify a better protection of these 
high valuable content, since these terms, such as “famous works,” “hot-play movies 
and TV series,” and “being viewed over a certain number of times,” have not been 
well-defi ned by case law, legal certainty cannot be ensured. In this context, hosting 
ISPs tend to interpret these concepts in an amplifi ed way, and thus monitor more 
content than necessary so as to avoid being held liable. In particular, it is really 
diﬃ  cult to defi ne “hot-play” and when a movie becomes not “hot-play” anymore, 
which may means hosting ISPs have to monitor a “hot-play” movie without time-
limits. Th erefore, without a proper explanation of several terms involved in a higher 
duty of care, hosting ISPs may have to introduce an unreasonably complicated and 
costly monitoring system, which stifl es their freedom to conduct business. In order to 
avoid unreasonably impeding hosting ISPs’ freedom to conduct business, the Chinese 
courts should either clarify the limits of this highly valuable content or stop requiring 
hosting ISPs to undertake a higher level of duty of care to protect this content.
4.8 Conclusions 
  When deciding whether hosting ISPs are liable under the roof of “safe harbor” 
provisions, the courts in the US, EU and China evaluate some common factors, 
including no general monitoring obligation, the knowledge of infringement, 
measures against repeat infringement, benefi t from infringement and inducement. 
Besides, Chinese courts require hosting ISPs to undertake a higher level of duty 
to protect highly valuable content. To be mentioned, with the development of 
Internet technologies, hosting ISPs adopt many new technologies to optimize 
their services, which substantially facilitate Internet users to share, locate and 
access information on the Internet. Th e facilitation as such not only helps Internet 
users access lawful information and useful knowledge, but also makes the access to 
infringing materials much easier. Especially, since there exist some hosting services 
659 See what has been discussed in Section 4.6. 
660 See the cases discussed in Section 4.6.
661 nubb.com v. Tudou.com (新传在线v.土豆网) (n591).
662 Han Han v. Baidu (韩寒v.百度) (n42).
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mainly used for infringing purposes.663 In this situation, in order to protect better 
copyright owners’ interests, the courts in the US, EU and China have relied more 
on the following factors to hold hosting ISPs liable, including intent (inducement), 
specifi c monitoring against repeat infringement and higher duty of care of highly 
valuable content. As discussed above, some strong arguments can be found to 
support these new liability criteria, but they need to be refi ned so as to avoid imposing 
an unreasonable burden on hosting ISPs. Regarding the intent of inducement, if a 
general intent of inducement can result in hosting ISPs’ liability for the infringement 
committed by their subscribers, it may unreasonably restrict hosting ISPs’ freedom to 
employ new technologies, and thus stifl e the development of Internet technologies. 
With respect to specifi c monitoring against repeat infringement, it is better to not 
defi ne specifi c monitoring as an obligation but rather treat it as a positive factor when 
deciding to grant hosting ISPs liability exemption. Th is approach avoids imposing 
an unreasonable monitoring burden on hosting ISPs, while encouraging them to 
implement specifi c monitoring. As for the higher duty of care on highly valuable 
content, since several terms used to defi ne highly valuable content have not been 
clarifi ed, hosting ISPs are exposed to legal uncertainty, which tends to force them to 
take more monitoring measures than necessary for their safety sake. Th us, such higher 
duty of care should not be imposed on hosting ISPs, unless the terms concerned are 
accurately defi ned.
Th e diﬃ  culty of regulating hosting ISPs’ copyright liability actually refl ects the overlaps 
and confl icts between diﬀ erent rights in respect of protecting intellectual property.664 
Too strong copyright protection may confl ict with hosting ISPs’ freedom of conducting 
their own business, and may even put Internet users’ interests in danger.665 In the US, EU 
and China, “safe harbor” provisions have been adopted to ensure hosting ISPs’ freedom 
to operate, so the liability rules should not be interpreted in a way that impose an 
unreasonable burden on hosting ISPs. As also noted by Douglas Lichtman and William 
Landes, “Copyright law is important, but at some point copyright incentives must take a 
backseat to other societal interests, including an interest in promoting the development 
of new technologies and an interest in experimenting with new business opportunities 
and market structures.”666 Th is chapter explores how liability rules are interpreted under 
663  See the Fung case, Rapidshare case and Newzbin case discussed above. Th e hosting services in these cases either 
aimed at promoting infringing use, or were widely used for infringing purpose.
664  Ruse-Khan HG, ‘Overlaps and Confl ict Norms in Human Rights Law: Approaches of European Courts to 
Address Intersections with Intellectual Property Rights’ in Geiger C (eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and 
Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015). As noted in this article, the confl icts between intellectual 
property protection and other rights have become quite frequent, which has aroused lots of discussion among 
academics.
665  See Lemley and Reese, ‘Reducing digital copyright infringement without restricting innovation’ (n3), at 1349. See 
also SABAM v. Netlog (n311), para. 44-46; Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM (n70), para. 26.
666 Lichtman and Landes, ‘Indirect liability for copyright infringement: an economic perspective’ (n12), at 401.
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the roof of “safe harbor” provisions in the US, EU and China, and particularly examines 
these imputed factors that frequently result in hosting ISPs’ liability according to the 
latest case law. Th en, this chapter proposes on how these imputed factors ought to be 
interpreted so as to avoid imposing an unreasonable burden on hosting ISPs, which, the 
author believes, contributes to preserving maximum freedom for hosting ISPs to operate 
in the US, EU and China. 
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Introduction:
According to the notice-and-takedown procedure, once a hosting ISP receives a proper 
complaining notice from copyright owner, it should promptly delete the infringing 
content indicated in the notifi cation or block the access to the infringing content.667 
Notice-and-takedown procedure was fi rstly adopted by DMCA 512 in the US, and it can 
be seen as a creative way to cope with the overwhelming infringement on the Internet. 
Since a hosting ISP does not need to monitor the content uploaded by its users,668 
the notices from copyright owners work as a way to make a hosting ISP aware of the 
infringing content. Furthermore, notices of complaint can be sent in a large numbers, 
which fi ts in with the fi ght against an overwhelming level of infringing materials on the 
Internet, because hosting ISP can easily delete the infringing content by following the 
indications in the complaints. After DMCA 512 was enacted, the notice-and-takedown 
procedure has also been adopted by some other nations, and China is one of them. 
Although the EU has not introduced such a notice-and-takedown procedure into its 
E-commerce Directive, the Directive provides the basis for Member States to adopt this 
procedure.669 In terms of Article 14(1)(b) of the E-commerce Directive, upon obtaining 
knowledge of any illegal information or activity, the hosting ISP needs to prevent access 
to the information expeditiously.670 Th erefore, after receiving such notices, which can 
result in hosting ISPs’ knowledge of the infringement, they need to take down the 
infringing materials. Th is chapter compares the notice-and-takedown procedures in the 
US, EU and China, and particularly analyses how the key issues ought to be interpreted 
in notice-and-takedown procedures so as to maximize hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate 
in these jurisdictions.
Sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 discuss the notice-and-takedown procedures in the US, EU 
and China, particularly examining how the courts in these jurisdictions apply notice-
and-takedown procedures. In the US and China, notice-and-takedown is a statutory 
procedure, and the US and Chinese law includes the detailed provisions on regulating 
this procedure. But in the EU, notice-and-takedown procedure is mainly based on the 
fact that a notice might lead to ISPs’ knowledge of infringement. Despite the existence 
of this basic diﬀ erence, the courts in these three jurisdictional areas pay attention to 
similar problems while ruling on notice-and-takedown procedures, including to what 
extent should a notice demonstrate infringement, how exactly should a notice indicate 
the location of infringing materials, how to defi ne “expeditiously remove”, how to deal 
with the defect notices and the validity of ex ante notices. Section 5.4 compares how the 
courts in the US, EU and China deal with these common problems when interpreting 
notice-and-takedown procedures, and then answer how these common problems ought 
667 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512 c(1)(c).
668 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512 m(1), E-commerce Directive (n1), Art. 15 of.
669 Commission Staﬀ  Working Paper: Online Services, Including E-commerce in the Single Market (n37), at 25.
670 E-commerce Directive (n1), Art. 14(1)(b).
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to be solved. Further, although the notice-and-takedown procedure is an eﬃ  cient tool 
to fi ght against overwhelming copyright infringement on the Internet, it also tends to 
result in wrong deletion. Section 5.5 explores the reasons resulting in wrong deletion, 
and then discusses hosting ISPs’ duties in reducing wrong deletion. Finally, it summarizes 
the fi ndings in previous sections, and then suggests how to cast hosting ISPs’ duties 
in notice-and-takedown procedures and who should take the burden to reduce wrong 
deletion (5.6).
5.1 Notice-and-takedown Procedure in the US
As expected by the US Congress, notice-and-takedown procedure should function as 
the formalization and refi nement of a cooperative process between ISPs and copyright 
owners which can be used to eﬃ  ciently reduce copyright infringement on the Internet.671 
In order to ensure that this cooperative process will be widely adopted, an ISP cannot 
benefi t from the liability limitation provided in “safe harbor” provision, if it refuses to 
take down the materials in question after receiving a qualifi ed notifi cation.672 Meanwhile, 
copyright owners are also not obligated to send a complaint so as to enforce their rights, 
but if they do not send the qualifi ed complaints, the limitation on liability will be 
applied, which means that actual knowledge or “red fl ag” knowledge of infringement 
still needs to be proved.673 Since the notice-and-takedown procedure is so heavily reliant 
on reducing copyright infringement on the Internet, DMCA 512 includes some detailed 
provisions to regulate the operation of notice-and-takedown procedure, 674 which will be 
discussed in the following text.
5.1.1 Setting a Designated Agent
In order to ensure that the notifi cations can reach hosting ISPs properly, DMCA 512 
requires the hosting ISPs to designate an agent particularly for receiving notifi cations 
from copyright owners.675 Furthermore, a hosting ISP also needs to make the contact 
information of its agent publicly accessible, such as publishing the contact information 
in an obvious location of its website, and providing contact information to the Copyright 
Oﬃ  ce for an index.676 Th e contact information must include “the name, address, phone 
number, and electronic mail address of the agent” and “other contact information which 
the Register of Copyright may deem appropriate.”677 For the purpose of guaranteeing 
that copyright owners can fi nd the contact information of agents, “the register of 
671 H.R. REP. 105-551(II) (n16), at 54.
672 Ibid.
673 Ibid. 
674 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, (c)(2), (3), (f ), (g)(3).
675 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, (c)(2).
676 Ibid.
677 Ibid.
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Copyrights shall maintain a current directory of agents available to the public for 
inspection, including through the Internet, in both electronic and hard copy format,” 
and hosting ISPs may be required to pay the cost of maintaining the directory.678
Hosting ISPs need to keep their designated agents available to be contacted, which 
means if they change the contacts of the agents, they must promptly update the contact 
information and make the updating publicly accessible. In the case of Ellison v. Robertson, 
the defendant had changed the e-mail address to which infringement notifi cations were 
supposed to have been sent, and failed to provide for forwarding of messages sent to the 
old address or notifi cation that the e-mail address was inactive, so the 9th Circuit Court 
concluded that the defendant did not fulfi ll the requirement of notice-and-takedown 
procedure for not having an eﬀ ective notifi cation procedure in place.679
5.1.2 Elements of Notiﬁ cation
In terms of notice-and-takedown procedure, a hosting ISP should remove the materials 
which are claimed to be illegal in a notifi cation, so the notifi cation must be competent 
and thus fulfi ll certain requirements. As provided in DMCA 512 (c)(3)(A), a competent 
notifi cation should at least substantially include the following elements:680 
  (i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the 
owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
 
  (ii) Identifi cation of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if 
multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notifi cation, 
a representative list of such works at that site.
  (iii) Identifi cation of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject 
of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, 
and information reasonably suﬃ  cient to permit the service provider to locate the 
material.
  (iv) Information reasonably suﬃ  cient to permit the service provider to contact 
the complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an 
electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted.
  (v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the 
material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its 
agent, or the law.
678 Ibid.
679 Ellison v. Robertson (n402), at 1080.
680 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, (c)(3)(A).
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  (vi) A statement that the information in the notifi cation is accurate, and under 
penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the 
owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
After examining the elements listed above, one can fi nd that DMCA set a very strict 
requirement on the content of notifi cation. First, in order to ensure that a notifi cation 
is sent with full caution, a competent notifi cation should include the signature of an 
authorized sender, a statement of his good faith and the accuracy of notifi cation. Second, 
a notifi cation should include the identifi cation of the copyrighted work claimed to be 
infringed and suﬃ  cient information about the alleged illegal material so that the receiver 
(hosting ISP) can easily locate the complained material without any further inspection. 
Th ird, in order to make sure that the complaining party can be contacted, a notifi cation 
also needs to include the contact information of the complaining party. Finally, if a 
notifi cation fails to substantially comply with these elements, it cannot be considered as 
evidence to decide whether the receiver (hosting ISP) has actual knowledge or “red fl ag” 
knowledge of infringement.681 However, if a defective notifi cation fulfi lls the elements 
(ii), (iii) and (iv) listed above, which raises enough suspicion to the receiver about the 
existence of infringement, the receiver shall notify the complaining party through the 
contact information given in the notifi cation and assist the complaining party to perfect 
its notifi cation.682
Among the elements required for notifi cation, identifi cation of the copyrighted works 
and identifi cation of the infringing materials have been most frequently discussed during 
the hearings. Since the infringement always occurs in a large scale, copyright owners 
tend to send less concrete notifi cations to hosting ISPs so as to cover as much infringing 
material as possible. However, it seems that this kind of eﬀ ort cannot always succeed. 
In the case of Arista Records v. MP3Board, the plaintiﬀ  sent three notifi cations to the 
defendant, and the fi rst two letters merely listed a handful of performers whose works 
were claimed to be infringed.683 Eventually, the court concluded the incompetence of 
these two letters because they neither accurately identifi ed the copyrighted works nor 
infringing materials.684 Nevertheless, the third letter was considered as competent, because 
it not only indicated the songs which were alleged to be infringed, but also included 
printouts of screenshots, on which 662 alleged infringing links were highlighted.685 
Furthermore, each notifi cation must separately comply with the requirements, and the 
copyright owner cannot claim that the combination of several notifi cations, which are 
separately defective, is substantially competent. In the case of Perfect 10 v. CCBill, the 
681 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, (c)(3)(B)(i).
682 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, (c)(3)(B)(ii).
683 Arista Records, Inc. v. Mp3Board, Inc., 2002 WL 1997918, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
684 Ibid.
685 Ibid. 
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fi rst two letters sent by the agent of plaintiﬀ  merely identifi ed the copyrighted works being 
infringed and the infringing materials, but failed to declare, under penalty of perjury, 
that he was authorized to represent the copyright owner, and that he had good faith to 
believe that the complained materials were infringing. Th e third letter supplemented the 
declaration that was missing from the fi rst two letters. Th e plaintiﬀ  tried to persuade the 
court to agree that the combination of the foresaid three notifi cations can be seen as one 
competent complaint. However, the court declined the plaintiﬀ ’s eﬀ ort and concluded 
that permitting a copyright holder to cobble together adequate notice from separately 
defective notices would unduly burden service providers.686
In order to best protect their interests, for certain high-valued contents, copyright owners 
may send notifi cations prior to the oﬃ  cial issue of these contents.687 However, the US 
courts refuse to admit the validity of these notifi cations. In the case of Hendrickson v. 
Amazon.com, the plaintiﬀ , who owned the copyright to a movie, sent a notifi cation 
to the defendant to claim that all DVD versions of the movie were infringing even 
before the DVD version was oﬃ  cially released, so actually the copyright owner sent 
a complaint when there was no material infringing his copyright on the defendant’s 
website. Nevertheless, nine months later, the plaintiﬀ  found that the DVD version of 
his movie could be still found on sale on the defendant’s website, so he claimed that the 
defendant should be liable because his notifi cation leads to defendant’s actual knowledge 
of infringement. Th e court denied this claim, because the Congress thus intended the 
notice to make a service provider aware of infringing activity that is occurring at the 
time it receives the notice.688
5.1.3 Counter Notiﬁ cation
Since hosting ISPs need to promptly remove the materials which are the subject of a 
complaint upon receiving competent notifi cation, in order to protect Internet users’ 
right from being improperly eroded by false complaints, the notice-and-takedown 
procedure requires a hosting ISP to promptly notify the Internet users of removing 
or deleting their uploaded materials.689 After receiving this notifi cation from hosting 
ISPs, the Internet users can send counter notifi cation to the hosting ISPs. Th e elements 
of counter notifi cation are similar to those in notifi cation, which are as follows: 1) a 
physical or electronic signature of the sender; 2) identifying the material which has been 
removed and indicating the location of the material as it  appeared before; 3) a statement 
under penalty of perjury that the sender faithfully believes that the material was wrongly 
removed; 4) the sender’s contact information, such as his name, address and telephone 
number, and also a statement about agreeing with the jurisdiction of Federal District 
686 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 481 F.3d 751, at 761 (9th Cir, 2007).
687 See Hendrickson v. Amazon.com, Inc., 298 F.Supp.2d 914, (C.D. Cal. 2003).
688 Hendrickson v. Amazon.com, Inc., 298 F.Supp.2d 914, at 917 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
689 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, (g)(2)(A).
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Court in the US.690 
Upon receiving the counter notifi cation from an Internet user, the hosting ISP shall 
promptly forward a copy of counter notifi cation to the person (copyright owner or 
his authorized agent) who sent the notifi cation, and then informs that person that the 
removed material will be replaced in 10 business days.691 Furthermore, the replacement 
must be done in no less than 10 but no more than 14 business days after receiving 
the counter notifi cation; however, if the person who sent the notifi cation has already 
notifi ed the hosting ISP that he has sought a court order against the Internet user who 
sent the counter notifi cation for his activity engaging in the infringement referred to in 
the notifi cation, the hosting ISP did not need to perform the replacement.692 
5.1.4 Limitation on Liability
After examining the operation of the notice-and-takedown procedure, one can fi nd that 
during the whole process, hosting ISPs keep being passive and just follow the directions 
indicated by notifi cations and counter notifi cations. Th erefore, DMCA 512 provides a 
wide liability limitation to these hosting ISPs who comply with the notice-and-takedown 
procedure. Even if the materials are wrongly removed or replaced, so long as hosting 
ISPs faithfully perform the removal and replacement pursuant to the notifi cation and 
counter notifi cation, they do not need to be responsible for any mistaken removal and 
replacement.693 
5.1.5 Misrepresentations 
As introduced in the last paragraph, hosting ISPs do not need to be responsible for 
wrong removal and replacement, so for their own good, they tend to follow the direction 
in notifi cation or counter notifi cation without examining whether the notifi cation 
or counter notifi cation is right or not. In order to prevent the notice-and-takedown 
procedure from being abused, DMCA provides that the person, who knowingly 
materially misrepresents whether the material or activity is infringing or not in his 
notifi cation or counter notifi cation, will be liable and pay for the damage incurred by 
his misrepresentation.694 In this provision, the key point is how to interpret “knowingly 
materially misrepresent”. In the case of Online Policy Group v. Diebold, the plaintiﬀ  sent 
a notifi cation complaining about an e-mail archive of the corporate communications 
regarding the accuracy and security of the voting machines available on the defendant’s 
website. Th e court concluded that the plaintiﬀ  knowingly materially misrepresented 
in its notifi cation, because even if the archive of communication referred to above was 
690 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, (g)(3).
691 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, (g)(2)(B).
692 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, (g)(2)(C).
693 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, (g)(2), (4). 
694 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, (f ).
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subject to copyright protection, they were clearly subject to the fair use exception.695 
Besides, the court also held that, in the context of DMCA 512(f), the “knowingly” meant 
that “a party actually knew, should have known if it acted with reasonable care or diligence, 
or would have had no substantial doubt had it been acting in good faith, that it was making 
misrepresentations.”696 As for the “materially”, it means that “the misrepresentation aﬀ ected 
the ISP’s response to a DMCA letter.”697 Th erefore, “misrepresentation” in DMCA 512 
(f ) is not easily proved. First, DMCA 512 (f ) sets a quite high requirement on senders’ 
subjective fault, and mere negligence cannot result in senders’ knowingly misrepresenting. 
Second, the misrepresentation should lead to hosting ISPs’ wrong deletion or removal of 
legal materials, which means that even though a complainant knowingly misrepresents in 
his notifi cation, if the hosting ISP doesn’t wrongly delete or remove the legal materials, the 
complainant needs not to be liable for his misrepresentation.
5.2 Notice-and-takedown Procedures in the EU
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, although the E-Commerce Directive 
does not include an explicit rule about any notice-and-takedown procedure, it does 
provide the basis for this procedure, since according to Article 14(1)(b), a notice leading 
to a hosting ISP’s knowledge of infringement will trigger the hosting ISP’s obligation to 
taking down the infringement expeditiously. In the Member States, the courts also treat 
the notices from rights holders as an important factor when deciding on whether the 
hosting ISPs actually know of the infringement.698 Th e European Commission has also 
recognized the importance of a notice-and-takedown procedure in respect of dealing 
with an overwhelming level of infringement on hosting platforms, and held a Public 
Consultation on Procedures for Notifying and Action on Illegal Content hosted by 
Online Intermediaries in 2012.699 Th is public consultation demonstrated that there 
were huge disagreements over many key problems of notice-and-takedown procedure, 
such as the requirements for notices, how fast should remove be done, how to prevent 
unjustifi ed notices, etc.700 Nevertheless, so far no notice-and-takedown procedure has 
been harmonized at the EU level. Some Member States have adopted the codifi ed 
695 Online Policy Group v. Diebold Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, at 1204 (N.D.Cal. 2004).
696 Ibid.
697 Ibid.
698  Sadeghi,  e Knowledge Standard for ISP Copyright and Trademark Secondary Liability: A Comparative Study on 
the Analysis of US and EU Laws (n368), at 105. See also Verbiest T et al., Study on the Liability of Internet 
Intermediaries (n389), at 36-46.
699  A clean and open Internet: Public consultation on procedures for notifying and acting on illegal content hosted by 
online intermediaries, European Commission(2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
consultations/2012/clean-and-open-internet_en.htm (last visited 19-02-2014).
700  Summary of Responses - A clean and open Internet: Public consultation on procedures for notifying and acting on illegal 
content hosted by online intermediaries, European Commission(2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_
market/consultations/2012/clean-and-open-internet/summary-of-responses_en.pdf (last visited 04-05-2016).
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notice-and-takedown procedures, including Finland, Hungary and Lithuania.701 Some 
other Member States, such as France, Italy and the UK, have ruled on the elements of 
a competent notice in their national legislations about implementing the E-commerce 
Directive.702 Th ere are also Member States which have not even ruled on the elements of a 
competent notice at the legislative level, including Holland and Germany.703 Th e following 
text explores how notice-and-takedown procedures are implemented in member states at 
both legislative and judicial levels under the roof of E-commerce Directive, including 
entity in charge of notice, formal requirement on notices, precise location of infringing 
materials, evidence about infringement and expeditious remove of infringing materials.
5.2.1 Entity in Charge of the Notice
In the EU, some Member States only acknowledge the notices from authorities at the 
legislative level, such as Spain and Italy.704 In Spain, only notices sent by competent bodies, 
including a court or an administrative authority, can result in a hosting ISPs’ knowledge 
of infringement from the legal perspective.705 According to Article 16.1 (b) of the Spanish 
E-commerce law, a hosting ISPs shall be held to know the infringement, when “a competent 
body has declared the data to be illegal, has ordered its removal or that access to the data 
be blocked, or when it has been declared that the damage has been done, and the provider 
is aware of the relevant solution, without prejudice to the notice-and-takedown procedure 
that applies to the providers on the basis of voluntary agreements and of other eﬀ ective 
knowledge-based means that can be established.”706 In 2012, Spain enacted Royal Decree 
1889/2011 which appointed the Intellectual Property Commission as the competent body 
to deal with the notices from copyright owners, and then decide whether the takedown 
requests should be sent to the corresponding ISPs.707 In Italy, the E-Commerce Directive has 
been implemented into Legislative Decree 70/03. According to Article 16.1 (b) of Legislative 
Decree 70/03, a hosting ISP, upon acquiring knowledge or awareness of infringement, or 
upon receiving a proper order from a court or a competent authority, should expeditiously 
remove or disable access to the infringing materials.708 Th erefore, the legislation in Italy only 
provides that a hosting ISP should take down infringing materials after receiving notice from 
competent authorities, but does not directly indicate whether a notice from private entities, 
such as copyright owners, can lead to the same eﬀ ects. 
701 Verbiest T et al., Study on the Liability of Internet Intermediaries (n389), at 106-109.
702  Szuskin L, et al., ‘Beyond Counterfeiting: Th e Expanding Battle Against Online Piracy’ (2009) 21 Intellectual 
Property & Technology Law Journal 4.
703 Verbiest T et al., Study on the Liability of Internet Intermediaries (n389), at 41-42.
704 Ibid, at 42.
705 Ibid. 
706 Ibid. 
707  Meliá JC, ‘Th e Administrative and Judicial Procedure Concerning Internet Infringements: Much More Th an a 
Simple Notice and Takedown Procedure’ (2014), WIPO/ACE/9/21.
708  Legislative Decree 70/03, Art. 16.1 (b), quoting Bellan, ‘Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, 
and Intermediaries: Th e Position in Italy’ (n238), at 90.
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Although competent authorities can send hosting ISPs notices which result in the 
accurate removal of infringing materials, authorities are incapable of pursuing every 
infringement because of the limited resources they have.709 Further, in the case of L’Oréal 
SA v. Ebay, the ECJ held that hosting ISPs’ knowledge of infringement can be acquired 
through either their own investigation or private notices.710 Th erefore, member states 
also acknowledge the eﬀ ectiveness of notices from private entities, so long as these 
notices can result in hosting ISPs’ knowledge of infringement. For example, Finnish law 
acknowledges that both a court order and a competent notice from copyright owners 
can trigger hosting ISPs’ obligation to take down infringing materials.711
5.2.2 Formal Requirement on Notices
Regarding the notices sent by competent authorities, the relevant legislation in the 
member states does not set formal requirements on them, since the accuracy of these 
notices can normally be guaranteed.712 However, regarding the notices from copyright 
owners, several member states prescribe the elements of a competent notice at legislative 
level so as to make notice-and-takedown procedure work properly.
As provided by Finnish law, a competent notice should include the following elements: 
1) details of the notifying party, 2) material in itemised form, 3) location of material, 
4) confi rmation that material is illegally accessible, 5) information that notifying party 
has in vain contacted content provider, 6) confi rmation that notifying party is copyright 
holder.713 Although the UK and France do not adopt a codifi ed notice-and-takedown 
procedure, they do rule on the elements of notice. In the UK, a notice must include the 
following elements: “1) the full name and address of the sender of the notice; 2) details 
of the location of the information in question; and 3) details of the unlawful nature of 
the activity or information in question.”714 France even drafts a detailed list of elements, 
comparable to those in Finnish law regarding notice. As provided in LCEN (Loi n° 
2004-575 du 21 juin 2004 pour la confi ance dans l’économie numérique), a notice 
should include:715 
709 Verbiest T et al., Study on the Liability of Internet Intermediaries (n389), at 15.
710 L’Oréal SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others (n327), Para. 122.
711  Fahllund K, Country Report (Finland), Global Advertising Lawyers Alliance(2002), available at http://www.gala-
marketlaw.com/pdf/fi nland2002.pdf (last visited 20-08-2014).
712  In Finland, Italy and Spain, where notices from authorities are acknowledged, legislation has not set formal 
requirement on the element of notices. See Commission Staﬀ  Working Paper: Online Services, Including 
E-commerce in the Single Market (n37), Annex II. Fahllund, Country Report (Finland) (n706). Bellan, ‘Intellectual 
Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries: Th e Position in Italy’ (n238), at 91-92.
713 Commission Staﬀ  Working Paper: Online Services, Including E-commerce in the Single Market (n37), Annex II.
714 Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 (n155), Art. 22 (b).
715 LCEN (n171), Art. 6-I-5.
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    1) Th e date of notifi cation;
  2)  Th e identity of the person who sends notice. If the sender is a natural person, 
the notice should indicate his/her full name, occupation, residence, nationality, 
date and place of birth. If the sender is a legal entity, the notice should indicate 
its legal form, its name, registered oﬃ  ce, and legal representative;
  3)  Th e name and address of the recipient. If the recipient is a legal entity, the notice 
should indicate its name and headquarters;
  4)  Th e description of the alleged infringing materials and their precise location;
  5)  Th e reasons for which the content should be removed, including the reference to 
legal provisions and justifi cation of the claims;
  6)  A copy of correspondence between the sender and the author or publisher of 
the disputed materials, which requires that the disputed materials should be 
removed. If no copy of correspondence can be oﬀ ered, the notice should state 
the reasons why the author or publisher could not be contacted.
Although the member states discussed above have already ruled on what elements should 
be included in a competent notice, in judicial practice there still exist disputes on how 
to interpret some of these elements. In the member states where no norm regulates the 
elements of notices at legislative level, similar disputes also exist on what constitutes 
a competent notice. Generally, the disputes focus on how to interpret “the precise 
location of alleged infringing materials” and “the evidence to prove the illegality of 
alleged infringing materials.”716 Th e following section explores how these two elements 
are interpreted in several member states.
5.2.3 Precise Location of Alleged Infringing Materials
Since hosting ISPs are not obliged to actively seek infringing materials on their 
platforms,717 in order to make them aware of infringing materials, notices should include 
the precise location of alleged infringing materials. Regarding how precise the location 
ought to be indicated, the courts in member states deliver diﬀ erent decisions.
In the case of Nord-Ouest v. Dailymotion, the Court de Cassation (French Supreme 
Court) held that the information about the location of infringing materials in a notice 
had to be suﬃ  cient for the ISP to identify them, and the simple mention of a video 
available on the ISP’s website was not enough.718 In Germany, in the case of GEMA 
v. YouTube, the plaintiﬀ  GEMA is a collecting society for musical performance and 
mechanical reproduction rights based in Germany, and it sent a notice to the defendant 
YouTube to complain that 258 music works managed by it were made unlawfully 
716 Commission Staﬀ  Working Paper: Online Services, Including E-commerce in the Single Market (n37), at 43.
717 E-commerce Directive (n1), Art. 15.
718  Bellan, ‘Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries: Th e Position in Italy’ (n238), 
at 72.
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accessible on the YouTube.719 Afterwards, the plaintiﬀ  sued YouTube for copyright 
infringement, since some of music works were still publicly accessible. In these notices, 
not only the titles and the authors of music works were indicated, but also the URLs of 
infringing videos were given.720 Th erefore, the Hamburg District Court concluded that 
the notices sent by plaintiﬀ  were competent, since it was quite easy for the defendant 
to locate the infringing videos by following the URLs given in the notices, and the 
defendant should immediately remove the infringing videos.721 Further, in Germany, 
besides URLs, some other indications can also precisely help hosting ISPs locate the 
alleged infringing materials. In the case of Stiftparfuem722, Federal Supreme Court held 
the plainti  pointed out that all of the perfumes branded in “Echo Davido ” and “Davido  
Cool Water Deep” in capacity of 20 ml were counterfeits without exception, so the defendant 
did not need to examine the likelihood of confusion, but just identify the perfumes in the same 
trademark and capacity.723  erefore, in the notice, the plainti  indicated all the legal and 
factual circumstances, from which the infringement could be clearly and easily identi ed by 
the defendant, since the defendant could locate all of the infringing o ers by searching with 
the keywords of trademarks, capacity and product categories on its auction platform.724
In Italy, diﬀ erent courts even delivered contradicting opinions. In a series of cases between 
RTI and YouTube, IOL, Yahoo!, the Plaintiﬀ , as copyright owner, sent notices that only 
identifi ed the titles of the TV programs being illegally uploaded but did not include the 
URLs of infringing materials, to the defendants. Finally, the court held that this kind of 
notices were competent, since although the URLs of alleged infringing materials were 
not provided, the platforms operated by the defendants oﬀ ered internal search engines 
through which the defendants could easily identify the infringing materials by inputting 
the titles of the TV programs as searching key words.725 By following the same approach, 
the District Court of Roma further stated that “it would be unreasonable to burden RTI 
with the additional work of providing Google with the URLs for any single infringing 
video.”726 However, in another case with nearly the same facts, the District Court of 
Turin held an opposite opinion. In the case of Delta TV v. YouTube, the plaintiﬀ  Delta 
TV found that some episodes of its copyrighted TV series could be accessed on the 
YouTube, and then Delta TV sent YouTube a notice which only indicated the titles of the 
719 LG Hamburg, Urteil vom 20.04.2012, 310 O 461/10.
720 Ibid.
721 Ibid.
722  It is a case about trademark infringement on hosting platforms, but because German courts did not diﬀ erentiate 
between the notice-and-takedown procedures applied to copyright infringement and trademark infringement, this 
case can be mentioned to demonstrate how German courts interpret “the precise location of alleged infringing 
materials.”
723 BGH, August 17, 2011, Case No. I ZR 57/09 - Stiftparfuem, para. 29.
724 Ibid, para. 29.
725  Bellan, ‘Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries: Th e Position in Italy’ (n238), 
at 112.
726  Bellan, ‘Intellectual Property Liability of Consumers, Facilitators, and Intermediaries: Th e Position in Italy’ (n238), 
at 112-113.
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videos alleged as infringing. Based on these facts, the District Court of Turin 
concluded that the notice sent by the Delta TV could not lead to the defendant’s 
actual knowledge of complained infringement, since it did not indicate the URLs 
of the infringing videos, which could not make the defendant accurately identify 
the alleged infringement.727 Th erefore, according to District Court of Turin, it is 
necessary for a competent notice to include the exact URLs of infringing materials.
Based on the case law discussed above, it can be concluded that a notice including the 
URLs of alleged infringing materials can defi nitely meet the requirement of precisely 
indicating the location. However, whether other indications, such as titles of works, 
authors of works, names of albums, etc., can precisely indicate the location of alleged 
infringing materials remains uncertain in Member States.
5.2.4 Evidence to Prove the Illegality of Alleged Infringing Materials
Because the actual knowledge or awareness in Article 14 of E-commerce Directive 
covers not only the suspected materials, but also their illegality,728 notices are supposed 
to include suﬃ  cient evidence to prove the illegality of suspected materials so as to trigger 
the hosting ISPs’ duty to take them down. Regarding what constitutes suﬃ  cient evidence 
in a notice, the courts in diﬀ erent member states deliver diﬀ erent decisions.
In Germany, the case of “Stiftparfuem” provides us a good insight into this issue. In this 
case, the plaintiﬀ  sent a notice to the defendant Ebay, and alleged that all of the perfume 
“Echo” and “Cool Water Deep” in capacity of 20 ml sold on Ebay were counterfeits. 
However, the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf held this notice incompetent. 
First, the Court held that, from the perspective of the defendant, it’s highly possible 
for the plaintiﬀ  to produce and distribute the perfumes on the market, since it is quite 
common for perfume manufacturers to sell the perfume in a capacity of 20 ml on the 
market.729 Th erefore, it is the plaintiﬀ ’s duty to prove its claim that it had not produced 
the complained perfumes in a capacity of 20 ml, but it failed to do so. Second, the notice 
also did not make it clear that the plaintiﬀ  had rights to pursue the infringement.730 
Th ird, the evidence oﬀ ered by the plaintiﬀ  was insuﬃ  cient to arouse the defendant’s duty 
to check out the alleged infringement, since the plaintiﬀ  only made a general statement 
that the complained perfumes were counterfeits. Besides, the notice did not show the 
corresponding original perfumes so that the fake nature of the oﬀ ers could not be clearly 
and unambiguously recognizable. Th erefore, for an objective viewer, it was possible that 
the designated perfumes were genuine.731 By deducing from the conclusion made by 
727 Spedicato, ‘Italy: the take-down notice must contain the specifi c YouTube URLs’ (n437). 
728 E-commerce Directive (n1), Art. 14.
729 OLG Düsseldorf, Urteil vom 31.03.2009, I-20 U 73/08.
730 Ibid.
731 Ibid.
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the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, a competent notice should include suﬃ  cient 
evidence which could substantially prove that the oﬀ ers were counterfeits. 
Th e German Federal Supreme Court, however, came to a diﬀ erent conclusion in this 
aspect.732 Th e Germany Federal Supreme Court diﬀ erentiated between the indication 
about a specifi c infringement and the evidence to justify the legality of that indication.733 
Th e indication was suﬃ  cient to arouse the defendant’s duty to remove the complained 
oﬀ ers. However, the evidence was only needed when the defendant had reasonable 
doubts about the legality of the indication. For instance, the defendant had reasonable 
doubts on the existence of a property right, the authorization to enforce this property 
right or the truth of the reported facts about an infringement; it therefore needed to 
undertake a costly investigation so as to surely identify the infringement.734 In this case, 
the defendant could have reasonable doubts on whether the products mentioned in 
the complaint infringed the plaintiﬀ ’s right, and whether the plaintiﬀ  was authorized 
to enforce this right.735 However, once having reasonable doubts, the defendant was 
obliged to notify the plaintiﬀ  of these doubts and ask the plaintiﬀ  to provide relevant 
evidence to clarify these doubts, but it failed to do so.736
Above all, in the view of the German courts, normally, a notice which includes the clear 
indications about a specifi c infringement can trigger the hosting ISP’s removing duty; 
however, if the hosting ISP has reasonable doubts about the legality of the indication, it 
is obligated to ask the sender to provide the relevant evidence to justify that indication. 
In the UK, the courts seem to set a stricter requirement on the evidence included in 
notices. In the case of Bunt v. Tilley, the Queen’s Bench Division held that “in order to 
be able to characterize something as ‘unlawful’ a person would need to know something 
of the strength or weakness of available defense.”737 Th erefore, unless the sender has 
clarifi ed why any potential defenses would not apply in a notice, the ISP should not 
be held as having actual knowledge of the unlawful activity under the Regulation.738 
By following the Interpretation about “details of the unlawful nature” in Bunt v. Tilley, 
a copyright notice needs to not only include evidence about infringement, but also 
demonstrates why the defense, such as fair use, is not applicable.
Since notices should include evidence about infringement, hosting ISPs need to 
evaluate this evidence so as to decide whether the designated materials are infringing. 
In Germany, upon receiving a notice, the hosting ISP at least needs to conduct a 
preliminary assessment on the evidence in the notice so as to see whether there exists any 
732 BGH – Stiftparfuem (n718).
733 Ibid, para. 31.
734 Ibid, para. 31.
735 Ibid, para. 32.
736 BGH – Stiftparfuem (n718), para 32. 
737 Bunt v Tilley and others, [2006] EWHC 407 (QB), para. 72.
738 Smith GJH and Boardman R, Internet Law and Regulation (Sweet & Maxwell. 2007), at 379.
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reasonable doubt on the truth of the reported infringement.739 In order to avoid 
imposing too much burden on a hosting ISP who had received notices, the German 
Federal Supreme Court stated that the action of hosting ISPs was only initiated, if the 
notices were so concretely drafted that the infringements alleged by the senders could 
easily be identifi ed, i.e. without complicated legal and factual inspection.740 Besides, how 
much inspection is required to be done by a hosting ISP depends on the circumstances 
in each case, especially, the gravity of the alleged infringement on the one hand, and 
the hosting ISP’s possibility of knowledge on the other hand.741 In France, in order to 
relieve hosting ISPs’ assessing burden, the French Constitutional Council held, only 
when materials are manifestly unlawful or the court issues an order to remove, need 
hosting ISPs expeditiously remove the materials at issue.742 Th erefore, by following this 
jurisprudence, only the notices which complain about manifestly unlawful materials 
can arouse the hosting ISPs’ obligation to remove the alleged infringing materials. 
Regarding what constitute “manifestly unlawful” materials, the French Constitutional 
Council did not specify more on this notion.743 One French court had held, “the sale of 
copyrighted video games well below under the counter price constitutes such a manifest 
infringement.”744
Hosting ISPs’ assessment on infringing evidence in notices arouses lots of criticism in 
the EU. First, unlike the child pornography which is manifestly unlawful, to conclude 
a copyright infringement is far more complicated, and hosting ISPs may not be capable 
of reaching the right decisions.745 Further, the assessment on infringing evidence forces 
hosting ISPs to act as private judges, and some people argue that it is not legitimate and 
feasible for hosting ISPs to assess the illegality of the materials which are the subject of 
a complaint.746
5.2.5 Expeditiously Remove Infringing Materials
If the materials turn out to be infringing according to hosting ISPs’ assessment, hosting 
ISPs need to expeditiously remove these infringing materials.747 Regarding what 
constitutes expeditiously removing, some codifi ed notice-and-takedown procedures 
provide the specifi c timeframes for hosting ISPs to carry out removal.748 In Hungary, 
739 BGH – Stiftparfuem (n718), para. 31.
740 Ibid. 
741  BGH: Verantwortlichkeit des Host-Providers für Persönlichkeitsrechtsverletzung durch Blog-Eintrag, GRUR 
2012, 311, para. 26.
742  Jasserand C, France- Dailymotion heavily  ned for the late removal of infringing content, wolters kluwer law & 
business(2012), available at http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2012/09/28/france-dailymotion-heavily-fi ned-for-
the-late-removal-of-infringing-content/, (last visited 28-09-2014).
743 Ibid.
744 Verbiest T et al., Study on the Liability of Internet Intermediaries (n389), at 39.
745 Ibid, at 36.
746 Commission Staﬀ  Working Paper: Online Services, Including E-commerce in the Single Market (n37), at 45.
747 E-commerce Directive (n1), Art. 14.1 (b).
748 Commission Staﬀ  Working Paper: Online Services, Including E-commerce in the Single Market (n37), at 44.
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with regard to intellectual property infringement, hosting ISPs need to act within 12 
hours after receiving notices.749 In Lithuania, hosting ISPs have to act within 1 day upon 
receiving notices complaining of copyright infringement.750 Nevertheless, most member 
states in the EU have not set a timeframe for hosting ISPs to conduct removing, so what 
constitutes expeditiously removing is mainly left for courts to decide according to the 
concrete facts in individual cases.751 For example, in France, in the case of TF1 v. YouTube, 
the Court of First Instance in Paris held that it was unreasonable for YouTube to remove 
the alleged infringing materials 5 days after receiving the notice from the plaintiﬀ .752 In 
another case, the defendant Daily motion removed the alleged infringing materials 4 days 
after receiving notice, and the same court held that it was too long.753 In the case of SPPF v. 
YouTube, the court held that removing the infringing material in 2 days was reasonable.754
5.2.6 Other Issues about Notice-and-takedown Procedures
According to notice-and-takedown procedures, the alleged infringing materials can be 
removed without judicial review, so it is possible that materials are wrongly removed. 
Th erefore, the notice-and-takedown procedure codifi ed in DMCA provides a counter for 
Internet users to retrieve their materials which are wrongly removed.755 In the EU, the 
counter-notice procedures exist in the Member States where the notice-and-takedown 
procedures have been adopted at legislative level, including Finland, Hungary and 
Lithuania.756 For instance, in Finland, if Internet users believe that the removal of their 
materials is groundless, they can send counter notices to ISPs in 14 days after receiving 
notices so as to have their materials restored.757 In the Member States which have not 
codifi ed notice-and-takedown procedures, there exists no counter-notice procedure.
749 Ibid.
750 Ibid.
751 Ibid, at 44-45.
752  Jasserand C, France -Youtube guilty but not liable? some more precisions on the status of hosting providers, wolters kluwer 
law & business(2012), available at http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2012/06/18/france-youtube-guilty-but-not-
liable-some-more-precisions-on-the-status-of-hosting-providers/, (last visited 28-09-2014).
753 Jasserand, France- Dailymotion heavily  ned for the late removal of infringing content (n742).
754  Leger P, Internet Service Providers’ liability in France, CERDI(2012), available at https://www.
google .n l /ur l ? sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=r ja&uact=8&ved=0CCwQF-
jAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cerdi.u-psud.fr%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2013%2F05%-
2FInternet-service-providersliability-in-France-P-Leger.pptx&ei=K33eVKi1J4SfPayYgPAM&usg=AFQjCNG-
mn-YXh1IrydyS1MoV8I51HEwRVQ&sig2=wSi5ADRPXJh7jgnS1I0yeQ&bvm=bv.85970519,d.d2s (Last 
visited 12-08-2014).
755 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, (g)(2),(3).
756 Verbiest T et al., Study on the Liability of Internet Intermediaries (n389), at 106-109.
757 Ibid, at 106.
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Regarding who should be liable for the wrong removal, it is normally held that hosting ISPs are 
exempted from liability if they commit the removing by following the claims in the notices.758 
As for notifi ers who send the wrong notices, the legislation in some member states 
declares that if they send notice in bad faith, they should be liable. For instance, in 
Finland, if a notifi er delivers false information in a notice, he needs to be liable for the 
damage resulting from that false information.759 However, if the notifi er has reasons to 
believe the false information oﬀ ered by him is correct, he should not be held liable.760 
In France, in order to avoid the abuse of notice-and-takedown procedure, the LCEN 
provides that if a person sends a notice to an ISP with knowledge of its inaccuracy, he 
would be sentenced to prison for 1 year and fi ned 15 000 euros.761 
Based on the above discussion about notice-and-takedown procedures in the EU, it is not 
diﬃ  cult to fi nd out that because of no harmonization at the EU level, the regulation of this 
procedure in the EU turns out to be fragmented. Some member states provide the codifi ed 
notice-and-takedown procedures, including Finland, Hungary and Lithuania. Some member 
states prescribe the elements of a competent notice in their legislation, including France and 
the UK. Some member states only recognize the eﬀ ectiveness of notices sent by competent 
authorities at legislative level, including Spain and Italy. Some member states have not ruled 
on notice-and-takedown procedure in their legislation at all, including the Netherlands and 
Germany. Despite the existence of these diﬀ erences in the EU, the case law in member 
states deals with some common problems when regulating notice-and-takedown procedures, 
including how exactly should the location of infringing materials be indicated (including 
URLs or not), to what extent should the unlawful nature of materials be demonstrated, in 
how many days should an ISP remove the materials after receiving notice. 
5.3 Notice-and-takedown Procedure in China
Even before China oﬃ  cially adopted “safe harbor” provisions in Internet Regulation, 
the Chinese Supreme Court had already provided a notice-and-takedown procedure 
in Internet Interpretation (2000). If looking into the notice-and-takedown procedure 
adopted by the Internet Interpretation (2000), it can be found that the Supreme Court 
took DMCA 512 as an important reference. According to this Interpretation, a hosting 
ISP needs to take measures to eliminate infringement after receiving an evidential 
warning notice from copyright owners, and otherwise it shall undertake liability for 
758  According to the codifi ed notice-and-takedown procedures in Finland, Hungary and Lithuania, ISPs do not need 
to be liable for wrong removing, if they follow the instruction in notices. See ibid, at 106-109. Besides, according 
to a Commission Staﬀ  Working Document, if ISPs respect notice-and-takedown procedures, even though the 
removed materials fi nally turn out to be not illegal, they need not to be liable. See also Commission Staﬀ  Working 
Paper: Online Services, Including E-commerce in the Single Market (n37), at 45.
759 Fahllund, Country Report (Finland) (n706).
760 Ibid. 
761 LCEN (n171), Art. 6-I-4.
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infringement.762 Furthermore, the Internet Interpretation (2000) also rules on elements 
of a notice, and according to it, a competent notice needs to at least include the proof 
of sender’s own identity, the proof of his copyright ownership and the proof about the 
infringement.763 Finally, the Internet Interpretation (2000) exempts hosting ISPs from 
liability if they follow the competent notices, and copyright owners shall be responsible 
for the damage caused by their wrong notices.764 However, the Internet Interpretation 
(2000) did not copy every part of the notice-and-takedown procedure from DMCA 
512; for example, it does not grant service subscribers the right to send counter notices. 
In addition, the notice-and-takedown procedure provided in the Internet Interpretation 
(2000) is far less detailed than that in the DMCA. Th erefore, the simplifi ed notice-
and-takedown procedure drafted by the Supreme Court left too much room for 
the lower courts to interpret, which leads to legal uncertainty in judicial practice.
After several years, the State Council of China promulgated the Internet Regulations 
which include a detailed notice-and-takedown procedure. Th e Internet Regulations 
provide the elements of a competent notice, the eﬀ ectiveness of a competent notice, the 
elements of a competent counter notice and the liability of wrong deletion in Article 14, 
Article 15, Article 16 and Article 24 respectively. 
  Article 14: the notice should consists of at least the following contents: (1) the name, contact 
information and address of the copyright owner; (2) the titles and web addresses of the alleged 
infringing works, performances, sound recordings and audio-visual products (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as the “materials”) which are required to be deleted or whose links are to 
be cut; and (3) the preliminary evidence for proving infringement.765
  Article 15: after receiving a notice from the copyright owner, the ISP shall immediately remove 
the material suspected of infringement or disable access to the link to the material suspected of 
infringement, and shall simultaneously forward the notice to the service recipients who transmit 
the material.766 Furthermore, where the web address of a service recipient is not clear and therefore 
the forwarding is impossible, the notice contents shall be simultaneously announced on the 
internet.767 
  Article 16: if the service recipient, who receives the notice about deletion from the ISP, deems 
that the deleted content doesn’t infringe any other’s copyright, it may ﬁ le a written counter-notice 
to request of restoring the deleted content, and the counter-notice should contain the following 
elements: (1) the name (title), contact information and address of the service recipient; (2) the 
names of the works, performance, audio recordings and audio-visual products as well as web 
762 Internet Interpretation (2000) (网络解释（2000）) (n190), Art. 5.
763 Ibid, Art. 6 and Art. 7.
764 Ibid, Art. 8.
765 Internet Regulations (网络条例) (n1), Art. 14.
766 Ibid, Art. 15.
767 Ibid.
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addresses requested for recovery; and (3) the preliminary evidential materials for proving non-
infringement.768 
  Article 17: after receiving a written statement from a service recipient, the ISP shall immediately 
replace the deleted works, performances, audio recordings and audio-visual products or recover 
the link to the aforesaid materials, and shall simultaneously transfer the written statement of the 
service recipient to the relevant copyright owner, and then the copyright owner cannot request the 
ISP to delete materials which has been recovered or to cut off the relevant link anymore.769 
  Article 24: if the relevant ISP, as a result of the copyright owner’s notice, wrongly removes the 
material or disables access to the link to the material and therefore causes any damage to its service 
recipient, the copyright owner shall be subject to compensation.770 
From the introduction mentioned above, it seems that the notice-and-takedown 
procedure in China has been well-established, since every stakeholder can defend its legal 
interests in this procedure. However, the Internet Regulations also include some blurred 
terms, such as “preliminary evidence”, which are quite confusing. In practice, what 
constitutes “preliminary evidence” aroused lots of discussion about how much evidence 
is suﬃ  cient for a competent notice. Some commentators understand the “preliminary 
evidence” as prima facie evidence, which means that the notice should contain suﬃ  cient 
evidence to prove the existence of infringement, not only including the evidence about 
ownership but also infringing evidence which requires the comparative analysis of the 
copyrighted work and the infringing material.771 It seems that this opinion is adopted by 
the National Copyright Administration of China (NCAC). In a model form of notice 
published by the NCAC, it is clearly indicated that evidential materials in a competent 
notice should include the physical evidence and documentary evidence of infringement, 
and the certifi cation of copyright ownership.772 However, if we interpret the “preliminary 
evidence” in such a strict sense, there would be at least two problems. First, on the 
Internet, copyright infringement always occurs on a large scale; if copyright owners are 
required to oﬀ er prima facie evidence in each notice, it would be too burdensome for 
them and go against the initial purpose of setting a notice-and-takedown procedure 
which aims at providing an eﬃ  cient way to remove the infringing materials. Second, it 
would be also a burdensome work for hosting ISPs to examine the notices if prima facie 
768 Ibid, Art. 16.
769 Ibid, Art. 17.
770 Ibid, Art. 24.
771  See Liu JR (刘家瑞), ‘ISP Safe Harbours in China (论我国网络服务商的避风港规则--兼评“十一大唱片公
司诉雅虎案”)’ (2009), 19 Intellectual Property (知识产权) 13, at 19.
772  Instruction about How to Fill in “the Notice requiring the deletion of or cutting oﬀ  the links to infringing materials” 
(《要求删除或断开链接侵权网络内容的通知》填写说明), http://www.ncac.gov.cn/chinacopyright/
contents/574/20879.html, (last visited 14-11-2014).
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evidence is required to be included in the notices, and also would force hosting ISPs to 
perform like judges rather than intermediaries between copyright owners and service 
recipients. 
Based on the reasons stated above, some Chinese courts have already lowered the 
copyright owners’ burden of proving infringement in their notices. In the case of Miao 
Fuhua v. 56.com, the plaintiﬀ  Miao Fuhua owned copyright of a video product called 
“QuJuMingChouLiTianFang”, and after she found that this video product was illegally 
uploaded to 56.com, she sent a notice to the 56.com and required the infringing video 
to be immediately deleted. Even though the notice sent by the plaintiﬀ  only indicated 
the information of copyright owner, the name of the video product being infringed 
and the certifi cate of ownership, the Beijing Chaoyang District Court still held that the 
notice was competent.773 Th erefore, according to Chaoyang District Court, copyright 
owners only need to oﬀ er the certifi cate of ownership and the video suspected to be 
infringing as preliminary evidence.   
Further, in China, a competent notice needs to indicate the location of infringing material 
so that hosting ISP can easily fi nd the suspected infringing material. Th e provision in the 
Internet Regulations appears quite clear, which requires copyright owners to oﬀ er the 
web address of infringing material in the notices.774 In the case of Fanya E-commerce v. 
Baidu.com, the plaintiﬀ  Fanya, as a copyright owner of music works, sent notices to the 
defendant Baidu.com to complain about the links pointing to illegal copies of its music. 
Th e notices sent by the plaintiﬀ  can be divided into two groups, one of which included 
the names, lyrics and authors of the music, and also the web address of infringing links, 
but the others missed the web address of infringing links. Finally, the Beijing Higher 
Court held that the second group of notices was not competent, since it would be too 
burdensome for the defendant to fi nd the infringing links merely by referring to the 
names, lyrics and authors of the music.775 
However, not all courts hold that the concrete web address is necessary for a competent 
notice. In the case of “Universal Music v. Yahoo.cn”, the Universal Music, as the plaintiﬀ , 
sent two notices to the defendant Yahoo.cn to complain about the links to infringing 
materials. Th e notices indicated the names of singers and albums, some URLs of 
infringing links and also attached the screenshot of these infringing links. But for each 
music work alleged to be infringed, the notices only oﬀ ered one URL of many infringing 
links, and the plaintiﬀ  called it the infringing sample. Nevertheless, the plaintiﬀ  required 
773  Miao Fuhua v. 56.com (苗富华诉北京我乐信息科技有限公司等侵犯著作权纠纷案), Beijing Chaoyang 
District Court (北京市朝阳区人民法院), Chao Min Chu Zi No.30077 ((2011)朝民初字第30077号).
774 Internet Regulations (网络条例) (n1), Art. 14.
775  Fanya E-commerce v. Baidu.com (泛亚电子诉百度侵权信息网络传播权案), Beijing Higher Court (北京市高
级人民法院), GaoMinChuZi No. 1201 ((2007) 高民初字第1201号). Actually, this is case is about an ISP who 
runs a search engine, but since hosting ISPs and ISPs who run search engines are covered by the same notice and 
takedown regime, this case still can be used as a reference to indicate how Chinese courts interpret competent 
notices.
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the defendant to disable access to all of the infringing links to its music by referring to the 
names of the singers and albums, and claimed that all the music links that were directed 
to these singers and albums were infringing. Th e defendant, however, merely disabled 
access to the links where the URLs were given in the notices, so the plaintiﬀ  asked 
the Court to hold the defendant secondarily liable for the infringement. Eventually, 
the Second Intermediate Court of Beijing held that after receiving the notices, the 
defendant has already got the information about the music being infringed, and should 
know that the infringing links to the plaintiﬀ ’s music can be identifi ed through its 
music searching engine; but the defendant merely cut oﬀ  the infringing links that these 
URLs were given and failed to cut oﬀ  the other infringing links, so it had subjective 
fault for the continuity of infringement and should be jointly and severally liable.776 
Th erefore, according to the Second Intermediate Court of Beijing, it is unnecessary for 
a competent notice to include the URLs of all infringing materials. 
Recently, the Chinese courts pay more attention to whether a notice can make ISPs 
accurately locate the infringing materials rather than whether a notice provides the 
URLs of infringing websites. In terms of Guiding Opinions published by the Beijing 
Higher Court, if a notice submitted by a copyright owner does not include the URLs 
of infringing materials, but oﬀ ers suﬃ  cient information for an ISP to accurately locate 
the infringing materials, this notice can be concluded as competent.777 As for whether 
the infringing material can be accurately located, the following factors should be 
comprehensively considered: the service oﬀ ered by ISPs, the types of works (literature, 
performance, audio recording, or audio-video product) required to be removed or 
their links disabled, and whether the names of these works are specifi c or not.778 Under 
the notice-and-takedown procedure, a competent notice is supposed to indicate the 
accurate location of infringing material being complained about, and then the ISP can 
take it down; so in this regard, the standard of “accurately locate” seems quite proper. 
However, notice-and-takedown procedure also needs to take the eﬃ  ciency into account. 
Sometimes an ISP can accurately locate the infringing materials by following the 
information oﬀ ered in the notice, but it might take too much time to do so. Th erefore, 
the standard of “accurately locate” has its own weakness, and that might be why Internet 
Provisions (the latest Judicial Interpretation) does not include this standard in its fi nal 
version.779 
Regarding what constitutes “immediately remove” after receiving notices, there is no 
common standard being reached in practice. In the case of Ningbo Success Multi-media 
Telecom v. Yahoo.cn, the plaintiﬀ  “Ningbo Success Multi-media Telecom” owned the 
776  Universal Music v. Yahoo.cn (环球唱片诉雅虎侵犯信息网络传播权案), Beijing Second Intermediate Court (北
京市第二中级人民法院), ErZhongMinChuZi No. 02622 ((2007)二中民初字第02622号).
777 Guiding Opinions (指导意见) (n229), Art. 28.
778 Ibid, Art. 29.
779  Internet Provisions (网络规定) (n208). Th e drafted version incorporated “accurately locate” standard in Art. 17, 
but it was deleted in the fi nal version. 
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copyright of a TV series named as “Fendou (Combat)”, and in the platform operated 
by the defendant Yahoo.cn, the plaintiﬀ  found that there were some links directing to 
the websites from which its TV series could be watched without permission. Later, the 
plaintiﬀ  sent a notice to the defendant, and the defendant removed the infringing links on 
the day of receiving the notice. Finally, the Chaoyang District Court (Beijing) held that the 
defendant fulfi lled its obligation to immediately remove the infringing links.780 In another 
case that has been discussed before (Universal Music v. Yahoo.cn), the plaintiﬀ  required 
Yahoo.cn to remove the infringing links in 7 days after receiving the notice.781 As the 
biggest literature-sharing platform in China, BaiDuWenKu has a policy that the alleged 
infringing contents will be removed in 48 hours after receiving competent notices.782 
It should be noted that the Guiding Opinions of the Beijing Higher Court do not set 
a fi xed term for deciding whether a removal is immediate or not, but indicates some 
factors to be comprehensively considered, and they are as follows: the way of sending 
the notice, the accuracy of notice, the amount of infringing documents indicated by the 
notice, how hard it is to remove the materials or disable access to links, the characteristics 
of internet service, and other relevant factors.783 Furthermore, the Supreme Court had 
tried to set a fi xed term for ISPs to remove the materials or disable access to links. 
According to the draft of Internet provisions, except having reasonable excuse, the 
ISPs should take necessary measures against infringing materials in a working day after 
receiving competent notice if the notice complains about illegal transmission of hot-
play784 movies or TV series, but for the other types of work, ISPs should take necessary 
measures in no more than 5 working days.785 However, in the fi nal version of the 
Internet Provisions, this Article has been deleted, and like the Guiding Opinions of 
Beijing Higher Court, the Internet Provisions only enumerate some factors for courts 
to evaluate. Th ese factors are as follows: the way of sending notice, the accuracy of 
notice, how hard it is to take measures, the characteristics of Internet service, and 
the types, fame, amount of works, performance, sound recordings and audio-video 
products being infringed.786 In consequence, the Supreme Court adopts a similar 
approach to that taken by the Beijing Higher Court, and leaves more fl exibility for 
lower courts to interpret “immediately remove” based on the concrete facts in each case.
780  Ningbo Success Multi-media Telecom v. Yahoo.cn (宁波成功多媒体诉雅虎侵犯著作权纠纷案), Beijing Chaoyang 
District Court (北京市朝阳区人民法院), Chao Min Chu Zi No. 4679 ((2008)朝民初字第4679号).
781 Universal Music v. Yahoo.cn (环球唱片诉雅虎侵犯信息网络传播权案) (n771).  
782  BaiduWenKu talks about copyright problem: we have notice-and-takedown procedure all the time (“百度文库
谈版权问题：一直有通知删除机制”), 2010, http://tech.163.com/10/1125/12/6MB9I2TJ000915BF.html, 
Accessed September 17, 2014. 
783 Guiding Opinions (指导意见) (n229), Art. 31.
784  “Hot-play” is a term that can always be found in the decisions made by Chinese courts, and fi nally was incorporated 
into the Provisions by Supreme Court. In terms of relevant decisions, “hot-play” has always been used to describe 
the audio-video works which are newly distributed, popular and still on screen. 
785 Internet Provisions (n208) (draft) (网络规定征求意见稿), Art. 18.
786 Internet Provisions (n208) (draft) (网络规定征求意见稿), Art. 14. 
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In China, for some high valuable copyrighted contents, copyright owners tend to send 
notices to hosting ISPs even before these contents are oﬃ  cially released so as to alert 
the hosting ISPs about possible infringement. For such a kind of notice, some Chinese 
courts hold that it can impose a duty of care on hosting ISP to prevent relevant contents 
from being illegally uploaded. For instance, in the case of China Film Group Corporation 
v. Ku6.com, the plaintiﬀ  China Film Group Corporation owned the copyright of a movie 
“ChiBi”, and before this movie was released, the plaintiﬀ  sent a notice, which warned of 
possible infringement, to the defendant who ran a platform for users to upload videos. 
However, the movie could still be accessed by the public on the defendant’s platform 
afterwards, so the plaintiﬀ  sued the defendant for copyright infringement. Th e fi rst 
Intermediate Court of Beijing held that after receiving warning notice, the defendant 
should know the movie concerned could not be made available to the public without the 
permission of the plaintiﬀ , but this movie was still publicly accessible on its platform, which 
demonstrated that the defendant did not fulfi ll its duty of care and was therefore liable.787 
5.4 Comparison between the US, the EU and China
Notice-and-takedown procedure was fi rst adopted by DMCA 512, which aims at 
eﬃ  ciently reducing copyright infringement on the Internet without involving time-
consuming trials. 788 According to this procedure, an ISP needs to remove the alleged 
infringing materials upon receiving competent notices. In the US, a competent notice 
does not need to include the evidence of infringement but only a statement of alleging 
infringement, which means hosting ISPs do not need to assess whether the materials 
complained about in notices are infringing and it is therefore irrelevant whether notices 
can actually result into ISPs’ knowledge of infringement.789 Th e notice-and-takedown 
procedure in China shares many common features with the US one, but a notice should 
include evidence about infringement so as to be held competent. In this sense, hosting 
ISPs in China are supposed to assess the infringing evidence indicated in notices, and 
then decide whether to remove the materials that are complained about in the notices. 
In the EU, notice-and-takedown procedure has not been codifi ed at the EU level, and 
normally the takedown obligation only can be provoked where notices can lead to ISPs’ 
knowledge of infringement.790 Th erefore, a competent notice in the EU should include 
evidence about complained infringement, and thus hosting ISPs are supposed to assess 
787  China Film Group Corporation v. Ku6.com (中国电影集团诉酷6网侵犯信息网络传播权案), Beijing First 
Intermediate Court (北京市第一中级人民法院), YiZhongMinZhongZi No.5514 ((2009)一中民终字第5514号
案).
788 H.R. REP. 105-551(II) (n16), at 54.
789  Holznagel, ‘Melde- und Abhilfeverfahren zur Beanstandung rechtswidrig gehosteter Inhalte nach europäischem 
und deutschem Recht im Vergleich zu gesetzlich geregelten notice and take-down-Verfahren’ (n63), at 106.
790 Ibid, at 107.
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that evidence before removing the infringing materials alleged in notices.791
Generally, codifi ed notice-and-takedown procedures can achieve a better legal certainty, 
since many issues involved in notice-and-takedown procedures have been clarifi ed at the 
legislative level. Th ese issues are: (1) hosting ISPs should designate a specifi c agency to 
receive notices; (2) the elements should be included in a competent notice; (3) hosting 
ISPs should forward the complaining notices to the Internet users whose content is 
removed; (4) the elements of counter-notice; (5) hosting ISPs should replace the removed 
content after receiving counter-notices; (6) who should be liable for wrong deletion. Th e 
clarifi cation of these issues helps the concerned parties, including copyright owners, 
hosting ISPs and Internet users, know the rights and obligations they have, which can 
make the notice-and-takedown procedures run more smoothly. Particularly, the codifi ed 
notice-and-takedown procedures authorize Internet users to send counter-notices, by 
which internet users can replace their legal content which has been wrongly taken down.
Nevertheless, despite the many diﬀ erences at legislative level, when ruling on notice-
and-takedown procedures, the courts in the US, EU and China do encounter some 
common problems, which will be discussed in the following section.
5.4.1 The Locations of Infringing Materials
In the countries which set a requirement on notice at legislative level, the locations 
of infringing materials need to be included in a competent notice, such as in the US, 
China, the UK, France and Finland discussed above. In Germany and Italy, the case 
law also requires the notice to at least include suﬃ  cient information for ISPs to locate 
the infringing materials.792 How should a notice indicate the location of infringing 
materials? From the perspective of ISPs, the locations of infringing materials must 
be detailed enough for them to easily identify the alleged infringing materials, such 
as providing URLs.793 However, rights holders argue that the specifi c information of 
infringing materials, such as URLs, should not be required as an essential element of 
a notice, since it would be burdensome for them.794 Th e courts also have divergent 
opinions on this issue. A court in Italy held that the URLs should be oﬀ ered in a notice 
so that the ISP can easily locate the infringing materials.795 In the US, in the case of 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc, the court also held that the URLs had to be indicated 
in the notices as the information “reasonably suﬃ  cient to identify the location of 
infringing materials.796 However, in Germany and China, the courts focus more on 
791  As can be seen from the above discussion about notice-and-takedown procedures in the EU, the UK and France 
clearly provide that evidence about infringement should be included in notices. In Germany, according to case law, 
evidence of infringement also needs to be included in notices.
792 See Section 5.2.3. “Precise location of alleged infringing materials” above.
793 Commission Staﬀ  Working Paper: Online Services, Including E-commerce in the Single Market (n37), at 43.
794 Ibid.
795 Spedicato, ‘Italy: the take-down notice must contain the specifi c YouTube URLs’ (n437).
796 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484 AHM, 2010 WL 9479059 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2010), at 14.
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whether the information in notices is suﬃ  cient for ISPs to precisely locate the infringing 
materials.797 In order to set a proper criterion on indicating the location of infringing 
materials, one should look into the purpose of sending notices. Sending notices aims at 
making the ISPs know precisely of which contents are infringing so that the ISPs can 
expeditiously remove these infringing contents. In this sense, providing URLs is the 
best way to fulfi ll this purpose. First, URLs (Universal Resource Locators) are Internet 
addresses which can “unambiguously resolve to a specifi c location where online resources 
can be found.”798 So alleged infringing materials can be precisely located, if the URLs are 
given in notices. Second, supplying the other location information, which is always search 
terms including names of authors, titles of works and albums, cannot ensure that all links 
generated from these search terms are to infringing materials.799 In these circumstances, in 
order to avoid the wrong takedown, ISPs would be forced to investigate the entire websites 
on the basis of the search terms, which is too burdensome for them.800 Further, the results 
generated via search terms are in “constant state of fl ux”, and “there is no certainty that any 
particular search will yield the exact same results at diﬀ erent times.”801 So if recognizing 
search terms as competent location information, ISPs need to constantly monitor the 
results returned via the search terms. Finally, it is not unreasonably burdensome for 
copyright owners to supply the URLs of alleged infringing materials in notices, since 
copyright owners have agreed to do so according to the Code of Conduct reached with 
ISPs.802 Th erefore, it is reasonable to require the URLs of alleged infringing materials to be 
included in notices. By doing so, it not only can avoid imposing an unreasonable burden 
on hosting ISPs, but also can reduce the wrong deletion of Internet users’ legal materials.
5.4.2 Expeditiously Remove
In order to avoid being held liable, upon receiving competent notices, ISPs should 
expeditiously remove the infringing materials alleged in the notices. How should 
“expeditiously remove” be defi ned? It is unrealistic to set a fi xed term. Th e Chinese 
Supreme Court had tried to set a fi xed term for removing, but fi nally failed.803 In the 
797 See Guiding Opinions (指导意见) (n229), Art. 28; see also BGH – Stiftparfuem (n718).
798  Seng D, ‘Th e State of the Discordant Union: An Empirical Analysis of DMCA Takedown Notices’ (2014) 18 
Virginia Journal of Law and Technology 369, at 396.
799 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 2d 1192, at 1200-1201 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
800 Seng, ‘Th e State of the Discordant Union: An Empirical Analysis of DMCA Takedown Notices’ (n793), at 398.
801 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc.(n794), at 1200-1201.
802  See Notice-and-Takedown Code of Conduct, Art. 4b(2). Th e detailed discussion about this Code of Conduct 
will be done in Section 7.1.1. Code of Conduct means the self-regulation agreement reached between multiple 
copyright owners and hosting ISPs, and it aims at reinforcing the cooperation between them so as to reduce 
copyright infringement on the Internet. See Section 7.1.
803  As discussed above in the Chinese part, according to the Internet Provisions (draft), except having reasonable 
excuse, the ISPs should take necessary measures against infringing materials in a working day after receiving 
competent notice if the notice complains about illegal transmission of hot-play movies or TV series, but for the 
other types of work, ISPs should take necessary measures in no more than 5 working days. However, in the fi nal 
version, this article was deleted.
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EU, most member states do not defi ne “expeditiously removing” in a fi xed term at 
legislative level, and even most of notice-and-takedown agreements between right 
holders and ISPs do not specify a fi xed term for takedown.804 Th erefore, this issue is 
mainly left for courts to decide case-by-case. Th e Chinese Supreme Court enumerates 
several factors for courts to decide whether takedown has been expeditiously done in 
the Internet Provision,805 which can oﬀ er us some useful clues. For example, the way of 
sending notice should be considered, so if the URLs of infringing materials indicated 
in photocopies rather than in e-format, it will take more time to fulfi ll the takedown 
obligation.806 Further, the following facts also result in a longer takedown-term, such 
as the notice is less accurate, the takedown measure is hard to conduct, and too many 
materials need to be removed.807 However, if in a notice, a famous or popular work 
is alleged to be infringed, the ISP is expected to takedown infringing materials more 
quickly than usual.808 
5.4.3 Substantially Comply or Fully Comply
Instead of requiring “substantially” comply with elements of notice like DMCA 512 in 
the US,809 in China, the Internet Regulation reads “notice shall contain the following 
elements”.810 If following literal interpretation, the text in the Internet Regulations 
should be interpreted in such a way, namely, a competent notice should fully comply 
with elements of notice, and only substantially complying is not enough.811 However, 
according to the Beijing Higher Court, it seems to be suﬃ  cient for a notice to substantially 
comply with the elements. In the Guiding Opinions of the Beijing Higher Court, Article 
28 reads that “if a notice sent to an ISP by the right owner does not include the web 
address of the alleged infringing material, but the information provided in the notice 
is suﬃ  cient for the ISP to accurately locate the alleged infringing material, the notice 
sent by the right owner can be determined to be” competent.812 So if the information 
oﬀ ered in a notice can substantially function like a web address, the notice can be held 
competent. In the EU, the ECJ holds a similar view. In the case of L’Oréal SA v. eBay, 
the ECJ held that when a notice is not suﬃ  ciently precise or properly substantiated, 
the information included in the notice still should be taken into account by the courts 
in Member States when determining whether a hosting ISP is aware of illegal activity 
804 Commission Staﬀ  Working Paper: Online Services, Including E-commerce in the Single Market (n37), at 44.
805 Internet Provisions (网络规定) (n208), Art. 14.
806 Ibid.
807 Ibid.
808 Ibid.
809  According to DMCA (n1), Sec. 512 (c)(3)(B)(i), a notice only needs to substantially comply with elements of 
notice so as to be valid. 
810  Internet Regulation (网络条例) (n1), Art. 14.
811  Wan Y, ‘Safe Harbors from Copyright Infringement Liability in China’ (2012) 60 Journal of the Copyright Society 
of the U.S.A 635, at 652.
812 Guiding Opinions (指导意见) (n229), Art. 28. 
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which is the subject of the complaint.813 Th erefore, once receiving an incompetent 
notice, the hosting ISP may still need to promptly remove the materials complained of 
in the notice, if hosting ISP can know the materials based on the information provided 
in the notice.
Further, a notice, which does not substantially comply with the requirement, may still 
arouse the hosting ISP’s obligation to help the notifi er perfect the notice. For instance, 
in the US, a hosting ISP is obligated to contact the notifi er and help it make the 
notice substantially comply with the requirement, if the notice includes the following 
information: (1) identifi cation of the copyrighted work claimed to be infringed, (2) 
identifi cation of the material that is claimed to be infringing, (3) the information permits 
the infringing materials to be located, (4) the contact information that allows the notifi er 
to be contacted.814 Similarly, in Germany, in the light of the Federal Supreme Court, 
if a notice includes the clear indication of the specifi c infringing materials, but the 
hosting ISP has reasonable doubts about the legality of the notice, it is obligated to ask 
the notifi er to provide relevant evidence to justify that indication.815 Th ese reasonable 
doubts include whether there exists a valid right, whether the notifi er is authorized to 
enforce this property right and whether the reported facts about the infringement are 
true.816 Th erefore, when a notice includes suﬃ  cient information to have the materials 
identifi ed and located, which can arouse hosting ISPs’ strong suspicion that the materials 
complained about are infringing, the hosting ISPs are obligated to contact the notifi ers 
and help them perfect the notices. In essence, the notice-and-takedown procedure works 
as a cooperative mechanism between copyright owners and hosting ISPs in respect of 
preventing infringement,817 so it is reasonable to require hosting ISPs to fulfi ll a certain 
obligation to help copyright owners perfect their notices, when the notices can arouse 
hosting ISPs’ strong suspicion that the materials complained of are infringing. 
5.4.4 Wrong Deletion
In China, as mentioned above, copyright owners should be liable for the damages 
caused by the wrong deletion resulting from their mistaken notices.818 Unlike DMCA 
512, which only requires copyright owners to be liable for the wrong deletion if they 
“knowingly materially misrepresent” in the notices,819 in terms of Internet Regulations, 
813 L’Oréal SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others (n327), para. 122.
814 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, c(3)(B)(ii).
815 BGH – Stiftparfuem (n718). Th e detailed discussion can be found in Section 5.2.4.
816 Ibid. 
817  “safe harbor” provisions aim at encouraging the cooperation between copyright owners and hosting ISPs in 
protecting copyright, see H.R. REP. 105-551(II) (n16), at 50. Th e notice-and-takedown procedure is one of the 
mechanisms to fulfi ll this aim.
818 Internet Regulation (网络条例) (n1), Art. 24.
819 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, (f ).
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copyright owners in China seem to undertake strict liability for wrong deletion.820 In 
the EU Member States discussed above, Finland and France set an explicit provision 
on wrong deletion, according to which, right holders are only subject to liability if 
they send false notices in bad faith.821 Th eoretically, the Chinese approach encourages 
copyright owners to send notices with more diligence, which can eﬀ ectively reduce 
wrong deletion; but the fault-based approach is friendlier for rights owners to curb large-
scaled infringement by sending notices. Further, can an ISP be liable for wrong deletion? 
In China, if an ISP removes the suspicious materials by following the instruction in 
a notice, even though the suspicious materials are fi nally proved to be legal, the ISP 
need not be liable for wrong deletion,822 as in the US823. In the EU, in some member 
states which have codifi ed notice-and-takedown procedures at the legislative level, if 
ISPs conduct deletion by following the procedure in good faith, they are exempted from 
liability for any wrong deletion.824 It is reasonable to grant liability exemption to these 
ISPs who faithfully follow the procedure. First, from the perspective of eﬃ  ciency, if ISPs 
are subject to liability for wrong deletion conducted by following the notices, they tend 
to check each notice quite carefully, which will unavoidably reduce the eﬃ  ciency of the 
procedure. Second, it’s also too burdensome for ISPs to inspect each notice, since notices 
are always sent in large numbers. 
5.4.5 The Validity of Ex ante Notices
In order to protect better their interests, some copyright owners send notices to hosting 
ISPs even before the infringement actually occurs. In these cases, notices function more 
like warnings of possible infringement, and copyright owners expect that, upon receiving 
such warnings, hosting ISPs take necessary measures to prevent the materials indicated 
in the warnings from being uploaded without permission. Regarding ex ante notices, 
the US courts dismiss the validity of them, but some Chinese courts recognize their 
validity.825 Th is thesis argues that the validity of ex ante notices should not be endorsed 
by courts. First, in terms of the necessary elements of a competent notice, the warning 
notice cannot be held as competent under notice-and-takedown procedure, since it is 
impossible for a warning notice to indicate the location of infringement or include any 
infringing evidence before the infringement actually occurs. Besides, if the validity of 
a warning notice is admitted, hosting ISPs need to actively check all of the materials 
820  Article 24 of Internet Regulation reads that “if the relevant ISP, as a result of the copyright owner’s notice, wrongly 
deletes or cuts oﬀ  the link to any work, performance, recording or audio-visual product and therefore causes any 
damage to its service recipient, the copyright owner shall be subject to compensation.” No fault requirement can 
be found in this Article.
821 LCEN (n171), Art. 6-I-4.
822  Article 24 of Communication Regulation makes it clear that copyright owners rather than ISPs should be liable for 
the wrong deletion caused by notices.
823 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, (g)(2).
824 Commission Staﬀ  Working Paper: Online Services, Including E-commerce in the Single Market (n37), at 45.
825 See what have been discussed in Section 5.1.2 and Section 5.3. 
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uploaded by their users so as to fi lter out the possible illegal uploading referred in the 
notice. Th erefore, admitting the validity of a warning notice seems to also confl ict with 
a statutory doctrine in “safe harbor” provisions, and it is that no general monitoring 
obligation should be imposed on hosting ISPs. 
5.5 Rethinking of Notice-and-takedown Procedures
In the Internet age, copyright owners lose their control on copyrighted works, and the 
piracy emerges on a large scale, so notice-and-takedown procedure, which can take down 
the infringing materials without judicial reviewing, has a big advantage of eﬃ  ciently 
curbing piracy. However, lots of criticism has been aroused against notice-and-takedown 
procedure, since it may erode other rights while strengthening copyright protection.826 
Particularly, the notice-and-takedown procedure is easy to be misused, and for example, 
“in 2007, Viacom sent 100,000 takedown notices to YouTube, en masse, including 
takedown notices for materials to which it did not own the copyright.”827 In order to 
avoid being liable, a hosting ISP is prone to remove the material complained about 
in the notice without examining whether the material is actually infringing or not.828 
Th erefore, legal materials are possibly being removed based on mistaken notices.
5.5.1 Wrong Deletion Resulting from Current Notice-and-takedown Procedures
In the US, the notice-and-takedown procedure favors copyright owners, upon receiving 
a competent notice, the hosting ISP should immediately remove the alleged infringing 
material, and no judicial review is needed.829 As a competent notice, it’s unnecessary to 
oﬀ er evidence about infringement, but merely include a statement made by copyright 
owners under penalty of perjury, which asserts the truth of the claim against copyright 
infringement.830 However, it seems that a statement under penalty of perjury cannot 
always prevent copyright owners from sending false notices, and actually, DMCA 
takedown notices are commonly faulty.831 After examining how a notice is sent, one may 
not be so surprised about why notices are commonly faulty. Since too many notices need 
to be sent, the copyright owners often “do not bother to check whether an item is truly 
infringing,” but rely on automated programs to identify the infringing materials by using 
“titles of copyright works and fragments of copyrighted songs or videos” as searching 
826  See Seltzer, ‘Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Eﬀ ects of the DMCA on the First 
Amendment’ (n36).
827  Cobia J, ‘Th e Digital Millennium Copyright Act Takedown Notice Procedure: Misuses, Abuses, and Shortcomings 
of the Process’ (2008), 10 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 387, at 392.
828 Moore and Clayton, ‘Th e Impact of Incentives on Notice and Take-down’ (n63), at 244.
829 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512 (c)(1)(C).
830 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512 (C)(3)(v), (vi).
831  Murtagh MP, ‘Th e FCC, the DMCA, and Why Takedown Notices are Not Enough’ (2009) 61 Hastings Law 
Journal 233, at 254.
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keywords.832 If any matching material is found, a notice will be sent to the relevant ISP, 
and request the takedown of that material without any cautious examination.833 Th is 
may explain why YouTube was ordered to take down a video entitled Beijing Olympic 
Opening Ceremony by International Olympic Committee, but the video turned out to 
be a record of a protest with just a few clips copyrighted by the International Olympic 
Committee.834 
Why can copyright owners send notices without diligent investigation? Th is can be 
explained by two reasons: fi rst, the public whose materials are wrongly removed rarely 
send counter notifi cations or fi le lawsuits against the copyright owners who send wrong 
notices;835 second, copyright owners need to pay damages caused by mistaken notices 
only when they “knowingly materially misrepresent” in the notice.836 In terms of the US 
courts, “knowingly materially misrepresent” is a high standard to reach. In the case of Rossi 
v. MPAA, the defendant MPAA sent a notice to a corresponding ISP and complained that 
the movies copyrighted by it were downloadable on the plaintiﬀ ’s website, which resulted 
in the plaintiﬀ ’s website being blocked by the ISP; however, the notice turned out to be 
mistaken, so the plaintiﬀ  sued the MPAA based on “misrepresentation” clause.837 Finally, 
the 9th Cir. Court held that, the cause of paying damage under “misrepresentation” 
clause was limited to situations where the misrepresentation was “knowing”, and that 
a subjective belief that materials were infringing, even if the belief was incorrect, did 
not qualify as a “knowing” misrepresentation.838 Besides the MPAA in this case, other 
copyright owners have also been held as not liable for sending wrong notices,839 and 
as noted by Urban and Quilter, no claims based on the “misrepresentation clause” 
succeeded except in the case of Online Policy Group v. Diebold,840 where the defendant 
Diebold sent a notice complaining about a clear fair use of its materials.841 In order 
to protest against the misuse of a takedown notice, a website called “Chilling Eﬀ ects 
832 Seidenberg S ‘Copyright in the Age of YouTube’ (2009)  95 ABAJ 46, at 48.
833 Ibid.
834 Ibid.
835  Cobia, ‘Th e Digital Millennium Copyright Act Takedown Notice Procedure: Misuses, Abuses, and Shortcomings 
of the Process’ (n822), at 391. See also Seng, ‘Th e State of the Discordant Union: An Empirical Analysis of DMCA 
Takedown Notices’ (n793), at 48.
836 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, (f ).
837 Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America, 391 F.3d 1000, at 1001-1002 (9th Cir. 2004).
838 Ibid, at 1004-1005.
839  See Dudnikov v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (D. Colo. 2005); Arista Records, Inc. v. Mp3Board, 
Inc. (n678).
840  Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc. (n690). In this case, the defendant produced voting machines, but these 
machines were criticized as inaccurate. In early 2003, an archive of internal emails among the defendant’s employees 
was revealed on the Internet, and some of these emails included evidence of the machines’ inaccuracy. Th e plaintiﬀ s 
Pavlosky and Smith wrote and published an article criticizing the defendant’s machines and containing a hyperlink 
to the email archive. Th e court held that the plaintiﬀ ’s use of the email archive is obviously a fair use, so the 
defendant knowingly misrepresented when sending the takedown notice. 
841  Urban and Quilter, ‘Eﬃ  cient Process or Chilling Eﬀ ects-Takedown Notices under Section 512 of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act’ (n38), at 629-630.
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Clearinghouse” has been set up to allow the public to report the notices they receive.842 
In the light of research done on the 876 notices reported to Chilling Eﬀ ects, Urban and 
Quilter noted that nearly 30% of takedown notices sent to Google were based on fl awed 
or highly questionable copyright claims.843 Other research done by Brennan Center for 
Justice at New York University revealed that, among 245 takedown notices reported to 
Chilling eﬀ ects in 2004, 63% of the notices “either targeted material with a fair use/First 
Amendment defense or stated a weak IP claim.”844 
Th erefore, the current notice-and-takedown procedure will unavoidably lead to negative 
eﬀ ects, such as suppression of fair use, freedom of speech and competition845. In order 
to test the possible suppression of fair use resulting from the notice-and-takedown 
procedure, Prof. Wendy Seltzer posted a clip of the NFL’s (National Football League) 
copyright notice on YouTube.846 Unsurprisingly, the NFL sent a takedown notice to 
YouTube, and then the video was removed.847 Soon afterwards, Prof. Seltzer sent a 
counter notice, which claimed a fair use defense on the basis that the video clip was used 
for critical and educational purposes, and then the video was replaced by YouTube.848 
However, instead of suing Prof. Wendy for infringement, the NFL sent another 
takedown notice to YouTube, and the video was removed again.849 It deserves attention 
that the NFL clearly knew of Prof. Seltzer’s fair use claim on its video, since the counter 
notice must have been forwarded to the NFL.850 So the NFL was supposed to launch a 
lawsuit against Prof. Wendy, but in the case that a takedown notice could easily remove 
the video without the need of overthrowing a fair use defense, the NFL decided to send 
another notice. Furthermore, the notice-and-takedown procedure has also been used to 
hinder criticism against copyright owners, which freezes the freedom of speech. In one 
instance, a blogger named Michelle Malkin made a video to criticize the rapper Akon, 
and then posted the video on YouTube.851 In order to support her argument, several 
excerpts from Akon’s music videos were incorporated into the video, and later on, the 
video was complained about by Akon and United Music Group based on copyright 
842  See https://www.chillingeﬀ ects.org/index.cgi, (last visited 22-08-2014).
843  Urban and Quilter, ‘Eﬃ  cient Process or Chilling Eﬀ ects-Takedown Notices under Section 512 of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act’ (n38), at 667.
844 Heins and Beckles, Will Fair Use Survive? Free Expression in the Age of Copyright Control, at 35.
845  Regarding competition concern, it mainly focuses on the notice sent to search engines, such as Google. In the light 
of research done by Urban and Quilter in 2005, “a large percentage of Google search notices – 55% of the Google § 
512(d) notices – are competition – related.” See Urban and Quilter, ‘Eﬃ  cient Process or Chilling Eﬀ ects-Takedown 
Notices under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’ (n38), at 651.
846  Lattman P, Law Professor Wendy Seltzer Takes on the NFL, Law Blog - WSJ.com(2007), available at http://blogs.wsj.
com/law/2007/03/21/law-professor-wendy-seltzer-takes-on-the-nfl / (last visit 25-08-2014).
847 Ibid.
848 Ibid.
849 Ibid.
850 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, g(2)(B).
851  Music Publisher Tries to Muzzle Podcast Criticizing Akon, Electronic Frontier Foundation(2007), available at https://
www.eﬀ .org/takedowns/music-publisher-tries-muzzle-podcast-criticizing-akon, (last visited 25-08-2014).
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infringement, so YouTube took the video down.852 Fortunately, with help from the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, Michelle Malkin sent a counter notice to YouTube, and 
successfully forced the UMG to rescind its takedown request.853 In another instance, 
Randy Queen, as a comic book artist, found an article criticizing his way of depicting 
women was posted on the blog Escher Girls, and then he sent a takedown notice to the 
host Tumblr on the basis that some of his copyrighted comic illustrations were cited in 
the article, although these illustrations were defi nitely incorporated for supporting the 
author’s argument.854 As has been pointed out above, counter notices are really rare, so 
the copyright owners have a big chance to suppress the criticism against them.
Besides, notice-and-takedown procedure has also been used by companies for fi ltering 
out the information that might negatively aﬀ ect their business. For instance, Yahoo 
sent a takedown notice to Cryptome, and complained about a report published on 
Cryptome which revealed that Yahoo was logging its users’ data and selling these data 
to the law enforcement agencies.855 Since the leak of Yahoo’s bad privacy policy was 
likely to worsen its reputation and make it less competitive, Yahoo attempted to get 
rid of these leaks by abusing the notice-and-takedown procedure.856 In another case, a 
voting machine company’s internal documents, which discussed the fl aws of its voting 
machine, were revealed on the Internet.857 In order to suppress criticism of the fl aws 
of its voting machine, the company fi led dozens of notices to the ISPs who hosted the 
leaked internal documents, and claimed these documents were copyrighted by it.858 
Although these documents were almost certainly covered by fair use, many hosting ISPs 
removed the document without checking the adequacy of the notice.859  
In the EU, notice-and-takedown procedures have been developed based on the fact that 
notices can result in hosting ISPs’ knowledge provided in Article 14 of the E-commerce 
Directive, so unlike the notice sent in terms of DMCA 512 c(3)(A), the notices under 
the EU regime should include the evidence to prove that the disputed materials are 
infringing.860 Th erefore, the notice-and-takedown procedure is supposed to be less 
852 Ibid.
853  Universal Music Group Backs O  Claims to Michelle Malkin Video, Electronic Frontier Foundation(2007), available 
at https://www.eﬀ .org/deeplinks/2007/05/universal-music-group-backs-claims-michelle-malkin-video (last visited 
25-09-2014).
854  David Lizerbram, Using Copyright to Suppress Criticism?, David Lizerbram & Associates(2014), available at http://
lizerbramlaw.com/2014/08/using-copyright-suppress-criticism/, (last visited 25-09-2014).
855  Kim Zetter, Yahoo Issues Takedown Notice for Spying Price List(2009), available at http://www.herbogeminis.com/
IMG/pdf/yahoo.pdf, (last visited 26-08-2014).
856 Ibid.
857  Paul Roberts, Diebold Voting Case Tests DMCA, PCWorld(2003), available at http://www.pcworld.com/
article/113273/article.html (last visited 27-11-2014).
858 Ibid. 
859 Ibid.
860  Holznagel, ‘Melde- und Abhilfeverfahren zur Beanstandung rechtswidrig gehosteter Inhalte nach europäischem 
und deutschem Recht im Vergleich zu gesetzlich geregelten notice and take-down-Verfahren’ (n63), at 107. 
From the text discussing  notice and takedown procedure in the EU, it can be concluded that evidence about 
infringement is required to be oﬀ ered in a notice by either the courts or legislations in the member states.
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vulnerable to abuse in the EU, since each notice needs to incorporate evidence that 
can prove alleged infringement. However, actually, the notice-and-takedown procedures 
are also vulnerable to be misused in the EU, since the EU regime creates incentives 
for ISPs to remove the disputed materials after receiving notices.861 In an experiment 
done by an Oxford research group, the UK hosting ISP is even more prone to follow 
a false notice, since no statement under penalty of perjury is required by UK law.862 
Similarly, an experiment done in the Netherlands also demonstrated that the ISPs are 
generally keen to avoid the liability without considering the accuracy of notices.863 In 
this experiment, some materials which were not protected by copyright anymore were 
posted onto the Internet, and then the researcher sent notices to 10 relevant Dutch ISPs; 
fi nally, seven of ten ISPs had removed the materials, and no one ever complained about 
these mistaken deletions.864 In the Member States which haven’t ruled on the minimum 
elements of a notice, the hosting ISPs prefer to remove more suspicious materials rather 
than keep them online, since the hosting ISPs only have a tiny interest in each of these 
suspicious materials but face the threat of paying high cost for keeping them.865 As noted 
by Christian Ahlert, in the EU, the current regulatory mechanism regarding notice-and-
takedown procedure “has created an environment in which the incentive to take down 
content from the internet is higher than the potential costs of not taking it down.”866
5.5.2 How to Reduce Wrong Deletion
Th erefore, some measures should be taken to reduce wrong deletion. During the public 
consultation on the EU Notice and Action procedures, civil society organizations 
expressed their concerns on the possible wrong deletion under these procedures, and 
made some proposals to reduce wrong deletion.867 Regarding how to reduce the wrong 
deletion, it is necessary to check the reasons that result in the wrong deletion. Based 
on the above discussion, it can be found that wrong deletion can be attributed to three 
reasons. First, copyright owners tend to send notices without diligent investigation. 
Second, hosting ISPs are highly likely to remove the materials complained of in the 
notices so as to reduce the risks of being sued by copyright owners. Th ird, Internet users 
normally do not send counter-notices even when their materials are wrongly taken down. 
861 Moore and Clayton, ‘Th e Impact of Incentives on Notice and Take-down’ (n63), at 243
862 Ibid, at 243-44.
863 Ibid, at 244. 
864 Ibid, at 244.
865  See Holznagel, ‘Melde- und Abhilfeverfahren zur Beanstandung rechtswidrig gehosteter Inhalte nach europäischem 
und deutschem Recht im Vergleich zu gesetzlich geregelten notice and take-down-Verfahren’ (n63), at 106.
866  Ahlert C, et al., How ‘liberty’ disappeared from cyberspace: the mystery shopper tests Internet content self-
regulation (2004), RootSecure.com, available at http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/
liberty.pdf (last visited 08-12-2014), at 11. In this article, the author explains why the ISPs tend to take down the 
suspicious materials after receiving notices.
867  Kuczerawy, A., Intermediary liability & freedom of expression: Recent developments in the EU notice & action 
initiative (2015) 31 Computer Law & Security Review 46, at 52-55.
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Th erefore, all three stakeholders, including copyright owners, hosting ISPs and Internet 
users, contribute to the wrong deletion. But who should be given the burden of reducing 
the number of wrong deletions? To answer this question, we need to examine how the 
notice-and-takedown procedure operates. Basically, the notice-and-takedown procedure 
can be simply described as “copyright owners notice and hosting ISPs take down”, so it 
has been implied that copyright owners bear the burden of seeking infringing materials, 
and hosting ISPs are just the facilitators who help copyright owners enforce their rights. 
Th erefore, this thesis argues that copyright owners should ensure the accuracy of their 
notices so as to reduce the wrong deletions. Th is argument also echoes the recent case 
law in the US.  In order to curb notice-and-takedown procedure’s possible suppression 
on free speech, the US courts have started to require copyright owners to take fair use 
into account. For example, in the case of Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., the defendant 
Universal Music Corp. was held liable under a mis-representation clause, because it 
failed to consider whether the plaintiﬀ ’s incorporation of its music into a homemade 
video was fair use, before sending a takedown notice to YouTube.868 Further, it is also 
unreasonable to require hosting ISPs to ensure the takedown is correctly made, since it 
would force the hosting ISPs to evaluate the notices like judges which they are not able 
to do. As mentioned above, in France, some eﬀ ort has been made to reduce the wrong 
deletions by imposing duties on hosting ISPs. French Constitutional Council held, only 
when materials are manifestly unlawful or the court issues an order to remove, need 
hosting ISPs expeditiously remove the materials in question.869 By doing so, the wrong 
removing is supposed to be reduced, since hosting ISPs are not obligated to take down 
the materials which are not manifestly unlawful. Nevertheless, regarding what constitutes 
“manifestly unlawful” materials, French Constitutional Council did not specify more on 
this notion.870 If a clear defi nition has not been given to “manifestly unlawful” by courts, 
hosting ISPs tend to remove the suspicious materials so as to secure their immunity. In 
fact, unlike child pornography which is identifi able for any non-lawyer, in the context 
of copyright, whether a material is manifestly infringing is much more problematic to 
decide, and often can only be answered with professional legal advices.871 Considering 
that notices might be received on a large scale every day, it seems still too burdensome for 
ISPs to seek professional legal advice for each notice. Regarding Internet users, although 
they are authorized to send counter-notices to have the removed materials replaced, they 
normally lack the expertise to decide whether the materials removed are legal or illegal. 
Particularly, after receiving the copies of the notices which alert them to the copyright 
infringement they might commit, they will be deterred from sending counter-notices.
868 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
869  Catherine Jasserand, France- Dailymotion heavily  ned for the late removal of infringing content, wolters kluwer law 
& business (2012), available at http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2012/09/28/france-dailymotion-heavily-fi ned-
for-the-late-removal-of-infringing-content/, Accessed September 28, 2014.
870 Ibid.
871 Verbiest T et al., Study on the Liability of Internet Intermediaries (n389), at 41.
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5.6 Conclusion:
In the US and China, notice-and-takedown procedure is a codifi ed procedure, so once a 
hosting ISP receives a notice including the essential elements prescribed by the laws, the 
hosting ISP is obligated to take down the materials indicated in the notice. Nevertheless, 
unlike the US, in China a competent notice should include the evidences of complained 
infringement, so hosting ISPs are supposed to assess these evidences to decide whether 
the complained materials are actually infringing before taking down them. In the EU, 
the regulations on notice-and-takedown procedure turn out to be fragmented, but 
generally, in the Member States when a notice can lead to a hosting ISP’s knowledge of 
infringing materials, the hosting ISP is obligated to take down the materials. In general, 
the codifi ed notice-and-takedown procedures are preferable to de facto notice-and-
takedown procedures developed in judicial practice, since the codifi ed ones can provide 
better legal certainty to hosting ISPs. Nevertheless, no matter whether the notice-and-
takedown procedure has been codifi ed, the courts in these jurisdictional areas face the 
similar problems when ruling on notice-and-takedown procedures. Th ese problems are 
as follows: how to defi ne a competent notice, how to deal with the defect notices, how 
to defi ne “expeditiously remove”, how to distribute the liability for wrong deletion, and 
the validity of ex ante notices. Th e answers to these problems have substantial impacts 
on the hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate. Regarding how to defi ne a competent notice, 
the dispute mainly focuses on how exactly the location of alleged infringing materials 
should be indicated in notices. Th is book argues that it is reasonable to require copyright 
owners to provide the URLs of infringing materials, and by doing so, hosting ISPs 
face less burden to locate the infringing materials. Regarding how to deal with defect 
notices, if a notice is not fully but substantially comply with the requirement, its validity 
ought to be endorsed. If a notice is neither fully nor substantially comply with the 
requirement, but arouses the hosting ISP’s strong suspicion of the existence of specifi c 
infringing materials, in the case of the contact of the notifi er having been given, the 
hosting ISP is obligated to contact the notifi er so as to help the notifi er perfect the 
notice. Regarding “expeditiously remove”, it is unpractical to set a fi xed term, and courts 
should decide in light of concrete facts in each case. As for who should be liable for 
wrong deletion, hosting ISPs are immunized for liability if they conduct the deletion by 
following notices. Further, copyright owners are required to send notices in good faith, 
and otherwise, they should be liable for wrong deletion. Regarding ex ante notices, their 
validity ought to be dismissed, since if admitting the validity of ex ante notices, hosting 
ISPs would be imposed a general monitoring obligation which is forbidden by “safe 
harbor” provisions. 
Although the current notice-and-takedown procedures contribute a lot to take down 
large-scale infringement on Internet, they also tend to result in wrong deletion. On 
one side, because internet users usually will not argue even if their legal contents were 
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removed, copyright owners are encouraged to send notices without seriously taking 
accuracy into account. On the other side, hosting ISPs tend to follow the notices no 
matter whether the notices are correct or wrong, since by doing so, they at least can 
avoid being sued by copyright owners. In order to substantially curb the wrong deletion 
under notice-and-takedown procedures, copyright owners rather than hosting ISPs 
should be imposed more duties to ensure the accuracy of notices, such as taking fair use 
into account when sending notices. 
To sum up, copyright owners should play an active role in notice-and-takedown 
procedure. Th ey shoulder the duty to seek infringing materials, notify hosting ISPs, 
and ensure the accuracy of notices. To the contrary, hosting ISPs are passive actors in 
this procedure, and their responsibilities are to properly respond to notices, such as 
conducting takedown after receiving competent notices, forwarding notices and counter 
notices, and informing copyright owners after receiving incompetent notices. Th is book 
asserts, by following this approach of distributing duties between copyright owners and 
hosting ISPs, it can avoid imposing an unreasonable burden on hosting ISPs in notice-
and-takedown procedures, and is thus capable of preserving maximum freedom for 
hosting ISPs to operate in the US, EU and China.
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Introduction:
Th e Internet users, who commit infringement directly, as primary infringers, should 
be liable for the infringement. However, Internet is characterized with anonymization, 
which means that Internet users can easily hide their identities on the Internet. Without 
knowing the identities of infringers in suspect, copyright owners cannot launch lawsuits. 
In order to ensure the copyright owners’ right to sue Internet users, the laws require ISPs 
to disclose the Internet users’ identities under certain circumstances. At international 
level, Trips-plus provisions such as ACTA also include a clause which requires ISPs to 
disclose the identity information of suspected infringers to intellectual property owners.872 
However, Internet users’ identities fall within the privacy which should be protected as 
one of the fundamental rights. Th erefore, certain degree of restriction has to be rendered 
on identity disclosure in the context of copyright enforcement. From the perspective of 
avoiding confl icts with copyright owners, hosting ISPs are more willing to disclose the 
identity information requested by them, but such disclosure ought to follow due process 
because of privacy concerns. Th is chapter explores the identity disclosure mechanisms in 
the US, EU and China, and then discusses how to regulate hosting ISPs’ duties in identity 
disclosure mechanisms from the perspective of preserving their freedom to operate.
Th is chapter fi rst examines the rules on identity disclosure in the US, including the 
identity disclosure provided in “safe harbor” provisions and the “John Doe” subpoena 
developed from case law (6.1). Th en, it looks into how the EU deals with identity 
disclosure in the context of copyright enforcement (6.2). In China, hosting ISPs need 
to disclose personal identity to Copyright Administrations and copyright owners upon 
request, and this chapter particularly examines the disclosure of personal identity in 
civil proceeding in China (6.3). Based on the exploration in the last three sections, it 
compares the hosting ISPs’ duties in identity disclosure mechanisms in the US, EU and 
China, and then discusses how to regulate hosting ISPs’ duties in solving the problems 
of current identity disclosure mechanisms (6.4). 
6.1 Disclosure of Identities in the US
DMCA 512 (h) grants copyright owners the rights to apply subpoenas for the purpose 
of disclosing Internet users’ identities. In the light of this Article, in the prescribed 
circumstances, a copyright owner or its agents can request the clerk of any US District 
Court to issue a subpoena for disclosing the identity of an alleged infringer.873 A 
competent request for subpoena should include a copy of a notifi cation according to 
DMCA 512 (c)(3)(A), a proposed subpoena, and a sworn declaration to indicate that 
the purpose of obtaining the  identity of an alleged infringer is only for “protecting 
872 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Art. 4.
873 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512 (h)(1).
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rights under this title.”874 A proposed subpoena shall authorize and order the ISP 
concerned, based on the identity information it has about the alleged infringer in the 
notifi cation, to expeditiously disclose suﬃ  cient information for the copyright owner or 
his authorized agent to identify the alleged infringer.875 If a request of subpoena fulfi lls 
the requirements above, the clerk will expeditiously grant the proposed subpoena.876 
Upon receiving the subpoena, the ISP should follow the order in the subpoena.877
What kind of ISPs falls into the coverage of subpoena? With the fl ourishing of p2p 
networks, this question aroused disputes between ISPs and copyright owners. In the 
case of RIAA v. Verizon, RIAA requested a subpoena to ask Verizon, an access provider, 
to disclose its Internet users who traded copyrighted music through p2p software.878 In 
the fi rst instance and appeal, RIAA’s request was supported, but in the last instance its 
request was denied.879 In the light of the fi nal judgment, since DMCA 512 (h)(2) makes 
it clear that a competent request for subpoena should include “a copy of a notifi cation 
described in subsection (c)(3)(A)”, but the notifi cation oﬀ ered by RIAA did not satisfy 
subsection (c)(3)(A)(iii), a subpoena could not be issued to Verizon based on RIAA’s 
request.880 After losing in this case, the RIAA tried to seek similar subpoenas from 
ISPs in the 8th and 4th Circuits, but still failed, because these courts upheld the same 
reasoning which favored Verizon.881 Th erefore, in the U.S., the subpoena under DMCA 
512 (h) can only be issued to ISPs who run caching, hosting or information location 
tool, but access providers are immune from such subpoenas.882 YouTube, as a popular 
video-sharing platform, has received several subpoenas for disclosing its subscribers’ 
identities. For example, in 2007, Twentieth Century Fox fi led a subpoena for YouTube 
to get the identity of someone who uploaded several episodes of its popular television 
shows without permission.883 In March 2007, Magnolia Studios also sought a subpoena 
874 Ibid, (h)(2).
875 Ibid, (h)(3).
876 Ibid, (h)(4).
877 Ibid, (h)(5).
878 RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services, 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, at 24-26 (D.D.C. 2003).
879  See RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services, 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003), 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003), 351 
F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir 2003).
880  RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir 2003), at 1236. According to DMCA (n1), Sec. 512 
(c)(3)(A)(iii), a notifi cation must identify “the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of 
infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably 
suﬃ  cient to permit the service provider to locate the material.” Nevertheless, Verizon, as an Internet access provider, 
was not involved in storing the infringing materials, so it was impossible for Verizon to remove or disable the access 
to the infringing materials, and thus notifi cations send by RIAA could not be competent under Sec. 512 (c)(3)(A)
(iii).
881  Shanahan CE, ‘ACTA Fool or: How Rights Holders Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 512’s Subpoena Provisions’ 
(2011), 15 Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review 465, at 472.
882  Peguera, ‘Th e DMCA Safe Harbors and Th eir European Counterparts: A Comparative Analysis of Some Common 
Problems’ (n175), at 492.
883  Cuban’s  lm studio subpoenas Google over videos, Reuters(2007), available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/2007/03/07/google-cuban-idUSN0726738220070307. quoting Eugene C Kim, YouTube: Testing the safe 
harbors of digital copyright law, 17 S. Cal. Interdisc. LJ (2007). 142
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for YouTube so as to identify the users who uploaded the videos copyrighted by it.884
Besides, copyright owners can also fi le John Doe subpoenas to fi nd out the identities 
of Internet users suspected of infringement.885 Th e procedure for seeking John Doe 
Subpoenas basically works as follows: a copyright owner should fi rst obtain the IP address 
of the alleged infringer and the alleged infringing materials available at that IP address, 
and then fi le a John Doe Subpoena to require the ISP to reveal the name and address 
associated with this IP address.886 Compared to subpoena under DMCA 512 (h), fi ling 
a John Doe subpoena is more costly.887 In determining whether to grant a subpoena, a 
court always needs to comprehensively consider the following factors: 1) the claim of 
copyright infringement involved, 2) the possibility that the identity information may be 
destroyed by the ISP, 3) the disclosure request is narrowly tailored, 4) the subpoena will 
substantially contribute to forwarding the case; 5) without the information requested 
by subpoena, the defendant cannot be identifi ed.888 Further, in order to protect Internet 
users’ privacy and the other rights protected by the fi rst amendment, ISPs are required 
to contact the Internet users before disclosing their identities so that the Internet users 
can fi le a motion to squash or modify the subpoenas.889
In order to disclose the Internet users’ identities, it is somehow necessary for an ISP 
to retain Internet users’ online data. Currently, in the US, there is no mandatory data 
retention law.890 Th ere were several bills which intended to require ISPs to retain online 
data, but eventually all of them failed to become law.891 However, it seems that it’s also 
not forbidden for an ISP to retain the Internet users’ data, because obviously, the ISPs 
such as YouTube have long been retaining its subscribers’ online data.892 In 2008, Judge 
Louis Stanton granted the motion which required YouTube to turn over the usernames 
of users, what videos have been watched, and the users’ computer addresses to Viacom 
and the other plaintiﬀ s.893 
6.2 Disclosure of Identities in the EU
In the EU, the European Parliament enacted several Directives to protect personal 
data, including Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Directive) and Directive 
884 Ibid. 
885 Nathaniel Gleicher, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard, The Yale Law Journal (2008).
886  Shanahan, ‘ACTA Fool or: How Rights Holders Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 512’s Subpoena Provisions’, 
at 472.
887 Ibid. 
888 Artista Records, LLC v. Does 1-12, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82548, at 5.
889 Ibid, at 5-6.
890  United States, Electronic Frontier Foundation, available at https://www.eﬀ .org/issues/mandatory-data-retention/us 
(last visited 20-08-2014).
891 Ibid. 
892  Miguel Helft, Google told to turn over user data of YouTube, Th e New York Times(2008), available at http://
agriculturedefensecoalition.org/sites/default/files/file/constitution_1/1G_2008_Viacom_Lawsuit_Google_
YouTube_July_4_2008_NYTimes.pdf, (last visited 20-08-2014).
893 Ibid.
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2002/58/EC (e-Privacy Directive). In light of Directive 95/46/EC, personal data is 
generally protected from being disclosed, but Article 13 opens a window for restriction 
on personal data protection, including where such restriction constitutes a necessary 
measure to safeguard “the protection of the data subject or of the rights and freedom of 
others.”894 Article 15 of the e-Privacy Directive also allows imposing certain restrictions 
on personal data protection, and according to the opinion delivered by the ECJ in the 
Promusicae case, Article 15 of the e-Privacy Directive should be read in conjunction 
with Article 13 of Directive 95/46/EC, so it is allowed by Article 15 of the e-Privacy 
Directive to restrict the protection of personal data when such restriction “is necessary 
to safeguard the rights and freedoms of others, including the right to property in civil 
proceeding.”895 Th erefore, in the light of the Directives relevant to privacy protection, 
the protection of personal data can be restricted in IP infringement cases.
Besides these two Directives about data protection, some Directives on IP protection 
also include rules about disclosing personal data. According to Article 15(2) of the 
E-commerce Directive, member states may establish obligations for ISPs promptly 
to “inform the competent public authorities of alleged illegal activities undertaken or 
information provided by the recipients of their service or obligation to communicate to 
the competent authorities, at their request, information enabling the identifi cation of 
recipients of their service with whom they have storage agreements.”896 Further, Article 8 
of IP Enforcement Directive requires member states to ensure that in a proceeding about 
IP infringement, courts may issue an order to disclose the identities of persons who 
conduct infringement on a commercial scale, upon receiving justifi ed and proportionate 
request from the claimants.897 
From the EU Directives referred above, it seems that identity information of 
persons is allowed to be disclosed if these persons are involved in IP infringement. 
However, the EU Directives are prone to be less explicit , so with regard to in 
what circumstances Internet users’ identity information can be disclosed, it is 
necessary to explore the ECJ cases, the implementing regulations and case law in 
member states. Th e following sections will explore how several key issues in identity 
disclosure mechanism are dealt in the EU, including: (1) can identity disclosure be 
done in civil proceeding; (2) whether hosting ISPs are obligated to retain their 
users’ personal data; (3) who can order hosting ISPs to commit identity disclosure. 
894  Directive 95/46/EC (n1), Art. 13 (g).
895   Kuner C, ‘Data protection and rights protection on the internet: Th e Promusicae judgment of the European court 
of justice’ (2008) 30 European Intellectual Property Review 199, at 199.
896  E-commerce Directive (n1), Art. 15(2).
897  Directive 2004/48/EC (n83), Art. 8.
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6.2.1 Identity Disclosure – Civil Proceeding or Only Criminal Proceeding
In the light of Article 13 of General data protection Directive and Article 15 of 
E-privacy Directive, restriction can be rendered on personal data protection for limited 
purposes, but most of these purposes clearly direct to preventing serious crime rather 
than protecting private interests.898 Further, Directives relevant to IP enforcement also 
do not declare that personal data can be disclosed in civil proceedings.899 Th erefore, it 
becomes a question of whether member states are required or prohibited to disclose the 
personal data retained by ISPs in civil proceedings. According to the ECJ’s viewpoint, 
“European legal framework is neutral in this regard.”900 In the case of Promusicae v. 
Telefónica, the ECJ held that it is not an obligation for member states to require ISPs 
to communicate personal data so as to guarantee the protection of copyright in the 
context of civil proceedings.901 In another case named Tele2, the ECJ held that the 
relevant EU Directives did not prohibit member states from requiring ISPs to disclose 
personal traﬃ  c data for the purpose of enabling civil proceedings dealing with copyright 
infringements.902 Further, in both these cases, the ECJ emphasized that when transposing 
the Directives relevant to communicate personal data, the member states should strike a 
fair balance between the various fundamental rights protected by European legal orders; 
and further, the authorities and courts in member states should take into account the 
fundamental rights and the general principles of community law, such as proportionality, 
when applying and interpreting their national law about disclosing personal data.903 So 
basically, the member states have a certain degree of freedom to establish their national 
rules about disclosing personal data in civil proceedings.
898  According to Article 13 of General Data Protection Directive, a restriction can be rendered on personal data 
protection when such a restriction constitutes a necessary measure to safeguard: (a) national security; (b) defence; 
(c) public security; (c) the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal oﬀ ences, or of breaches 
of ethics for regulated professions; (e) an important economic or fi nancial interest of a Member State or of the 
European Union, including monetary, budgetary and taxation matters; (f ) a monitoring, inspection or regulatory 
function connected , even occasionally, with the exercise of oﬃ  cial authority in cases referred to in (c), (d) and (e); 
(g) the protection of the data subject or of the rights and freedoms of others. In light of Article 15 of E-privacy 
Directive, the restriction on personal data protection must constitute a necessary, appropriate and proportionate 
measure within a democratic society to safeguard national security (i.e. State security), defence, public security, 
and the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal oﬀ ences or of unauthorised use of the 
electronic communication system.
899  Article 15(2) of E-commerce Directive only indicates that an ISP can pass on Internet users’ personal data to 
competent authorities upon request. Article 8 of IP Enforcement Directive only prescribes that in a proceeding 
about IP infringement, courts may issue an order to disclose the identities of persons who conduct infringement 
on a commercial scale, but does not clarify whether such disclosure can be made in civil procedure.
900  Kuner C, et al., Study on online copyright enforcement and data protection in selected Member States (2009), DG 
Internal Market and Service of European Commission, at 9.
901  Case C-275/06 Productores de Música de España v Telefónica de España Sau (‘Promusicae’) [2008] ECR I-00271, 
para. 71.
902  Case C-557/07, LSG-Gesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung von Leistungsschutzrechten GmbH v. Tele2 Telecommunication 
GmbH [2009] ECR I-01227, para. 47.
903  See Productores de Música de España(Promusicae) v. Telefónica de España SAU (n896), LSG-Gesellschaft zur 
Wahrnehmung von Leistungsschutzrechten GmbH v. Tele2 Telecommunication GmbH (n897).
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In the member states, some of them have already established the rules on disclosing 
personal data for the purpose of enabling copyright litigations in civil proceedings. In 
Italy, according to the Article 156bis of Italian Copyright Law, “if the rights holder has 
seriously proved its claims and has indicated documents, elements and information in 
possession of the other party which confi rms such claims, the court – upon the rights 
holder’s request – can order the alleged infringer to show the documents or to supply the 
relevant information concerning third parties involved in the production and distribution 
of the infringing products.”904 In the UK, copyright owners can apply the “Norwich 
Pharmacal orders” from courts so as to request hosting ISPs to disclose their users’ personal 
data retained by them.905 In order to successfully bring a “Norwich Pharmacal orders” 
claim, the following conditions should be fulfi lled: “(1) a wrong must have been carried 
out or allegedly carried out by a wrongdoer; (2) there must be the need for the order to 
enable action to be brought against the wrongdoer; and (3) the person against whom the 
order was sought must be somehow involved in the wrongdoing so as to have facilitated 
it, and must be able or likely to be able to provide the information necessary to enable the 
wrongdoer to be sued.”906 In Germany, in line with Section 101(1) of the Copyright Act, 
a copyright owner can request the court to issue an order that requires the ISP to disclose 
the identity of the user who commits copyright infringement on a “commercial scale.”907 
As for what constitutes a “commercial scale,” the court should evaluate on the basis either 
of the number of infringements or the severity of the infringement.908 Th erefore, Germany 
limits the disclosure of personal data within serious copyright infringement cases in civil 
proceedings.
6.2.2 The Retention of Personal data
In order to disclose the suspected infringers’ identities, the personal data of the 
suspected infringer should be retained at the fi rst place. In 2006, the EU enacted the 
Data Retention Directive, in the light of which member states should require ISPs to 
retain the data which are necessary to identify the subscribers or users for the purpose 
of the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime and the retention 
period is not less than six months but no more than two years from the date of the 
904  Tasillo A and Sterpi M ‘Italy’ in Calame TJ and Sterpi M eds., Copyright Litigation: Jurisdictional Comparisons 
(European Lawyer 2015), at 216.
905  See Kuner C, et al., Study on online copyright enforcement and data protection in selected Member States (n895), 
at 24.
906  Mitsui Limited v Nexen Petroleum UK Limited [2005] EWHC 625 (Ch), quoting Kuner C, et al., Study on online 
copyright enforcement and data protection in selected Member States (n895), at 25.
907  Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte, Sec. 101 (1). As provided in this Article, any person who 
infringes copyright or another right protected under this Act on a commercial scale may be required by the injured 
party to provide information without delay as to the origin and the distribution networks of infringing copies or 
other products.
908 Ibid. 
Chapter 6
198
communication.909 Can these data retained for combating serious crime be disclosed for 
the purpose of copyright enforcement? Th e ECJ agreed to such a disclosure in 2012. 
In the case of Bonnier Audio AB v Perfect Communication Sweden AB, the ECJ held 
that the Data Retention Directive should not be interpreted to prohibit an ISP in 
Civil proceedings from being ordered to give a copyright owner the information of the 
subscriber who was alleged to commit copyright infringement.910 
Regarding whether hosting ISPs are obliged to retain personal data in the light of Data 
Retention Directive, the answer is probably not. According to Article 5 of the Data Retention 
Directive, the categories of data are “only to be retained with respect to fi xed network 
telephony, mobile telephony, Internet access, Internet e-mail, and Internet telephony.”911 
Since the online communication through hosting ISPs’ services normally can be categorized 
as neither Internet e-mail nor Internet telephony, the hosting ISPs, including video platforms, 
Usenet, blogs, message boards, social networking platforms, etc., are not obliged to retain 
personal data generated in online communication processes.912 Nevertheless, the member 
state, such as France, still enacted a legal decree to require hosting ISPs to retain signifi cant 
amounts of traﬃ  c data and so-called identifi cation data, which went beyond the requirement 
of the EU Data Retention Directive.913 
In fact, the proportionality of the Data Retention Directive has been widely challenged.914 
In 2014, the ECJ ruled on the validity of the Data Retention Directive, and concluded that 
the provisions in the Directive were not proportionate based on the following reasons: the 
retention of data was not precisely circumscribed to ensure that the retention was limited 
to what was strictly necessary; the Directive also did not provide for suﬃ  cient safeguards 
to ensure eﬀ ective protection of the data retained against the risk of abuse and against any 
unlawful access and use of that data, so it confl icted with Article 8915 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.916 Th erefore, the data retention rules in the 
909  Council Directive 2006/24/EC of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection 
with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks 
and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, OJ L 105/54, Art. 1 and Art. 6.
910 Case C-461/10, Bonnier Audio AB v Perfect Communication Sweden AB [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:2190.
911  See Directive 2006/24/EC (n904), Art. 5. See also Feiler L, ‘ e legality of the data retention directive in the light 
of the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection’ (2010) 1 European Journal of Law and Technology 3, Para. 
7.3.4.
912 Ibid. 
913  Maxwell W, ‘Systematic government access to private-sector data in France’ (2014) 4 International Data Privacy 
Law 4, at 7.
914  Blakeney S, ‘Th e Data Retention Directive: combating terrorism or invading privacy?’ (2007) 13 Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review 153, at 153. In Germany, the Constitutional Court even held that the two new 
Articles, which aimed at transposing the provisions in the Data Retention Directive, were are null and void, since 
they confl ict with the right to privacy of telecommunications protected in Article 10 of the German Constitution. 
See Kaiser AB, ‘German data retention provisions unconstitutional in their present form; decision of 2 March 
2010, NJW 2010, p.833’ (2011) 6 European Constitutional Law Review 503, at 509.
915  In the light of this Article, personal data “must be processed fairly for specifi ed purposes and on the basis of the 
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law.”
916  Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications and others [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
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EU need to be crafted and pay more attention to privacy protection. In these circumstances, 
whether France still requires hosting ISPs to retain Internet users’ personal data remains 
uncertain before the relevant rules have been eventually revised.
6.2.3 Ordering the Disclosure of Personal Identity
Regarding who can order the hosting ISPs to disclose the suspected infringers’ identities, in 
order to prevent personal identity from being inappropriately disclosed, normally any request 
of disclosing personal identity should be subject to judicial or administrative review in the 
EU.917 
In France, ISPs are not allowed to disclose Internet users’ personal identities to copyright 
owners’ representatives, and they can only respond to the identity requests issued by 
a court or the administrative authority – Hadopi.918 In light of Article L.331-21 of 
the French Intellectual Property Code, the Hadopi Commission “may obtain, for the 
purpose of investigation, any documents, regardless of the support used, including data 
stored and processed by ISPs.”919 Th e ISP can be requested to disclose the identity, 
postal address, electronic address and telephone number of a suspected infringer, if these 
data are necessary to establish the evidence of a copyright infringement.920 If copyright 
owners want to obtain the identities of suspected infringers, they need to fi le lawsuits, 
and then the personal identities become judicial data which can be communicated to 
copyright owners by ISPs once the courts order such disclosure.921
In Germany, ISPs are also not allowed to disclose the personal identity to copyright 
owners based on the IP addresses submitted by copyright owners, since by doing so, 
ISPs would violate the obligation of keeping telecommunication secrecy.922 Th erefore, 
if copyright owners want to have the suspected infringers’ identities disclosed, they 
need to bring claims to courts according to Section 101 (1) of the Germany Copyright 
Act.923 For the purpose of investigating criminal activities, the criminal enforcement 
authorities in Germany may request ISPs to disclose the suspects’ identities, but the 
order of disclosure still has to be issued by courts.924 In exceptional circumstances, the 
order may also be issued by the public prosecution oﬃ  ce, but this order will become 
ineﬀ ective if it is not confi rmed by the judge within 3 days.925 Th erefore, in Germany, 
the disclosure order normally can only be issued by courts, no matter whether such 
disclosure is requested by copyright owners or criminal enforcement authorities.
917  Kuner C, et al., Study on online copyright enforcement and data protection in selected Member States (n895), at 4.
918 Ibid, at 28.
919 Ibid. 
920 Ibid.
921 Ibid, at 29.
922 Ibid, at 35.
923 Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte (n902), Sec. 101 (1). 
924 Criminal Procedure Code (Strafprozeßordnung, StPO), Sec. 100b (1).
925 Ibid.
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In the UK, the personal data can be disclosed to the competent authorities, such as the police, 
the Serious Organized Crime Agency, HM Revenue and Customs, the Security Service, 
the Secret Intelligence Service and the Government Communication Headquarters.926 If a 
copyright owner wants to know the identity of a suspected infringer, he has to bring a civil 
action that requests the court to issue a “Norwich Pharmacal order.”927
6.2.4 Summary in the EU
In the EU, the relevant directives generally allow the Internet users’ personal data to be 
disclosed for the purpose of fi ghting copyright infringement. But since the disclosure of 
Internet users’ personal data might invade the Internet users’ privacy, according to the 
ECJ decisions, the authorities and courts of the member states should ensure that such 
disclosure is not conducted in a way that confl icts with “those fundamental rights or with 
other general principles of Community law, such as the principle of proportionality.”928 
Th erefore, the member states can establish their own rules of disclosing personal data 
under the general principle set by the ECJ. In Member States, for the purpose of 
protecting privacy, the disclosure of personal identity can only be done according to the 
orders issued by courts or competent authorities. Besides, normally hosting ISPs are not 
subject to the obligation of retaining their users’ personal data in the context of Data 
Retention Directive. After the Data Retention Directive was held disproportionate, the 
disclosure of personal identity may become even harder, since without data retention, 
no data can be disclosed. 
6.3 Disclosure of Identities in China
In China, there are several rules about the disclosure of infringers’ identities. According to 
the Article 13 of Internet Regulations, the administrative department of copyrights may, 
within the purpose of investigating into the infringements upon the right to network 
dissemination of information, require the relevant ISPs to provide such materials as 
the names, contact information, and the web addresses of its service recipients who are 
suspected of committing copyright infringement.929 Further, where any Internet service 
provider refuses or delays to provide such identity information as the name, contact 
information and web address of its service recipients who are suspected of committing 
infringement, the administrative department of copyright shall give it a warning.930 In 
the event of serious circumstances, the equipment such as computers that are mainly 
applied to provide the Internet service shall be confi scated.931 From the provisions above, 
926 Kuner C, et al., Study on online copyright enforcement and data protection in selected Member States (n895), 22.
927 Ibid, at 24.
928 Productores de Música de España(Promusicae) v. Telefónica de España SAU (n896), para. 68 and 70.
929 Internet Regulation (网络规定) (n1), Art. 13.
930 Ibid, Art. 25.
931 Ibid.
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it seems that only the administrative department of copyright can request the Internet 
users’ identity information from ISPs. Nevertheless, relevant Judicial Interpretations 
issued by People’s Supreme Court grant copyright owners the right to request Internet 
users’ identity information in civil procedures. In terms of Internet Interpretation 
(2006), copyright owners can request the registration information of Internet users from 
hosting ISPs for the purpose of suing the Internet users for copyright infringement, and 
if the hosting ISPs refuse to provide the registration information at request without fair 
reasons, they need to undertake the liability accordingly.932 In the following text, it will 
discuss how identity disclosure works in civil procedure in China.
6.3.1 Disclosure upon the Order of Courts or Request of Copyright Owners
As being discussed above, in China, besides Copyright Administrations can order 
identity disclosure, in civil cases, hosting ISPs can also be requested to disclose the 
suspected infringers’ identities. Nevertheless, unlike the relevant rules in the US and 
EU, the Internet Interpretation (2006) does not specify whether an identity disclosure 
request from the copyright owner ought to go through judicial examination, which has 
resulted in a little bit turmoil in judicial practice. 
In the case of Qiao v. tiexue.net, the defendant ran a website “tiexue.net” which 
allowed its users to upload pictures on it, and the plaintiﬀ  Qiao found some of his 
copyrighted pictures were uploaded to tiexue.net without permission, so Qiao sued 
the defendant for copyright infringement.933 Before the term of adducing evidences 
expired, the defendant did not submit the registration information of Internet users 
who uploaded the infringing pictures, so the court held it as a reason to conclude the 
defendant liable.934 In another case, the same plaintiﬀ  Qiao sued the website china.
com for copyright infringement based on the similar facts as in the previous case.935 
During the hearing, the defendant submitted the registration information of Internet 
users who were alleged to commit copyright infringement, and the court held that the 
defendant fulfi lled its duty of disclosing the infringers’ identities.936 In these two cases, 
the hosting ISPs disclose the identity information of the suspected infringing users in 
front of judicial review.
By contrast, there are still some cases where hosting ISPs disclosed their Internet 
users’ identities directly upon the request of the copyright owners. In the case of 3rd 
Mian Xiang v. Great Wall Broadband, the defendant Great Wall Broadband provided 
932 Internet Interpretation (2006) (网络解释(2006)) (n145), Art. 5.
933  Qiao v. tiexue.net (乔某某 v. 铁血网), Beijing Haidian District Court (北京市海淀区基层人民法院), (2006) 
Hai Min Chu Zi, No. 15350 (（2006）海民初字第15350号)
934 Ibid.
935  Qiao v. china.com (乔某某 v. 中华网), Beijing Second Intermediate People’s Court (北京市海淀区中级人民法
院), (2006) Er Zhong Min Chu Zi, No. 8997 (（2006）二中民初字第8997号).
936 Ibid. 
Chapter 6
202
webhosting services, and the plaintiﬀ 937 found that some of its copyrighted books were 
unlawfully available on a website hosted by the defendant, so the plaintiﬀ  sued Great Wall 
Broadband for copyright infringement.938 In this case, even before fi ling a lawsuit, the 
plaintiﬀ  sent the defendant a notice which requested the defendant to disclose its client’s 
registration information in question, and then the defendant submitted the corresponding 
registration information to the plaintiﬀ .939 Eventually, the court held that the defendant 
fulfi lled its obligation of disclosing the suspected infringing users’ identity. 
Since the registration information may reveal the identities of Internet users which 
should be protected as their privacy, any request about disclosing registration 
information is supposed to be reviewed by the court so as to prevent the abuse of this 
disclosing procedure. In fact, People’s Supreme Court also realizes that any disclosure of 
information relevant to personal identities needs to be ordered by courts. For instance, 
in another Judicial Interpretation about protecting rights of person on the Internet, it 
is clearly prescribed that a People’s Court, based on the plaintiﬀ ’s claim and concrete 
circumstances in the case, may order the ISP to submit the court the information that 
can identify the Internet users suspected of infringement, such as their name, contacts, 
IP addresses and etc.940 Th erefore, the procedural defect stated above may be fi xed by 
People’s Supreme Court in the near future.
6.3.2 To What Extent Hosting ISPs Ought to Conduct Identity Disclosure
Before “real-name registration” policy was implemented in China,941 Internet users 
usually do not need to register for hosting ISPs’ services by submitting their real identity 
information, so the identity information disclosed by hosting ISPs normally cannot have 
the suspected infringers identifi ed. In a case (Qiao v. china.com) discussed above, the 
registration information disclosed by the defendant just included the so-called internet 
names such as “wolf”, “keer” and “axjidy”, and the e-mail addresses,942 which could not 
really help the plaintiﬀ  identify the real infringers. Nevertheless, the court still held that 
the hosting ISPs fulfi lled the obligation to conduct identity disclosure. 
937  In this case, the plaintiﬀ  is a copyright agency company, and it got authorization to sue infringers from copyright 
owners whose books were unlawfully transmitted in question.
938  3rd Mian Xiang v. Great Wall Broadband (三面向诉长城宽带), Hubei Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court (湖北
省武汉市中级人民法院), (2009) Wu Zhi Chu Zi, No. 18 ((2009)武知初字第18号).
939 Ibid.
940 Internet Provisions (网络规定) (n208), Art. 4.
941  “real-name registration (网络实名制)” means that when Internet users register for ISPs’ services, they need to 
provide their real identity information. According to Article 6 of Decision of the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress on Strengthening Network Information Protection (全国人民代表大会常务委员会
关于加强网络信息保护的决定), When processing website access services, or landline or mobile phone network 
access formalities, or providing information release services for users, network service providers shall require the 
users to provide real identity information when entering into agreements with the users or when confi rming the 
provision of such services. After then, blogs, BBS and other hosting services has started to implement “real-name 
registration” policy. 
942  Qiao v. china.com (乔某某 v. 中华网), Beijing Second Intermediate People’s Court (北京市海淀区中级人民法
院), (2006) Er Zhong Min Chu Zi, No. 8997 (（2006）二中民初字第8997号).
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In the case of joy.cn v. tudou.com,943 the court discussed to what extent should a hosting 
ISP conduct identity disclosure. In this case, the plaintiﬀ  found a TV series copyrighted 
by it was uploaded to the defendant’s website by an Internet users named as “Mo 
Daqian (莫大千)”, so besides suing the defendant for contributory infringement, the 
plaintiﬀ  also requested the defendant to disclose the Internet user Mo Daqian’s real 
name, address, phone number, email address and the IP address used for uploading the 
TV series. However, during the hearing, the defendant merely provided Mo Daqian’s 
registration information and IP address, which was not suﬃ  cient to have Mo Daqian 
identifi ed. Finally, the court held that the defendant had already fulfi lled the obligation of 
identity disclosure based on the following reasons: (1) it was unreasonable to require the 
hosting ISPs to disclose more identity information than those provided by its users when 
registering the accounts; (2) the defendant had proved that the registration information 
disclosed by it was true. Th erefore, if Internet users do not need to register accounts by 
submitting their real identity information, in most cases, the registration information 
retained by hosting ISPs normally cannot reveal the real identities of Internet users.944
Nevertheless, it is still possible for copyright owners to get suﬃ  cient identity information 
from hosting ISPs in some occasions. In a case (3rd Mian Xiang v. Great Wall Broadband) 
discussed above, the registration information disclosed by the defendant included the 
client’s real name, personal ID number and even the address, which is far enough for the 
plaintiﬀ  to identify the direct infringer.945 
Based on the above case law, it can be found, regarding to what extent identity information 
should be disclosed, the Chinese courts only require hosting ISPs to disclose the identity 
information concerned within its capacity permitted by the Internet technologies, such as 
the users’ registration information. If the identity information disclosed by a hosting ISP 
is not suﬃ  cient to have the suspected infringers identifi ed, so long as it can prove that it 
has already disclosed the identity information concerned within its capacity permitted by 
the Internet technologies, it does not violate the obligation of identity disclosure. After 
the implementation of “real-name registration” policy, Internet users need to register for 
services with their real identity information, so hosting ISPs are supposed to provide the 
information which is capable of having alleged infringing users identifi ed.946
943  joy.cn v. tudou.com (激动网v.土豆网), First People’s Intermediary Court of Shanghai (上海市第一中级人民法
院), (2009) HuYiZongMinWu(Zhi)ZhongZi No. 79 ((2009)沪一中民五(知)终字第79号).
944  In the other two disputes between joy.cn and toudou.com, the defendant toudou.com even failed to disclose the 
alleged infringing users’ registration information because these information has been lost, and the courts still held 
toudou.com fulfi lled its obligation of identity disclosure. See Cases: joy.cn v. tudou.com (激动网v.土豆网), First 
People’s Intermediary Court of Shanghai (上海市第一中级人民法院), HuYiZongMinWu(Zhi)ZhongZi No. 53 
((2009)沪一中民五(知)终字第53号); joy.cn v. tudou.com (激动网v.土豆网), First People’s Intermediary Court 
of Shanghai (上海市第一中级人民法院), HuYiZongMinWu(Zhi)ZhongZi No. 102 ((2009)沪一中民五(知)
终字第102号).
945  3rd Mian Xiang v. Great Wall Broadband (三面向v.长城宽带) (n933). 
946  After the implementation of  a“real-name registration” policy, there is still no case in which copyright owners request 
hosting ISPs to disclose Internet users’ identity information. Th e possible reason might be that it is ineﬃ  cient to sue 
Internet users.
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6.3.3 Summary in China
In general, China has not set a strict procedure on the disclosure of Internet users’ identity 
information. In most cases, the Internet users’ identity information was disclosed by the 
orders of the courts. However, according to some court decisions of the past, hosting ISPs 
may directly disclose their users’ identity information upon the request of the copyright 
owners without judicial review. Regarding to what extent should identity information be 
disclosed, the Chinese courts only require hosting ISPs to disclose the identity information 
concerned within its capacity permitted by the Internet technologies, such as the users’ 
registration information. Further, like the US, there is no specifi c rule to require hosting 
ISPs to retain Internet users’ online communication data at legislative level.
As mentioned, in the latest Judicial Interpretation on online copyright infringement, the 
clause about identity disclosure has been abandoned.947 Th erefore, currently there exists 
no specifi c provision regulating identity disclosure in online copyright infringement 
cases. How does the abandonment of the identity disclosure clause impact upon the 
judicial practice? Does it mean copyright owners cannot request hosting ISPs to disclose 
the alleged infringers’ identity in copyright cases, or copyright owners still can make 
the requests as such? After the enactment of the latest Judicial Interpretation, no online 
copyright case has dealt with the request of disclosing the alleged infringers’ identity 
information.948 Hence, there is still no clear answer to the questions raised before.
6.4 Comparison of Hosting ISPs’ Duties in Identity Disclosure Mechanisms
From the discussion done above, one can fi nd, in the US, EU and China, hosting ISPs can 
be requested to disclose the Internet users’ identity data they have for purpose of fi ghting 
against copyright infringement. In the US and EU, copyright owners can only request the 
hosting ISPs to disclose the Internet users’ identity data by applying for the orders from 
courts. However, in China, hosting ISPs may directly send the Internet users’ identity data 
to copyright owners upon their request, and no judicial review is needed. Regarding data 
retention, in the US and China, there is no specifi c rule that requires hosting ISPs to retain 
their users’ communication data. In the EU, although the Data Retention Directive has 
been enacted to require ISPs to retain their users’ communication data, generally the ISPs 
indicated in this Directive do not cover hosting ISPs. 
Despite the existence of these diﬀ erences, according to the above exploration of identity 
disclosure mechanisms in the US, EU and China, hosting ISPs’ duties can mainly be 
summarized as answering the following two questions: (1) under what circumstances 
947  Internet Provisions (网络规定) (n208). According to the last Article of this Judicial Interpretation, it replaces the 
Internet Interpretation (2006). 
948  A search on the website of “Judicial Opinions of China” on which the judicial decisions are published, did not 
reveal any case involving identity disclosure in the case of online copyright infringement after the enactment of the 
latest Judicial Interpretation. See http://www.court.gov.cn/zgcpwsw/, (last visited, August 6, 2015).
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can hosting ISPs disclose Internet users’ identity information; (2) to what extent should 
hosting ISPs disclose Internet users’ identity information. In the following text, how to 
answer these two questions will be discussed.
6.4.1 The Pre-conditions of Identity Disclosure 
In the light of identity disclosure mechanisms, hosting ISPs are obligated to disclose 
Internet users’ identity information upon requests from competent third parties. 
Th erefore, the obligations undertaken by hosting ISPs are passive rather than active in 
identity disclosure mechanisms. In the US, EU and China, competent authorities can 
order hosting ISPs to disclose such information to them. Nevertheless, regarding how 
copyright owners can get alleged infringers’ identity information, diﬀ erent approaches 
have been adopted in the US, EU and China. In the EU, normally, copyright owners 
need to launch lawsuits, and request courts to order hosting ISPs to disclose alleged 
infringers’ identity information to them.949 In the US, although the applications of 
identity disclosure also have to be submitted to courts, disclosure subpoenas are issued 
by clerks with no need of judges’ approval,950 so identity disclosure can be ordered 
without suﬃ  cient examination.951 In China, Internet users’ identities can even be passed 
on to copyright owners without judicial review.952 
Since identity disclosure is relevant to the protection of Internet users’ privacy, hosting 
ISPs should conduct identity disclosure by following due process. Nevertheless, 
because of anonymity on the Internet, the clash between copyright protection and 
privacy security has come to the fore.953 Some scholars even argue that the protection 
of copyright endangers privacy.954 In order to properly defi ne hosting ISPs’ duties in 
protecting Internet users’ privacy, it is necessary to explore the reasons resulting in 
privacy concerns of identity disclosure. First, identity information can be disclosed 
without judicial review, and for the purpose of avoiding liability, hosting ISPs tend to 
disclose their users’ identity information upon copyright owners’ request without taking 
into account privacy protection (China). Second, disclosure subpoenas can be issued 
by clerks without suﬃ  cient examination (the US). In the case of Wal-Mart, in order to 
acquire the identity of the person who posted “Wal-Mart Day After Th anksgiving sales 
949 Kuner C, et al., Study on online copyright enforcement and data protection in selected Member States (n895).
950  David Gorski, Future of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) Subpoena Power on the Internet in Light of 
the Verizon Cases,  e, 24 Rev. Litig. (2005). 158. In terms of DMCA 512(h), the subpoena can be ordered by a 
clerk rather than a judge.
951  Bretan, ‘Harboring Doubts about the Eﬃ  cacy of 512 Immunity under the DMCA’ (n49), at 52-53. Katyal, 
‘Privacy vs. Piracy’ (n25), at 330.
952 3rd Mian Xiang(三面向诉长城宽带) v. Great Wall Broadband (n933). 
953  Vincents OB, ‘When rights clash online: Th e tracking of P2P copyright infringements vs. the EC personal data 
directive’ (2008) 16 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 270, at 270.
954  Cohen, ‘Overcoming Property: Does Copyright Trump Privacy?’ (n40), at 101. Katyal, ‘Privacy vs. Piracy’ (n25), at 
335 and 345. Edwards, ‘Should ISPs be Compelled to Become Copyright Cops? File-Sharing, the Music Industry 
and Enforcement Online’ (n40).
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information” on the FatWallet site, Wal-Mart applied for a subpoena under DMCA 
§ 512(h) by “submitting a declaration under penalty of perjury that its sales prices 
were protected by copyright law,” and the federal court approved such a ridiculous 
application.955 Th ird, a copyright owner can request the subpoena to disclose someone’s 
identity without submitting substantial evidence about infringement (the US).956 In 
light of DMCA 512 (h), when applying for a subpoena, a copyright owner only needs 
to submit a copy of a notice, a proposed subpoena and a sworn declaration that the 
identity is acquired for the purpose of protecting its copyright, but no evidence about 
copyright infringement is necessary.957 
Among these three reasons, hosting ISPs are only responsible for the fi rst one. Th erefore, 
in order to solve privacy concerns of identity disclosure mechanism, hosting ISPs’ duties 
are to refrain from disclosing Internet users’ identity information to copyright owners 
without orders from courts. By contrary, the positive duties ought to be imposed on 
courts and copyright owners, such as copyright owners are obligated to submit suﬃ  cient 
evidences about infringement when applying for disclosure orders, and courts ought to 
examine the applications in a diligent way.
6.4.2 Disclosing Obligations of Hosting ISPs
Once receiving disclosure orders from competent authorities, hosting ISPs are obligated 
to disclose Internet users’ identity information. Nevertheless, when Internet users 
register for hosting ISPs’ services, they normally do not need to submit their real identity 
information (except in China). Th erefore, usually hosting ISPs do not keep the suﬃ  cient 
information which is capable of having the suspected infringers identifi ed. Under this 
condition, even if hosting ISPs are obligated to disclose the identity information they 
retain, the suspected infringers still fail to be identifi ed.
China oﬀ ers a solution for this problem, and that is to force hosting ISPs to require their 
users to submit the real identity information when registering for the services. However, 
this solution can hardly be copied in the EU and US. First, it would impose the costly 
burden on hosting ISPs, since the hosting ISPs need to examine the identity information 
provided by Internet users and make sure these identity information is real, but such 
a duty may run beyond the capacity of hosting ISPs. More importantly, it goes against 
enlarging Internet users’ freedom of speech, if requesting Internet users to submit their 
real identity information. In cyberspace, anonymity is considered to play an important 
role in guaranteeing the freedom of expression, because anonymity not only allows 
the public to freely deliver their opinions about “their interests, beliefs and political 
ideologies without fear of reprisals from the state or any other powerful organization,” but 
955  Gray ME, FatWallet Victorious in Challenge to Wal-Mart’s Frivolous DMCA Subpoena, BerkleyLaw(2002), available 
at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/4719.htm (last visited 20-08-2014).
956 DMCA (n1) Sec. 512 (h). 
957 Ibid.
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also “permits others to receive these views.”958 Compared with China, the EU and US 
obviously attach more importance to protecting citizen’s freedom of speech, and the 
“real-name registration” policy therefore can hardly be an option for the EU and US.
Another solution might be to require hosting ISPs to retain Internet users’ online 
communication data. Nevertheless, so far the US and China have not enacted the 
regulation on data retention at legislative level. Particularly, in the US, Th ere were several 
bills which aimed at requiring ISPs to retain online data, but because of privacy concerns, 
eventually all of them failed to become law.959 In the EU, the Data Retention Directive 
has been enacted for fi ghting against serious crimes rather than copyright infringement, 
and hosting ISPs are not obligated to conduct identity data retention according to the 
Article 5 of the Directive.960 In addition, because of the serious privacy concerns on data 
retention, in 2014, the ECJ held the Data Retention Directive disproportionate, even 
though this directive was enacted for public good – against serious crimes.961 Th erefore, 
currently there is no strong reason to justify the obligation that requires hosting ISPs to 
retain Internet users’ online communication data for copyright enforcement.
6.5 Conclusion
In the US, EU and China, hosting ISPs are all obligated to disclose Internet users’ 
identity information under certain circumstances. In the US and EU, hosting ISPs are 
only subject to disclosing orders from competent authorities, and if a copyright owner 
wants to acquire the identity of an alleged infringer, it needs to request the court to 
issue an identity disclosure order. By contrast, in China, there is not specifi c procedure 
to regulate the identity disclosure in civil disputes, and hosting ISPs may even disclose 
Internet users’ identity information to copyright owners upon their request. Although 
the disclosure of personal identity is to a certain degree necessary for the purpose of 
copyright enforcement on the Internet, it also may put Internet users’ privacy in danger. 
Th erefore, due process should be rendered on the disclosure of identity. From the 
perspective of hosting ISPs, they are not the initiators but just reactors of this mechanism, 
so they only need to fulfi ll a passive obligation which is not to voluntarily communicate 
their users’ identity information to copyright owners without orders from courts or 
competent authorities. In addition, hosting ISPs are only obligated to disclose the 
identity information retained by them. However, the personal data retained by hosting 
ISPs may not be suﬃ  cient to have the suspected infringers identifi ed, so the eﬀ ectiveness 
of identity disclosure is in question. In China, this problem has been solved by adopting 
958 Williams, ‘On-Line anonymity, deindividuation and freedom of expression and privacy’ (n41), at 687.
959 United States, Electronic Frontier Foundation, (n885).
960  Feiler, ‘ e legality of the data retention directive in light of the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection’ 
(n906).
961 See Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications and others (n911).
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“real-name registration” policy. Nevertheless, similar policy can hardly be transposed 
into the US and EU because of concerns on freedom of speech. Moreover, it is also 
inappropriate to require hosting ISPs to retain Internet users’ online communication 
data because of privacy concerns.
To sum up, in identity disclosure mechanisms, even though information disclosed by 
hosting ISPs are not suﬃ  cient to have alleged infringers identifi ed, hosting ISPs should be 
still held to fulfi ll their duties if they have disclosed the identity information retained by 
them. Further, because privacy is protected as a fundamental right, hosting ISPs shoulder 
an obligation of omission which is to refrain from disclosing identity information to 
copyright owners without court orders. Th ese duties are easy for hosting ISPs to fulfi ll, 
and do not negatively aﬀ ect hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate in the US, EU and China.
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Chapter 7
Self-regulation of Copyright Enforcement on Hosting Platforms
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Introduction:
Since the birth of the Internet, some scholars have been prompting the idea that the 
Internet should not be subject to traditional forms of governance, and self-regulation 
or self-governance is more proper to solve the problems in the Internet.962 In the digital 
realm, it’s nearly impossible for traditional forms of governance to keep pace with the 
rapid development of digital technologies, and the specialized legal rules “would likely 
become outdated shortly thereafter”.963 Th erefore, the self-regulation which is more 
fl exible and easier to update, can play an important role in cyberspace.964 Besides, even 
with the application of state regulation, the copyright infringement on the Internet still 
has not been reduced to a tolerable level, for which self-regulation needs to coexist with 
state regulation.965 Further, the state regulation also admits the positive impact of self-
regulation. For example, the E-Commerce Directive encourages trade, professional and 
consumer associations or organizations to draw up codes of Conduct at community level 
so as to better implement the Directive.966 What occurs in digital copyright enforcement 
also demonstrates the importance of self-regulation. As noted by Prof. Hugenholtz, 
traditionally, courts take charge in copyright enforcement, either in civil procedures 
or criminal procedures; however, on the internet, “copyright enforcement is gradually 
being moved from the courts and put into the hands of intermediaries applying a self-
imposed ‘code of conduct’”.967 It is a global tendency that ISPs are either committing or 
compelled to commit themselves to self-regulatory rules and procedures which aim at 
solving massive copyright infringement on the Internet.968 
Basically, the self-regulation regarding hosting ISPs can be divided into two categories, 
one of which is the code of conduct achieved among multiple stakeholders,969 and 
the other one is the so-called “second level agreements”970 reached between copyright 
owners and hosting ISPs. Since it is common that the contents uploaded to hosting 
platforms contain materials owned by copyright owners, hosting ISPs reach second level 
agreements with copyright owners so as to decide how to deal with these suspected 
infringing contents from a business perspective. Over time, second level agreement 
962  Johnson DR and David G, ‘Post, Law and Borders: Th e Rise of Law in Cyberspace’ (1996) 48 Stanford Law Review 
1367, at 1370. Gibbon LJ, ‘No Regulation, Government Regulation, or Self-Regulation: Social Enforcement or 
Social Contracting for Governance in Cyberspace’ (1996) 6 Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 475. Hardy 
IT, ‘Th e Proper Legal Regime for Cyberspace’ (1993) 55 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 993.
963 Easterbrook FH, ‘Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse’ (1996) 1 University of Chicago Legal Forum 207, at 213.
964 Hugenholtz, ‘Codes of Conduct and Copyright Enforcement in Cyberspace’ (n55), at 305.
965  Anon, ‘Th e Principles for User Generated Content Services: A Middle-Ground Approach to Cyber-Governance’ 
(2008) 121 Harvard Law Review 1387, at 1406.
966 E-commerce Directive (n1), Art.16.
967 Hugenholtz, ‘Codes of Conduct and Copyright Enforcement in Cyberspace’ (n55), at 303.
968 Ibid.
969 For instance, the Principles for User Generated content services (n42).
970  Th e Second level agreement is a term used by Yafi t Lev-Aretz. According to her defi nition, a second level agreement 
is a pre-emptive license obtained by hosting ISPs to ratify the mass usage of copyrighted materials by their users. 
See Lev-Aretz Y, ‘Second Level Agreements’ (2011) 45 Akron Law Review 137, at 152.
 Self-regulation of Copyright Enforcement on Hosting Platforms
213
became “more standardized”971, and thus refl ects the “deference to the cross-industry 
form of private ordering”972. Generally, Codes of Conduct tend to focus on how should 
the ISPs and copyright owners cooperate together to reduce the infringement, but 
second level agreements also contribute to “ratify[ing] the mass usage of copyrighted 
materials” on hosting platforms.973 
According to the norms set in these self-regulation document, hosting providers need to 
assume some responsibilities which are not prescribed in legislation or case law for the 
purpose of reducing copyright infringement. Th is chapter analyzes the responsibilities 
indicated in these two types of self-regulation, and then evaluates how they aﬀ ect hosting 
ISPs’ freedom to operate when solving the copyright disputes on hosting platforms. It 
starts with the discussion on codes of conduct (7.1). In this part, according to the variety 
of involving intensities from government, it explores the norms set in three diﬀ erent 
codes of conduct, which are Notice-and-Takedown Code of Conduct (hereafter NT 
Code), Principles for User Generated Content Services (hereafter UGC Principles), and 
Self-discipline Codes in China. Based on the exploration done on these three codes of 
conduct, it evaluates the codes of conduct from the perspective of preserving hosting 
ISPs’ freedom to operate by comparing them with state regulatory norms (7.1.4). In the 
next section (7.2), it discusses the second level agreements reached between copyright 
owners and hosting ISPs. First, it explores the substantial contents of second level 
agreements (7.2.1). Th en, it evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of second level 
agreements in respect of preserving hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate (7.2.2 and 7.2.3). 
Finally, it answers the question – whether self-regulation can better regulate hosting 
ISPs’ copyright responsibilities with regard to preserving their freedom to operate (7.3).
7.1 Codes of Conduct
Codes of conduct are the agreements achieved between multiple stakeholders so as to 
solve the copyright infringement problem in hosting services. From the perspectives 
of stakeholders, they need such kind of codes of conduct for their own interests. For 
example, copyright owners would like to ask hosting ISPs to take more responsibility in 
reducing the infringement. From the perspective of hosting ISPs, they are also willing 
to take more copyright-protecting measures so as to get the copyright owners’ promises 
of not suing in return. Besides, governments also prefer to see the stakeholders solve 
the tremendous copyright infringement on the Internet by themselves, so they can save 
lots of time and energy in law-making.974  Normally, codes of conduct mean the norms 
971 Ibid. 
972  Lev-Aretz Y, ‘Copyright Lawmaking and Public Choice: From Legislative Battles to Private Ordering’ (2013) 27 
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 203, at 251.
973 Lev-Aretz, ‘Second Level Agreements’ (n965), at 152.
974 Hugenholtz, ‘Codes of Conduct and Copyright Enforcement in Cyberspace’ (n55), at 304.
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resulting from self-regulation committed by private actors, but the authorities also often 
participate in the norms-setting process under a self-regulatory framework in varying 
degrees of intensity,975 such as the Notice-and-Takedown Code of Conduct in the 
Netherlands.976 However, there are still some codes of conduct purely achieved among 
private entities, such as Principles for User Generated Content Services.977 In China, 
government even plays a dominant role in drafting the self-regulation norms, such as 
“Self-discipline Treaty on Internet Audio-video Program Services in China” (hereafter 
Self-discipline Treaty) and “Self-discipline Declaration on Copyright Protection by the 
Internet Industry in China” (hereafter Self-discipline Declaration).978 In the following 
text, these four codes of conduct will be analyzed.
7.1.1 NT Code of Conduct
  At the EU level, the E-Commerce Directive does not codify the notice-and-takedown 
procedure, but Member States are encouraged to explore this procedure at their 
own discretion.979 In the Netherlands, with the eﬀ orts from governmental sectors 
and private entities (especially copyright owners and ISPs), a code on notice-and-
takedown procedure was achieved in 2008 so as to deal with the illegal content on 
the Internet. Th e code has 7 Articles, which provide detailed rules about the notice-
and-takedown procedure, including the requirement of notice, the evaluation done 
by ISPs and the corresponding measures after the evaluation.
7.1.1.1 Requirement of Notice
  Th e Code fi rst clarifi es that the notifi er should be responsible for the accuracy of the 
notices, and then the Code diﬀ erentiates the notices sent from public authorities 
and private sectors.980 Regarding the notices sent by public authorities in formal 
investigating processes, such as a notice from the Public Prosecutor’s Oﬃ  ce with 
an imperative character, the Code does not set any particular requirement on 
the content of such notices, and the ISPs are obliged to comply with them.981 
975 Ibid.
976  Notice-and-Take-Down Code of Conduct, ecp.nl (2008), available at http://ecp.nl/over-ecp/216/over-ecp.html (last 
visited 15-12-2014).
977  Principles for User Generated Content Services (n42).
978  In the case of Self-discipline Treaty, it was drafted and published by the State Administration of Radio Film and 
Television for the industry participants to sign in. see Self-discipline Treaty on Internet Audio-video Program Services 
in China (中国互联网视听节目服务自律公约) (n42). Regarding the Self-discipline Declaration, without the 
active coordination done by National Copyright Administration and Beijing Municipal Bureau of Copyright, it 
is almost impossible that more than 100 websites would sign in this Declaration. See 101 websites sign in “Self-
discipline Declaration on Copyright Protection by Internet Industry in China” together (101家网站共同发布《中国
互联网行业版权自律宣言》), www.npc.gov.cn (全国人大网)(2010), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/
xinwen/fztd/fzsh/2010-01/21/content_1535617.htm (last visited 12-12-2014).
979  Directive 2000/EC/31, Art. 21.2, this Article requires the Commission to submit a report about notice-and-
takedown procedure, so this procedure is defi nitely encouraged by the E-Commerce Directive.
980 Notice-and-Take-Down Code of Conduct (n971), Art. 4.
981 Ibid, Art. 4a and Note to Art. 4a.
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However, if a notice is sent from the private sector, it should contain the following 
information:982
  1) Th e contact details of the notifi er;
  2)  Th e information that the intermediary needs to be able to evaluate the 
content, at least including the location (URL);
  3)  A description of why the content is unlawful according to the notifi er, 
or why it is in confl ict with the criteria published by the intermediary 
governing undesirable content;
  4)  A statement of reason why this intermediary is being approached as the 
most appropriate intermediary to deal with the matter.
  After checking the elements listed above, it can be seen that the Code sets a quite 
strict requirement on the content of a competent notice. In a competent notice, the 
copyright owner not only needs to indicate the location of the alleged infringing 
materials as precisely as possible,983 but also demonstrates why the alleged infringing 
materials are unlawful or undesirable content. Besides, copyright owners can also 
request the urgent removal of infringing materials indicated in the notices, but 
suﬃ  cient reasons need to be given to explain why an urgent removal is necessary.984 
For instance, in the case of dealing with repeated infringement, a request for urgent 
remove can be initiated.985 
7.1.1.2 Evaluation of Notice 
  After receiving a notice from a copyright owner, the ISP need not comply with the 
notice automatically, but should evaluate the notice and then decide whether the 
materials complained in the notice are unlawful or undesirable.986 Nevertheless, 
the Code does not set a standard about the evaluation, and ISPs can make their 
own evaluating policies. Th erefore, ISPs can choose to undertake a superfi cial or 
sophisticated evaluation. 
7.1.1.3 Measures to Be Taken
  After the evaluation, the ISPs can take diﬀ erent measures based on their evaluation 
result in each case. If an ISP concludes that the designated materials are not 
982 Ibid, Art. 4b.
983 Ibid, Note to Art. 4b.
984 Ibid, Art. 4c.
985 Ibid, Note to Art. 4c.
986 Ibid, Art. 5.
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unequivocally unlawful, it should inform the notifi er about its conclusion with the 
reasons attached.987 But if an ISP concludes that the materials are unequivocally 
unlawful, the ISP should immediately remove the materials.988 In the event that an 
ISP cannot be quite sure about whether the complained materials are unlawful or 
not, the ISP should forward the notice to the person who provided the materials 
concerned.989 After receiving the notice forwarded by the ISPs, the content 
providers need to contact the corresponding notifi ers, and discuss how to deal with 
the content.990 If an agreement cannot be reached between notifi er and content 
provider, the notifi er can either make an oﬃ  cial notice to the police, or launch a 
lawsuit against the content provider. However, in practice, content providers may 
not contact the notifi ers even after receiving the notices forwarded by the ISPs, and 
in this situation, the ISPs may either take the content oﬄ  ine, or disclose the content 
providers’ identities, such as content providers’ name, contact information.991 
Besides, the ISPs should undertake due caution to prevent any mistaken removal.992
7.1.1.4 Assessment
  Comparing with the codifi ed notice-and-takedown procedures discussed in the 
previous chapter, the procedure set in the Code is more detailed and clear for the 
relevant parties to fulfi ll their obligations.993 In this regard, hosting ISPs face more 
legal certainty in the procedure. In addition, the Code also includes several fl exible 
provisions. As discussed above, ISPs need to evaluate notices with due caution, 
but notifi ers are responsible for the accuracy of notices. Th erefore, ISPs can in 
fact defi ne the “due caution” by themselves, which avoids imposing unreasonable 
evaluation burden on them.994 Further, the Code allows hosting ISPs and copyright 
owners to make further mutual arrangements between them. As indicated in Note 
to Art. 7c, copyright owners and ISPs are free to collaborate with each other to 
speed up the whole procedure.995 For example, a notifi er can be regarded as a trusted 
party so that the evaluation of its notices can be omitted.996 With these fl exible 
987 Ibid, Art. 6a.
988 Ibid, Art. 6b.
989 Ibid, Art. 6c.
990 Ibid.
991 Ibid, Note to Art. 6c.
992 Ibid, Art. 6d.
993  Besides including 7 detailed Articles that regulate notice-and-takedown procedure, the Code also provides 
explanatory notes to these Articles. Th ese explanatory notes instruct how to interpret each Article in diﬀ erent 
circumstances, which helps to clarify relevant parties’ duties in the procedure.
994  In Section 5.5, the author demonstrates that it is too burdensome for hosting ISPs to evaluate notices so as to 
ensure their accuracy, so hosting ISPs should not be obligated to conduct such evaluation. By contrast, in the 
context of self-regulation, the intensity of evaluation (due caution) can be defi ned by ISPs themselves, which can 
avoid imposing unreasonable burden on ISPs while encouraging them to evaluate notices based on their capacity. 
995  Ibid. Note to Art. 7c.
996 Ibid.
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  arrangements, ISPs have more freedom to decide their anti-piracy policies during 
operation. Further, the Code is not a binding contract,997 and it means that hosting 
ISPs can choose whether to fulfi ll the duties prescribed in the Code. Nevertheless, 
non-bindingness also means that hosting ISPs may still face risk of being sued by 
copyright owners, even though they fulfi ll these duties. 
7.1.2 Principles for User Generated Content Services 
  In 2007, in order to solve the overwhelming copyright infringement over the 
Internet, some copyright giants, such as CBS, Sony and Disney, reached an 
agreement with some leading hosting ISPs, including Dailymotion and Veol.998 Th e 
Principles admit that no anti-piracy system is perfect, but hosting ISPs need to be 
more active in eliminating copyright infringement. Particularly, hosting ISPs are 
required to take some measures which go beyond the statutory requirement, such 
as employing content identifi cation technologies. In general, UGC Principles can 
be seen as a win-win deal when statutory law fails to properly solve the copyright 
infringement on the Internet, because according to UGC Principles, hosting ISPs 
promise to take more eﬃ  cient measures to eliminate infringement in exchange for 
the not-suing promise from copyright owners.
  At the beginning of UGC Principles, the objectives pursued by parties are enumerated 
as follows: (1) eliminating infringing content on UGC websites; (2) encouraging the 
upload of original and authorized user-generated content; (3) accommodating fair 
use on UGC websites; (4) protecting the legitimate interests of user privacy. Besides 
listing these general objectives which are about balancing all involved interests, 
UGC Principles require hosting ISPs to adopt content identifi cation technologies 
which aim at eliminating copyright infringement on their platforms.
  Content identifi cation technologies allow hosting ISPs to identify whether the 
materials uploaded by Internet users contain any content copyrighted by any signee 
of UGC Principles. In order to fulfi ll this goal, copyright owners should fi rst oﬀ er 
“the reference data for content to establish a match with user-uploaded content”, 
and then indicate how to deal with the user-uploaded content which matches the 
reference data.999 If copyright owners have not indicated any specifi c treatment for 
the matched content, this matched content needs to be blocked by hosting ISPs.1000 
Besides blocking matched content from being uploaded, copyright owners can 
also choose the alternative treatment, such as allowing the content to be uploaded, 
997  Ibid, see introduction of explanatory statement, and it states “complying with the code is voluntary, and there can 
be no formal enforcement in the case of non-compliance.”
998  Internet and Media Industry Leaders Unveil Principles to Foster Online Innovation While Protecting Copyrights(2007), 
available at http://www.ugcprinciples.com/press_release.html.
999 Principles for User Generated Content Services (n42), Art. 3a.
1000 Ibid.  
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licensing use of the content, etc..1001 From the perspective of hosting ISPs, they 
fi rst should establish databases used for fi ltering out matched content, and make it 
reasonably convenient for copyright owners to deliver the reference materials to the 
fi ltering database.1002 Further, before any up-loaded content can be made available 
on hosting ISPs’ websites, it needs to pass through the fi ltering database, and if any 
user-uploaded content matches the reference materials, the hosting ISP needs to take 
corresponding measures, such as blocking or other measure indicated by copyright 
owners.1003 Besides, hosting ISPs can manually review all of the user-uploaded 
content as a complement or replacement to content identifi cation technology, so 
long as the manual review is as eﬀ ective as the identifi cation technology in terms 
of eliminating infringing content.1004 With the purpose of avoiding blocking any 
authorized content, copyright owners should provide a list of users authorized to 
utilize the content which would match the reference materials.1005
  In order to ensure that content identifi cation technologies function properly, when 
copyright owners deliver the reference materials to the hosting ISPs, they should 
“believe in good faith that they have the appropriate rights to do so, and update 
rights information as reasonable to keep it accurate.”1006 Besides, copyright owners 
should coordinate with hosting ISPs so as to avoid unduly stressing the content 
identifi cation technology, such as delivering too much reference material during 
limited periods.1007 Further, with the cooperation from copyright owners, hosting 
ISPs should reasonably ensure that these reference materials are incorporated into 
the content identifi cation system as soon as possible in such overload periods.1008 
Because infringing content might be uploaded before the corresponding reference 
materials are incorporated into the content identifi cation system, hosting ISPs 
should regularly use the content identifi cation system to check throughout their 
service and then remove such infringing materials.1009 In order to protect users’ 
legal interests while preventing infringement, a reasonable procedure should be 
developed by copyright owners and hosting ISPs to deal with the case where users 
and copyright owners have confl icting claims over the content which is blocked or 
removed by the content identifi cation system.1010
  Besides establishing a content identifi cation system, UGC Principles also ask 
hosting ISPs to undertake some other duties which go beyond statutory obligation. 
1001 Ibid, Art. 3c.
1002 Ibid, Art. 3a. 
1003 Ibid, Art. 3c. 
1004 Ibid, Art. 3f. 
1005 Ibid, Art. 3e.
1006 Ibid, Art. 3g.
1007 Ibid. 
1008 Ibid.
1009 Ibid, Art. 3h.
1010 Ibid, Art. 3i. 
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First, hosting ISPs should work with copyright owners to identify the sites which 
are “dedicated to, and predominately used for” infringement, or facilitating such 
infringement. Once such a site has been identifi ed, the hosting ISP must block 
the links to this site, and if the hosting ISP is able to identify specifi c links which 
solely oﬀ er access to legal content on such site, the hosting ISP may not block these 
legal links.1011 Second, hosting ISPs should provide commercially reasonable means 
to help copyright owners locate the infringing content throughout their websites 
where user-uploaded content is publicly accessible.1012 
  UGC Principles also reiterate some rules which have been provided in current 
law, but make these rules more detailed. First, hosting ISPs should in relevant and 
conspicuous places on their sites state that they promote the respect for intellectual 
property rights and discourage infringing content from being uploaded, and also 
inform users not to upload any infringing content.1013 Second, when copyright 
owners send notices to hosting ISPs, the notices should include the URLs by which 
the hosting ISPs can locate the infringing content.1014 After receiving a notice, the 
hosting ISP needs to expeditiously remove the corresponding content, notify the 
uploader, and if the uploader sends a qualifi ed counter-notifi cation, the hosting 
ISP should forward this counter-notifi cation to the relevant copyright owner.1015 
Th ese measures just mirror notice-and-takedown procedure in DMCA 512.1016 
However, as for whether to replace the removed content, UGC Principles indicate 
a diﬀ erent solution, which is that hosting ISPs can decide at their own option, to 
follow either applicable law or the agreement with copyright owners.1017 Besides, 
UGC Principles also reinforce the repeat infringer termination policy provided in 
DCMA 512.1018 According to UGC Principles, in order to properly implement the 
repeat infringer termination policy, hosting ISPs should take reasonable measures 
to track the infringing uploads from the same user, and prevent the terminated user 
from applying for a new account by reusing the verifi ed email address.1019 Further, 
measures also need to be taken against repeat infringing content. After infringing 
content has been removed as requested by a notice, the copyright owner can either 
do it by itself or request the hosting ISP to incorporate the infringing content into 
the content identifi cation system as reference data.1020 
  According to UGC Principles, hosting ISPs also have a duty to retain user’s online 
1011 Ibid, Art. 4.
1012 Ibid, Art. 5.
1013 Ibid, Art. 1, 2. 
1014 Ibid, Art. 7.
1015 Ibid, Art. 8.
1016 See DCMA (n1), Sec. 512, c(1)(C), g(2)(A) and g(2)(B).
1017 Principles for User Generated Content Services (n42), Art. 8.
1018 See DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, i(1)(A).
1019 Principles for User Generated Content Services (n42), Art. 11.
1020 Ibid, Art. 9.
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communication data for 60 days, and copyright owners can request this data in 
terms of law, when this data is necessary for any valid process.1021 Th is data includes: 
“(a) the information related to user uploads of audio and video content to their 
services, including Internet Protocol addresses and time and date information for 
uploaded content; and (b) user-uploaded content that has been on their services but 
has been subsequently removed following a notice of infringement.”1022 Th is data 
will help immensely, when copyright owners try to trace the identities of users who 
upload infringing materials. For instance, according to DMCA 512(h), copyright 
owners can apply for subpoenas to request hosting ISPs to disclose the suspect users’ 
identity information, but the hosting ISPs only need to disclose it to the extent that 
such information is available to them.1023 However, users usually do not reveal their 
true identity, when registering accounts for hosting ISPs’ services, so the hosting 
ISPs might not keep much information about users’ identity. UGC Principles set 
an obligation for hosting ISPs to retain users’ uploading data, which not only makes 
the identifi cation of users available, but also oﬀ ers evidence to prove infringement.
  Compared to the statutory rules, hosting ISPs need to shoulder more duties to 
reinforce copyright protection on their platforms under the frame of UGC 
Principles. In the light of the non-monitoring responsibility clause and notice-and-
takedown procedure provided in DMCA 512, copyright owners should take the 
main responsibility to police copyright infringement.1024 Nevertheless, according to 
UGC Principles, most of the burden of monitoring copyright infringement is shifted 
from copyright owners to hosting ISPs.1025 For instance, content identifi cation 
technologies need to be adopted by hosting ISPs so as to fi lter out the infringing 
content before it is made available on the Internet. By contrast, if following notice-
and-takedown procedure, hosting ISPs only need to react correspondingly to notices 
send by copyright owners. Further, UGC Principles also impose some other duties 
on hosting ISPs, such as reinforcing repeat infringer policy, preventing the same 
infringing materials from being uploaded again and retaining users’ uploading data. 
7.1.3 Self-discipline Code in China
  In China, several self-discipline codes about copyright enforcement on the Internet 
have been reached in the past decade, and the administrative agencies always take a 
lead in drafting and promoting these codes. For example, “Self-discipline Treaty on 
Internet Audio-video Program Services in China” (hereafter Self-discipline Treaty) 
was drafted and published by the State Administration of Radio Film and Television 
1021 Ibid, Art. 10.
1022 Ibid.
1023 DMCA (n1), Sec. 512, (h).
1024 Ibid. 
1025  Anon, ‘Th e Principles for User Generated Content Services: A Middle-Ground Approach to Cyber-Governance’ 
(n960), at 1401.
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  for the industry participants to sign.1026 In the case of “Self-discipline Declaration on 
Copyright Protection by the Internet Industry in China” (hereafter Self-discipline 
Declaration), without the active coordination done by the National Copyright 
Administration and Beijing Municipal Bureau of Copyright, it is almost impossible 
that more than 100 websites would sign this Declaration.1027
7.1.3.1 Self-discipline Treaty 
  Th e Self-discipline Treaty was drafted by the State Administration of Radio Film 
and Television which focuses more on censoring the inappropriate content1028 
rather than fi ltering out infringing content, so anti-piracy is not the main purpose 
of the Self-discipline Treaty. However, the measures adopted by the Self-discipline 
Treaty do contribute to copyright protection.
  According to Article 4 of the Self-discipline Treaty, the signatories should comply 
with the laws about regulating the copyright of audio-video programs on the 
Internet, actively take copyright-protection measures, respect and protect the legal 
interest of copyright owners and the units oﬀ ering audio-video program services on 
the Internet, so as to create and maintain a fair and orderly copyright environment 
for Internet audio-video programs, and promote the development of the Internet 
audio-video program service industry.1029 Besides, the signatories should establish 
a database for collecting the information about Internet audio-video programs 
together, and they are also encouraged to notify the other signatories about the 
audio-video programs which are illegal in terms of laws, statutes, regulations and 
policies through the foresaid database.1030 Further, the signatories should regularly 
log on the database so as to check the illegal contents gathered in the database, and 
if any of this illegal content is available on their websites, they need to remove it.1031 
1026  Self-discipline Treaty on Internet Audio-video Program Services in China (中国互联网视听节目服务自律公约) 
(n42).
1027  101 websites sign in “Self-discipline Declaration on Copyright Protection by Internet Industry in China” together (101
家网站共同发布《中国互联网行业版权自律宣言》) (n973).
1028  Th ere is no standard defi nition about “inappropriate content”, but generally, the following content will be treated 
as inappropriate: 1) any content that is against the basic principles prescribed and set by the Constitution; 2) 
any conduct that endangers the unifi cation, the integrity, the sovereignty and the territory of the State; 3) any 
content that divulges state secrets, endangers national security, or harms the honor and interests of the State; 4) 
any content that instigates national hatred and ethnic discrimination, undermines national solidarity, or infringes 
people’s walks of life and or customs; 5) any content that propagates paganism or superstition; 6) any content 
which disturbs social order or undermine social stability; 7) any content that induces minors to cross social lines, 
violate laws and commit crimes, or exaggerates violence, pornography, gamble, or terrorist activities …, see State 
Administration of Radio Film and Television; Ministry of Information Industry (国家广播电影电视总局; 信息
产业部), Administrative Provisions for the Internet Audio-Video Program Service (互联网视听节目服务管理
规定), Order No. 56 of the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television and the Ministry of Information 
Industry (国家广播电影电视总局、中华人民共和国信息产业部令第56号), December 20, 2007, Art. 16.
1029  Self-discipline Treaty on Internet Audio-video Program Services in China (中国互联网视听节目服务自律公约) 
(n42), Art. 4.
1030 Ibid, Art. 7(2).
1031 Ibid, Art. 7(3).
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As referred to above, the database is built mainly for the purpose of fi ltering out 
sensitive/inappropriate contents, but since the contents which infringe copyright 
are part of inappropriate contents, the database can also contribute to copyright 
enforcement on hosting platforms.
7.1.3.2 Self-discipline Declaration
  Th e Self-discipline Declaration specifi cally aims at eliminating copyright 
infringement on the Internet, and it requests hosting ISPs to take more measures 
than those prescribed in law so as to reduce copyright infringement. As stated by 
Mr. Zhang (vice chairman of Copyright Society of China), the duties set in the Self-
discipline Declaration are not too hard to comply with, but a certain level of eﬀ ort 
still needs to be done to fulfi ll them.1032
  First, hosting ISPs should reinforce the supervision and management of contents 
uploaded by Internet users, and deter Internet users from uploading contents 
copyrighted by others and committing copyright infringement through their 
Internet platform.1033 Second, hosting ISPs also need to actively adopt the standard 
technical measures that are recognized by industries so as to prevent infringement 
from occurring.1034 Further, hosting ISPs should particularly take technical 
measures to restrict the following content from being uploaded, including: 1) the 
contents cannot be disseminated without permission from competent authorities; 
2) the audio-video works that are newly distributed, popular and still on screen.1035 
Th erefore, the Self-discipline Declaration sets an obligation for hosting ISPs to 
monitor the audio-video works that are newly distributed, popular and still on 
screen. Th ird, if a user violates service terms, refuses to heed the exhortation, and 
repeatedly disseminates illegal contents, the hosting ISPs should not only remove 
corresponding contents and terminate the service to the user, but also report the user 
to the relevant authorities.1036 Fourth, hosting ISPs should treat the notices from 
copyright owners seriously, and ensure that the infringing content will be removed 
in 24 hours after receiving competent notices.1037 Fifth, hosting ISPs should actively 
develop a copyright identifi cation and claim system so as to provide a convenient way 
for copyright owners to claim their copyright and license their works.1038 Further, 
the Internet industry (including hosting ISPs) should actively communicate with 
1032  Press Conference on 2009 Special Action held by State Administration of Press and Publication(新闻出版总署2009
专项行动新闻发布会), http://www.scio.gov.cn/(2010), available at http://www.scio.gov.cn/wlcb/blxxjbygl/
Document/527754/527754.htm (last visited 20-12-2014).
1033 Self-discipline Declaration, Art. 3. 
1034 Ibid, Art. 4.
1035 Ibid.
1036 Ibid, Art. 5.
1037 Ibid, Art. 6.
1038 Ibid, Art. 7.
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  copyright owners and relevant associations, and develop the new copyright license 
mechanism in the online environment so as to promote the legal dissemination of 
works.1039
  Like UGC Principles, the Self-discipline Declaration not only crafts some statutory 
rules, such as repeat infringer policy and action term upon receiving notices, but 
also sets some new duties for hosting ISPs, such as adopting standard technical 
measures, monitoring audio-video works which are newly distributed, popular 
and still on screen, and developing a copyright identifi cation and claim system. In 
addition, the Self-discipline Declaration also encourages hosting ISPs to develop a 
new copyright license mechanism with copyright owners.
7.1.4 The Evaluation of the Codes of Conduct
  From the self-regulation documents discussed above, a general tendency can be 
drawn, and that is, compared with state norms, hosting ISPs need to take more 
responsibilities to eliminate copyrighted contents from being uploaded without 
permission.1040 Further, the rules set in self-regulation are more detailed and explicit 
for copyright owners and hosting ISPs to follow.1041 In following text, by comparing 
with state norms, a further examination will be done to self-regulation from the 
perspective of preserving the freedom to operate of hosting ISPs’ copyright.
7.1.4.1 A New “Safe Harbor”
  In the context of codes of conduct, hosting ISPs promise to fulfi ll the duties 
prescribed in self-regulation. Although these duties may go beyond the obligations 
set in state norms, hosting ISPs usually can avoid being sued by copyright owners 
once fulfi lling these duties. As provided in Art. 14 of UGC Principles, “If a UGC 
Service adheres to all of these Principles in good faith, the Copyright Owner should 
not assert a claim of copyright infringement against such UGC Service with respect 
to infringing user-uploaded content that might remain on the UGC Service despite 
such adherence to these Principles.”1042 In this regard, codes of conduct create 
another kind of “safe harbor” for hosting ISPs. 
  According to the above discussion on codes of conduct, state of the art fi ltering 
technologies have been required to be installed into hosting services, which helps 
immensely to eliminate copyright infringement. As noted by Lessig, the code is “the 
most eﬀ ective way to regulate behavior in cyberspace.”1043 Before any content can be 
1039 Ibid, Art. 8.
1040 For example, hosting ISPs are commonly requested to adopt fi ltering technologies. 
1041  Taking notice-and-takedown procedure as an example, the Code of Conduct and UGC Principle clearly request 
copyright owners to submit the IP addresses of infringing materials in notices, and the Self-discipline Declaration 
requires hosting ISPs to remove the designated materials in 24 hours after receiving the notices.
1042 Principles for User Generated Content Services (n42), Art. 14.
1043 Lessig L, ‘Th e Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach’ (1999) 113 Harvard Law Review 501, at 514.
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  uploaded and made available on hosting platforms, it needs to pass the inspection 
done by fi ltering technologies, so most of infringing uploads cannot ever be accessible 
by the public, which will eﬀ ectively reduce copyright owners’ damages caused by 
infringing uploads. For example, when a user tries to upload a newly distributed 
fi lm on a video platform, without fi ltering technologies, the uploading would highly 
likely succeed, and may be watched by many Internet users before it is removed 
through notice-and-takedown procedure. In these circumstances, irrevocable 
damage may have been caused to the copyright owner before the infringing upload 
is taken down, since the public who can watch the fi lm on the video platform may 
not go to the cinema or buy DVDs. However, if fi ltering technologies have been 
adopted, the fi lm cannot be successfully uploaded, and no damage will be caused to 
the copyright owner. Besides, fi ltering technologies can also resolve another problem 
of notice-and-takedown procedure, and that is to prevent the infringing materials 
from being uploaded again and again. Under notice-and-takedown procedure, the 
materials that have been removed can be easily uploaded again.1044 However, in line 
with UGC Principles and the Self-discipline Declaration, the infringing contents 
that have been removed can be incorporated into fi ltering system as reference data, 
so infringing contents can be eﬀ ectively prevented from being uploaded again.1045 
  As being discussed in Chapter 4, in several cases copyright owners have tried to 
convince the court that hosting ISPs should adopt fi ltering technologies, but fi nally 
failed, because this claim may confl ict with the “no general monitoring obligation” 
clause.1046 Nevertheless, through codes of conduct, copyright owners and hosting 
ISPs agree on a fl exible fi ltering mechanism,1047 according to which the fi ltering 
technologies adopted by hosting ISPs need not to be perfect but state of the art and 
keep on developing with the eﬀ orts of both copyright owners and hosting ISPs. 
Th is fl exible fi ltering mechanism not only provides better protection for copyright 
owners, but also avoid imposing unreasonable burden on hosting ISPs. As noted by 
1044  In order to prevent these illegal uploads from being uploaded repeatedly, a French judge had made a “notice-
and-staydown” regime, which requests ISPs to take every possible measures to prevent the same content from 
being uploaded again, but fi nally, this “notice-and-staydown” regime was rejected by French Supreme Court. 
See Angelopoulos, ‘Beyond the Safe Harbours: Harmonising Substantive Intermediary Liability for Copyright 
Infringement in Europe’ (n91), at 265.
1045  Principles for User Generated Content Services (n42), Art. 9. In China, the hosting ISPs who sign the Declaration 
commonly build the so-called black-content database, and once  content has been mentioned in a complaint 
notice, the content will be input into the black-content database. If the same content is uploaded again, the black-
content database can identify it and fi lter it out.
1046  For instance, in the case of SABAM v. Netlog, the plaintiﬀ  claimed that the defendant ought to be required to 
introduce a fi ltering system for preventing infringing materials from being made available on its platform, but 
eventually the ECJ dismissed the plaintiﬀ ’s claim. One of the reasons is that the installation of a fi ltering system 
as such would require the defendant to actively monitor all of the information on its platform without time 
limitation, which would impose a general monitoring obligation on the defendant. See SABAM v. Netlog (n311), 
Para. 43-45, 52.
1047  Anon, ‘Th e Principles for User Generated Content Services: A Middle-Ground Approach to Cyber-Governance’ 
(n960), at 1405.
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Prof. Hugenholtz, “norms set by private actors directly concerned are usually geared 
more precisely to the needs of a specifi c industry”,1048 so copyright owners and 
hosting ISPs, as industrial participants, who know exactly what is going on in their 
industries, can reach an agreement which fi ts more into the needs of both sides. 
  When state norms fail to properly defi ne the boundary of hosting ISPs’ responsibilities 
for copyright infringement, through codes of conduct copyright owners and hosting 
ISPs establish the “best practice” from a business perspective.1049 Once hosting ISPs 
comply with the “best practice”, they can acquire the copyright owners’ promises of not 
suing them in return. To sum up, under the frame of Codes of Conduct, hosting ISPs 
avoid assuming unreasonable anti-piracy burden and meanwhile face fewer lawsuits, so 
Code of Conduct contribute to preserving the freedom to operate of hosting ISPs.
7.1.4.2 Better Legal Certainty 
  Codes of conduct usually include more detailed norms than state regulation, which 
makes them easier for hosting ISPs to comply with. For example, NTD Code of 
Conduct not only includes 7 Articles to instruct the obligations and rights of the 
parties involved in notice-and-takedown procedures, but also provides explanatory 
notes which instruct how to interpret these Articles in detail.1050 Further, codes of 
conduct also tend to clarify some disputed issues in case law. For instance, when a 
copyright owner sends a notice to hosting ISPs, it is always a question of whether 
the URLs of the materials mentioned should be indicated in the notice. In the 
hearings, copyright owners claim they do not need to oﬀ er URLs in notices, but 
hosting ISPs argue that the URLs are necessary for them to locate the materials, 
and diﬀ erent courts hold diﬀ erent opinions on this issue.1051 However, both Code 
of Conduct and UGC Principles read that the URLs of such materials should be 
included in notices,1052 so actually, oﬀ ering URLs seems not so burdensome as 
copyright owners claim in the hearings. As industrial participants, what is occurring 
in the industries is crystallized for them, so they always can reach a more appropriate 
solution than judges who lack the expertise in relevant industries. In addition, it is 
also a controversial issue to determine how much time should be allowed for alleged 
infringing materials to be removed once hosting ISPs receive competent notices. 
Th e Self-discipline Declaration in China provides that the infringing materials 
complained in notices ought to be removed in 24 hours.1053
1048 Hugenholtz, ‘Codes of Conduct and Copyright Enforcement in Cyberspace’ (n55), at 306.
1049  Angelopoulos, C, Filtering the Internet for copyrighted content in Europe (2009) 4 IRIS plus (Supplement to 
IRIS-Legal Observations of the European Audiovisual Observatory) 2, at 9.
1050 See Notice-and-Take-Down Code of Conduct (n971), and the above discussion about NTD Code of Conduct.
1051 See discussion in previous chapter “notice-and-takedown procedure in the US, the EU and China”, Section 5.4.1.
1052  Notice-and-Take-Down Code of Conduct (n971), Art. 4b. Principles for User Generated Content Services (n42), 
Art. 7.
1053 Self-discipline Declaration, Art. 6.
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  Codes of conduct can help to achieve certain harmonization in respect of regulating 
hosting ISPs’ copyright responsibilities at international level. Th e Internet, unlike 
nations in the physical world, does not have geographic borders, but the application 
of state regulation has its boundary, and is always connected to a particular 
nation-state jurisdiction. Based on this inherent confl ict between the Internet 
and state regulation, Professor David Post and David Johnson argued that both 
the feasibility and legitimacy of state regulation is challenged by the Internet,1054 
and the Internet “cannot be governed, satisfactorily, by any current territorially 
based sovereign”.1055 Although the eﬀ ectiveness of state governance on the Internet 
should not be inappropriately underestimated, state governance does have its 
own defects when regulating hosting ISPs’ copyright responsibilities. Particularly, 
state governance cannot overcome the restriction set by nations. For instance, the 
infringing materials uploaded onto hosting platforms can be accessed globally, but 
the laws and jurisprudence about copyright protection in each nation are diﬀ erent. 
As can be found from the discussion in previous chapters, even though “safe harbor” 
provisions have been commonly adopted in the US, EU and China, hosting ISPs’ 
responsibilities for copyright infringement are still diverse in these jurisdictions, 
which poses barriers for hosting ISPs to operate in these jurisdictions. Codes of 
conduct can help to overcome the territorial restriction, and set harmonized rules 
for copyright owner and hosting ISPs in diﬀ erent territories to comply with. Within 
the leeway left by national laws, UGC Principles are a good example. So far, UGC 
Principles cover the hosting ISPs and copyright owners based in the US, France 
and Germany,1056 and in 2011, even a Chinese video-sharing website called Youku 
signed the UGC Principles.1057 Th ese signatory hosting ISPs based in diﬀ erent 
countries only need to follow the unitary rules set by UGC Principles when dealing 
with copyright infringement on their platforms.
1054 Johnson and David, ‘Post, Law and Borders: Th e Rise of Law in Cyberspace’ (n957), at 1370.
1055 Ibid, at1375.
1056  Principles for User Generated Content Services. 2007. Th e signatories of UGC Principles include CBS Cooperation, 
Crackle, Dailymotion (French), Sevenload (Germany), Disney, myspace.com, Veoh, Viacom, etc. 
1057  Youku Joins Broad Coalition in Support of UGC Principles, PR Newswire(2011), available at http://www.prnewswire.
com/news-releases/youku-joins-broad-coalition-in-support-of-ugc-principles-117512623.html.
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7.1.4.3 Drawbacks of Codes of Conduct
  Although Codes of Conduct have advantages in regulating hosting ISPs’ copyright 
responsibilities from the perspective of preserving their freedom to operate, their 
drawbacks should not be ignored. First, the rules set in self-regulation are not legally 
enforceable, because self-regulation functions more like an informal understanding 
among signatories rather than a binding contract.1058 According to the explanatory 
statement of the NTD Code of Conduct, “complying with the code is voluntary, and 
there can be no formal enforcement in the case of non-compliance.”1059 UGC Principles 
also state that the rules set in Principles should not “be construed as a concession or 
waiver with respect to any legal or policy position or as creating any legally binding rights 
or obligations.”1060 In China, the self-regulation documents are titled as self-discipline 
Treaty or Declaration,1061 so the self-regulation in China also relies on voluntary 
enforcement.1062 Since self-regulation is usually non-binding, the legal certainty is likely 
to be under threat.1063 In this regard, hosting ISPs may face a risk of being sued, even 
though they have already fulfi lled the duties prescribed in codes of conduct.
  Second, according to codes of conduct, hosting ISPs may need to take the anti-
piracy measures that put Internet users’ interests in danger, which could bring them 
legal risks. Regarding the codes of conduct drafted merely by private sectors, they 
are normally lack of transparency, since the private sectors are not willing to and 
do not need to reveal the negotiation process, and it is also diﬃ  cult for the public 
to know about the creation and existence of self-regulation or even monitor the 
self-regulation.1064 Lack of transparency is likely to cause another problem, and that 
is the Internet users’ interests cannot receive proper protection. Further, if only 
the industrial stakeholders who are directly concerned draft the self-regulation, 
they tend to defend only their own interests, but leave the Internet users’ interests 
unattended.1065 Th e UGC Principles are a typical example. UGC Principles declare 
that the fair use of hosting service will be accommodated, but are intentionally 
1058  See Posting of Sherwin Siy to Policy Blog (Public Knowledge), http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/1230, 
quoting Anon, ‘Th e Principles for User Generated Content Services: A Middle-Ground Approach to Cyber-
Governance’ (n960), at 1388.
1059 Notice-and-Take-Down Code of Conduct (n971). See introduction of explanatory statement.
1060 Principles for User Generated Content Services (n42).
1061  See what is discussed in “self-regulation in China” (Section 8.1.3), one document is named as “Self-discipline 
Treaty on Internet Audio-video Program Services in China”, and the other is named as “Self-discipline Declaration 
on Copyright Protection by Internet Industry in China”.
1062  To be mentioned, although Chinese authorities took a leading role in drafting these self-regulation documents, 
they are not the laws. Certainly, hosting ISPs may face sanctions if they violate the duties set in these documents, 
but these documents cannot be referred as the basis to decide sanctions against hosting ISPs. Th erefore, these self-
regulation documents are still non-binding from a legal perspective.
1063 Hugenholtz, ‘Codes of Conduct and Copyright Enforcement in Cyberspace’ (n55), at 307.
1064  Koop BJ, et al., ‘Should Self-regulation be the Starting Point?’ in Koops BJ, et al. eds., Starting Points for ICT 
Regulation - Deconstructing Prevalent Policy One-liners (T.M.C. Asser Press. 2006), at 124
1065 Hugenholtz, ‘Codes of Conduct and Copyright Enforcement in Cyberspace’ (n55), at 307.
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“silent on just how such accommodation should take place.”1066 Actually, adoption 
of fi ltering technologies seems to naturally contradict the accommodation of fair 
use. As noted by Michael S. Sawyer, given that fair use is even a big challenge for 
courts to evaluate, it is almost impossible for any technological solution to reach 
accurate determinations.1067 Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) also noticed that 
fi ltering technologies can hardly accommodate fair use, and then made a proposal 
to fi x the problem.1068 Further, a fi ltering mechanism does not provide a proper 
conduit for users to respond, when the users’ uploads are blocked by fi lters.1069 
Th erefore, even if in the case that it is a fair use to incorporate copyrighted materials 
into uploads, Internet users cannot retrieve their uploads. Moreover, in terms of 
UGC Principles, hosting ISPs should retain users’ uploading data for 60 days,1070 
which may raise privacy concerns. In order to avoid potential liability, hosting ISPs 
tend to incorporate these norms concerning users into terms of service and users 
have to accept these boilerplate terms when they make subscriptions.1071 However, 
the validity of these terms is subject to the jurisprudence of diﬀ erent jurisdictions. 
Th erefore, hosting ISPs should evaluate whether the anti-piracy measures adopted 
by them violate the mandatory norms that aim at protecting Internet users’ interests.
  Th ird, codes of conduct may not be widely representative enough, so their 
applicability could be limited when regulating hosting ISPs’ copyright 
responsibilities. For instance, the code of conduct like UGC Principles just has 
a limited number of signatories, and it has been questioned as being not broadly 
representative enough.1072 Many big names, such as AOL, Google, Facebook and 
the four big recording companies, did not sign the UGC Principles.1073 Without the 
participation of these high-profi le parties, the infl uence of UGC Principles is largely 
reduced. Besides, because of their lack of bargaining power, the less infl uential 
parties in the industries, including small studios, individual copyright owners, 
blogs and other small platforms that allow users to post materials, cannot join the 
negotiations.1074 Regarding these high-profi le companies, they can choose to join 
the negotiation on 
1066  Nathenson IS, ‘Civil Procedures for a World of Shared and User-Generated Content’ (2010) 48 University of 
Louisville Law Review 912, at 937.
1067  Sawyer, ‘Filters, Fair Use & Feedback: User-Generated Content Principles and the DMCA’ (n43), at 366. In part 
III of this article, Michael made a detailed analysis on why fi ltering technologies cannot accommodate fair use.
1068 Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content, Electronic Frontier Foundation (n43).
1069 Sawyer, ‘Filters, Fair Use & Feedback: User-Generated Content Principles and the DMCA’ (n43), at 385.
1070 Principles for User Generated Content Services (n42), Art. 10.
1071 Hugenholtz, ‘Codes of Conduct and Copyright Enforcement in Cyberspace’ (n55), at 309.
1072  Anon, ‘Th e Principles for User Generated Content Services: A Middle-Ground Approach to Cyber-Governance’ 
(n960), at 1387.
1073 Ibid.
1074 Ibid.
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codes of conduct and decide whether to join the codes of conduct.1075 Nevertheless, for 
these small hosting ISPs, they have almost no chance to join the negotiations that are 
dominated by several leading players. 
7.2 Second Level Agreements
As defi ned by Yafi t Lev-Aretz, a second level agreement is a pre-emptive license acquired 
by hosting ISPs “in order to ratify the mass usage of copyrighted materials by their 
users.”1076 Th erefore, compared with the codes of conduct which focus on preventing the 
unauthorized usage of copyrighted materials, second level agreements put the emphasis 
on legalizing the unauthorized usage of copyrighted materials. Th e following text will 
explore the substantial contents of second level agreements, and then examine the 
advantages and disadvantages of these agreements.
7.2.1 The Substantial Content of Second Level Agreements
Traditionally, if users want to use the materials copyrighted by others, they need to 
directly negotiate the licenses with copyright owners, and these licenses are fi rst level 
agreements.1077 Nevertheless, it is impractical for Internet users to reach the fi rst level 
agreements as such with copyright owners before they exploit copyrighted materials on 
hosting platforms, so in fact, a tremendous number of copyright materials are exploited by 
Internet users without authorization. As discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, the unauthorized 
exploitation of copyright materials results in lots of lawsuits between copyright owners 
and hosting ISPs. For the purpose of reducing the lawsuits, hosting ISPs negotiate 
agreements with copyright owners to deal with the unauthorized exploitation done 
by Internet users. Although Internet users are not a party to these agreements, these 
agreements do authorize Internet users to exploit copyrighted materials on a hosting 
platform, so in this sense, these agreements are named as “second level agreements”.1078
According to the research done by Yafi t Lev-Aretz, YouTube is a pioneer in negotiating 
second level agreements, and thereafter, many other hosting ISPs, including Yahoo!, 
Myspace, Dailymotion, also signed a series of second level agreement with copyright 
owners.1079 In order to examine the substantial contents of second level agreements, 
a closer look will be done to the agreements reached between YouTube and copyright 
owners. Th ese agreements usually include the following arrangements: 1) YouTube users 
are allowed to incorporate the copyrighted works into their videos and upload these videos 
1075  For instance, although Google joined the negotiation process of UGC Principles, it did not sign it fi nally. See 
Anon, ‘Th e Principles for User Generated Content Services: A Middle-Ground Approach to Cyber-Governance’ 
(n960), at 1387.
1076 Lev-Aretz, ‘Second Level Agreements’ (n965), at 152.
1077 Ibid, at 152.
1078 Ibid, at 152-153.
1079 Ibid, at 153-154.
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onto YouTube; 2) copyright owners set their brand channels on YouTube to provide 
their professionally-created contents; 3) copyright owners can share the advertising 
revenue collected not only from videos in their brand channels, but also from the user-
generated videos that incorporate the audio and audiovisual works copyrighted by them; 
4) copyright owners can request the removal of videos which incorporate the works 
copyrighted by them; 5) YouTube promised to develop a Content Identifi cation System 
by which copyright owners can track, monetize or block the contents copyrighted by 
them. 1080 From the arrangements listed above, one can fi nd that second level agreements 
basically include two substantial items, one of which is that copyright holders set their 
brand channels on hosting platforms, and the other content is how to deal with Internet 
users’ uploads which contain copyrighted materials. Regarding these uploads containing 
copyrighted materials, copyright owners can choose to authorize or block them, and if 
the uploads are allowed to be uploaded, copyright owners can still choose to monetize 
or just track them. In order to complete such a complex process, content identifi cation 
technologies need to be employed.1081 Th erefore, as noted by Yafi t Lev-Aretz, second 
level agreements become standardized after a time, and hosting ISPs who engage in the 
agreements have commonly adopted content identifi cation technologies.1082 
Among these content identifi cation technologies, the Content ID system developed by 
YouTube is most infl uential because of its dominating role in the video-sharing market. 
So far, “More than 5,000 partners use Content ID, including major US network 
broadcasters, movie studios and record labels.”1083 Th is chapter takes the Content ID 
system as an example to inspect how content identifi cation technologies work. Content 
ID system is in essence an automated fi ltering process, which combines the video 
fi ngerprinting technology developed by YouTube and audio fi ngerprinting technology 
licensed from Audible Magic.1084 In order to take advantage of the Content ID system, 
copyright owners should fi rst fi ll out a form to claim their right on certain contents,1085 
and deliver the reference fi les of the content claimed by them to YouTube.1086 Content 
1080  See Warner Music Group and YouTube Announce Landmark Video Distribution and Revenue Partnership (n30); 
CBS and Youtube Strike Strategic Content And Advertising Partnership (n30); Universal Music Group and 
Youtube Forge Strategic Partnership (n30); Sony BMG Music Entertainment Signs Content License Agreement 
with YouTube (n30).
1081 Lev-Aretz, ‘Second Level Agreements’ (n965), at 152.
1082  Ibid, at 160-161. As pointed out by Yafi t Lev-Aretz in this article, after YouTube adopted content identifi cation 
technologies, the other hosting ISPs, including Myspace, Dailymotion and imeem, also launched content 
identifi cation technologies. In China, the video-sharing website Youku in China has adopted a similar system called 
“copyright claim”, through which copyright owners can claim their copyright right and join the revenue-sharing 
program. See Youku Copyright Cooperation System (优酷版权合作协议), Youku, available at http://www.youku.
com/copyright_apply.html (last visited 12-24-2014).
1083  Statistics-YouTube (2015) (n22).
1084  Steve Chen,  e state of our video ID tools, Google Oﬃ  cal Blog(2007), available at http://googleblog.blogspot.
nl/2007/06/state-of-our-video-id-tools.html (last visited 12-24-2014).
1085  Content Identi cation Application, YouTube, available at https://www.youtube.com/content_id_signup (last visited 
12-24-2014).
1086 How Content ID works (n42).
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ID system provides several options for copyright owners when the uploads contain 
materials matching the reference fi les delivered by them: mute, block, track or monetize; 
and copyright owners should make their choices in advance when they deliver the 
reference fi les.1087 Muting means to remove the sound track of videos.1088 Blocking 
prevent the whole video from being viewed.1089 Tracking authorizes copyright owners 
to get the viewership statistics on the videos containing their copyrighted materials.1090 
Monetizing allows copyright owners to share the ad revenue created by displaying 
advertisement against the videos that incorporate their claimed contents.1091 
7.2.2 The Advantages of Second Level Agreements
Within second level agreements, hosting ISPs acquire more legal certainty in operation, 
and are able to commercially explore the bulk of premium content and provide user-
friendlier services. Th erefore, second level agreements contribute to enhancing the 
freedom to operate of hosting ISPs. Th e following text will explore these advantages of 
second level agreements in details.
Secondary level agreements are another kind of “best practice” that was initiated by 
hosting ISPs, and is open for copyright owners to sign up to. Under the frame of second 
level agreements, hosting ISPs can face fewer lawsuits, because copyright owners receive 
better protection by cooperating with hosting ISPs in second level agreements. Firstly, 
second level agreements bring copyright owners new revenue sources, and they can get 
royalties or share advertising revenue from the hosting ISPs which they have a partnership 
with.1092 Secondly, second level agreements can help copyright owners eﬃ  ciently reduce 
their enforcement costs, because with the help of content identifi cation technologies “a 
broader range of potential infringements can be detected at far less cost than is required 
for manual enforcement.”1093 Without these agreements, copyright owners can merely 
rely on notice-and-takedown procedures to remove the contents copyrighted by them, 
which is in fact more costly.1094 Th irdly, copyright owners are allowed to have multiple 
choices to deal with the “infringing” uploads according to their needs so that they can 
maximize their benefi ts.1095  For example, if an upload is a full copy of a newly released 
1087 Ibid. 
1088 Ibid. 
1089 Ibid. 
1090 Ibid. 
1091 Ibid. 
1092  In the series of contracts that were signed between YouTube and copyright owners, copyright owners can share the 
advertising revenue collected not only from videos in their brand channels, but also from the user-generated videos 
that incorporate the audio and audiovisual works copyrighted by them. See footnote 54. In China, Youku pays 
royalties to get licenses to oﬀ er movies for viewing on its website. See footnote 1082.
1093 Depoorter B and Walker RK, ‘Copyright False Positives’ (2013), 89 Notre Dame Law Review 319, at 326.
1094  By following notice-and-takedown procedures, copyright owners need to input a certain degree of human resources. 
For example, NBC Universal had employed three staﬀ  whose only responsibility was to daily search for contents 
owned by NBC Universal but uploaded to platforms without permission, and then send notices to corresponding 
platforms. See Buckley B, ‘SueTube: web 2.0 and copyright infringement’ (2007) 31 Columbia Journal of Law & 
the Arts 235, at 238.
1095 See Content Identifi cation Application, How Content ID works (n42).
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movie, the copyright owner can choose to block it so as to ensure its box oﬃ  ce revenue. 
If a copyright owner intends to open up the market for a Television series, it can allow 
one or two full episodes to be uploaded but with sound track muted. If an upload only 
contains two minutes of the reference fi les, the copyright owner may choose to monetize 
or track it. Fourthly, UGC platforms provide an excellent means for copyright owners 
to interact with consumers, publicize their contents, and more importantly, copyright 
owners’ contents can receive vast exposure on the platforms.1096 Even Viacom, who 
fi led a 1 billion dollars lawsuit against YouTube,1097 recognizes that fans are increasingly 
willing to “participate with its works through fan sites, fan fi ction, mash-ups, and 
video parodies,”1098 and hosting ISPs oﬀ er the perfect platforms for these fan activities. 
Overall, secondary level agreements provide several mechanisms which allow copyright 
owners to maximize their interests. In this regard, signing second level agreements is 
more attractive to copyright owners than suing hosting ISPs, so second level agreements 
help to reduce lawsuits faced by hosting ISPs.
Because second level agreements help to reduce lawsuits faced by hosting ISPs, they 
contribute to increasing the legal certainty in hosting ISPs’ operation. As noted by Lev-
Aretz, since the boundary of safe harbor is not clear, together with high litigation costs 
and the potential exposure to damages, ISPs have a strong motivation to build a business 
partnership with copyright owners so as to protect themselves from lawsuits.1099 Th e 
bankruptcy of Veoh demonstrated how devastating the litigation can be for a hosting ISP. 
In the case of Veoh, although it won the two copyright lawsuits against it, too high litigation 
costs still substantially resulted in its bankruptcy.1100 Besides legal certainty, hosting ISPs 
also have their income increased by reaching second level agreements with copyright 
owners. Hosting ISPs’ revenue is mainly based on selling ad space on their websites, but in 
advertisers’ eyes, user-generated contents, such as videos of family doing strange things, are 
usually “incompatible with commercials for cars and other products.”1101 As recognized by 
Myspace, “although UGC accounts for a majority of video consumed in the United States, 
the bulk of revenues comes from premium content.”1102 Within Second level agreements, 
the bulk of premium content is allowed to be available on hosting platforms, and hosting 
ISPs therefore have more sources to attract advertisers. 
1096  Lev-Aretz, ‘Second Level Agreements’ (n965), at 167. Platforms’ advantage on interaction has also been recognized 
by copyright owners, and Doug Morris, the CEO of Universal Music Group stated, “You Tube is providing a new 
and exciting opportunity for music lovers around the world to interact with our content”, see Universal Music 
Group and Youtube Forge Strategic Partnership (n30).
1097  Hassanabadi A, ‘Viacom v. Youtube: All Eyes Blind–Th e Limits of the DMCA in a Web 2.0 World’ (2011) 26 
Berkeley Technology Law Journal 405, at 405.
1098 Nathenson, ‘Civil Procedures for a World of Shared and User-Generated Content’ (n1060), at 951.
1099  Lev-Aretz, ‘Copyright Lawmaking and Public Choice: From Legislative Battles to Private Ordering’ (n967), at 252.
1100  Helman L and Parchomovsky G, ‘Th e Best Available Technology Standard’ (2011) 111 Columbia Law Review 
1194, at 1208.
1101  Barnes B and Stone B, MGM to Post Full Films on YouTube, Th e New York Time(2008), available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/11/10/business/media/10mgm.html?_r=2& (last visited 12-12-2014).
1102 Lev-Aretz, ‘Second Level Agreements’ (n965), at 160.
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Th rough second level agreements, hosting ISPs are capable of providing services which 
are friendlier to Internet users. Firstly, a second level agreement to a certain extent 
functions like a low-cost transaction mechanism over valuable cultural goods.1103 Taking 
Content ID as an example, when an upload contains materials matching with the 
reference fi les, Content ID “facilitates a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ decision by the owner who can 
then profi t from the deal or nix it at a very low cost.”1104 Users can therefore avoid 
the potential liability for uploading contents copyrighted by others. Secondly, second 
level agreements can promote the tolerated uses defi ned by Tim Wu.1105 According to 
Tim Wu, “Tolerated use is a term that refers to the contemporary spread of technically 
infringing, but nonetheless tolerated use of copyrighted works.”1106 Since the enforcing 
cost may be too high, and infringement may do little harm to or even benefi t copyright 
owners, the copyright owners may choose to tolerate the infringing use.1107 With the 
adoption of content identifi cation technologies, copyright owners tend to tolerate more 
use of their copyrighted contents, because by doing so, they can benefi t from tracking 
or monetizing the videos.1108 In fact, copyright owners are willing to allow Internet users 
to exploit their copyright materials. For example, according to the agreement between 
UMG and YouTube, UMG allows the YouTubers to incorporate its copyrighted music 
into their user-generated contents.1109 Th erefore, for these creative users who are active 
on the platforms, there are more raw materials including a wide range of copyright 
content available for them to create new works.1110 Overall, by benefi ting from second 
level agreements, Internet users are able to use a wide range of copyright contents 
without being involved in burdensome negotiation or costly litigation with copyright 
owners, which will substantially enrich the users’ ability of expression.1111 In this regard, 
second level agreements allow hosting ISPs to operate in a way which is friendlier to 
Internet users, and helps hosting ISPs to attract more users.
7.2.3 Disadvantages of Second Level Agreements
Although second level agreements contribute to enhancing the freedom to operate 
of hosting ISPs, they are highly likely to result in tension between hosting ISPs and 
their users. In essence, second level agreements are the compromises reached between 
copyright owners and hosting ISPs, so users’ interests tend to be intentionally or 
1103  Heald PJ, ‘How Copyright Makes Books and Music Disappear (and How Secondary Liability Rules Help Resurrect 
Old Songs)’ (2013) 13 Illinois Program in Law, Behavior and Social Science Paper1, at 32.
1104 Ibid.
1105 Wu T, ‘Tolerated Use’ (2008) 31 Columbia Journal of Law & Arts 617.
1106 Ibid, at 617.
1107 Ibid, at 619.
1108  Boroughf B, ‘Th e Next Great YouTube: Improving Content ID to Foster Creativity, Cooperation, and Fair 
Compensation’   (2014) 25 Albany Law Journal of Science & Technology 95, at 105.
1109 Universal Music Group and Youtube Forge Strategic Partnership (n30).
1110 Lev-Aretz, ‘Second Level Agreements’ (n965), at 167-168.
1111 Ibid, at 168. 
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unintentionally neglected. Th e following section explores how Internet users’ interests 
are negatively aﬀ ected in second level agreements, and then assesses the legal risks faced 
hosting ISPs for these negative eﬀ ects.
Scholars assert that currently second level agreements oﬀ er far more favor to copyright 
owners than Internet users.1112 Th e dispute-settlement mechanism between copyright 
owners and Internet users is a typical example. Before 2012, after the user fi led a dispute 
against the copyright owners’ claim on videos, the Content ID system granted copyright 
owners rights to make the decision, and the users could not dispute anymore.1113 Th is 
process is very biased in favor of copyright owners, because it in fact deprived users of 
defending their claims through the notice-and-takedown procedure.1114 In addition, 
second level agreements are also vulnerable to change, which put the legal status of UGC 
in uncertainty. For example, in 2009, UMG could not reach an agreement with YouTube 
to prolong their cooperation, so UMG terminated the agreement and then signed a new 
contract with YouTube’s competitor – “sevenload”.1115 However, in terms of the pre-
existing agreement between UMG and YouTube, UMG had already allowed YouTubers to 
incorporate its music into their uploads. After the termination of the agreement, how to 
deal with these uploads containing UMG’s music became a complicated issue.1116
Besides, second level agreements may have Internet users’ uploads wrongly blocked or 
monetized. First, content identifi cation, as the core of second level agreements, may 
wrongly block legal contents.1117 For example, Content ID system has blocked the following 
videos which are obviously legal: Michelle Obama’s Democratic National Convention 
speech,1118 NASA’s oﬃ  cial clips on Mars landing,1119 and Justin Bieber’s music video 
uploaded by himself.1120 In addition, second level agreement may result in the abuse of 
1112  See generally Simon AR, ‘Contracting in the Dark: Casting Light on the Shadows of Second Level Agreements’ 
(2014), 5 William & Mary Business Law Review 305; Boroughf, ‘Th e Next Great YouTube: Improving Content 
ID to Foster Creativity, Cooperation, and Fair Compensation’ (n1102); Lev-Aretz, ‘Copyright Lawmaking and 
Public Choice: From Legislative Battles to Private Ordering’ (n967).
1113 Simon AR, ‘Contracting in the Dark: Casting Light on the Shadows of Second Level Agreements’ (n1106), at 325.
1114  McKay P, YouTube Copyfraud & Abuse of the Content ID System, Fair Use Tube(2012), available at http://fairusetube.
org/youtube-copyfraud (last visited 12-23-2014).
1115  Holger Schmidt, Die Antwort auf Youtube: Universal-Musikvideos jetzt auf Sevenload, Frankfurt Allemeine(2009), 
available at http://blogs.faz.net/netzwirtschaft-blog/2009/04/02/die-antwort-auf-youtube-universal-musikvideos-
jetzt-bei-sevenload-1014/ (last visited 12-16-2014).
1116 Lev-Aretz, ‘Second Level Agreements’ (n965), at 172-173.
1117  Boroughf, ‘Th e Next Great YouTube: Improving Content ID to Foster Creativity, Cooperation, and Fair 
Compensation’ (n1102), at 11-12.
1118  Fitzgerald B, YouTube Pulls Michelle Obama’s Democratic National Convention Speech In ‘Error’, Th e Huﬃ  ngton 
Post(2012), available at http://www.huﬃ  ngtonpost.com/2012/09/05/youtube-pulls-michelle-obama-
speech_n_1857708.html (last visited 12-16-2014). 
1119  Higgins P, Mars Landing Videos, and Other Casualties of the Robot Wars, Electronic Frontier Foundation(2012), 
available at https://www.eﬀ .org/deeplinks/2012/08/mars-landing-videos-and-other-casualties-robot-wars (last 
visited 12-16-2014).
1120  Chiang O, Justin Bieber Swears O  YouTube For Facebook, Unwittingly Steps In Copyright Mine eld, Forbes(2010), 
available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverchiang/2010/11/30/justin-bieber-swears-oﬀ -youtube-for-facebook-
unwittingly-steps-in-copyright-minefi eld/ (last visited 12-16-2014).
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the copyright claim mechanism. For instance, YouTube requires claimants to have 
exclusive rights to the materials in videos,1121 and this means that claimants “cannot 
claim public domain content, fair use content, or third party content.”1122 However, 
since the Content ID system makes no front-end copyright ownership verifi cation, 
the claimants may monetize public domain content.1123 In some cases, the Content ID 
system even blocks the contents that copyright owners allow to be exploited by users 
because of false claims. For example, some game companies had to ask the users to 
contest the matches and then found out who claimed the content.1124 Furthermore, like 
many other fi ltering technologies discussed above, content identifi cation technologies 
are not capable of distinguishing between fair use and infringing use,1125 so fair use 
content is vulnerable to be monetized or blocked by copyright owners. 
Th e above discussion demonstrates that second level agreements may harm Internet 
users’ interests. Nevertheless, hosting ISPs face little legal risk to do so,1126 because in 
order to use hosting services, Internet users need to agree with terms of service which 
normally grant hosting ISPs the rights to deal with uploads at their discretion and exempt 
them from removing uploads.1127 Although there is little risk for hosting ISPs from a 
legal perspective, they may still need to take better measures to protect Internet users’ 
interests because of the pressure from the public. Taking the above dispute-settlement 
process adopted by YouTube as an example, since this process incurred lots of criticism 
in tech blogs and the YouTube help forum, YouTube eventually corrected the undue 
1121  Qualifying for Content ID, YouTube, available at https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/1311402?hl=en (last 
visited 12-16-2014).
1122  Boroughf, ‘Th e Next Great YouTube: Improving Content ID to Foster Creativity, Cooperation, and Fair 
Compensation’ (n1102), at 9.
1123 Simon, ‘Contracting in the Dark: Casting Light on the Shadows of Second Level Agreements’ (n1113), at 324.
1124  Crossley R, Industry  ghts back as YouTube begins mass cull of game videos, CVG(2013), available at http://www.
computerandvideogames.com/442245/industry-fi ghts-back-as-youtube-begins-mass-cull-of-game-videos/ (last 
visited 12-16-2014).
1125  Boroughf, ‘Th e Next Great YouTube: Improving Content ID to Foster Creativity, Cooperation, and Fair 
Compensation’ (n1102), at 12.
1126 Lev-Aretz, ‘Second Level Agreements’ (n965), at 177.
1127  For example, according to Art. 7.8 of its Terms of Service – YouTube, once knowing any potential violation of 
service terms, “YouTube reserve the right (but shall have no obligation) to decide whether the Content complies 
with the content requirements set out in these terms and may remove such Content and/or terminate a User’s 
access for uploading Content which is in violation of these Terms at any time, without prior notice and at its sole 
discretion.” Further, Art. 13.2 B iii provides that YouTube shall not be liable to users for “the deletion of, corruption 
of, or failure to store, any Content and other communications data maintained or transmitted by or through your 
use of the service.” See Terms of Service, available at https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms&gl=GB 
(last visited 08-24-2015). According to Art. 5 of Terms of Use Agreement – Myspace, “Myspace may, in its sole 
discretion, delete, move, re-format, remove or refuse to post or otherwise make use of Content without notice 
or any liability to you or any third party in connection with our operation of Content venues in an appropriate 
manner.” See Terms of Use Agreement, available at https://myspace.com/pages/terms (last visited 08-24-2015). 
According to Art. 5.2 of Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, “we can remove any content or information 
you post on Facebook if we believe that it violates this Statement or our policies.” See Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities, available at https://www.facebook.com/terms.php?ref=pf (last visited 08-24-2015).
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process under pressure from the public.1128 After the reform, when a user fi les a dispute, 
Content ID allows copyright owners to have two options: renounce the Content ID 
claim or initiate the notice-and-takedown procedure.1129 Further, facing the accusation 
that Internet users suﬀ er from the false copyright claims under the Content ID system, 
YouTube announced that it would pay up to 1 million dollars to support its users to 
defend their own rights.1130 
Finally, so far, second level agreements can only work as a solution between leading 
hosting ISPs and high-profi le copyright owners, but small copyright owners and small 
platforms can barely have chance to engage in individual agreement because of their lack 
of bargaining power.1131 Further, it is also extremely costly to adopt a complicated content 
identifi cation system, which means that small hosting ISPs cannot aﬀ ord to do so. For 
instance, in order to build a Content ID system, YouTube spent approximately 50,000 
man hours on engineering tests and millions of dollars on research and development.1132 So 
far, the implementation of second level agreements is limited to specifi c types of platforms, 
including audio-and video-sharing platforms, but do not cover image-sharing, blogs and 
fan fi ction websites.1133 Th erefore, many hosting ISPs are unable to engage in second level 
agreements, and thus cannot enjoy the benefi ts of such agreements. 
7.3 Conclusion:
As has been demonstrated in the previous chapters, although “safe harbor” provisions 
exempt hosting ISPs from monetary liability under certain circumstances, diﬀ erent 
courts interpret liability exemption norms in diﬀ erent ways, which poses legal 
uncertainty for hosting ISPs when conducting business. Further, from the perspective 
of copyright owners, although they still take the litigation as a weapon against piracy, 
because of the high cost but limited benefi ts of the litigation, copyright owners started 
to turn to reach self-regulation agreements with ISPs.1134 As noted by Paul Starr, when 
the public institutions fail to provide a positive public good, the private sector will resort 
to self-regulation.1135 In this context, self-regulation becomes more and more prevalent 
in solving copyright infringement problems on hosting platforms. 
1128  Simon, ‘Contracting in the Dark: Casting Light on the Shadows of Second Level Agreements’ (n1113), at 325.
1129  Higgins P, YouTube Upgrades Its Automated Copyright Enforcement System, Electronic Frontier Foundation(2012), 
available at https://www.eﬀ .org/deeplinks/2012/10/youtube-upgrades-its-automated-copyright-enforcement-
system (last visited 12-16-2014).
1130  Madore PH, YouTube Will Pay Up To $1 Million in Legal Fees For Qualifying Users, Hacked(2015), available at 
https://hacked.com/youtube-will-pay-1-million-legal-fees-qualifying-users/ (last visited 12-28-2015).
1131 Lev-Aretz, ‘Second Level Agreements’ (n965), at 171-172.
1132 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 260-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
1133 Lev-Aretz, ‘Second Level Agreements’ (n965), at 111-163.
1134  Bridy A, ‘Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online Copyright Enforcement’ (2010), 89 
Oregon Law Review 81, at 83-84.
1135 Starr P, ‘Th e Meaning of Privatization’ (1988) 6 Yale Law & Policy Review 6, at 6.
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Th is Chapter examines two types of self-regulation that have been reached to solve 
copyright infringement problems on hosting platforms. Generally, codes of conduct 
focus more on how to reduce copyright infringement on hosting platforms, and second 
level agreements mainly aim at legalizing the unauthorized exploration of copyrighted 
materials on hosting platforms. Based on the examination done in this Chapter, it can 
be concluded that compared to state regulation regimes, these self-regulation agreements 
are capable of regulating hosting ISPs’ copyright responsibilities in a way that enlarges 
their freedom to operate. First, within self-regulation, hosting ISPs acquire more legal 
certainty in operation. In the light of self-regulation, copyright owners can receive better 
protection, which helps hosting ISPs to avoid lawsuits. Further, the norms prescribed 
in self-regulation tend to be more detailed for hosting ISPs to follow, which contributes 
to reducing their legal risks in operation. Moreover, the self-regulation agreements like 
UGC Principles are capable of overcoming the territorial restriction, and harmonizing 
the rules of hosting ISPs’ copyright responsibilities in diﬀ erent jurisdictions. Such 
harmonization particularly contributes to reducing the legal risks faced by hosting ISPs 
when operating in diﬀ erent jurisdictions. Second, through self-regulation, hosting ISPs 
can avoid having an unreasonable burden against copyright infringement, and may 
even acquire more freedom to exploit materials on their platforms. For instance, second 
level agreements allow hosting ISPs to commercially exploit the uploads which contain 
premium materials. Nevertheless, self-regulation also has its weakness in regulating 
hosting ISPs’ copyright responsibilities. First, the applicability of self-regulation is limited. 
For example, UGC Principles only have limited signatories, and second level agreements 
so far merely cover limited types of hosting platforms. Particularly, small hosting ISPs, 
because of lacking bargaining powers, are usually barred from self-regulation. Second, 
self-regulation, like codes of conduct, is normally not legally enforceable, so hosting 
ISPs cannot be absolutely secured from liability, even though they’ve already fulfi lled the 
duties prescribed in self-regulation. Further, within self-regulation, in order to meet the 
requirement of copyright owners, hosting ISPs need to take some anti-piracy measures 
which put internet users’ interests in danger. From a legal perspective, hosting ISPs 
face few risks in adopting these measures, because Internet users need to agree with 
terms of services which usually grant broad rights and liability exemption to hosting 
ISPs. Nevertheless, hosting ISPs should make sure that the anti-piracy measures adopted 
by them do not violate the mandatory norms of protecting Internet user’s interests. 
Although self-regulation is not perfect, it is the “best practice” reached between hosting 
ISPs and copyright owners, and therefore contributes to improving the freedom to 
operate of hosting ISPs while providing better protection to copyright owners.
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In the past decade, platforms run by hosting ISPs have gained popularity among 
Internet users, because they are allowed to access, post, share information and even 
interact with each other on these platforms. Nevertheless, the popularity of platforms 
also brings legal risks to hosting ISPs, since many copyrighted materials are uploaded on 
their platforms without authorization, which may constitute copyright infringement. 
In the light of rules on indirect copyright infringement, hosting ISPs can be held liable 
for the copyright infringement committed by their users. In order to ensure hosting 
ISPs’ freedom to operate, “safe harbor” provisions which exempt hosting ISPs from 
monetary liability under prescribed circumstances have been enacted in the US, EU and 
China. In this regard, the rules of hosting ISPs’ copyright responsibilities have reached 
certain harmonization in the US, EU and China. However, “safe harbor” provisions in 
each jurisdiction are not the same and courts tend to interpret “safe harbor” provisions 
diﬀ erently because of the jurisprudence in their own jurisdictions. Th erefore, despite 
the common adoption of “safe harbor” provisions, hosting ISPs are still exposed to 
diﬀ erent copyright responsibilities in the US, EU and China, which increases their legal 
risks when operating in these jurisdictions. In addition, when deciding hosting ISPs’ 
responsibilities for copyright infringement, courts may impose too much burden on 
hosting ISPs, which unreasonably restricts their freedom to operate.
Based on the above observation, this book aims at answering a main research question: 
how to regulate hosting ISPs’ responsibilities for copyright infringement while preserving 
their maximum freedom to operate in the US, EU and China. In order to answer the 
main research question, this book takes a comparative approach to examine the rules of 
hosting ISPs’ responsibilities for copyright infringement in the US, EU and China. By 
comparison, this book fi nds out how to interpret the rules of hosting ISPs’ copyright 
responsibilities so as to maximize their freedom to operate, and concludes whether and 
how further harmonization can be done regarding regulating hosting ISPs’ copyright 
responsibilities in the US, EU and China. In addition, based on the diﬀ erent copyright 
responsibilities imposed on hosting ISPs, this book answers the following sub-questions: 
(i) should hosting ISPs be required to keep purely passive so as to fall under “safe harbor” 
provisions; (ii) how the courts interpret the factors that are relevant to decide hosting 
ISPs’ copyright liability under “safe harbor” provisions; (iii) whether the liability criteria 
that developed by the case law are capable of preserving maximum freedom for hosting 
ISPs to operate; (iv) how notice-and-takedown procedures ought to be interpreted so 
as to avoid imposing an unreasonable burden on hosting ISPs; (v) whether hosting 
ISPs should be given more duties to ensure the accuracy of notices; (vi) how hosting 
ISPs’ duties ought to be tailored in identity disclosure mechanisms; (vii) whether self-
regulation can better preserve hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate.
Th is chapter summarizes the main fi ndings in the previous chapters and then answers 
the sub-questions addressed above. It fi rst describes the responsibility rules relevant to 
copyright enforcement on hosting ISPs’ platforms, as addressed in chapter 2 (para. 8.1), 
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including the liability rules about indirect infringement, and “safe harbor” provisions in 
the US, EU and China. It then discusses the case law of deciding hosting ISPs’ copyright 
liability in the US, EU and China, and answers the fi rst 3 sub-questions, as concluded 
in Chapter 3 and 4 (para. 8.2).  Next, it explores how the notice-and-takedown 
procedures and identity disclosure mechanisms are applied in the US, EU and China, 
and then answers the next 3 sub-questions, as identifi ed in Chapter 5 and 6 (para. 8.3). 
Subsequently, it explores and evaluates the self-regulation of copyright enforcement on 
hosting platforms, and then as concluded in Chapter 7, it answers the last sub-question 
(8.4). Finally, this Chapter lists the concrete conclusions that are reached by this study, 
and then provides several recommendations to these hosting ISPs who are currently 
operating or plan to operate in the US, EU and China (8.5).
8.1 Responsibility Rules of Copyright Enforcement on Hosting Platforms
Hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate is mainly regulated by the responsibility rules of 
copyright enforcement on hosting platforms, so Chapter 2 explores these responsibility 
rules in the US, EU and China so as to draw a full picture of hosting ISPs’ responsibilities 
for copyright infringement on hosting platforms.
Hosting ISPs may be secondarily liable for the copyright infringement committed by 
their users. Th erefore, this chapter fi rstly explores the secondary liability rules in the 
copyright fi eld in the US, EU and China. In the EU, there is only limited harmonization 
in respect of secondary liability in the copyright fi eld, so this chapter looks into the 
secondary liability rules in several member states, including Germany, France, Italy and 
the UK. Generally, the secondary liability rules in these jurisdictions are diverse. Th e 
common law countries have already developed the specifi c liability rules about indirect 
copyright infringement, such as contributory infringement and vicarious liability in the 
US, authorization infringement and joint tortfeasance in the UK. In civil law countries, 
such as Germany, France, Italy and China, the courts usually decide the indirect 
copyright infringement cases by referring to the general liability rules, particularly the 
duty of care notion, in tort laws. 
Besides, this chapter looks into the “safe harbor” provisions which grant hosting ISPs 
liability privilege in certain conditions. Unlike the secondary liability rules which are 
varied in the US, EU and China, the liability privilege rules are homogenous per se 
in these jurisdictions. Based on the comparison, at least three common points can be 
found. First, hosting ISPs have no general obligation to monitor the materials uploaded 
on their platforms. Second, in order to benefi t from liability exemption, hosting ISPs 
should not be aware of the infringement in question, or upon knowing the infringement, 
they should expeditiously remove the infringing materials. Th ird, hosting ISPs also need 
to fulfi ll certain obligations for the purpose of copyright enforcement, such as disclosing 
suspected users’ identities to copyright owners or competent authorities. Regarding 
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notice-and-takedown procedures, the US and China have codifi ed this procedure in 
the “safe harbor” provisions, but the E-commerce Directive leaves this procedure for the 
Member states to develop by themselves. Although the “safe harbor” provisions in the 
US, EU and China are not the same, they share an important common feature, and that 
is to exempt hosting ISPs from copyright liability under the prescribed conditions while 
requiring hosting ISPs to fulfi ll certain obligations to facilitate copyright enforcement 
on hosting platforms.
Th rough the exploration done in Chapter 2, it concludes that in the US, EU and China, 
the rules of indirect copyright infringement are diverse, but the liability exemption rules 
– “safe harbor” provisions are homogenous per se. Further, “safe harbor” provisions play 
an important role in regulating hosting ISPs’ responsibilities for copyright infringement, 
because the “safe harbor” provisions are not only concerned with deciding whether 
hosting ISPs need to be liable for copyright infringement on their platforms, but also 
bring in several mechanisms which require hosting ISPs to fulfi ll certain obligations 
to facilitate copyright enforcement on their platforms. Based on this observation, the 
following chapters examine how courts decide hosting ISPs’ responsibilities for copyright 
infringement in the US, EU and China under the roof of “safe harbor” provisions.
8.2  Hosting ISPs’ Freedom to Operate and Their Liability for Copyright 
Infringement
As has been observed in Chapter 2, hosting ISPs may be liable for the copyright 
infringement on their platforms according to the secondary liability rules in the fi eld 
of copyright, and meanwhile the “safe harbor” provisions have been adopted to grant 
hosting ISPs liability privileges under the prescribed conditions. Th erefore, Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4 examine how the courts in the US, EU and China decide hosting ISPs’ 
copyright liability under the roof of “safe harbor” provisions, and then based on the 
comparison, these two chapters suggest how the liability rules ought to be interpreted so 
as to better regulate the hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate.
Although hosting ISPs are granted liability privileges by “safe harbor” provisions, the 
pre-condition is that they are indeed the qualifi ed hosting ISPs defi ned in the “safe 
harbor” provisions. Th erefore, Chapter 3 examines how to defi ne the qualifi ed hosting 
ISPs that fall into the “safe harbor” provisions. It is well-known that in the US, EU 
and China, hosting ISPs are required to remain passive when oﬀ ering hosting services 
so as to continue to be under the “safe harbor” provisions. Nevertheless, the courts in 
the US, EU and China make interpretations about hosting ISPs’ “passivity” diﬀ erently. 
In China, the courts have held hosting ISPs not passive enough for the following facts: 
displaying the logos and ads when uploads are viewed, generating the collections of 
uploaded contents. In the EU, the French, Germany and Italian courts have held 
hosting ISPs to be publishers or entities similar to publishers based on the following 
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grounds: for commercially exploiting uploaded contents, for requesting the transfer of 
rights, for setting diﬀ erent categories for uploading, for allowing subscribers to create 
their own personal pages, for providing an internal search engine for subscribers to index 
contents, and for editing the contents uploaded by subscribers. However, nowadays the 
courts in France, Germany, Italy and China have switched to a standard which is more 
favorable to hosting ISPs. In China, displaying logos and advertisements cannot be used 
as reasons for disqualifying hosting ISPs from the “safe harbor” provisions anymore. In 
France, Italy and Germany, the courts follow the instruction issued by the ECJ in the 
Adwords case, and hold that some hosting ISPs which were once held disqualifi ed for 
“safe harbor” provisions become qualifi ed now. In the US and UK, the courts have long 
set a low threshold for hosting ISPs to fall under “safe harbor”. In the UK, only when a 
hosting ISP has edited or controlled the uploaded materials in question, will it be held 
as a disqualifi ed hosting ISP, and the other factors, such as displaying advertisement, are 
irrelevant. In the US, a hosting ISP is even allowed to preview the uploaded materials, so 
long as this preview is done for the purpose of fi ltering out infringing materials. Further, 
according to US case law, hosting ISPs are also allowed to employ new technologies to 
edit the uploaded materials for the purpose of optimizing their services, so long as any 
editing is done automatically through technical processes.  
Based on the exploration of the case decisions in the US, EU and China, Chapter 3 
summarizes the factors which have been mentioned which disqualify a defendant as 
qualifi ed hosting ISP. Th ese factors are: commercially exploiting the uploaded content, 
editing or categorizing the uploaded content, displaying its logo with uploaded content, 
requiring rights transfer by “terms and conditions,” and uploading some content by 
itself. After the evaluation of these factors, Chapter 3 concludes that these factors should 
not function as reasons to exclude hosting ISPs from the “safe harbor,” except editing, 
categorizing, or actively exploiting the uploaded contents. Further, this chapter asserts, 
it is unreasonable to require hosting ISPs to keep purely passive anymore, and they 
should be allowed to conduct a degree of management on the uploaded content. In 
order to draw a proper borderline for permissible management, one fi rst needs to check 
whether this management will result in a hosting ISP’s knowledge or control of uploaded 
content (the ECJ’s opinion), and then check whether this management is conducive to 
preventing infringements or not (the US approach). Th is criterion helps to preserve 
maximum freedom for hosting ISPs to operate, because it not only allows hosting ISPs 
to employ the new technologies to optimize their services, but also prevents them from 
optimizing their services for infringing purposes, and even encourages them to actively 
take measures against copyright infringement on their platforms. 
Once a defendant is held as a qualifi ed hosting ISP defi ned by “safe harbor” provisions, 
it is still necessary to examine whether the defendant complies with liability privilege 
conditions set in “safe harbor” provisions. Further, even though the defendant is held as 
qualifying for liability privilege, it may still face the injunction relief, since “safe harbor” 
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provisions only exempt it from monetary relief. Chapter 4 discusses how the courts 
decide hosting ISPs’ liability under the roof of “safe harbor” provisions by examining the 
case decisions in the US, EU and China. Although the courts in diﬀ erent jurisdictions 
mainly rely on diﬀ erent approaches to decide hosting ISPs’ liability, they generally take 
into account the following factors: (1) hosting ISPs are not obligated to undertake 
general monitoring responsibility; (2) whether hosting ISPs have specifi c knowledge 
of infringement; (3) whether hosting ISPs take reasonable measures against repeat 
infringement; (4) whether hosting ISPs benefi t from infringement; (5) whether hosting 
ISPs induce infringement, or intend to facilitate infringement.
After examining the case law in the US, EU and China, Chapter 4 concludes that 
some tendencies of regulating hosting ISPs’ secondary liability can be drawn in these 
jurisdictions. First, because of a “non-general monitoring obligation” clause, in the US 
and EU, it is not easy to prove hosting ISPs’ knowledge of infringement except if they 
receive competent complaints. In China, hosting ISPs’ knowledge of infringement is 
easier to prove, because the “should know” criterion developed in case law not only 
covers the US “red fl ag” test, but also aims at regulating hosting ISPs’ business model by 
requiring them to fulfi ll a certain duty of care against infringement. Second, “receiving 
benefi ts” has become a less important factor for courts to evaluate when deciding hosting 
ISPs’ liability. Normally, courts will not hold hosting ISPs liable only because they make 
profi ts in operation. Th ird, hosting ISPs’ intent has become a more prevailing factor 
when courts conclude liability. Further, courts tend to evaluate hosting ISPs’ business 
models rather than simply checking whether their services are capable of non-infringing 
use or not. Generally, if a hosting ISP’s business model is more likely to result in 
infringements, it needs to take more eﬀ ective measures to prevent such infringements. 
In addition, although a general monitoring responsibility cannot be imposed on hosting 
ISPs, a specifi c monitoring responsibility against repeat infringement has been approved 
by some courts in the EU and China. Th e specifi c monitoring responsibility works 
thus: once infringing content has been identifi ed, the hosting ISP needs to monitor this 
specifi c content so as to prevent it from being uploaded again. Besides, compared with 
the US and EU, China requires hosting ISPs to undertake a higher level of duty of care 
to prevent hot-play audio-video works and famous works from being uploaded, which 
can oﬀ er better protection for the highly valuable content as such. 
Th en, Chapter 4 analyzes these factors which mainly aﬀ ect the hosting ISPs liability 
in the US, EU and China, and examine how factors ought to be interpreted so as to 
preserve maximum freedom for hosting ISPs to operate. With respect to hosting ISPs’ 
intent and business model, because the services oﬀ ered by hosting ISPs are capable 
of infringing use, any promotion of their services, in a broad sense, can be seen as 
promoting the infringing use of their services. Th erefore, if not restricting the ambit 
of imputed intent and business models, hosting ISPs will be deterred from adopting 
new technologies and optimizing their services to attract more subscribers, which will 
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eventually harm e-commerce. Based on this deduction, Chapter 4 concludes that only 
when a hosting ISP is proved to have a specifi c intent to induce copyright infringement, 
should it be held liable (the US approach). It means the inducement must be actively 
done through specifi c acts, such as clear expression or other aﬃ  rmative steps to foster 
infringement. By contrast, a general intent to induce, such as the inducement merely 
deduced from hosting ISPs’ business models, should not lead the hosting ISPs to be 
liable. As for specifi c monitoring responsibility against repeat infringement, since the 
boundary between specifi c monitoring and general monitoring can be blurred, specifi c 
monitoring responsibility may impose too much burden on hosting ISPs, which will 
unreasonably curb hosting ISPs’ freedom to conduct business. Further, imposing specifi c 
monitoring responsibility on hosting ISPs may also confl ict with Internet users’ freedom 
of speech and privacy. Th erefore, Chapter 4 suggests that specifi c monitoring should 
not be defi ned as an obligation but rather a positive factor to grant hosting ISPs liability 
exemption. To be specifi c, courts should not hold hosting ISPs liable based on the fact 
that they do not take specifi c monitoring measures, but if hosting ISPs take specifi c 
monitoring measures, courts should hold these eﬀ orts as a reason to exempt them from 
liability. Th is solution can avoid imposing an unreasonable monitoring burden on 
hosting ISPs while encouraging them to adopt specifi c monitoring measures against 
copyright infringement. Regarding better protection for highly valuable contents, 
including famous works, hot-playing audio-video works, and content being viewed 
over a certain number of times, since the boundaries of these highly valuable contents 
are unclear, hosting ISPs tend to monitor more contents than necessary so as to avoid 
being held liable. Th erefore, without the proper declaration of several terms involved 
in a higher duty of care, hosting ISPs face high legal uncertainty in operation, and may 
have to introduce too complicated and costly monitoring systems. In order to avoid 
unreasonably curbing hosting ISPs’ freedom to conduct business, the Chinese courts 
should either clarify the boundaries of this highly valuable content or stop requiring 
hosting ISPs to undertake a higher level of duty of care to protect this content.
8.3 Hosting ISPs’ Duties to Facilitate Copyright Enforcement
Besides being held liable for copyright infringement under certain circumstances, 
hosting ISPs also need to fulfi ll some duties to facilitate copyright enforcement on their 
platforms. As has been described in Chapter 2, these duties are prescribed in notice-and-
takedown procedures and identity disclosure mechanisms. Th erefore, Chapters 5 and 6 
explore how the notice-and-takedown procedures and identity disclosure mechanisms 
are applied in the US, EU and China. Th en, based on the exploration, these two 
chapters conclude how the duties of hosting ISPs ought to be regulated in the notice-
and-takedown procedures and identity disclosure mechanisms so as to preserve their 
maximum freedom to operate in these three jurisdictions.
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Th e notice-and-takedown procedure was fi rst codifi ed in the US “safe harbor” 
provisions. It aims at removing the huge amount of infringing materials on hosting 
platforms without tedious lawsuits. Ideally, notice-and-takedown procedure works 
thus: after fi nding infringing materials on hosting ISPs’ platforms, copyright owners 
send complaining notices to the hosting ISPs, and then the hosting ISPs immediately 
remove the infringing materials. Because of the eﬃ  ciency of notice-and-takedown 
procedure in respect of reducing copyright infringement, China also has codifi ed this 
procedure into “safe harbor” provisions. In the EU, although the E-commerce Directive 
does not include a codifi ed notice-and-takedown procedure, it does provide a basis for 
this procedure, since according to Article 14(1)(b), a notice leading to a hosting ISP’s 
knowledge of infringement will trigger the hosting ISP’s obligation to expeditiously take 
down infringement. Because there is no harmonization at the EU level, the regulation 
of notice-and-takedown procedures in Member States turns out to be quite fragmented. 
Some member states have adopted the codifi ed notice-and-takedown procedures, 
including Finland, Hungary and Lithuania. Some other member states, such as France, 
Italy and UK, rule on the elements of a competent notice in their national legislation 
about implementing the E-commerce Directive. Th ere also exist member states which 
even have not ruled on the elements of a competent notice at legislative level, including 
Holland and Germany. 
Generally, the codifi ed notice-and-takedown procedures can achieve better legal certainty, 
since many issues concerned in notice-and-takedown procedures have been clarifi ed at 
the legislative level. Th ese issues are: (1) hosting ISPs should set a specifi c agency to 
receive notices; (2) the requirement of a competent notice; (3) hosting ISPs should 
forward the complaining notices to the Internet users whose contents are removed; (4) 
the elements of counter-notice; (5) hosting ISPs should replace the removed content 
after receiving counter-notices; (6) who should be liable for any wrong deletion. Th e 
clarifi cation of these issues helps the concerned parties, including copyright owners, 
hosting ISPs and Internet users, know the rights and obligations they have, which can 
make the notice-and-takedown procedures run more smoothly.
Despite the diﬀ erences at legislative level, when ruling on notice-and-takedown 
procedures, the courts in the US, EU and China do have to deal with similar disputable 
questions. Th ese questions are as follows: how to defi ne a competent notice, how to 
deal with the defect notices, how to defi ne “expeditiously remove”, how to regulate 
the liability of wrong deletion, and the validity of ex ante notices. Th e answers to these 
questions aﬀ ect the duties of hosting ISPs in notice-and-takedown procedures. Based 
on examining the case law in the US, EU and China, Chapter 5 concludes how these 
questions ought to be answered. Regarding how to defi ne a competent notice, the dispute 
mainly focuses on how exactly the location of alleged infringing materials should be 
indicated in notices. Th is chapter argues that it is reasonable to require copyright owners 
to provide the URLs of infringing materials. Regarding how to deal with defect notices, 
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the court should approve the validity of a notice which is not fully but substantially in 
line with the requirement. If a notice is neither fully nor substantially in line with the 
requirement, but arouses a hosting ISP’s strong suspicion of the existence of specifi c 
infringing materials, the hosting ISP is obligated to contact the notifi er so as to help the 
notifi er perfect the notice. Regarding “expeditiously remove”, it is impractical to set a 
fi xed term, and courts should decide in the light of concrete facts in each case, such as 
the way of sending notices, the accuracy of notices, how hard it is to remove the materials 
in question and how much material needs to be removed. As for who should be liable 
for wrong deletion, hosting ISPs ought to be immunized for liability if they conduct 
the deletion by following notices. Further, copyright owners should be required to send 
notices in good faith, and otherwise, they should be liable for wrong deletion. Regarding 
ex ante notices, their validity ought to be dismissed, since if admitting the validity of ex 
ante notices, hosting ISPs would be imposed a general monitoring obligation which is 
forbidden by “safe harbor” provisions. 
Although the current notice-and-takedown procedures contribute a lot to take down 
large-scale infringement on the Internet, they also tend to result in wrong deletion. In 
fact, all three stakeholders, including copyright owners, hosting ISPs and Internet users, 
contribute to wrong deletion. First, copyright owners tend to send notices without 
diligent investigation. Second, hosting ISPs are highly likely to remove the materials 
complained of in the notices so as to reduce the risks of being sued by copyright 
owners. Th ird, Internet users normally do not send counter-notices even when their 
materials are wrongly taken down. After examining the measures that have been 
adopted to reduce wrong deletion, this chapter asserts, in order to substantially curb 
wrong deletion, copyright owners rather than hosting ISPs should be given more duties 
to ensure the accuracy of notices, such as taking fair use into account when sending 
notices. If requiring hosting ISPs to be responsible for reducing wrong deletion, they 
need to evaluate notices like private judges, but this goes beyond their capacity and 
therefore imposes unreasonable burden on their freedom to operate.
Overall, in notice-and-takedown procedures, copyright owners ought to shoulder the 
responsibility of seeking and identifying infringing materials, and the duty of hosting 
ISPs is to help copyright owners protect their rights, such as expeditiously removing the 
suspected infringing materials after receiving notices. Further, hosting ISPs also function 
as a communication conduit between copyright owners and Internet users, such as 
forwarding notices and counter notices. Regarding wrong deletion, more duties should 
be imposed upon copyright owners rather than on hosting ISPs in order to reduce it. 
Distributing duties between copyright owners and hosting ISPs in this way can avoid 
imposing an unreasonable burden on hosting ISPs in notice-and-takedown procedures, 
and thus helps to preserve maximum freedom for hosting ISPs to operate.
In order to help copyright owners identify anonymous infringers on the Internet, hosting 
ISPs are obligated to disclose the infringers’ identities under certain circumstances. 
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From the perspective of avoiding the confl icts with copyright owners, hosting ISPs are 
more willing to disclose alleged infringers identity information to them, but because of 
privacy concerns, the identity disclosure should be conducted in a due process. Chapter 
6 examines the identity disclosure mechanisms in the US, EU and China. In the US, 
DMCA 512 (h) provides a green channel for copyright owners to request internet 
users’ identities, according to which, a copyright owner or its agents can request the 
clerk of any US District Court to issue a subpoena for disclosing the identity of an 
alleged infringer. Besides the “green channel”, copyright owners can also fi le John Doe 
subpoenas to request hosting ISPs to disclose the suspected infringers’ identities. In 
the EU, the relevant directives and ECJ decisions also allow the suspected infringers’ 
identities to be disclosed in copyright cases. Th e identity disclosure mechanisms have 
also been established in the Member States, such as “Norwich Pharmacal orders” in 
the UK, Section 101 (1) of the Germany Copyright Act and Article 156bis of Italian 
Copyright Law. In the US and EU, hosting ISPs are  only subject to the disclosing 
orders of competent authorities, and if copyright owners want to acquire the identity 
information of suspected infringers, they need to apply for court orders. By contrast, 
in China, no specifi c procedural requirement is imposed on disclosing Internet users’ 
identities in civil proceedings, and upon the request of copyright owners, hosting ISPs 
can even disclose Internet users’ identities without judicial review. 
Based on the exploration of identity disclosure mechanisms in the US, EU and China, 
it can be found that hosting ISPs’ duties are mainly based on the answers to these two 
questions: (1) under what circumstances is a hosting ISP obligated to conduct disclosure; 
(2) to what extent should a hosting ISP disclose a suspected infringer’s identity. Because 
of privacy concerns, hosting ISPs should be forbidden to voluntarily disclose suspected 
infringers’ identities to copyright owners without orders from courts or competent 
authorities. Regarding the second question, hosting ISPs are only obligated to disclose 
the identity information retained by them. Nevertheless, hosting ISPs normally do not 
retain enough personal data to have suspected infringers successfully identifi ed, so the 
eﬀ ectiveness of identity disclosure is in question. China has solved this problem by 
adopting a “real-name registration” policy. In the light of this policy, hosting ISPs should 
require Internet users to submit their real identity information when registering for 
their services. Because of concerns on freedom of speech, a similar policy can hardly be 
transposed into the US and EU. In addition, it is also inappropriate to require hosting 
ISPs to retain Internet users’ online communication data because of privacy concerns, 
although imposing such an obligation on hosting ISPs helps to solve the eﬀ ectiveness 
problem of identity disclosure mechanisms. 
Overall, in identity disclosure mechanisms, hosting ISPs assume a passive obligation, 
and that is to disclose the identity information of alleged infringers to the extent such 
information is available to them, upon receiving orders from competent third parties. 
Further, they are not responsible for the failure of identifying suspected infringers once 
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they disclose the identity information retained by them. In addition, hosting ISPs should 
be forbidden to disclose their users’ identity information to copyright owners without 
court orders. Th ese duties require a little eﬀ ort to fulfi ll, and do not unreasonably restrict 
hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate.
8.4 Duties under Self-regulation 
Besides state regulation discussed above, self-regulation gains popularity between 
copyright owners and hosting ISPs to solve the copyright disputes on hosting platforms. 
In the light of self-regulation, copyright owners and hosting ISPs cooperate with each 
other so as to reduce copyright infringement on hosting platforms. Generally, self-
regulation can be divided into two types - codes of conduct and second level agreements. 
Regarding codes of conduct, they are the result of the cooperation and compromise 
between multiple copyright owners and hosting ISPs, such as UGC Principles, but 
government may be also engaged with a variety of gravities, such as NT Code of Conduct 
in the Netherlands and Self-discipline Codes in China. Generally, copyright owners and 
hosting ISPs, as industrial participants, who know exactly what is going on in their own 
industries, can reach an agreement which better fi ts the needs of both sides. Th erefore, 
codes of conduct can better preserve hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate when solving 
copyright disputes between hosting ISPs and copyright owners on hosting platforms. 
First, codes of conduct avoid imposing unreasonable burdens on hosting ISPs, since 
any duty which is too burdensome for them would not be agreed by hosting ISPs. 
Second, codes of conduct contribute to increasing the legal certainty faced by hosting 
ISPs in operation. In the light of codes of conduct, hosting ISPs promise to undertake 
more responsibilities against copyright infringement, and once hosting ISPs fulfi ll 
these responsibilities, copyright owners usually will not sue them. Further, the norms 
prescribed in codes of conduct tend to be more detailed than statutory rules, which make 
them easier for hosting ISPs to comply with.1136 Moreover, codes of conduct like UGC 
Principles can overcome the restriction of sovereignty, and internationally harmonize 
the rules of regulating hosting ISPs’ responsibilities for copyright infringement. 
Nevertheless, codes of conduct also have drawbacks. First, codes of conduct are non-
binding, which means they are not enforceable from a legal perspective. Further, codes 
of conduct also have limited applicability. Regarding the codes of conduct achieved 
solely between private entities, such as UGC Principles, it is almost impossible for small 
hosting ISPs to join the negotiation because of lacking bargaining powers. Moreover, 
1136   Taking notice-and-takedown procedure as an example, the NT Code of Conduct and UGC Principle clearly 
request copyright owners to submit the URLs of infringing materials in notices, and Self-discipline Declaration 
requires hosting ISPs to remove the designated materials in 24 hours upon receiving notices. See Section 7.1.3.2 
and 7.1.2. In contrast, the codifi ed notice-and-takedown procedures in the US and China do not address whether 
the URLs of infringing materials should be included in notices and what constitutes “immediately remove”. See 
Section 5.4.1 and 5.4.2.
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within codes of conduct, hosting ISPs may need to take some anti-piracy measures 
which put Internet users’ interests in danger. 
Besides codes of conduct, copyright owners and hosting ISPs have also reached a 
wide range of second level agreements. Unlike the codes of conduct which focus on 
preventing the unauthorized usage of copyrighted materials, second level agreements 
emphasize more the legalizing of the unauthorized usage of copyrighted materials. As 
time goes by, second level agreements have become standardized. In the light of second 
level agreements, hosting ISPs are commonly required to adopt content identifi cation 
technologies, which allow copyright owners to track, block and monetize Internet users’ 
uploads which contain their copyrighted materials. Content identifi cation technologies 
to a certain degree function like a low-cost transaction mechanism over valuable cultural 
goods, because they allow copyright owners to make a “yes” or “no” decision, when an 
upload contains materials matching the reference fi les.
Second level agreements have many advantages in preserving hosting ISPs’ freedom 
to operate. First, within second level agreements, copyright owners receive better 
protection, which helps to reduce the lawsuits faced by hosting ISPs. By signing second 
level agreements, copyright owners can benefi t from receiving new revenue, reducing 
enforcement costs and better interacting with fans. Further, they can maximize their 
benefi ts, because content identifi cation technologies allow them to have multiple choices 
to deal with the uploads that contain their copyrighted materials. Second, by reaching 
second level agreements with copyright owners, hosting ISPs have more freedom to 
commercially exploit the materials uploaded by their users, and attract more advertisers 
because more professionally-created contents are available on their platforms. Further, 
individual agreements can even create positive externalities on Internet users. Within 
second level agreements, Internet users are able to use a wide range of copyright contents 
without being involved in burdensome negotiation or costly litigation with copyright 
owners, which will substantially enrich the users’ ability of expression. Nevertheless, 
second level agreements are in essence the compromises reached between copyright 
owners and hosting ISPs, so users’ interests tend to be intentionally or unintentionally 
neglected. Besides, the applicability of second level agreements is also limited. So far, 
second level agreements are mainly applied to audio- and video-sharing platforms, but 
picture-sharing, blogs and fan fi ction websites are outside second level agreements. 
Further, small hosting ISPs are also barred from second level agreements because of their 
limited bargaining power and costly content identifi cation systems.
Overall, compared with state regulation regimes, self-regulation can better preserve 
freedom for hosting ISPs to operate. Within a self-regulation regime, hosting ISPs 
face more legal certainty in operation. Further, self-regulation can avoid imposing 
unreasonable burdens on hosting ISPs, and even entitle more freedom to hosting ISPs 
to commercially exploit the content on their platforms. Nevertheless, the applicability 
of self-regulation is limited, and particularly, small hosting ISPs can hardly join the self-
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regulation agreements controlled by several dominating market players. Further, self-
regulation is generally the “best practice” reached between copyright owners and hosting 
ISPs, so Internet users’ interests tend to be paid less attention. Some self-regulation 
agreements require hosting ISPs to take the anti-piracy measures which put Internet 
users’ interests in danger. From the legal perspective, hosting ISPs can usually avoid 
being held liable for adopting these measures, because Internet users need to agree 
with the “terms of services” before using the services, and the “terms of services” grant 
wide rights and liability exemptions to hosting ISPs. Nevertheless, the measures taken 
by hosting ISPs should avoid violating the mandatory norms which aim at protecting 
Internet users’ interests.
8.5 Conclusions and Recommendations
Th e services provided by hosting ISPs facilitate copyright infringement on the Internet, 
and for the purpose of protecting copyright, certain copyright responsibilities have 
been imposed on hosting ISPs, which restrains their freedom to operate. Th is book 
fi rst explores the copyright responsibilities imposed on hosting ISPs by state regulation, 
including secondary liability and the duties of facilitating copyright enforcement as 
prescribed in notice-and-takedown procedures and identity disclosure mechanisms. 
Th en, it suggests how these copyright responsibilities ought to be tailored so as to better 
regulate hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate. Moreover, it explores how the freedom to 
operate of hosting ISPs is regulated under a self-regulation regime, and points out that 
self-regulation does have some advantages over state regulation in respect of regulating 
hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate. 
Based on the study in this book, the following concrete conclusions can be drawn:
(i) It is no longer proper to require hosting ISPs to keep purely passive, and they should 
be allowed to conduct certain management of uploaded content. Nevertheless, such 
management cannot result in hosting ISPs’ knowledge or control of the uploaded 
content. In addition, the management that helps the prevention of infringement should 
be also allowed. (Section 3.5) 
(ii) Hosting ISPs do not need to undertake a general obligation to monitor the content 
uploaded by Internet users. (Section 4.1) Hosting ISPs’ knowledge of infringement 
cannot be easily concluded without notices from copyright owners, except in China. 
(Section 4.2) “Receiving benefi ts” has become a less important factor for courts to 
evaluate when deciding hosting ISPs’ liability. (Section 4.4) Hosting ISPs’ intent and 
business model become a prevailing factor for courts to evaluate when deciding liability. 
(Section 4.5) Specifi c monitoring obligations against repeated infringement have been 
developed by some courts in the EU and China. (Section 4.3) In China, hosting ISPs are 
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required to undertake a higher level of duty of care to protect highly valuable content. 
(Section 4.6)
(iii)  Th ese liability criteria that developed by case law, including the intent and 
business model of hosting ISPs, specifi c monitoring obligations against repeated 
infringement, and higher level of duty of care to protect highly valuable content, 
need to be refi ned so as to avoid imposing an unreasonable burden on hosting ISPs. 
(Section 4.7 and 4.8)
(iv)  A competent notice should be required to include the URLs of infringing materials. 
It is impractical to set a fi xed term to regulate what constitutes “expeditiously 
removing”, and it ought to be decided by courts based on the concrete facts in 
each case. Th e notices which substantially comply with the requirement should 
be deemed as valid. Hosting ISPs need to help copyright owners to perfect their 
notices, once the defect notices arouse their strong suspicion of existing infringing 
materials. Hosting ISPs do not need to be liable for wrong deletion, if they faithfully 
conduct deletion by following the notices. Th e validity of ex ante notices ought to 
be denied. (Section 5.4)
(v)  Th e current notice-and-takedown procedures are easily abused and result in wrong 
deletion. In order to substantially reduce wrong deletion under notice-and-takedown 
procedures, copyright owners rather than hosting ISPs should be imposed more 
duties to ensure the accuracy of notices. (Section 5.5)
(vi)  Hosting ISPs are obligated to disclose suspected infringers’ identity information only 
after receiving orders from competent authorities, and they should be forbidden 
to conduct such disclosure to copyright owners without orders from competent 
authorities. Further, hosting ISPs are only obligated to disclose suspected infringers’ 
identity information retained by them, and should not be held responsible for the 
failure of identifying suspected infringers once they have disclosed the identity 
information retained by them. (Section 6.4 and 6.5)
(vii)  Although Self-regulation is not perfect in regulating hosting ISPs’ responsibilities 
for copyright infringement, it helps to preserve better the freedom to operate of 
hosting ISPs. (Section 7.1.4, 7.2.2 and 7.2.3)
Besides the conclusions listed above, this book provides some recommendations for 
these hosting ISPs who are now operating or have a plan to operate in the US, EU and 
China.
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(i)  It is better for hosting ISPs to adopt technical fi ltering measures against infringing 
materials, especially the infringing materials which are repeatedly uploaded. In the 
EU and China, case law imposes specifi c monitoring obligations on hosting ISPs, 
and requires them to take reasonable measures to prevent infringing materials from 
being repeatedly uploaded. In the US, although case law does not explicitly require 
hosting ISPs to assume such specifi c monitoring obligations, the US courts do see 
the eﬀ orts of adopting technical fi ltering measures as evidence to prove hosting ISPs’ 
fulfi lling of their anti-piracy duties. (Section 4.3)
(ii)  For hosting ISPs who are operating in China, it is better for them to monitor the 
following content: (1) the materials that are uploaded to the channel “movies and 
television series”; (2) famous works and hot-playing audio-video works; (3) the 
uploads that have been viewed over a certain number of times. In China, the case law 
requires hosting ISPs to assume the obligations of monitoring these highly valuable 
contents. (Section 4.6)
(iii)  From the perspective of avoiding liability, once having received notices from copyright 
owners, it is better for hosting ISPs to expeditiously remove the suspected infringing 
materials that are complained about in the notices. If the materials indicated in 
notices are proved to be infringing, but hosting ISPs did not expeditiously remove 
them upon receiving notices, hosting ISPs would be held liable. If the materials 
indicated in the notices are proved to be non-infringing, it is commonly held in 
the US, EU and China that copyright owners rather than hosting ISPs ought to 
be responsible for wrong deletion. Th erefore, even if hosting ISPs conduct wrong 
deletion by following notices, they would not be held liable. (Section 5.4.4)
(iv)  Hosting ISPs must refrain from promoting the infringing use of their services in 
operation. In the US, EU and China, when courts decide hosting ISPs’ liability, they 
evaluate whether hosting ISPs encourage or induce their users to commit copyright 
infringement. (Section 4.5)
(v)  Hosting ISPs should be actively engaged in self-regulation, and then establish their 
freedom to operate by negotiating with copyright owners. Self-regulation is the 
“best practice” reached between hosting ISPs and copyright owners. Within self-
regulation, hosting ISPs can face fewer legal risks and acquire more legal certainty in 
operation. (Section 7.3)
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8.6 Closing Remark
Th is book discusses hosting ISPs’ responsibilities for copyright infringement in the US, 
EU and China, and particularly examines how the current responsibility rules ought to 
be interpreted or revised so as to preserve maximum freedom for hosting ISPs to operate 
in these jurisdictions. Besides examining the state regulation, this book also assesses self-
regulation norms reached between copyright owners and hosting ISPs, and concludes 
that self-regulation can better preserve hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate. Th e legislative 
history of “safe harbor” provisions in the US, EU and China suggests that it is necessary 
to strike a balance between copyright protection, hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate and 
Internet users’ interests.1137 Nevertheless, this research mainly focuses on how to interpret 
the “safe harbor” provisions from the perspective of preserving the freedom to operate of 
hosting ISPs. Th erefore, although this research takes into account copyright protection 
and Internet users’ interests, when regulating hosting ISPs’ copyright responsibilities, it 
does not make sure that the result of this research fi ts in with the delicate balance that is 
expected by the policy makers in each jurisdiction. Further, this research recognizes that it 
helps to preserve maximum freedom for hosting ISPs to operate in the US, EU and China, 
if harmonization can be achieved in the rules of regulating hosting ISPs’ responsibilities for 
copyright infringement. However, full harmonization at both legislative and judicial levels 
is too complicated a project for this research to manage, so this research mainly focuses on 
further harmonization in interpreting “safe harbor” provisions at the judicial level. 
Based on the research done in Chapter 7, it can be found that self-regulation has certain 
advantages over state regulation in regulating hosting ISPs’ responsibilities for copyright 
infringement. Particularly, self-regulation can better reconcile the confl icts between 
copyright protection and hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate. Th erefore, it would be a wise 
choice for state regulation to take advantage of self-regulation so as to regulate hosting 
ISPs’ responsibilities for copyright infringement. In fact, some eﬀ orts have been made 
to integrate self-regulation into state regulation.1138 
1137  As stated in a legislative document of the E-commerce Directive, the liability rules of intermediaries should strike 
a delicate balance between the diﬀ erent interests concerned and promote cooperation between diﬀ erent parties so 
as to reduce the infringement on the Internet. See IP/98/999 ‘Electronic Commerce: Commission Proposes Legal 
Framework’ (n14). Th e legislative document of DMCA also notes that it is necessary to balance the interests of 
copyright owners, online service providers and information users in a proper way so as to foster the development 
of e-commerce. See H.R. REP. 105-551(II), (n16) at 21. In China, Internet Regulation also aims at reconciling the 
interests of copyright owners, ISPs and Internet users. See Legislative Aﬀ air Oﬃ  ce Answered Reporters’ Questions 
on “Regulation on the Protection of the Right to Internet Dissemination of Information” (法制办就《信息网络
传播权保护条例》答记者问) (n33).
1138 As being provided in the Australia Copyright Act, Sec. 36 (1A), when deciding whether a person authorizes the 
copyright infringement concerned, the court should take into account “whether the person complied with any 
relevant industry codes of practice” to prevent or avoid the infringement. In Hong Kong, according to the Sec. 
88B(3) of Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2014, when deciding whether an ISP takes reasonable measures to limit 
or stop copyright infringement, the court should take account of whether the ISP complies with all the provisions 
in the Code of Practices. Further, In China, although it is not a statutory rule for courts to refer to self-regulation 
norms when deciding cases, many courts still consider whether hosting ISPs have adopted the measures as prescribed 
in self-regulation to prevent infringement from occurring, when they hear the cases about hosting ISPs’ liability. 
Summary and Conclusion
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Nevertheless, how to integrate self-regulation into state regulation is still an ongoing 
issue, which needs further study. Moreover, self-regulation also needs state regulation to 
overcome its disadvantages, such as a lack of binding power, not widely representative, 
trampling on internet users’ interests.1139 Nevertheless, how and in what way should 
state regulation step into self-regulation is still in question. Th erefore, it is meaningful 
to study how to regulate hosting ISPs’ responsibilities for copyright infringement by the 
integration of self-regulation and state regulation. Nevertheless, how to accomplish such 
integration is a far-reaching question,1140 which goes beyond the discussion in this book, 
and the author leaves it for study in the future.
1139  If self-regulation is “not completely dependent on statutory legal regulators, informal institutions can play an 
important role in shaping and ordering online conduct”; and ideally, besides taking advantage of private actors’ 
fl exibility and their expertise in internet technologies, self-regulation also needs the government’s involvement to 
ensure full representation in drafting process. See Anon, ‘Th e Principles for User Generated Content Services: 
A Middle-Ground Approach to Cyber-Governance’ (n960), at 1405-1406. As observed by Netanel, it is almost 
impossible for self-regulation, which aims at solving the disputes among internal parties, to care about reducing 
harmful externalities to outsiders, so such self-regulation should work under the oversight of government. See 
Netanel NW, ‘Cyberspace Self-governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Th eory’ (2000) 88 
California Law Review 395, at 476. Easterbrook, as an advocate of self-regulation in cyberspace, also acknowledges 
the importance of state regulation, and points out that formal regulations need to set norms that contribute to 
bargaining between stakeholders, including making rules clearer, creating property rights and creating bargaining 
institutions. See Easterbrook, ‘Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse’ (1996) 1 University of Chicago Legal Forum 
207 (n958).
1140  Since the 1990s, how to regulate activities on the Internet through integrating self-regulation with state regulation 
has been an ongoing issue that arouses lots of discussion. So far, from a theoretical perspective, there are mainly 
three diverse approaches to integration, which are the co-regulation approach, the hybrid arrangements approach 
and the substitution approach, and academics and practitioners have delivered strong arguments for each of these 
approaches. See Bonnici, J. P. M., Self-regulation in cyberspace (Cambridge University Press. 2008), at 9-22.
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Hosting ISPs’ services are featured with duel uses, which means their services can be 
used for both infringing and non-infringing purposes. In practice, many users upload 
materials copyrighted by others on hosting platforms without authorization, and 
a large number of these uploadings constitute copyright infringement. Because it is 
very much less cost-eﬀ ective for copyright owners to sue Internet users who directly 
commit copyright infringement, copyright owners turn to hosting ISPs and request 
them as gatekeepers to be responsible for copyright infringement on their platforms. 
In the US, EU and China, lawsuits between copyright owners and hosting ISPs have 
occurred on a tremendous scale, which poses obstacles for hosting ISPs to conduct 
business in these jurisdictions. For these hosting ISPs which are operating or planning 
to operate in the US, EU and China, it is necessary to know the legal risks they face and 
then adapt their ways of operation so as to avoid these legal risks. Further, in order to 
ensure the freedom to operate of hosting ISPs, it is also necessary to examine whether 
current rules that regulate hosting ISPs’ responsibilities for copyright infringement 
impose an unreasonable burden on them, and if the answer is “yes”, how should current 
responsibility rules be adjusted so as to avoid imposing such an unreasonable burden, 
or is there any other way which can better regulate hosting ISPs’ responsibilities for 
copyright infringement? In addition, the Internet is borderless, so hosting ISPs naturally 
have the advantage to conduct international business, but this advantage can decline 
if lacking the harmonization of rules that regulate their responsibilities for copyright 
infringement at the international level. In the US, EU and China, “safe harbor” 
provisions which grant hosting ISPs liability exemption under certain circumstances 
have been commonly adopted, so in this respect, a certain degree of harmonization has 
been reached. Nevertheless, the liability rules in the US, EU and China are diverse, and 
the courts in these jurisdictions tend to interpret “safe harbor” provisions in diﬀ erent 
ways, so hosting ISPs still face a high level of legal uncertainty when expanding their 
business in these jurisdictions. Th erefore, it is necessary to check whether and how 
further harmonization can be achieved at the judicial level in the US, EU and China.
Based on the above observations, Chapter 1 fi rst narrates some background information 
of this study. Th en it presents the research question: how to regulate hosting ISPs’ 
responsibilities for copyright infringement while preserving their maximum freedom 
to operate in the US, EU and China? Th ereafter, it introduces the methodology and 
outline of this study.
Chapter 2 narrates the rules that regulate hosting ISPs’ responsibilities for copyright 
infringement in the US, EU and China, including the liability rules relevant to decide 
indirect copyright infringement and “safe harbor” provisions. It concludes that in the 
US, EU and China, the rules of indirect copyright infringement are diverse, but the 
liability exemption rules are substantially similar. Further, “safe harbor” provisions play 
an important role in regulating hosting ISPs’ responsibilities for copyright infringement. 
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Th e introduction of responsibility rules in this Chapter provides the basis for the analysis 
of relevant case law in the next four chapters.
In the light of “safe harbor” provisions, hosting ISPs need to keep passive in operation so 
as to fall under “safe harbor”. Chapter 3 takes a comparative approach to examine how 
the courts in the US, EU and China interpret “keeping passive” in case law. Based on the 
examination of case law, it summarizes the circumstances in which courts hold hosting 
ISPs not qualifying for keeping passive, and they are: commercially exploiting the 
uploaded content, editing or categorizing the uploaded content, displaying its logo with 
uploaded content, requiring rights transfer by “terms and conditions,” and uploading 
some content by itself. Th en, it concludes that these circumstances should not exclude 
hosting ISPs from “safe harbor” provisions, except editing, categorizing or actively 
exploiting the uploaded contents. Finally, this chapter asserts that it is unreasonable 
to require hosting ISPs to keep purely passive anymore. In order to preserve maximum 
freedom for hosting ISPs to operate, the following two criteria ought to be employed 
when deciding whether the management done by hosting ISPs is permissible: (1) check 
whether this management will result in a hosting ISP’s knowledge or control of uploaded 
content, (2) whether this management is conducive to preventing infringements or not.
Once hosting ISPs fall under “safe harbor”, they still need to meet the prescribed 
conditions so as to be exempted from liability. Chapter 4 explores how the courts in 
the US, EU and China decide hosting ISPs’ copyright liability under the roof of “safe 
harbor” provisions. Generally, the courts evaluate the following factors: (1) hosting 
ISPs are not obligated to undertake general monitoring responsibility; (2) whether 
hosting ISPs have specifi c knowledge of infringement; (3) whether hosting ISPs take 
reasonable measures against repeat infringement; (4) whether hosting ISPs benefi t from 
infringement; (5) whether hosting ISPs induce infringement, or intend to facilitate 
infringement. In the light of case law, factors (3) and (5) become much more important 
in deciding whether hosting ISPs are liable. Regarding factor (3), Chapter 4 asserts, 
specifi c monitoring against repeat infringement should not be defi ned as an obligation 
but rather a positive factor to grant hosting ISPs liability exemption. Regarding factor 
(5), Chapter 4 concludes that only when a hosting ISP bears a specifi c intent to induce 
copyright infringement, should it be held liable. Th rough interpreting factors (3) and 
(5) in these ways, it helps to preserve maximum freedom for hosting ISPs to operate in 
the US, EU and China.
Besides being subject to copyright liability under certain circumstances, hosting ISPs are 
also obligated to fulfi ll certain duties to facilitate copyright protection on their platforms. 
Chapters 5 and 6 explore the notice-and-takedown procedures and identity disclosure 
mechanism respectively. In the light of notice-and-takedown procedures, hosting ISPs 
need to expeditiously remove the alleged infringing materials upon receiving competent 
notices. Based on the examination of case law, Chapter 4 summarizes the main questions 
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that need to be dealt with by courts when ruling on notice-and-takedown procedures, 
and then concludes how these questions ought to be answered from the perspective of 
preserving hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate. Th ese questions are as follows: how to defi ne 
a competent notice, how to deal with the defect notices, how to defi ne “expeditiously 
remove”, how to regulate the liability of wrong deletion, and the validity of ex ante 
notices. Overall, in notice-and-takedown procedures, copyright owners ought to 
shoulder the responsibility of seeking and identifying infringing materials, and the duty 
of hosting ISPs is to help copyright owners protect their rights, such as expeditiously 
removing the suspected infringing materials after receiving notices. Further, hosting 
ISPs also function as a communication conduit between copyright owners and Internet 
users, such as forwarding notices and counter notices. Regarding wrong deletion, more 
duties should be imposed upon copyright owners rather than on hosting ISPs in order 
to reduce it. 
According to identity disclosure mechanisms, hosting ISPs are obligated to disclose the 
infringers’ identities under certain circumstances. Based on the examination of identity 
disclosure mechanisms in the US, EU and China, Chapter 6 concludes that hosting 
ISPs’ duties are mainly based on the answers to these two questions: (1) under what 
circumstances is a hosting ISP obligated to conduct disclosure; (2) to what extent should 
a hosting ISP disclose a suspected infringer’s identity. Generally, hosting ISPs assume a 
passive obligation in identity disclosure mechanisms, and that is to disclose the identity 
information of alleged infringers to the extent that such information is available to them, 
upon receiving orders from competent third parties. Further, they are not responsible for 
the failure of identifying suspected infringers once they disclose the identity information 
retained by them. In addition, hosting ISPs should be forbidden to disclose their users’ 
identity information to copyright owners without court orders. Th ese duties require a 
little eﬀ ort to fulfi ll, and do not unreasonably restrict hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate.
Th e disputes between copyright owners and hosting ISPs have not been solved through 
state regulation, so at private level, they start to cooperate and reach self-regulation so 
as to reduce the endless lawsuits. Chapter 7 explores two types of self-regulation which 
are codes of conduct and second level agreements. Compared with state regulation 
regimes, self-regulation can better preserve the freedom for hosting ISPs to operate. 
Within a self-regulation regime, hosting ISPs face more legal certainty in operation. 
Further, self-regulation can avoid imposing unreasonable burdens on hosting ISPs, 
and even entitle more freedom to hosting ISPs to commercially exploit the content 
on their platforms. Nevertheless, the applicability of self-regulation is limited, and 
particularly, small hosting ISPs have little chance join the self-regulation agreements 
controlled by several dominating market players. Further, self-regulation is generally 
the “best practice” reached between copyright owners and hosting ISPs, and may put 
Internet users’ interests in danger. From the legal perspective, hosting ISPs can usually 
avoid being held liable for endangering Internet users’ interests, because Internet users 
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need to agree with the “terms of services” before using the services, and the “terms of 
services” grant wide rights and liability exemptions to hosting ISPs. Nevertheless, the 
measures taken by hosting ISPs should avoid violating the mandatory norms which aim 
at protecting Internet users’ interests.
Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes and assesses the research fi ndings in previous chapters, 
and then answers the main research question and sub-research questions. In addition, 
it also provides some recommendations for hosting ISPs who are currently conducting 
business or planning to operate in the US, EU and China. Furthermore, it addresses the 
limitations of this research and points out what could be done in the future.
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1 Social and Economic Relevance
How to defi ne hosting ISPs’ responsibilities for copyright infringement on their platform 
has become an increasingly important issue in our society. In the last decade, with the 
development of information technologies, the services oﬀ ered by hosting ISPs have 
been steadily updated. Because hosting ISPs’ services are featured with dual-use, the 
update of hosting services not only helps the public to access lawful information more 
conveniently, but also allows copyrighted materials to be more easily shared and accessed 
without authorization. Copyright owners claim that copyright infringement on hosting 
platforms causes tremendous damage to them, and therefore request hosting ISPs to 
undertake more responsibilities to reduce copyright infringement. By contrast, hosting 
ISPs argue that imposing too many copyright responsibilities on them would stifl e their 
freedom to operate. In the US, EU and China, lots of litigations have occurred between 
copyright owners and hosting ISPs, and diﬀ erent courts tend to interpret responsibility 
rules in diﬀ erent ways, which results in diﬀ erent impacts on hosting ISPs’ freedom to 
operate. 
How much freedom hosting ISPs should have in operation is a question which generates 
substantial eﬀ ect on e-commence. Th e business engaged by hosting ISPs accounts 
for an important part in e-commerce. Th e hosting ISPs like YouTube, Facebook and 
eBay have been playing a leading role in e-commerce. Th erefore, in order to promote 
the development of e-commerce, it is necessary to avoid imposing too burdensome 
copyright responsibilities on hosting ISPs so as to ensure their freedom to operate. If the 
legal risks faced by hosting ISPs are too high, there will be much less investment being 
poured in this sector, which is detrimental to e-commerce. First, technology innovators 
will lack incentives to develop and implement new technologies which can optimize 
their hosting services. Second, investors will reduce their capital investment in the 
hosting service industry because of the dim prospects to make profi ts. In the US, EU 
and China, although “safe harbor” provisions have been commonly adopted to ensure 
hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate, the courts in these jurisdictions have developed several 
liability criteria which may impose too far-reaching obligations on hosting ISPs. Th ese 
far-reaching obligations to a large extent increase the legal risks faced by hosting ISPs 
in operation. Particularly, for many start-up hosting ISPs, they may be not capable of 
fulfi lling these obligations. Th is study examines the responsibility rules in the US, EU 
and China, and then suggests how these responsibility rules ought to be adjusted so as 
to avoid imposing unreasonable burden on hosting ISPs.
Benefi ting from the borderless Internet, hosting ISPs naturally have the advantages to 
expand their business into other countries. However, in diﬀ erent jurisdictions, hosting 
ISPs are subject to diﬀ erent copyright responsibilities, which causes legal uncertainty 
for those hosting ISPs who operate internationally, and thus poses obstacles to the 
development of cross-border e-commerce. Th is study examines the legislations and 
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case law relevant to regulating hosting ISPs’ responsibilities for copyright infringement, 
and then draws the copyright responsibilities imposed on hosting ISPs in the US, EU 
and China, which helps hosting ISPs map their legal risks in these jurisdictions. After 
knowing the legal risks, hosting ISPs can more easily make their business plans when 
operating in the US, EU and China. In addition, for the purpose of promoting cross-
border e-commerce, it would be quite helpful to harmonize the rules that regulate 
hosting ISPs’ copyright responsibilities in diﬀ erent jurisdictions. Currently, the “safe 
harbor” provisions are per se homogenous in the US, EU and China, so in this regard, 
certain harmonization has been achieved in regulating the copyright responsibilities of 
hosting ISPs. Th is study examines how the “safe harbor” provisions are interpreted by 
the courts in the US, EU and China, and then discusses whether and how further 
harmonization can be done in respect of interpreting “safe harbor” provisions. 
With the development of information technologies, nearly all kinds of works, including 
books, music, movies, games and software, can easily be uploaded on hosting platforms 
without authorization. Copyright owners complain that infringement on hosting 
platforms results in huge damage on the copyright industry. Th is study bears in mind 
that hosting ISPs’ freedom to operate should be restricted by copyright protection, and 
it is necessary to require hosting ISPs to undertake certain responsibilities for reducing 
copyright infringement on their platforms. In addition, this study also explores the self-
regulation between copyright owners and hosting ISPs, and demonstrates how to reach 
mutually benefi cial agreements regarding dealing with infringing materials on hosting 
platforms. 
Th e copyright responsibilities imposed on hosting ISPs also aﬀ ect the Internet users’ 
freedom of expression. Th e services oﬀ ered by hosting ISPs help Internet users access 
knowledge and information immensely. It is quite convenient for Internet users to fi nd 
the information they need on hosting platforms. In addition, with the help of services 
oﬀ ered by hosting ISPs, Internet users can not only passively receive the information 
they need, but also can actively engage in generating and distributing information. For 
instance, video-sharing websites like YouTube and Dailymotion not only allow Internet 
users to listen to music, watch and movies, but also allow them to share the videos 
generated by them with others; social networking platforms like Facebook and Twitter 
allow Internet users to post their opinions online and exchange their ideas with others. 
Th erefore, the services oﬀ ered by hosting ISPs enlarge the public’s ability to the freedom 
of expression. If imposing too many copyright responsibilities on hosting ISPs, hosting 
ISPs may be forced to shut down their services, and there will be fewer hosting services 
that allow Internet users to access, generate and distribute information. Moreover, facing 
too high a level of legal risk, hosting ISPs may over-react towards the materials uploaded 
by Internet users, which causes lots of lawful materials to be taken down. Th is study 
recommends how to preserve maximum freedom for hosting ISPs to operate, which can 
generate a positive externality on Internet users’ freedom of speech.
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2 Target Groups
Th e results of this study should be interesting to various groups, including academics and 
practitioners, who are engaged in dealing with hosting ISPs’ copyright responsibilities. 
Th is thesis takes a comparative approach to study the hosting ISPs’ copyright 
responsibilities in the US, EU and China. Th e comparison covers the legislation, case 
decisions and self-regulation agreements, which could oﬀ er useful clues for legislators 
to revise the current law, for judges to decide the cases about hosting ISPs’ copyright 
responsibilities, and for copyright owners and hosting ISPs to lay down their market 
plans. 
All of the US, EU and China adopt “safe harbor” provisions at legislative level, which 
grant hosting ISPs liability exemption under certain conditions while requiring them to 
undertake certain duties so as to facilitate copyright enforcement on hosting platforms. 
In this regard, the laws that regulate hosting ISPs’ copyright responsibilities are per se 
homogenous. Nevertheless, the norms provided by the “safe harbor” provisions in these 
jurisdictions are not the same. Th is study compares these diﬀ erent norms and fi nds out 
the diﬀ erent impacts resulting from these norms in practice. Th ese fi ndings can help 
legislators evaluate whether the norms concerned need to be revised and how to revise 
these norms. 
Judges may also be interested in reading this thesis. Since the “safe harbor” provisions in 
the US, EU and China are per se homogenous, judges in one jurisdiction may want to 
know how the courts in other jurisdictions interpret the similar norms concerned. Th is 
thesis looks into the case law about deciding the copyright responsibilities of hosting 
ISPs in the US, EU and China. Regarding whether hosting ISPs should be held liable 
for the infringing materials on their platforms, this study examines how the courts in 
the US, EU and China evaluate the factors relevant to conclude liability, including 
knowledge of infringement, benefi ting from infringement, inducement and measures 
against repeat infringement. Regarding the notice-and-takedown procedure, this study 
examines how the courts in the US, EU and China decide some key issues, including 
how to defi ne a competent notice, how to deal with the defect notices, how to defi ne 
“expeditiously remove”, how to regulate the liability of wrong deletion, and the validity 
of ex ante notices. In addition, this study also concludes how these disputed factors 
ought to be interpreted for the purpose of better preserving the freedom to operate of 
hosting ISPs, which may also provide useful clues for courts to decide cases that concern 
hosting ISPs’ copyright responsibilities.
Th e result of this study should be of interest to copyright owners and hosting ISPs. 
Th is thesis not only examines the norms of hosting ISPs’ copyright responsibilities at 
legislative level in the US, EU and China, but also examines how the courts in these 
jurisdictions interpret these norms when hearing relevant cases. From the perspective 
of copyright owners, the result of this study can help them evaluate the responsibility 
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norms in the US, EU and China, and then decide whether to sue hosting ISPs and choose 
the most suitable litigation strategies in these jurisdictions. From the perspective of 
hosting ISPs, the result of this study can help them evaluate the legal risks of conducting 
business in the US, EU and China, and then take the corresponding measures to reduce 
the legal risks they face in these jurisdictions. In addition, this study also covers the self-
regulation agreements reached between copyright owners and hosting ISPs. Th ese self-
regulation agreements demonstrate how copyright owners and hosting ISPs cooperate 
with each other and solve the copyright disputes on hosting platforms. Copyright 
owners and hosting ISPs can learn from these self-regulation agreements, and reach 
similar agreements so as to settle the disputes between them.
3 Activities and Products
Th e result of this study will be published as a book. Th erefore, it will be available to 
the people including students, academics, judges, legislators, policy makers, copyright 
owners and hosting ISPs who are interested in the topic of how to regulate hosting 
ISPs’ responsibilities for copyright infringement. By reading this book, students 
and academics can know the rules of hosting ISPs’ copyright responsibilities at both 
legislative and case law levels, and based on this knowledge, they can develop their own 
arguments and ideas on regulating the copyright responsibilities of hosting ISPs. In 
addition, this study also points out that some provisions in legislation need to be revised, 
and these recommendations may be considered by legislators. Besides, this study gives 
some recommendations on how to interpret current rules when deciding hosting ISPs’ 
copyright responsibilities, which can be adopted by judges. Finally, as has already been 
mentioned above, copyright owners and hosting ISPs can make their litigation strategies 
by referring to this study.
Parts of this study have been published in academic journals. For instance, Chapter 3 
has been published in European Intellectual Property Review, and parts of Chapter 4 
related to the US, Germany and China have been published in International Review 
of Intellectual Property and Competition Law. Further, parts of this study are results 
of the research projects that the author was engaged in. For instance, Part of Chapter 5 
in relation to the EU and China is an updated version of a report submitted to China-
EU Law School (Research project: “A Comparative Study on Secondary Liability of 
Hosting ISPs”). Part of Chapter 6 in relation to China is an updated version of a research 
report submitted to Google and University of Washington (Research Project: “UW-
Google Intermediary Liability Research Project”). Chapter 7 is an updated version of 
a conference paper “Self-regulation: a New Way against Copyright Infringement on 
UGC Websites” which was presented at the “Intellectual Property Work-in-Progress 
Colloquium” held in the University of Washington. Th e feedback from other experts 
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made a great contribution to the improvement of this research.
Under the support of CESL (China-EU School of Law) and Prof. A.W.J. Kamperman 
Sanders, the author held a workshop “Secondary liability of hosting Internet Service 
Providers in the European Union” at the Faculty of Law in Maastricht University. Th e 
speakers at this workshop included several professors and lawyers from the Netherlands, 
Germany, Belgium and China, and the author benefi ted a lot from their presentations 
and comments.
4 Innovation
Although there exists a number of reports, research papers and publications which 
study hosting ISPs’ responsibilities for copyright infringement on their platforms, these 
research studies have not taken a comparative approach to comprehensively study the 
responsibility rules in the US, EU and China. In addition, the “safe harbor” provisions 
which regulate hosting ISPs’ copyright responsibilities in the US, EU and China are per 
se homogenous, but the courts in these jurisdictions interpret these homogenous rules 
in diﬀ erent ways. Th is study examines at length the relevant case law in the US, EU 
and China, and compares how the courts in these jurisdictions interpret the norms set 
in “safe harbor” provisions. Besides fi nding out the diﬀ erences between case laws, this 
study also contributes to analyzing how these diﬀ erences aﬀ ect the freedom to operate of 
hosting ISPs. Moreover, based on the comparison, this study concludes how the norms 
in “safe harbor” provisions ought to be interpreted so as to preserve maximum freedom 
for hosting ISPs to operate in the US, EU and China.
In addition, this study does not stop by examining the traditional legal norms, and 
also contributes to exploring the self-regulation agreements reached between copyright 
owners and hosting ISPs. In order to solve copyright disputes on hosting platforms, 
a number of self-regulation agreements have been reached. Th is study examines self-
regulation norms by comparing them with traditional legal norms, and then draws the 
advantages and disadvantages of self-regulation in respect of preserving the freedom to 
operate of hosting ISPs. Moreover, this study also provides several recommendations for 
these hosting ISPs who are currently operating or planning to operate in the US, EU 
and China.
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5 Planning and Implementation
How to regulate hosting ISPs’ responsibilities is still an ongoing issue that attracts 
the attention of academics and practitioners, so there are many seminars, workshops 
and conferences which discuss this issue each year. In the past years, the author joined 
several workshops which focused on discussing the liability of online intermediaries, and 
got much useful feedback from experts during the discussions with them. Th erefore, 
the author plans to present the results of study in diﬀ erent seminars, workshops and 
conferences. By doing so, the results of the study can be better spread, and the author 
can also obtain comments or even critiques from other experts, which can contribute to 
improving the author’s research.
Th e author plans to translate parts of this study into Chinese and get them published in 
Chinese journals. When China drafted its own “safe harbor” provisions, the legislators 
in China took DMCA § 512 and E-commerce Directive as two important references. 
Th e academics and practitioners in China should be quite interested to read this study, 
especially the parts about how the courts in the US and EU interpret the norms set in 
“safe harbor” provisions, and then learn a lesson from the case law in the US and EU.
Th e author also plans to refi ne Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis, and then publish them in 
English journals. Th ese two chapters are the study results of two research projects that 
the author was engaged in. Th ey take a comparative approach to study the notice-and-
takedown procedures and identity disclosure mechanisms in the US, EU and China. Th e 
author believes that after refi ning, these two chapters can be accepted by the journals 
which are interested in publishing comparative study. 
Th e Internet has become an important way for the public to access the information they 
need, so the author plans to publish parts of this study on the Internet. Th e Center for 
Internet and Society in Stanford University has been running a project called World 
Intermediary Liability Map (WILMap), which invited both academics and practitioners 
from the world to draw an intermediary liability map of their own jurisdictions. Th is 
study makes a comprehensive analysis about hosting ISPs’ copyright responsibilities in 
China, and the WILMap is a perfect platform to publish this research. Th e author has 
already contributed several case decisions to the Chinese webpage and will continue to 
send other parts of the study to WILMap in the future.  
